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The article discusses the Supreme Court case Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, in which the Court ruled that a public high school football coach's act of leading post-game prayers was protected by the First Amendment. The Court abandoned the previous Lemon test, which aided in deciding Establishment Clause issues, and replaced it with a new "historical practices and understandings" test. The article argues that this new test is problematic because it provides little guidance and fails to consider the indirect pressures students face to participate in religious activities. The article also examines the First Amendment's Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses and their application to government employees like teachers and coaches. [Extracted from the article]

This article offers a new perspective on academic institutions' engagement with Title IX, notably its provisions on pregnant and parenting students, as laid down in Regulation 34 CFR 106.41 as amended (the Pregnancy Regulation), and the concomitant NCAA model policy on pregnant and parenting student-athletes. That new perspective is achieved through a systematic content analysis of institutional pregnancy statements in schools' online student-athlete handbooks (OSAHs). There are few, if any, other examples of OSAHs being subjected to this degree of scrutiny, so the authors introduce readers to the rich source of data that OSAHs offer, and provide guidance on their analysis and interpretation. In considering why so few institutions have a pregnancy statement in their OSAHs, and why hardly any of them reflect the NCAA's model to any meaningful extent, the authors contend that institutions made a deliberate policy choice that was in part facilitated by the Supreme Court's decision in Gebser v Lago Vista Independent School District 524 US 274 (1998). The issue of pregnancy discrimination thus reflects a recurring feature within college sports: a three-way struggle between legal norms, a regulator with extensive but still limited powers, and member institutions that possess varying degrees of influence. On this occasion, the struggle has resulted in a comparative handful of colleges exercising disproportionate power not only over those other stakeholders, but also over the student-athletes whose wellbeing should lie at the heart of the relationship between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As lawyer and former Kentucky state legislator Harry M. Caudill reported, in his definitive Night Comes to the Cumberlands, the public schools in eastern Kentucky lagged far behind. A 1960 University of Kentucky study found that high school graduates in Harlan County were performing three years and five months behind high school graduates nationally and were in no position to compete for good jobs. They were an impoverished citizenry surrounded by rich resources. The legislature simply provided no source of revenue for poor school districts and the disparity between rich and poor would continue to grow - to the point that something had to be done. But it would take another thirty years for a substantial remedy to occur. That remedy did not come from any legislative awakening that recognized and cured longstanding fiscal deficiencies of the past. Rather, it was the result of a courageous nine-year political fight waged by local school superintendents, supported by a contemporaneous grass-roots policy effort, executed by creative legal statesmanship, and resolved by an activist Supreme Court decision. The historical record confirms that the effort to bring fiscal adequacy and equity to eastern Kentucky school students was not achieved without a fight. Its legacy will be the courts' determination that an adequate education is the fundamental right of each and every student; that the General Assembly is solely responsible for maintaining an efficient system of schools; and that those schools must be adequately funded to meet the state's goals.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a recent Supreme Court ruling in Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) versus Harvard and SFFA versus University of North Carolina, highlighting how it aligns with Chief Justice John Roberts' stance that eliminating racial discrimination entirely is essential. Topics include the implications of the ruling on college admissions policies, its impact on K–12 education, and the potential consequences for racial diversity efforts in schools and universities.

In 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that education was not a fundamental right, leaving in place systems that continue today to perpetrate vast inequities among school districts! Through a comparative analysis of treaties, constitutions, legislation, and international and state judicial decisions, we demonstrate that education is indeed a fundamental human right, though our constitutional jurisprudence has denied its fundamental right status. We use case studies from Baltimore, a typical city whose residents face economic hardships, to reveal the dire consequences of this ruling.2 Without the right to an education, schoolchildren in poor systems continue to be deprived of the myriad of human rights that a quality education delivers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author identifies the limitations of the effects and effectiveness of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Endrew F. versus Douglas County School District. Topics covered include the entities that played a role in the education of Andrew F., an 18-year old from Highlands Ranch, Colorado diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), a background on Endrew's education and America's perception of the nature of law.

The article examines whether the New York statute, the Dignity for All Students Act (DASA) is an effective tool in reducing incidents of student harassment and in generating litigation. Topics covered include the amendments made to the New York Education law as brought about by the DASA, details of the Eskenazi versus Connetquot Central School District case and the decision in the Motta ex rel. Motta versus Eldred Central School District case.

Abstract: Despite a large literature examining the effect of litigation on education finance and student achievement, there is relatively little recent evidence about how extra resources generated by litigation are spent. This paper uses national data to examine the effects of high court finance rulings from 1991 to 2002 on school districts’ education spending: including the categories of capital, plant, and support expenses as well as the teacher wage bill. It also decomposes the latter change into a quantity effect from teacher hiring and a price effect due to increased wages. I find that the largest spending increase comes from salary increases to teachers, with other large increases for hiring more instructors and increasing support spending. Further evidence suggests that the higher salaries are manifest more in an increased experience premium rather than higher salaries for new teacher hires. This evidence helps rationalize the role teachers unions play in supporting, and sometimes originating finance lawsuits. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article discusses the rulings of various courts in the U.S. on several court cases including Ingraham v. Wright, Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney and Graham v. Connor. It mentions cases on corporal punishment involving K-12 public schools across the country. It relates that a recent Federal statistics reveals that 223,190 children in public schools have suffered from corporal punishment in 2006-2007. It also presents the dates when the rulings are released.

