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When the Supreme Court declined definitively to block Texas’s S.B. 8, which effectively eliminated pre-enforcement federal remedies for what was then a plainly unconstitutional restriction on abortion rights, a prominent criticism was that the majority would have never tolerated the similar treatment of preferred legal protections—like gun rights. This refrain reemerged when California enacted a copycat regime for firearms regulation. This theme sounds in the deep-rooted idea that judge-made law should adhere to generality and neutrality values requiring doctrines to derive justification from controlling a meaningful class of cases ascertained by objective legal criteria. This Article is about consistency, and inconsistency, in judicial decision-making—and more specifically, about the extent to which federal courts should provide similar opportunities to obtain relief for wrongs to discrete constitutional rights. The Article explores how a commitment to generality and neutrality values can translate into a paradigm promoting transsubstantivity (meaning consistent applicability across separate substantive concerns) for constitutional remedies (meaning rules for implementing and preventing or punishing the violation of constitutional rights)—and how the Supreme Court has deviated from this paradigm. Supported by an array of examples, the Article proposes a novel framework turning on the notion that remedial inconsistency can be transparent, translucent, or opaque given the clarity of doctrinal inconsistency. Prophylactic remedial doctrines (like the Miranda-warning mandate and First Amendment overbreadth) are transparently inconsistent, for instance, because they apply differently to discrete rights on their faces. And indeterminate remedial standards (like the political question doctrine for justiciability and the “plan of the Convention” doctrine for state sovereign immunity) are opaquely inconsistent because discerning their variable character requires inductive analysis of actual applications. After these descriptive claims, the Article proceeds to a normative examination of how this framework could help improve judicial approaches to constitutional remedies—while recognizing that non-transsubstantive doctrines are desirable in many circumstances. Courts, for example, should work to make doctrines of opaque and translucent inconsistency more transparent so that appropriate institutional actors can more easily assess, affirm, alter, or abandon them. And judges should consider the risk of introducing unnecessary elements of opaque inconsistency before relying on overdeterminative reasoning to reach otherwise established results. Among additional contributions, by providing innovative tools for centering remedial consistency as an important—but not absolute—aspect of constitutional law, this Article offers a potential step toward decreasing perceptions of the Supreme Court’s work as pervasively political, thereby reinforcing its legitimacy at this time of widespread skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the nonviolent nature of human rights adjudication, arguing that courts can succeed without coercion by inspiring voluntary compliance through moral conviction. It examines the limitations of human rights courts in enforcing their judgments, explores different scholarly perspectives on international law's effectiveness, and proposes the concept of adjudication as world building.

In Daniels v Scribante (hereafter the Daniels case) the Constitutional Court had to decide whether: (a) the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) afforded Ms Daniels the right to make improvements to her dwelling; (b) if consent from the person in charge, Mr Scribante, was a requirement for Ms Daniels to make such improvements; and (c) if consent was not a requirement, if Ms Daniels could effect improvements to the total disregard of Mr Scribante. The judgment in Daniels is important not only because it paved the way for Ms Daniels to effect improvements on her existing dwelling without the consent of Mr Scribante, but also because it showed that under section 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) on the application of the Bill of Rights Mr Scribante owed a positive obligation to Ms Daniels to ensure that she lived in conditions that afforded her human dignity. In Daniels the Constitutional Court indicated that private landowners were enjoined by section 25(6) of the Constitution through ESTA to accommodate ESTA occupiers on their land. According to the Constitutional Court in Daniels, the nature of the obligation imposed by section 25(6) of the Constitution was both negative and positive, and in this particular case it rested on Mr Scribante. Against this background, this case note provides at the outset the salient facts and judgment of the Daniels case. This is followed by an analysis aimed at critiquing the judgment in Daniels pertaining to what is expected of private landowners in the new constitutional dispensation. It is concluded that more may be required from the private landowner – a positive duty – to ensure that ESTA occupiers enjoy fundamental rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a court case wherein the U.S. Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble guaranteed that those in custody were entitled to necessary medical care as a Constitutional right. Topics include leading cases for deliberate indifference claims, the difference of medical detoxification from jail detoxification for substance abuse, law surrounding an individual's rights and standards in correctional facilities and the effect of the Supreme Court denying certiorari.

