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I argue that one of the central concepts of the second part of Being and Time – resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) – represents a new way of doing philosophy and should therefore be understood as a philosophical method. Resoluteness is a specific way of comporting oneself towards things and is methodologically necessary to uncover these things as what they are. I draw on insights from the recently published On My Own Publications, in which Heidegger points to resoluteness as a crucial step towards his later methodological stance. In doing so, I illuminate important aspects of Being and Time and contribute to ongoing debates about Heidegger’s philosophical method. I demonstrate that it is Heidegger’s critique of transcendental philosophy and of the inquiry into possibility conditions that is meant to be overcome by developing the idea of resoluteness as a philosophical method., Argumentiram da je jedan od središnjih pojmova drugog dijela Bitka i vremena – odlučnost (Entschlossenheit) – predstavlja nov način filozofiranja i trebao bi se, stoga, razumjeti kao filozofijska metoda. Odlučnost je poseban način odnošenja prema stvarima i metodologijski je nužno za otkrivanje kakve jesu te stvari. Oslanjam se na uvide na recentno objavljeno djelo O mojim tiskovinama u kojem Heidegger ističe odlučnost kao ključan korak prema kasnijem metodologijskom stavu. Čineći to, rasvjetljujem važne aspekte Bitka i vremena i doprinosim trenutnoj raspravi o Heideggerovoj filozofijskoj metodi. Dokazujem da se idejom o odlučnosti kao filozofijskoj metodi nastoji nadići Heideggerova kritika transcendentalne metode i ispitivanja o uvjetima mogućnosti., Ich argumentiere, dass einer der zentralen Begriffe des zweiten Teils von Sein und Zeit – Entschlossenheit – eine neue Art des Philosophierens repräsentiert und demzufolge als philosophische Methode aufzufassen ist. Entschlossenheit ist eine spezifische Art, sich den Dingen gegenüber zu verhalten, und ist methodologisch unentbehrlich, um diese Dinge als das aufzudecken, was sie sind. Ich rekurriere auf Erkenntnisse aus dem neulich erschienenen Werk Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen, in dem Heidegger auf Entschlossenheit als einen einschneidenden Schritt in Richtung seiner späteren methodologischen Gesinnung verweist. Hierdurch beleuchte ich belangvolle Aspekte von Sein und Zeit und leiste einen Beitrag zu laufenden Debatten über Heideggers philosophische Methode. Ich beweise, dass es Heideggers Kritik an der Transzendentalphilosophie und an der Untersuchung von Möglichkeitsbedingungen diejenige ist, die es durch die Entfaltung der Idee der Entschlossenheit als philosophische Methode zu überwinden gilt., J’affirme que l’un des concepts centraux de la seconde partie d’Être et Temps – Résolution anticipante (Entschlossenheit) – représente une nouvelle manière de faire de la philosophie et devrait, par conséquent, être entendu comme une méthode philosophique. La résolution anticipante est une manière spécifique de se rapporter aux choses et, d’un point de vue méthodologique, est nécessaire pour découvrir les choses telles qu’elles sont. Je m’appuie sur les idées de l’œuvre récemment publiée Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen (De mes publications) dans laquelle Heidegger met en avant la résolution anticipante comme une étape cruciale pour sa position méthodologique tardive. De cette façon, je mets en lumière les aspects importants d’Être et Temps et contribue aux débats continus sur la méthode philosophique d’Heidegger. Je démontre que c’est la critique d’Heidegger de la philosophie transcendantale et le questionnement sur les conditions de possibilité qui tentent d’être dépassés.