Scholars view Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District as the high-water mark of student speech protection and the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick (the Bong Hits case) as a considerable retreat from this mark. By contrast, this Note argues that Tinker, while employing strongly speech-protective rhetoric, nonetheless requires courts to defer to educators' reasonable determinations of what speech may cause a substantial disruption and provides only very modest protection for student speech. Com- paring the Tinker standard to those of Fraser and Kuhlmeier reveals that it gives no less deference to educators, and little more protection to student speech. As a consequence of misconstruing Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier, scholars have failed to address why Bong Hits' requirement of deference to educators' reasonable judgments is any less acceptable than Tinker's. Deference under Tinker recognizes the difficulty inherent in predicting the potential consequences of speech without eliminating the limited protection provided by Tinker's required showing of potential disruption. By contrast, the sole protection Bong Hits provides is in maintaining the line between advocacy and nonadvocacy, yet deferring to the reasonable judgments of educators on this question blurs the line considerably, thereby largely eliminating protection for student speech. To illuminate the differences between the Tinker and Bong Hits tests, this Note analogizes to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's "clear and present danger" and Judge Learned Hand's "express advocacy" tests and concludes that the special policy considerations that apply to the school environment do not justify departing from the principles underlying these paradigmatic First Amendment standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The centralization of school discipline in the second half of the twentieth century is widely understood to be the inevitable result of court decisions granting students certain civil rights in school. This study examines the process by which school discipline became centralized in the Los Angeles City School District in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, and finds that the locus of control over student discipline shifted from the school site to the centralized district largely in response to local pressures. Indeed, during a period of large-scale student unrest, and in an environment of widespread racial and cultural tensions, many Los Angeles students, parents, community members, and educators actively promoted the centralization of school discipline--although often for directly conflicting purposes. Ultimately, this article argues that the centralization of school discipline was not inevitable and must be understood in the broader historical context in which it occurred. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision in the case Parents Involved in Community Schools versus Seattle School District Number 1. Overview of the evolution of race-based jurisprudence; Explanation of the standard review process used by the school district in admitting students; Proposal on establishing a constitutionally permissible race-conscious placement policy for secondary education.

The article examines how the landscape of school funding litigation has changed over the three decades. School funding litigation has its roots in Brown v. Board of Education and addresses the unresolved remnant in Brown's attack on the separate but equal doctrine by advocating for greater equity in school funding. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court, in "San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez," concluded that education was not a fundamental right and that disparities in school funding among school districts do not violate the federal constitution.

Public services in many states have been placed under federal court supervision. In our 1991 PAR article, we examined the implications of the federal judicial decisions in supervising the Kansas City Metropolitan School District for the "new triumviate" governing public services—public officials, legislators, and judges. In this article, we examine judicial decisions affecting the same school district a decade later to reveal the impact of judicial supervision on the school district and to discern the implications for policy termination. We find that, once begun, judicially mandated federal court supervision of public institutions is not readily terminated, even pursuant to the wishes of the United States Supreme Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the case between the Good News Club and the Milford Central School District in New York. Information on the use policy of Milford; Reason of Milford's school board for refusing the club of its use of school property; Ruling of the Supreme Court.

The article focuses on the school finance policy in the U.S. during the years 1955 to 1980. School districts have lived with taxing limitations for more than a century. Conventional school finance plans permitted local school boards to maintain taxing discretion only within a ceiling which provided that if the tax rate were to be higher, it necessitated voter approval. Beginning in the 1970s, however, a new strategy began appearing with increasing frequency in the form of limitations on spending. In 1972, in an effort to avoid a court ruling in the case, Serrano vs. Priest, the California legislature enacted Senate Bill 90, which imposed a spending ceiling on school districts. The bill's complicated formula resulted in a different ceiling for each district. Efficiency proponents contended that if schools could not be made more productive, then at least it would be possible to limit the amount of public money wasted. The spending limit idea began to build momentum and spilled over beyond the boundaries of public schooling.

The article discusses the court case involving the complainant Kristine Rost, mother of the accused victim of sexual harassment by classmates in the U.S. The defendant is Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District. Rost challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado's grant of summary judgment in favor of the district regarding her claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20. U.S.C.S. §§1681-1688.

The article presents information on several U.S. Supreme Court cases involving school operations. In Safford v. Redding, the court ruled 8 to 1 for the violation of the Fourth Amendment where a 13-year old girl was stripped and searched by school officials for a drug called Ibuprofen. In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., the court decided 6 to 3 that parents of a disabled child can get refunds for private school tuition even if their child is not enrolled in a public school's special education program. The case Horne v. Flores is also discussed.

Focuses on a California-based appellate court's reversal of a Los Angeles County Superior Court decision requiring the city school district to desegrate its schools. Failure of trial court's findings to show that the school board discriminated against minority students; Absence of violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection provisions.

Focuses on a U.S. appellate court's treatment of a school district rule stating that unwed parents were ineligible to be hired as teachers' aides. Absence of rational relation of the rule to the objectives sought to be achieved by school officials; Parenthood of an illegitimate child; Creation of a scholastic environment conducive to the moral development of the students.

This article focuses on the ruling of the Court of Appeals of Minnesota in the case Beseke versus Garden Center Inc. The Court held that a student's action against a school district and its employees based on negligent supervision of intoxicated students at a school sponsored event called Bowl-A-Thon was precluded by a statute insulating a social host from liability for negligently providing liquor to intoxicated persons. Two of the students who participated in the event, sponsored and supervised in part by their technical school, became intoxicated and disorderly. They were objected from the bowling alley. After leaving they caused an automobile accident. Those injured sued the school district. The trial court dismissed the action. The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal on the grounds that the Minnesota Civil Damages Act, an act worded very similar to Alabama's Dram Shop Act, was the exclusively remedy for injuries resulting from the distribution of intoxicating liquor. As such, the Appeals Court reasoned that there was no common law cause of action against a social host. Regarding the Civil Damage Act, the court noted the legislative removal of the word giving from the Act which it interpreted to mean that the Act only applied to commercial vendors.