The article presents a tribute to U.S. Federal Judge David Frank Hamilton, who is retiring from his position. Also cited are the decisions of Hamilton on legal issues like the constitutional rights of detainees, the Fourth Amendment protection for detainees from unreasonable force, and his position on consumer class action viability in cases like Pearson v. Target Corp.

The process of political shaping of the right to a healthy environment, started with the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration in 1972, basically ended only fifty years later, when the United Nations Assembly adopted the Resolution declaring access to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a universal human right. At the beginning of the long journey, the responsibilities for implementing the decisions expressed in the Stockholm Declaration were divided between the member states, on the one hand, and the international community, on the other.The dominant position was given to state authorities. It was agreed that they must be entrusted with the task of planning, managing and controlling ecological resources, in order to improve the quality of the environment, and that states have the right to sovereignly exploit their own resources in accordance with their environmental protection policy. On the other hand, the belief was expressed that the international community will find a source of strength for later concrete action in the Stockholm Declaration. Since then, very modest progress has been made at international level. Official UN statements noted that the 2022 Resolution is not legally binding for 193 member states, but that its proponents hope it will encourage countries to enshrine the right to a healthy environment in national constitutions and regional treaties and encourage them to implement laws that relate to that right, and that it will help people fight for their right to a safe climate, their right to breathe clean air and their rights to access clean and safe water, adequate food, healthy ecosystems and a non-toxic environment. In the global context, the right to a healthy environment is still aspirational (imperfect, unfinished), something that still needs to be fought for at the national level. It will remain so until the consumer society model is replaced by a new form of social organization, which will be based on a different value system. Such a conclusion is also indicated by the reasonable, well-balanced judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union at the end of 2022, in the case of JP v. Ministre de la Transition écologique (C-61/21). It stated that the provisions of the directives related to air quality must be interpreted in the sense that they do not aim to give individuals the right to seek compensation from the member state for loss and damage caused by the state’s violation of EU law, but that it does not excludes the possibility of an individual claiming compensation from the state on the basis of national law. During the past half century, about 150 countries around the world have constitutionalized the right to a healthy environment. It thus, at the national level, gained a significantly different physiognomy and more effective protection not only before the courts of general jurisdiction, but also before the constitutional courts, in proceedings regarding constitutional appeals. However, some new problems arise here. Among them, the competition (conflict) of property rights and certain sectoral rights included (integrated) within universal human right to a healthy environment, such as the right to water, which is discussed in this paper, is particularly significant. In conditions where it is not possible to satisfy the interests of everyone, states will be forced to prioritize their own citizens, and that means civil (private) rights, over universal human rights for the sake of social stability and the preservation of internal order. The process of constitutionalization will be slowed down, and it is possible that in some countries a kind of deconstitutionalization will be carried out, by amending the constitution or informally, through a more restrictive application of universal human rights and more restrictive decision-making regarding constitutional appeals. In the final part of the paper, it was stated that the boundaries between traditional subjects and objects of law are gradually being erased and that the environment must eventually be understood as a community of all living beings, which has a specific legal subjectivity and the right to be healthy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although from a scientific and epistemological perspective, criminal investigation is an interdisciplinary activity governed by operational principles and legal norms (rules and principles), the operational principles are governed (or limited) by legal norms. Consequently, the best dogmatic construction places them as guiding criteria of the constitutional principle of efficiency. The operational principles of immediacy, timeliness and secrecy characterize criminal investigation and are limited by legal norms to protect fundamental rights and guarantees. Current paper defines