The work attempts to show how an answer to a basic question posed by Martin Heidegger, treated exhaustively in a meaning of Being, may be found within ontological difference in a way this issue has been presented in his work The Basic Problems of Phenomenology dated from 1927. The work starts from the idea that The Basic Problems of Phenomenology should be regarded as a new elaboration of the Third Division of part One of Heidegger's, basically still unfinished, main work Being and Time, and that it can be freely said that German philosopher manages very successfully to „fit” substantial and methodical issues presented in both work, thus enabling to reach answers on basic question. To show outlines of ontological difference as a meaning of Being, it is necessary to make certain steps when primarily regarding Heidegger’s critical examination of Kant’s metaphysical theses which enables „exposure” of outlines of ontological differentiation within the phenomenon of intentionality. Only thus it is possible to come to a key notion of transcendence where ontological difference is funded, that is a transcendence as a definition of ex-sistence presenting execution of ontological difference. To be more exact, in his existing understanding ex-sistence transcends, exceeds entities towards the truth of their Being, thus haunting inside openedness of Being, and after returns to entities thus differentiating Being from entity. As a result it can be confirmed how transcendence enables inclusion of transcendental horizon of an issue of Being in general, therefore coming to a original time as a meaning of Being itself, nominally being confirmed by transcendence-akin difference or ontological difference in the broad sense, to which belongs horizon of time. Therefore, which can be shown in the work, the original time, as unity of ex-static temporality and horizontal time, gives meaning to a Being in general. Because, ex-static temporality includes a meaning of ex-sistence and this has

When an agent “loses herself” in a project, or becomes completely absorbed in an activity, she has what Heidegger calls “reflected self-understanding”. This kind of reflected understanding allows the agent to find herself out in the world, “in things”, without ever holding any reflexive attitudes about herself. In my dissertation, I develop and defend Heidegger’s account of reflected self-understanding, which constitutes – for Heidegger – the most basic grip an agent has on who she is. I suggest that Heidegger’s account of reflected self-understanding is not only a significant contribution to the history of philosophy, but also the central kernel that structures Heidegger’s thought on the topics of understanding, interpretation, truth, and authenticity in Being and Time.

Sommes-nous libres ou sommes-nous déterminés ? La liberté est-elle simplement une illusion dans un cours des choses gouverné par la nécessité ? Il semble que la question sur la liberté ne saurait trouver de réponse certaine si elle reste ainsi posée dans ces termes qui sont ceux de la troisième antinomie kantienne. Notre étude tentera de montrer, à l’aide du corpus heideggérien, que poser la question de la liberté dans le cadre de la causalité, c’est d’emblée mécomprendre l’essence de l’être humain, de la liberté et du monde. Ce n’est qu’en redécouvrant une liberté plus originaire que l’on pourrait comprendre en quoi nous sommes essentiellement libres. La thèse de notre étude est que la « liberté herméneutique » chez Heidegger correspond à cette liberté originaire. Notre mémoire retracera, en trois parties, l’évolution du concept de liberté chez Heidegger de l’époque de Sein und Zeit jusqu’à sa pensée tardive. La première partie de notre étude s’intéresse au Dasein en tant qu’il est être-au monde : en reproblématisant la relation de l’être humain avec son monde, nous montrerons que l’être humain est essentiellement libre en tant qu’il se caractérise par son ouverture herméneutique au monde. La deuxième partie cherche à éclaircir le lien entre liberté et vérité : le Dasein, en tant qu’il est libre, est aussi dans la vérité entendue comme ouverture. Nous pourrons ainsi mettre en évidence dans la dernière partie de notre mémoire la continuité entre le concept de la liberté lors du « tournant » avec celui de l’époque d’Être et Temps et approfondir la notion de l’authenticité au-delà d’Être et Temps., Do we have free will or are determined? Is freedom only an illusion in a course of the world governed by necessity? It seems that the question of liberty cannot find a definitive answer if it remains thus posed in these terms which are those of the third Kantian antinomy. Our study will try to show, with the help of Heidegger’s work, that asking the question of liberty within the framework of causality is to misunderstand from the outset the essence of human being, of liberty and of the world. It is only by discovering a more radical liberty, freed from this framework, that one could understand how we are essentially free. The thesis of our study is that “hermeneutical freedom” in Heidegger corresponds to this radical freedom. Our thesis will retrace, in its three parts, the evolution of the concept of freedom in Heidegger from the time of Sein und Zeit until his later period. The first part of our study will look into Dasein as being-in-the-world: by problematizing the relationship between the human being and its world, we will show that freedom is essentially characterized as a hermeneutical openness to the world. The second part seeks to clarify the link between freedom and truth: Dasein, as it is free, is also truth understood as openness. We will thus be able to highlight in the last part of our study the continuity between the concept of freedom at the time of the "turn" with that at the time of “Being and Time” and be able to deepen the notion of authenticity beyond “Being and Time”.

