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This article revisits Feuerbach's "break with speculation" in the early 1840s in light of issues raised by the original Pantheism Controversy, initiated in 1785 by the publication of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza. The article first describes the concerns underlying Jacobi's repudiation of Spinozism, and rationalism more generally, in favor of a personalistic theism that disclaims the possibility of philosophical knowledge of God. It goes on to reconstruct Hegel's alternative to Jacobi's famous salto mortale before considering how Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's philosophy of religion, as well as the personalism of the so-called Positive Philosophy (inspired by the late Schelling), was influenced by both Spinoza and Jacobi in ways that have not yet received sufficient attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This essay presents a certain defense of Hegel's doctrine of Incarnation. For Hegel, the logic of the Incarnation constitutes not only the highest insight of religion and theology but, arguably, the key to philosophy itself, as the perfected self-knowledge of the absolute. Such knowledge is what Hegel calls "absolute knowing", and marks the absolute reconciliation of the knowing subject and its object, substance, or in other words: of the domains of, as it were, historical knowledge and eternal truth. Hegel discovers in the Christian doctrine of Incarnation the logic of this very reconciliation of history and eternity: truth, or the absolute, coincides with the subject's knowledge of it, which not only includes but privileges the historical "dismemberment" involved in such knowing. Only in Christianity does God dismember himself, or become historical—sacrifice himself, die—in order to know and become himself. But this "death of God" is for Hegel the very meaning of modern subjectivity. For this reason, or if Hegel is right, the Hegelian subject constitutes the sole way in which the desire of philosophy—namely, for the other that truth is—can keep itself from becoming incoherent after the death of God. It is not merely that Hegel's doctrine of the subject remains valid despite the death of God; rather, the Hegelian subject, whose logic is incarnational and for this reason founds itself on the "death of God", stands as the sole coherent articulation of this event, even and especially in its Nietzschean guise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This philosophical investigation interrogates the relationship between G.W.F. Hegel's concept of the master-slave dialectic in The Phenomenology of Spirit and the critique and reformulation of it by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks. As a means of contextualization and expansion of Hegel's original textual account, I consider Susan Buck-Morss' seminal defense through grounding the dialectic in Hegel's possible historical knowledge of the Haitian Revolution. I maintain that despite a compelling picture, Buck-Morss' insights are unable to fully vindicate Hegel from the rebukes of Fanon, and as a result, Hegel's phenomenology necessitates a concrete analysis of the actual conscious experiences of the racialized and colonized subject in order to realize its aims. In pursuit of this critical methodology, I develop the upshot and positive movement of Fanon's critique through what I describe as a "phenomenology of flesh" in conversation with Maurice Merleau Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I return to the familiar territory of the Lord-Bondsman "dialectic" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in order to raise the question of the relation of Hegel's use of the theme of recognition there to Fichte's. Fichte had introduced the notion of recognition in his Foundations of Natural Right, to "deduce" the social existence of humans within relations of mutual recognition as a necessary condition of their very self-consciousness. However, there it also functioned as part of a solution to a problem within the work on which the theory of rights was meant to be based, the earlier Foundation of the Complete Wissenschaftslehre of 1794-5. In Hegel's classic account in chapter 4 of the Phenomenology we find recognition offered as a solution to a problem within an account of "self-consciousness" that has a number of clearly Fichtean features. But I suggest that to the degree that the lord-bondsman episode there expresses any "theory of recognition", it is not Hegel's own theory but rather his interpretation of Fichte's, a theory of which he is critical. Freed from this misleading assumption that the "lord-bondsman dialectic" represents something deep about Hegel's own philosophy, we might then be more able to get clearer about Hegel's actual views about recognition and the role it plays in his own philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Dewey's philosophy, as Richard Rorty observed, is historicist to the core. From the 1910s onwards, Dewey emphasised the need for a 'reconstruction' in philosophy, which could extract what was most valuable from the Western philosophical tradition and employ it in the attempt to grapple with the most pressing contemporary problems. In his autobiographical reflections, Dewey acknowledged that his early enthusiasm for Hegel's philosophy had left a 'permanent deposit in his thinking', a claim that has recently received