these operational principles and their relationships with legal norms. Theoretical research through an analysis of laws, STF judgments, research and articles on the subject of criminal investigation and underlying principles concludes that (a) the principle of immediacy is not restricted by legal norms; (b) the principle of opportunity is largely restricted by legal norms to protect fundamental rights and guarantees, particularly the right to privacy and intimacy; (c) the principle of secrecy, restricted within the investigative line, is not limited by legal norms. Current paper concludes that operational principles have a core of their own and that legal norms restrict these principles on the basis of fundamental rights and guarantees, but not to such an extent that they violate the constitutional principle of efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Supreme Court "companion cases" are decisions released on the exact same day that address substantially similar legal or factual matters. The list of consequential Supreme Court decisions that the Justices have resolved as part of a set of companion cases is lengthy: It includes NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Korematsu v. United States, Brown v. Board of Education, Terry v. Ohio, Roe v. Wade, Miller v. California, and Gregg v. Georgia. Although it is not surprising that important topics like civil rights and abortion generate significant amounts of litigation, the Supreme Court's practice of conducting plenary review of multiple similar cases and issuing separate decisions resolving each one should give us pause. The Justices have a number of other procedural tools available for disposing of similar matters for which parties seek review. Options include granting certiorari for only one of the cases, vacating and remanding some of the matters, issuing at least one summary disposition, consolidating the cases, or releasing the decisions at very different times. The Court sidesteps these alternative approaches when it issues companion cases. Yet previous scholars have not devoted adequate attention to this practice as a distinct procedural mechanism, with unique characteristics that may motivate its usage. This Note fills that gap by studying some of the Court's most famous companion cases and taxonomizing them into four categories-coordinate hedges, contested hedges, extensional reinforcements, and applicative reinforcements-based on factors including the voting behavior of the Justices and the constitutive decisions' relationships to each other. The Note leverages that taxonomy to frame its analysis of why the Court chose to issue companion cases given all the procedural alternatives. This Note concludes by discussing how the practice of deciding certain sorts of companion cases-in which a majority of the Justices agree that they should resolve similar cases in ostensibly contradictory ways-may improve the Court's legitimacy by accentuating its responsibility and capacity to collaboratively identify subtle distinctions between comparable cases that compel different outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research article examines various proposals generated from the philosophy of law and from legal theory, around the requirement of rationality, not only in the regulation of law, but also in the adoption of judicial decisions, showing different perspectives: On one hand, which defends a logicist type of rationality, and, on the other, the one that advocates a non-logicist or argumentative rationality paradigm, under the premise that the law is fundamentally praxis. It also demonstrates how the absence of control of discretionary decisions, issued by the constitutional courts, to solve difficult cases, including those related to fundamental rights, and the objections raised to the proportionality test, merit the structuring criteria of rationality that contribute to mitigate the risks of arbitrariness and to guarantee a balance between material justice, human dignity, and legal security and stability. This research, concerning the criteria of rationality in the application of law, is of a juridical nature, and it has been developed from a qualitative approach through the bibliographic review of theoretical categories supported by authors versed in the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims, in general, to identify the limits to the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in judicial decision making, having as specific objectives: (i) to describe the context of the use of AI from the due legal process; (ii) identify the analytical basis hypotheses provided for in the ordinary legislation and their conformation from the use of AI instruments, with a focus on explainability. The operationalization of jurisdiction, in the current context of a justice system permeated by AI instruments, must find limits in the Constitution of the Republic, in the theory of judicial decision and in specific rules of legal hermeneutics. Such limits, however, were not created with an eye towards AI, which is why there remains the need to identify beacons for the ethical use of technological tools in the Judiciary. As a research