Desde a década de 1970 os estudos sobre o pensamento de Martin Heidegger no Brasil focalizaram sobretudo as intuições colhidas de Ser e Temo e algumas outras obras coetâneas. Ao longo dos últimos anos, contudo, mostrou-se cada vez mais crescente o interesse por textos relativos ao que se conhece como segunda fase do pensar heideggeriano, isto é, compilados em meio à reorientação dada pelo autor à sua filosofia a partir de 1930 em diante. Isso tanto no campo da análise interpretativa, quanto no implemento de traduções de obras até pouco tempo indisponíveis aos leitores brasileiros. Hoje o panorama é bem outro, tornando viável uma aproximação dos conceitos que atravessam de uma fase a outra e, mais que isso, garantem a “coesão interna” e/ou “organicidade” inerente à obra de Heidegger vista de maneira mais abrangente. Entre outras abordagens possíveis, esse é o caso do conceito Dasein, introduzido já nas preleções do início da década de 1920, embora com repercussão notadamente mais evidente a partir de Ser e Tempo. Àquela altura, com o propósito de reintroduzir à filosofia o questionamento sobre o sentido do ser em geral, Heidegger acabara por se deparar com dois problemas: de um lado, a impossibilidade de uma abordagem frontal a propósito do ser; de outro, a insuficiência da história da metafísica no tratamento dispensado ao tema. Justamente no horizonte desse impasse metodológico se localiza a eleição do ente dotado de precedência ôntico-ontológica, ou seja, o Dasein, o fenômeno humano tomado como existência. Existe, então, um embate crucial entre a função do Dasein, como aquele que negaria herança à metafísica tradicional, e um conceito que para Heidegger representara o seu máximo desdobramento, qual seja: o sujeito. Assim, o projeto de superação da metafísica é, em certo sentido, a tentativa de mover-se para além do sujeito, na exploração de um arsenal conceitual-hermenêutico completamente novo. Há, porém, quem suspeite da capacidade de Ser e Tempo na consecução desse intento – como é o caso de Edith Stein e Jean-Luc Marion – questionando até que ponto o Dasein pode ser tomado como foco de superação da metafísica. A propósito disso, os textos criados a partir da década de 1930 guardam importantes indicações sobre o processo de evolução seja da compreensão heideggeriana a respeito do ser, seja da reformulação do lugar atribuído ao conceito Dasein: desde a modificação em sua grafia, aparecendo daí em diante como Da-sein (separado por hífen), até os adjetivos que passaram a qualificá-lo, não mais o “detentor do ser”, mas o “buscador”, o “custódio”, o “cuidador da verdade”. Sobre isso, o contraponto com Ser e Tempo pode ser efetivado sobretudo a partir das Contribuições à Filosofia, material elaborado entre 1936 e 1938, mas publicado apenas em 1989. Na intermediação entre Ser e Tempo e as Contribuições, obras que podem ser consideradas os principais expoentes da trajetória de Martin Heidegger num espectro de mais de três décadas, a presente investigação tentará mensurar a função do conceito Dasein, suscitando-o como amálgama na continuidade de uma reflexão tencionada ao pensar inicial (Das anfängliche Denken). Since the 1970s, the studies on Martin Heidegger’s thought in Brazil have focused mainly on the insights gathered from Being and Time, and some other contemporary works. Over the past few years, however, there has been an increasing interest in texts related to what is known as the second phase of Heidegger’s Thought, that is, compiled in the midst of the reorientation given by the author to his philosophy from 1930 onwards. This is true not only in the field of interpretative analysis but also in the implementation of works’ translations that until recently were unavailable to Brazilian readers. Nowadays the panorama is quite different, making it possible to approach concepts that cross from one phase to another, and, more than that, guarantee the “internal cohesion” and/or “organicity” inherent in Heidegger’s work seen in a more comprehensive way. Among other possible approaches, this is the case of the Dasein concept, already introduced in the lectures of the early 1920s, although with a notably more evident repercussion from Being and Time. At that point, in order to reintroduce the question of the meaning of Being in general to Philosophy, Heidegger had come up against two problems: on the one hand, the impossibility of a frontal approach to Being; on the other, the insufficiency of the history of metaphysics in the treatment given to the theme. Precisely in the horizon of this methodological impasse is the election of the entity with ontic-ontological precedence, that is, Dasein, the human phenomenon perceived as existence. There is, then, a crucial conflict between the function of Dasein, such as the one that would deny inheritance to traditional metaphysics, and a concept that for Heidegger had represented its maximum unfolding, namely: the subject. Thus, the project to overcome metaphysics is, in a sense, the attempt to move beyond the subject, in the exploration of a completely new conceptual-hermeneutical apparatus. However, there are those who suspect the capacity of Being and Time to achieve this goal – as is the case with Edith Stein and Jean-Luc Marion – questioning the extent to which Dasein can be perceived as a focus for overcoming metaphysics. In this regard, the texts that have been created from the 1930s have important indications about the evolution process, whether from Heidegger’s understanding of Being, or from the reformulation of the place attributed to the Dasein concept: since the change in its spelling, appearing from there onwards as Da-sein (separated by a hyphen), even the adjectives that started to qualify him, no longer the “holder of the being”, but the “seeker”, the “custodian”, the “caregiver of the truth”. Thereupon, the counterpoint with Being and Time can be carried out mainly from Contributions to Philosophy, written between 1936 and 1938, although published only in 1989. In intermediation between Being and Time and Contributions to Philosophy, works that can be considered the main exponents of the trajectory of Martin Heidegger in a spectrum of more than three decades, the present investigation aims to measure the function of the Dasein concept, raising it as an amalgam in the continuation of a thought intended to the original thinking (Das anfängliche Denken).