considerable scholarly attention. Yet Dewey's intellectual development is marked by an increasing disenchantment with fundamental aspects of Hegelian philosophy, which he considered to be infected with a 'reactionary spirit'. In his mature writings, this essay argues, Dewey turned to a pre-Hegelian (and pre-Kantian) philosopher, David Hume, in order to establish the most important philosophical principles that he initially associated with Hegel on non-metaphysical, non-theological foundations. Hume, on Dewey's reading, was both sceptical and revolutionary; but his call for the transfer of the experimental method to moral subjects had not been heeded. Dewey's philosophical project both explained why, historically, a 'reactionary spirit' had returned to infect post-Humean philosophy, and why the revolution in philosophy for which Hume called was now more urgent than ever. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The place and role of Hegel(ianism) in the history of philosophy is a central topic within the historical-philosophical research. It is also the subject matter of Jon Stewart's recent book Hegel's Century. But its focus is on the European, rather than the global story. This paper offers a brief supplement in the form of a North American story, specifically, a narrative of the relationship between Hegelianism and pragmatism. Having covered Hegelian "proto-pragmatism" and pragmatism's (both classical and contemporary) Post-Hegelianism, the author offers his own outline of what he sees as the continuity between the two philosophies. It lies in the common historicism, holism, and syntheticism as well as in a common anti-Cartesianism, anti-Kantianism and anti-Platonism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What was Hegel to pragmatism? An inspiration? A source? To explore their relationship requires us to answer two main questions: (1) Was Hegel a pragmatist (or “proto-pragmatist”), and if so why? And (2) Is pragmatism Hegelian, and if so why? Interpretations differ, and further research is required. The author provides a basic overview of the developments within pragmatist philosophy and reveals its complex relationship with Hegelianism. He concludes that the two philosophies share common ground in various directions and that, without Hegel, pragmatism as we know it would probably not exist.

The status of realism in Foucault, despite being insistently elaborated, remains elliptical - in part thanks to its association with a set of propositions we could call fictionalist. By reading the texts where Foucault addresses the interarticulation of fiction, universalism and facticity, the article proposes a non-realist reading of his work, which is marked by the refusal not of the real as an object, but of its ontological evidence. Initially, it presents the insufficiencies of the interpretations that demand an ontology, such as Paul Veyne's, as well as of those that replace it with the exceptionality of creation, such as Michel de Certeau's, and the most promising approach to the reading proposed by Giorgio Agambem.. Next, it examines in detail the question of literature as a methodological paradigm, especially in Foucault's references to the work of René Char. Finally, it shows in which sense the enunciation of archeogenealogy's discourse is closer to Fichte's (non)realism - in its unlikely encounter with Blanchot - than to Hegelian dialectics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of logical form, as influentially specified by Frege and Bolzano, is accompanied by a paradox: to capture some universal property of discourse, we must specify that property, thereby rendering it particular and thus unsuitable for the universal purpose. Thus, instead of a single form, we have rather a sequence of them, corresponding to the logics of Aristotle, Frege, Brouwer, and others. In this paper, I argue that Hegel’s conception of logical form focuses on this historical aspect of the problem. Thus, he does not create a new logical form, e.g., that of dialectical logic, as Marx, as well as Priest and others, believe, but makes the attitude towards “fixed determinations” of logic part of these determinations themselves. This corresponds to Hegel’s differentiation between three layers of logic: formal, dialectical, and speculative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This text investigates the procedurality inaugurated by the action of subjects, which can be seen especially in the developments devoted to the play Antigone, in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. The conflict of irreducible rights entails the creation of a theory of action – in which the ends do not justify the means. Such an ethical requirement, always a posteriori, is imposed when the non-control of the relational world is verified, implying, finally, an open historicity. However, if simply being in the world is an action since it produces effects, we ask ourselves about the conditions (background in a situation governing expectations, but also the history of thought) and potentialities (disruptive emergence that organizes expectations, in becoming) of action. Thanks to externalizations that generate a problematic field, in the form of language, work and desire, we contract alterity relations and arrive at ourselves, through the other, fatally different from the starting point. It is up to philosophy to judge the implications of each particular action.