problem, we intend to discuss what are the limits to the use of AI in decision making, whether in the civil or criminal fields, based on the so-called analytical reasoning, provided for in articles 489, §1, CPC, and 315, §2, CPP. The procedure method used is the hypothetical-deductive method. The research technique is bibliographic. It is suggested, as a hypothesis, the Judiciary, as an instrument for the protection of fundamental and personality rights, when exercising decision-making based on AI instruments, is limited, in principle, to repetitive decisions devoid of complexity, the which even meet the duty of reasoning when working on the concept of explicability, under penalty of violating due process of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brazilian Supreme Court rulings on the Arguição de Descumprimento de preceito fundamental (ADPF) n° 132 and the Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade (ADI) n° 4277 created the precedents responsible for the recognition of same-sex civil unions in Brazil, a breakthrough in the history of LGBT rights. However, with the legal obligation to meet the same requirements demanded for heterosexual civil unions, homosexual unions face a barrier: the need to prove the relationship's publicity. In fact, the requirement of notoriety, when applied by courts in cases where the bonds are not externalized due to fear of homophobic practices isn't adequate. Furthermore, this requirement must be pondered in order to ensure the fundamental right to privacy, as provided in the Constitution. In conclusion, the flexibilization of the legal requirement of publicity does not always occur in Brazilian courts and, when applied, it's not enough to ensure the recognition of homo-affective civil unions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2008, Ecuador recognized the Constitutional Rights of Nature in a global first. This recognition implies a major shift in the human-nature relationship, from one between a subject with agency (humans) and an exploitable object (nature), to a more equilibrated relationship. However, the lack of a standard legal framework has left room for subjective interpretations and variable implementation. The recent widespread concessioning of pristine ecosystems to mining industries has set up an unprecedented conflict and test of these rights. Currently, a landmark case involving Los Cedros Protected Forest and mining companies has reached the Constitutional Court of Ecuador. If Ecuador's highest Court rules in favor of Los Cedros and the Rights of Nature, it would set a legal precedent with enormous impact on biological conservation. Such a policy shift offers a novel conservation strategy, through citizen oversight and action. A ruling against Los Cedros and the Rights of Nature, while a major setback for biodiversity conservation, would be taken in stride by the active social movement supporting these goals, with the case likely moving into international courts. Meanwhile, extractive activities would continue and expand, with known consequences for biodiversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the introduction of the institute of individual constitutional complaint in the Lithuanian legal system, an additional opportunity arose for individuals to defend violated constitutional rights or freedoms, disputing the constitutionality of the legal regulation of criminal proceedings. Analyzing the practice of individual constitutional complaints regarding the constitutionality of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter – CCP) formed by the Constitutional Court, various reasons for their non-acceptance become apparent. Complaints are usually rejected on the grounds that the petitioners misinterpret the disputed legal regulation, raise the issue of its application rather than constitutionality, or associate the violation of their constitutional rights or freedoms with decisions that are not adopted on the basis of the disputed legal regulation or are not final. This article focuses on the requirement to use all the means of protection of one’s constitutional rights or freedoms established by law before applying to the Constitutional Court. Taking into account that, according to the CCP, certain decisions of a court or pre-trial investigation judge are final and not subject to appeal, this paper seeks to establish whether they are considered as such in the context of constitutional disputes. Although a person is not required to exercise the possibility of reopening a criminal case before filing an individual constitutional complaint, in certain cases decisions adopted in accordance with the legal regulation regulating it must be considered final within the meaning of Law on the Constitutional Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines Indiana State constitutional law developments from 2018 to 2019. Topics discussed include several decisions that show a trend toward a restrictive view of the constitutional rights of Indiana residents, an overview of several the court cases that include Solomon v. State and Stone v. State, and a call on judges to decide separately state constitutional law arguments in opinions.