Proponho-me examinar a abordagem heideggeriana da espacialidade existencial [existenziale Räumlichkeit] em Ser e Tempo à luz de uma crítica de Sloterdijk. Em Esferas I, Sloterdijk afirma que Heidegger teria apresentado, em Ser e Tempo, uma abordagem “embrionariamente revolucionária” sobre ser e espaço, mas não a teria concluído. O seu próprio ‘projeto das esferas’ pretenderia preencher esta lacuna. Com base na análise dos momentos fundamentais da espacialidade existencial, cujo desenvolvimento é elaborado nos §§12 a 28 e no §70 de Ser e Tempo, e tomando em consideração comentários que o próprio Heidegger fez, mais tarde, sobre a sua abordagem do espaço em Ser e Tempo, tentarei responder à questão do alegado caráter inacabado da análise da espacialidade existencial em Ser e Tempo., In this paper I aim to examine Heidegger’s analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time in the light of Sloterdijk’s criticism of it. Sloterdijk states in Spheres I that Heidegger presented, in Being and Time, an “embryonically revolutionary” approach to being and space but did not complete it. His own ‘Spheres Project’ would purport fill this gap. Based on the analysis of the fundamental moments of existential spatiality (§§12 to 28 and §70 of Being and Time), and taking into account comments made by Heidegger himself in later years, I will attempt to answer the question of the alleged unfinished character of the analysis of existential spatiality in Being and Time.

Este texto ofrece una aproximación al concepto fundamental de ser-ahí (Dasein), concepto que ayuda a conseguir una comprensión de Ser y tiempo. Frente a la interpretación habitual que reduce el concepto de ser-ahí (Dasein) al ámbito de la existencia humana, se trata de mostrar que el ahí (Da) del ser-ahí (Dasein) no sólo indica la apertura de la existencia humana y de sus respectivas estructuras ontológicas, sino que apunta sobre todo hacia la pregunta por el sentido del ser en general. This text offers an approach to the basic concept of Dasein, concept that helps to get an understanding of Being and Time. In front of the traditional interpretation that reduces the concept of Being-there (Dasein) to human existence, I show how the There (Da) of Being-there not only refers to the openness of human existence and its existential traits, but that it also points at the question of the meaning of being in general.