In the wake of Foucault's reproach of all political projects "global and radical", Foucault resuscitates the Stoic concept of epimeleia heautou (care of the self), suggesting selftransformation--" making one's life a work of art"--to be a potent antidote to domination. By making one's life a work of art, which entails disengagement from all things that turn one away from oneself, one can circumvent domination, as well as reduce one's own inclinations to dominate others. Foucault justifies this by claiming that self-relation is ontologically prior to otherrelatedness and thus, ethically prior; however, he neglects to delineate how he derives this assumption, making it little more than an arbitrarily posited axiom. I argue that it is upon this assumption that the legitimacy of Foucault's final era hinges, and hence its tenability warrants investigation. In this paper, I use Hegel's immanent ontology systematized in the Science of Logic. I dispute Foucault's claim regarding self-relation's primacy by demonstrating how self-relation immanently emerges in the passage through an other and I outline the ramifications of holding fast to an unsustainable categorical assumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article presents the main results of the rethinking of Hegel's philosophy and Hegelianism, which Wilhelm Dilthey carried out in The History of Hegel's Youth. This study is based on the author's translation from the German of Wilhelm Dilthey's work Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels. Hegel's philosophy became one of the foundations of the picture of the natural world, the world of man, culture, and history, which even now functions as a paradigm of world philosophy and has a significant influence on modern intellectual culture and our image of the world. The article includes an analysis of the methodology developed by Wilhelm Dilthey for understanding Hegel's philosophy, the central element of which is a personal approach. It reveals the intellectual background of Wilhelm Dilthey's rethinking of Hegel's philosophy and analyses the influence of Dilthey's interpretation of Hegel's philosophy on the transformation of the picture of the world of European culture, which is related to Hegel's philosophy. The author proves that the cosmological model of Hegel's philosophy is based on the personal experiences of the philosopher in his youth, which allows us to interpret Hegel's philosophy as mystical, irrational, and pantheistic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the main results of the rethinking of Hegel’s philosophy and Hegelianism, which Wilhelm Dilthey carried out in The History of Hegel’s Youth. This study is based on the author’s translation from the German of Wilhelm Dilthey’s work Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels. Hegel’s philosophy became one of the foundations of the picture of the natural world, the world of man, culture, and history, which even now functions as a paradigm of world philosophy and has a significant influence on modern intellectual culture and our image of the world. The article includes an analysis of the methodology developed by Wilhelm Dilthey for understanding Hegel’s philosophy, the central element of which is a personal approach. It reveals the intellectual background of Wilhelm Dilthey’s rethinking of Hegel’s philosophy and analyses the influence of Dilthey’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy on the transformation of the picture of the world of European culture, which is related to Hegel’s philosophy. The author proves that the cosmological model of Hegel’s philosophy is based on the personal experiences of the philosopher in his youth, which allows us to interpret Hegel’s philosophy as mystical, irrational, and pantheistic.

This paper is devoted to the methodology of history of philosophy. There are considered two approaches: the Hegelian and Schellingian ones. It is shown that the Hegelian approach has many weak points. Both approaches are demonstrated on the material of Indian philosophy. The Schellingian approach was hammered out then by Foucault as archeology of philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article titled "Philosophy and Negativity: On Hegel's Path of Thought in Jena" is a review of Fernando Forero Pineda's doctoral thesis, published by the National University of Colombia. The author argues that Hegel created an "ontology of negativity," which allows for human experience to always be open to the unforeseen. The article explores the relationship of philosophy with its time, Hegel's dialogue with Kant's transcendental criticism, and the meanings of reason in Jena's speculative logic. The author highlights the importance of negativity in Hegel's dialectical-speculative thinking. [Extracted from the article]

This work takes a critical and cursory look at the term 'education' as well as the challenges of higher education in Nigeria. The paper explicates these issues from Hegel's model of development. It argues that education is imperative for the development of any nation and underscores the relevance of man to his socialcultural milieu. It insists that the current problems or challenges bedeviling higher education in Nigeria is a systemic one, especially given the long, total neglect by the Nigerian political institution. The article concludes that Hegel's view of society as containing intrinsic or inner contradictions; exemplified by the dialectic of history--portrayed by the triadic movement could not be sustained when x-rayed vis-à-vis the enormous problems plaguing higher education in Nigeria. However, the view of the paper is that though the challenges are not insurmountable, determined and pragmatic efforts must be made by all stalk-holders to address the ills bedeviling Nigerian education sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I address the problem of the political, ideological, and philosophical context as a background for Karl Marx’s linguistic references to Hegelian philosophy, especially with the famous epilogue to the second German edition of Das Kapital in mind. I argue that, in addition to the already complex logical