Drastic changes in Supreme Court doctrine require citizens to reorder their affairs rapidly, undermining their trust in the judiciary. Stare decisis has traditionally limited the pace of such change on the Court. It is a bulwark against wholesale jurisprudential reversals. But, in recent years, the stare decisis doctrine has come under threat. With little public or scholarly notice, the Supreme Court has radically weakened stare decisis in two ways. First, the Court has reversed its long-standing view that a precedent, regardless of the quality of its reasoning, should stand unless there is some special, practical justification to overrule it. Recent decisions instead claim that "poor reasoning" in a prior decision justifies overruling cases. Second, the Court has discredited older precedents. The Court has claimed such older decisions have less weight because they may have violated individual rights during their life span. The radical weakening of stare decisis presents a grave threat to legal stability. Justices can always find reasoning they believe is "poor" in prior decisions, which they can also claim have long violated citizens' rights. Under this formulation, stare decisis provides little restraint against changing course. It also opens the door to "wave theories" of stare decisis, whereby new Justices seeking rapid change can claim fidelity to a weak version of stare decisis early in their careers, only to suggest a stronger version later to protect their own decisions. This weakening of stare decisis has deep analytical flaws that would allow perpetual changes to legal doctrine based simply on the current Justices' preferences. The Court must not accept the alarming effects this movement would have on legal stability, doctrinal consistency, and judicial legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court of the United States is designed to serve as the judiciary branch of government's final word on an issue. It is often presented with contested issues and asked to serve as a tiebreaker. So, when the Supreme Court itself doles out an equally divided decision, is it failing at its core responsibility? This Comment addresses that question with a detailed analysis of how the Supreme Court's equally divided votes have impacted the nation. While equally divided decisions are arguably rare, this Comment explores the persistence of these decisions throughout the Court's history and the influence these decisions have had on important areas of the law, including economic rights, civil rights, and criminal procedure. Finally, this Comment details current proposals to remedy equally divided decisions from the Supreme Court and proposes its own: mandatory recusal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the fall of 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued a decision upholding the criminal conviction of an Austrian national (E.S.) in violation of Austria's Criminal Code against the disparagement of religious doctrines. Her initial conviction in the Austrian court was based on statements she made about the Prophet Muhammad while teaching a series of seminars entitled "Basic Information on Islam." In upholding her conviction, the ECtHR found that there had been no violation of the Austrian's right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (Convention), and therefore Austria's conviction was valid and did not impermissibly infringe on her right to freedom of expression. This case adds yet another dimension to the polarizing debate regarding freedom of expression and the permissible limitations that may be placed upon this freedom. In this article, I argue that this case can be viewed as a turning point in the free expression debate, and perhaps indicates an awareness that such restrictions on speech may be necessary in order to maintain public safety and order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that education was not a fundamental right, leaving in place systems that continue today to perpetrate vast inequities among school districts! Through a comparative analysis of treaties, constitutions, legislation, and international and state judicial decisions, we demonstrate that education is indeed a fundamental human right, though our constitutional jurisprudence has denied its fundamental right status. We use case studies from Baltimore, a typical city whose residents face economic hardships, to reveal the dire consequences of this ruling.2 Without the right to an education, schoolchildren in poor systems continue to be deprived of the myriad of human rights that a quality education delivers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After reviewing the place of securities law enforcement within the Canadian court system, the author traces the Peers and Aitkens decisions from the Provincial Court to the Supreme Court and outlines how these cases dealt with the question of what penalties trigger the right to a jury trial under section 11(f) of the Charter. The author explains how section 11(f) impacts the division of powers by creating a constitutional cap on the prison sentences that are available for violations of provincial law. In light of stiff maximum penalties for violations of securities laws, the Peers and Aitkens decisions raise the question of whether there are constitutional reasons to continue to try regulatory offences by judge alone in provincially appointed courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