Desde una posición eminentemente crítica con respecto a la literatura especializada relativa a la obra más temprana de Heidegger, en este trabajo intentaremos poner de manifiesto cómo el significado conferido en ella al concepto de facticidad permite descubrir ciertas insuficiencias de su interpretación tradicional en Ser y tiempo y proyectar una nueva mirada sobre la problematicidad que entraña su presencia en este texto. Adopting a mainly critical point of view in front of the specialized literature dedicated to young Heidegger's philosophy, this essay aims to show how the meaning given by Heidegger to the concept of facticity in this early lessons allows to make evident the deficiencies of its traditional interpretation in Being and Time, as well as to discover the extremely problematical situation which presents this notion of facticity in that book. Finally we suggest an answer to this problematical situation by mean of a reflection in the motives that underlie to the so-called «Turn» (Kehre) in his philosophy.

Is Dasein’s disclosedness the „most primordial“ truth? This is the question to be addressed in this paper. Heidegger’s main work Being and Time is an incomplete work. What was actually written was only a third of the original plan. In§44, disclosedness is regarded as the most primordial truth. However, is it also valid in Heidegger’s thought after Being and Time? I first show how Heidegger develops his theory of truth in Being and Time §44, which shows that there are three concepts of truth ‘correspondence’, ‘discovery’ and ‘disclosedness’. By briefly explaining them, I present an outline of the theory of truth in Being and Time. I then show how Dasein’s disclosedness is grasped in Being and Time. In section 5 of this paper, I confirm Heidegger’s theory of truth in the late 1920s. I will show the change in the theory of truth. Finally, considering what we have made clear so far, I will examine whether Dasein’s disclosedness is the most primordial truth.

“Ontological pluralism” (OP) - supported today by philosophers such as McDaniel (2009, 2017) and Turner (2010) - claims that ‘being’ (in its existential sense) picks out a number of different features of reality that do not share any common characteristics. But if OP is not a view about these common characteristics – of which, it claims, there are none – then is it a view about anything? McManus (2013a) argues that Heidegger - an outspoken historical advocate of OP - failed to address this problem, and several related challenges that arise for him from his commitment to OP. However, I argue that Heidegger in fact solves it (as well as some other challenges raised for him by McManus) in Section 4 of his Being and Time (BT), where he claims that the inquiry into Being that he proposes must take the form of an inquiry into “Dasein”: into the kind of being enjoyed by whoever can undertake such an inquiry. On my interpretation, Heidegger takes guidance from Aristotle, who argues in Metaphysics, Gamma 2 that substance is the central modality of Being, to which other modalities are related in the “pros hen” way, and, as such, also the principal object of the “science of being as being.” I argue that what distinguishes Dasein from other kinds of beings is its capacity to be affected by Being in all of its diverse modalities (all of which bear on Heidegger’s inquiry into Being that Dasein is said to be able to perform) and that, in like manner, it is the process through which different kinds of beings leave their imprint on Dasein (an instance of Aristotle’s formal causation) that holds Heidegger’s conception of Being together as the subject-matter of a single inquiry. In Chapter 1, I offer an analysis of the challenges to Heidegger’s version of OP raised by McManus (2013a), and I answer some of them directly. In Chapter 2, I offer a reading of Heidegger’s writings bearing on pros hen homonymy (his notes for “Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy” and “Interpretations from Ancient Philosophy” from the Summer Semesters 1926 and 1931 as well as BT itself). I argue that, in its basic thrust, Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenon agrees with that defended by Shields (1999) and Ward (2008). In Chapter 3, I offer a critical assessment of Shields (1999) and Ward (2008) and I defend an account of pros hen homonymy that hopes to improve on them, distinguished by its employment of the notion of the priority in the causal network (PCN): I argue that PCN explains the centrality of some instances of a pros hen homonyms with respect to other instances. In Chapter 4, I outline my ‘post-Aristotelian’ interpretation of Dasein over against the prevailing one, according to which Dasein’s “understanding of Being” somehow determines (instead of being determined by) Being. I argue that such a ‘post-Kantian’ interpretation of Dasein – I focus on Philipse (1998) and Carman (2003) – cannot give Heidegger an answer to the “problem of the unity of Being” (SZ: 3 [1]) without revoking his commitment to OP, and that for this – and several other reasons – we should move beyond it.