relationship between Hegelian philosophy and the Marxian critique of political economy, the references to Hegel in the Marxian narrative also refer to a symbolic dimension typical of the pre and post-Vormärz disputes, in which theological and political conflicts intersect as a horizon of affirmation or denial of the social reality of the time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we will work on the articulation between the psychoanalytical act and the experience with the sensitive in an analysis. For this, we will initially approach the logical operations of causation of the subject in order to understand what being we are talking about when we maintain that the psychoanalytic act gives rise to the certainty of existing. Then we will unfold the experience of the sensitive from the notion of a living body, voice and resonance of the real. In the end, we understand that the analysis calls us to sustain a sensitivity beyond reason, one that consents to the resonance of the real and opens us to the power of life, of the act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (0185-3481) is the property of Universidad Iberoamericana Cuidad de Mexico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (0034-8244) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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Copyright of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia is the property of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the conception of absolute idealism elaborated by Czech Hegelian František Sedlák. First, Max Stirner’s position of egoism is presented, as Sedlák was influenced by his critique of the conceptual vertical, i.e. of the subsumption of the individual under abstractions. Second, it examines how Sedlák employed such critique in resolving the so-called “paradox of authority.” Third, it sketches both Sedlák’s reception and critique of Tolstoyanism, at whose conceptual core he encountered a problem associated with conception of abstract morality, which he criticized at first from the standpoint of Stirnerian egoism, later from the standpoint of Hegelian absolute idealism. Finally, Sedlák’s conception of absolute idealism as a philosophy of existence is reconstructed.

The article presents a meeting between Moacir Gadotti and Karl Marx, two important critical thinkers in education. Gadotti, like Marx, is committed to the worker's point of view, and his work has the potential to drive alternative political projects. Gadotti's book "Concepção Dialética da Educação" highlights the importance of dialectics in history and its role as a new weapon of struggle in Latin America. The article also mentions the relevance of dialectics in pedagogy and its relationship with reality. The text discusses the history of dialectics in philosophy, from its origins in Lao Tse and Zeno of Elea to its development by Hegel and its critique by Marx. It also discusses the value of labor force in capitalism and the importance of class consciousness and revolution in Marx and Engels' scientific socialism. The article concludes by highlighting the importance of dialectics in the transformation of education and society. [Extracted from the article]

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Copyright of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy is the property of Bajo Palabra: Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This essay evaluates Corradetti's compelling assertion that the "primary aim" of his Relativism and Human Rights "is that of reconstructing some central concepts of the Hegelian understanding of the right and of providing a post-metaphysical reinterpretation of the notion of recognition in terms of a dialectical process, granting fundamental rights within the context of an institutional discursive model of rationality." The discussion is divided into four parts. Part 1 reviews Hegel's reception of the tradition of natural right, asserting that the latter plays a role in Hegel's recognitive account of ethical life greater than Corradetti allows. Part 2 considers the use Corradetti makes of Hegel's concept of dialectical negativity, arguing that, while it can and should be understood in terms of relations of recognition and, especially, misrecognition, it also articulates features of Hegel's logic and metaphysics that - pace Corradetti - can play a role in a postmetaphysical theory of social life. Part 3 seconds Corradetti's claims about the value of recognition theory for a Hegelian account of universal human rights, but asserts that that value is best expressed via an intercultural understanding of that account. Part 4 details the normative dimension of such an account, arguing that here, too, Hegel has more to offer than Corradetti allows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article summarizes the major topoi of Hegelianism that Malraux adopts in his texts on art (The Voices of Silence, The Imaginary Museum and The Metamorphosis of the Gods), before focusing, in particular, on Malrucian interpretation of the end of art and on the links that the latter has with his own concept of the imaginary museum. According to some of Hegel's exegetes (Bernard Bosanquet, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, Thierry de Duve, but also Theodor Adorno, Arthur Danto, Joseph Kosuth, Rainer Rochlitz or Jan Patočka), the end of traditional art paves the way for its retrospective conceptualization, its reconfiguration in the public space, as well as for very exciting debates on the nature of contemporary art, post-religious, post-national, post-historical in a way. The article illustrates the original place that Malraux occupies within this "positive" and creative interpretation of the end of art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper summarizes the major themes of my current monograph project and my recent co-edited volume on post-Kantian perfectionism. The central thesis is that Kant's critique of rational heteronomy in the Groundwork effectively ruled out certain types of perfectionist ethics and their corresponding political applications, notably the programmes of Christian Wolff and his school, which