District of Columbia v. Heller was a landmark riding in which the Supreme Court established that citizens have a constitutional right to possess firearms in their homes for self-protection. The 5-4 decision--along with the Court's subsequent ruling in McDonald v. Chicago--upended the prevailing wisdom that the Second Amendment protected the right of the states to assemble militias for collective security. In this Article, we examine the effects of these rulings on gun regulation in the United States and, more to the point, on gun politics. We situate our analysis within several related theoretical frameworks, most notably those focused on policy feedback and on the role of courts in producing social change. We argue that the effects of Heller (together with the parallel decision in McDonald) have been rather limited. We examine the rulings ' first-order effects on pre-existing gun control laws, as well as second-order effects on a number of related outcomes. We find that Heller and its progeny have had generally small or non-existent impacts on gun policy, on the organizational capacities and political strategies ofpro-gun and pro-regulation groups, and on public attitudes toward gun regulation. Our findings support a constrained view of the Court 's ability to drive social and political change. We conclude, however, by noting that recent developments--particularly hints that some Supreme Court Justices are eager to develop Second Amendment jurisprudence--have the potential to alter these conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In late 2018, the South African Constitutional Court delivered judgment in Law Society of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa, which had been referred to it by the North Gauteng High Court. The matter concerned the constitutionality of former president Jacob Zuma's support for and signing of the infamous 2014 Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit protocol, which has deprived the people of the SADC region from recourse to the SADC Tribunal. In short, the Constitutional Court confirmed both the finding that the signing of the protocol was unconstitutional, and the order for the president's signature to be removed, exactly as the high court had ruled. While welcoming the judgment, this contribution explores whether the ruling offers credible hope to SADC citizens and represents an important milestone for South Africa and the region. Or is it a token victory for constitutional democracy and the rule of law? A discussion of the judgment, supplemented by references to other case law and literature, leads to two conclusions: Firstly, it is evident that the South African constitutional scheme is extensive in reach, and the Constitution is central in the interpretation of treaty and customary international law. While the majority judgment ironically deviates from this, instead focusing more on the dictates of international law, the minority judgment clearly locates the grounds for reviewing the former president's conduct in his failure to respect the rights in our Constitution. Secondly, the order to un-sign the protocol could be seen as an opportunity for South Africa to recommit to justice, the rule of law, human rights and the key values of democracy. The South African president did eventually withdraw South Africa's signature from the protocol but the question remains whether the judgment and the un-signing of the protocol are token victories for maintaining the rule of law, particularly fostering access to justice in a regional court for ordinary citizens, in South Africa and the sub-Saharan region. It is one thing to un-sign a contentious protocol that divested the region's people of an avenue of access to justice; it is another to repair the damage that was caused by the events discussed later which effectively dismantled the SADC tribunal; something about which the political elite has remained silent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with the recent Weiss/PSPP decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court, attempting to contextualise these decisions within previous conflicts between these two courts. The FCC's case law is studied through the perspective of three different types of reviews it developed: fundamental rights review, ultra vires review and constitutional identity review. Then, a detailed analysis of the Weiss and PSPP cases is given in order to understand the repercussions of the first case in which the FCC officially exercised its proclaimed competences and declared the CJEU and ECB's decisions as ultra vires, undermining fundamental principles of the EU legal order. This act could potentially lead to significant changes in current mechanisms of resolving disputes between the highest courts of the EU and national legal orders. Finally, the future of judicial conflicts is discussed through the analysis of the Weiler/Sarmiento model and the system (or lack of system) of resolving the conflicts currently in place. The paper concludes by highlighting that the Weiss/PSPP decisions could very well be those that finally stimulate a long-needed solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In international and national jurisprudence it can be noticed that, under certain circumstances, courts are prone to limit some of the owners’ entitlements with regard to their immovable property' so as to enable the use of such property by' other persons or families as their home. This Wend is due to the growing population on the planet, a drastic social stratification, mass migration and etc., on the one hand, and efforts to mitigate problems and growing tensions in society by pursuing appropriate social and legal policies, on the other hand. There are legal loopholes in this area that courts tend to eliminate by extensively intetpre-ting international conventions, sometimes even referring to something that is not stipulated therein. For instance, courts colloquially and in a simplified manner speak of limitations ofthe ownership right by the right to home. Systematic analysis of the relevant international documents, nevertheless, reveals that this subject matter is indeed covered by' three rights: 1. the right to adequate conditions for establishing home; 2. right to respect home and 3. right to protect home. Even though they are neither exhaustively• enumerated as such in intentional documents, nor terminologically determined, theyt make a logical sequence that undoubtedly emanate from the human rights catalogue and court decisions that have