U cilju omogućenja dijaloga između mišljenja Martina Heideggera i Rudolfa Steinera polazimo od teze Rainera Thurnhera da su Heideggerovi egzistencijali raspoloženje, razumijevanje i govor korelati tradicionalnih psihičkih fenomena u njihovoj trostrukoj klasifikaciji na mišljenje, htijenje i osjećanje (koju uvelike koristi i Steiner). Radi provjere te teze analiziramo vremensku konstituciju tih psihičkih fenomena, odnosno njihovih egzistencijalnih korelata iz vremenskih dimenzija budućnosti, sadašnjosti i prošlosti u Heideggerovu Bitku i vremenu i u određenim Steinerovim predavanjima., For the purpose of enabling a dialogue between Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and Rudolf Steiner’s work, we start from Rainer Thurnher’s hypothesis that Heidegger’s “existentials”, Befindlichkeit, Verstehen and Rede, represent correlates of psychic phenomena in their traditional triple division into thinking, willing and feeling (often used by Steiner as well). To test this hypothesis, we analyze the temporal constitution of these psychic phenomena, that is, their existential correlates from the temporal dimensions of future, present, and past in Heidegger’s Being and Time and in some of Steiner’s lectures.

This thesis consists of an ontological investigation of phenomenological-hermeneutic character of the work Sein und Zeit (Being and time) of Martin Heidegger. Through a set of meditations with this great work, is come to the experience of the sense of Being with which it is observed its ontological viability. So, we understand that the experience of the sense of Being is the realization of the existential analytics (ontology of the Dasein) through which the fundamental ontology is consumed. However, the fullness of the successful culmination of the Heideggerian ontological project does not lie in the experimental attainment of the sense of Being, but in going beyond it, from and in it, accessing the same Being. Therefore, the consummation of the experience of the sense of being (the realization of the fundamental ontology) is shown to us as the income in the same revelation of Being as nothing and protooriginal time from and in the immersion in the sense of Being as temporality ecstatic-horizontal Aquesta tesi consisteix en una investigació ontològica de caràcter fenomenològic-hermenèutic de l’obra Sein und Zeit (Ser i temps) de Martin Heidegger. A través d’un conjunt de meditacions amb aquesta obra magna s’arriba a l’experiència del sentit del ser i es constata la seva viabilitat ontològica. Així doncs, entenem que l’experiència del sentit del ser és la realització de l’analítica existenciària (ontologia del Dasein) a través de la qual es consuma l’ontologia fonamental. Tanmateix, la plenitud de la culminació exitosa del projecte ontològic heideggerià no es limita a l’assoliment experimental del sentit del ser, sinó en anar més enllà d’aquest, des de i en ell, accedint al mateix ser. Per això, la consumació de l’experiència del sentit del ser (l’efectuació de l’ontologia fonamental) se’ns mostra com l’ingrés en la mateixa revelació del ser com a no-res i temps protooriginari des de i en la immersió en el sentit del ser com a temporalitat extàtico-horitzontal

From the question of the meaning of being to the question concerning technology, the theme of questioning runs through the whole of Martin Heidegger’s work and plays a key role in the development of his thought. Despite its importance, however, it is a theme that has largely been left unexplored. This thesis is intended as the beginning of a corrective to a long overdue examination of Heideggerian questioning. I give a close, inner-textual analysis of questioning as it appears in Being and Time. By following Heidegger’s explicit commentary on and implicit use of questioning, I demonstrate that the question of being [die Seinsfrage] is not a one-time occurrence but a continuous process of opening up to genuinely new and original possibilities of being. Such questioning takes the form of a preparing to receive and be received by being. I “conclude” that Heidegger’s questioning is carried out in the service of a radical ontological revolution.