were dominant in the German territories in the mid-to late eighteenth century. Kant's critiques did not, however, preclude the emergence of a new type of perfectionism, no longer based on the state-sponsored promotion of eudaimonia or material, intellectual, and spiritual thriving, but on the advancement of freedom and the conditions for its exercise. Predicated on the idea of right, post-Kantian perfectionism focuses on maintaining and enhancing the juridical, political, and economic conditions for rightful interaction among self-defining individuals. Humboldt, Schiller, Fichte, Hegel, and the Hegelian School exemplify this new approach in different ways. Marx's problematic relation to this tradition is outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to explore and lay out crucial aspects of the interpretation of the Hegelian philosophy offered by the American thinker Richard Dien Winfield. Winfield works out an innovative line of interpretation that decisively ties Hegel to a non-foundational type of philosophical epistemology with significant consequences concerning the concept of objectivity in both theoretical and practical philosophical investigation. The article attempts to reconstruct this line of interpretation and assess its argumentative force, in view of an array of epistemological problems regarding theory construction in political philosophy. On this account, the principal question is whether the special brand of epistemological non-foundationalism ascribed by Winfield to Hegel is actually in a favorable position to successfully tackle with these problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts at analyzing the process of reimagining and reproducing the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and Pakistan in 1971 in the textbooks at school level during the dictatorial regimes of Zia and Musharraf. What has appealed me to draw temporal, spatial, and thematic limitations for this research? To begin with, the dictatorial regimes, are believed to, have deeply relied on manipulating the Textbook Boards to further their agendas. Moreover, both the dictators are deemed to be opposing ideologues – e.g., Zia – a fanatic ruler – radicalized the textbooks while Musharraf – a champion of "Enlightened Moderation" – tried to deradicalize the curriculum. Additionally, partitions present two different scenarios for a fascinating comparison – e.g., in 1947, Pakistan was an emergent state while in 1971, a parent state. The content analysis of the textbooks reveals that both the regimes adopted Hegel's "philosophical" approach of treating history – selecting the personalities, events, or periods of their choice while excluding or discarding the other – to reinforce the national narrative. It further suggests that the state-sponsored curriculum fosters religious nationalism, rather than secular nationalism, which, subsequently, nurtures majoritarian nationalism and bolsters the process of othering the minority groups in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article examines types of abductive inference in Hegelian philosophy and machine learning from a formal comparative perspective and argues that Robert Brandom's recent reconstruction of the logic of recollection in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit may be fruitful for anticipating modes of collaborative abductive inference in human/A.I. interactions. Firstly, the argument consists of showing how Brandom's reading of Hegelian recollection may be understood as a specific type of abductive inference, one in which the past interpretive failures and errors of a community are explained hypothetically by way of the construction of a narrative that rehabilitates those very errors as means for the ongoing successful development of the community, as in Brandom's privileged jurisprudential example of Anglo-American case law. Next, this Hegelian abductive dynamic is contrasted with the error-reducing backpropagation algorithms characterizing many current versions of machine learning, which can be understood to perform abductions in a certain sense for various problems but not (yet) in the full self-constituting communitarian mode of creative recollection canvassed by Brandom. Finally, it is shown how the two modes of "error correction" may possibly coordinate successfully on certain types of abductive inference problems that are neither fully recollective in the Hegelian sense nor algorithmically optimizable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In its origins, the nineteenth century movement for a renewal of Kantian defined itself in opposition to Hegel’s speculative philosophy. However, due to still not fully clarified reasons, the development of this movement leads, by the beginning of the twentieth century, to the acknowledgement of the necessity of an equal renewal of Hegelianism. The objective of the present study is to explain the progressive transformation of Baden Neo-Kantianism into a variety of Neo-Hegelianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation of what Hegel means when he claims that history is “teleologically” structured. Contrary to the common interpretation, I argue that Hegel’s attribution of teleology to history is not rooted in the Eurocentric claim that history’s purpose is, and always has been, to pave the way for the social, cultural, and philosophical accomplishments of modern Europe. On the contrary, through an exploration of the way in which Hegel’s understanding of history is rooted in the concept of “the death of God,” I argue that Hegel sees historical explanation itself as well as the teleological aim which underpins the structure of any historical explanation, as gaining their significance within a particular cultural, social, and normative context. In this sense, I hope that Hegel’s conception of historical explanation can provide us with a theoretical structure that encourages us to be open to alternative historical narratives and reflective of the cultural and normative interests inherent in our own dominant narratives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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