been rendered in past seventy years. In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and national courts, ownership right has been mainfy constrained so as to enable an uninhibited life in the space considered home and so as to prevent eviction from that space. In such circumstances, the court shall give the preference to one of the two fundamental rights: the ownership right or the right to home. This is achieved through the so-called balancing of interests. In order for the outcome of such balancing to be as fair as possible, it is primarily necessary to determine whether a particular space can be considered home. In this respect there often exist certain dilemmas. They' are the consequence of the absence of a precise definition, or even of a more widely accepted terminological determina-tion of the notion home. In this paper, this phenomenon is diSRussed in detail in a broader historical and comparative context. The analysis has revealed that in Europe from ancient times to the end ofXIUI century, home was considered a community of persons and goods (univesitas rerum et personarum), and that it consisted of two components: tangible (referring to the space and things) and intangible, spiritual (referring to the connections between community• members and their emotional connection to the space). The emergence of liberal ideology; associated with materialism and an individualised concept of law, influenced the change in its perception. In the modern world, and especially in the field of economy, home has been reduced to the living space. Nevertheless, when considering the request to limit the ownership right so as to preserve home, the court shall establish if there are spiritual attachments of the user to the specific living space thatjustify preferring his/her needs over material interests ofthe owner. Eventually', provided that the court decides to limit the ownership right, it shall determine how the owner will be compensated for the use of his/her space. As a ride, that burden shall be borne by the person who continues using that space. If, however, that turns out to be impossible, financial means for the use of living space shall be secured by' the state from the finds aimed at financing social programs. By• way of ratified international conventions, the state is, in general, obliged to do that. Besides, the article also gives an overview of the examples of active legal policies and examples of good practice in comparative law. The legal policy of the Republic of Serbia and its court practice in this respect are also examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the ruling by the Delaware Court of Chancery in the case Belton v. Gebhart to present historical insights on shareholder activism and civil rights. Also cited are the efforts to advance rights to education for African Americans, the desegregation in Delaware public schools, the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) framework, and the works of civil rights advocates Louis L. Redding and Chancellor Collins Seitz.

In 2018, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's finding that a corrections officer deprived a female inmate of her civil rights through his commission of aggravated sexual abuse. Following the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals while splitting with the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, the Third Circuit held that size and coercive power disparities between a defendant and a victim do not speak to the force element of the federal aggravated sexual abuse statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Although the Third Circuit takes a balanced approach, its adoption of the Seventh Circuit's analysis is problematic because the court ignores the Seventh Circuit's underlying assumption that force must result in bodily injury. Such thinking ignores the legislative intent behind the statute and effectively reintroduces the outdated resistance doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A half century before the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed inclusionary zoning in Southern Burlington N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Township, the state struggled to secure basic municipal zoning. While New Jersey's political elite embraced zoning in the 1910s and 20s to weather a period of tremendous growth and change, a disapproving judiciary steadfastly maintained that the practice violated basic property rights. Hundreds of state court decisions in the 1920s held zoning ordinances unconstitutional. Finally, the people of New Jersey in 1927 overwhelmingly passed an amendment to the state constitution overruling those decisions and affirming zoning as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. This essay traces those uncertain early years of zoning in New Jersey. The amendment was not the result of a state monolithically coming to its senses. Instead, its passage documents a decade-long struggle played out not only in the courts and legislature but also in the press and the town meeting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Africa has developed domestic legislation governing all surrogacy matters within the country. These provisions are contained in Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. In Ex parte MS; In re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood Agreement 2014 2 All SA 312 (GNP), the commissioning parents did not adhere to the requirement provided by Chapter 19. The parties to the (initially informal) surrogacy agreement authorised the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother prior to the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement by the court. In considering the best interest of the resultant child, the High Court decided to ratify the inadequate surrogate motherhood agreement. This discussion aims to establish whether the court's judgement in Ex parte MS; In re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood Agreement was in accordance with the provisions of current legislation and case law. It furthermore aims to answer two primary questions: firstly, whether adjudicators should make use of the best interest of the child when ratifying inadequate surrogate motherhood agreements; and secondly, in what manner the court should go about implementing the best interest of the child when validating inadequate surrogate motherhood agreements. It is submitted that courts should refrain from applying the best interest of the child as a constitutional right in inadequate surrogacy matters where the child is yet to be born alive, in accordance with the Digesta Texts. Parties to the invalid agreement should rather be instructed to make use of a section 22 parental responsibilities and rights agreement, a section 28 termination agreement, or adoption as provided for by chapter 15 of the Children's Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article examines the Supreme Court's voting, speech, and religion decisions in the 2017-18 Term, arguing that their unifying feature is the denial of systemic equality. In a series of end-of-Term constitutional rights decisions, the Court resolutely insisted on viewing equality in atomistic terms. In so doing, the Court ignored and even exacerbated systemic inequalities in each of these realms. In his last Term on the Court, Justice Kennedy was part of the majority in all of these decisions. The Court decided three important redistricting cases in the 2017-18 Term. Partisan gerrymandering is the classic systemic harm, yet the Court insisted on an individualized showing of injury in holding that Wisconsin plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate standing in their statewide challenge to a state districting plan (Gill v. Whitford). The Court also denied relief for an alleged gerrymander in Maryland (Benisek v. Lamone). In another redistricting case (Abbott v. Perez), the Court upheld Texas's congressional and state legislative districts, eliding the evidence of systemic injury to Latino voters. In two critical free speech decisions, the Court struck down a California law imposing certain notification requirements on pregnancy-related clinics (National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra), and a state agency fee law for public sector labor unions (Janus v. AFSCME). Both decisions focus myopically on individual speakers, while ignoring the systemic viewpoint discrimination that arises from the Court's First Amendment decisions. The Court's disregard for systemic equality is also evident in two highprofile decisions involving claims of religious discrimination. The majority squinted hard to find evidence that the civil rights commissioners discriminated against a Christian baker who refused to make a cake for a same-sex wedding (Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission), while upholding an entry ban on people from six Muslim-majority countries despite overwhelming evidence of discriminatory animus against Muslims (Trump v. Hawaii). This Article describes and criticizes the last-Term Kennedy Court's inattention to-- and in some cases hostility toward--systemic equality. It argues that the Court's relentlessly atomistic approach to discrimination has obscured and intensified systemic inequalities in the public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article highlights the law concerning "No Trespassing" signs in the U.S. state of Tennessee. Topics discussed include decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Christensen concerning the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights; specific Fourth Amendment protections against searches on the curtilage of one's home; and the role of jurisdictions in making physical barriers the standard for revocation the implied invitation for individuals.

Credibility of the asylum applicant's assertions within any member state of the European Union with regard to his or her possible persecution on grounds of sexual orientation, following return, is extremely important for the assessment of asylum admission. Nevertheless, in the case C-473/16, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) states that performing a psychological expertise for assessment of an applicant' sexual orientation does not comply with the Directive, as concerns the Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 2010-2015, the Iowa Supreme Court decided multiple cases under article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. However, the court's reasons for deciding issues under the Iowa Constitution were less than principled. The Iowa Supreme Court's current practice of spontaneously interpreting the Iowa Constitution raises significant jurisprudential problems: it does not necessarily require lawyers to adequately argue, brief, and preserve state constitutional issues for appeal, it does not prioritize federal or state constitutional claims in any order, and the approach seems arbitrary on its face. A more principled approach to state constitutional interpretation could remedy these issues. The primacy approach is an approach to state constitutional interpretation under which state supreme courts decide issues under the state constitution when the parties adequately argue and brief the state constitutional issue. This Note argues that the Iowa Supreme Court should adopt the primacy approach to state constitutional interpretation to continue the Court's role as an important part of the United States' federalist system and an imperative protector of Iowans' individual rights, to improve the efficiency of state constitutional interpretation, and to improve the process by which the Iowa Supreme Court reaches issues under the Iowa Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., which brought for-profit corporations under the protection of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, has been the subject of widespread support and criticism. Some have lauded the Hobby Lobby decision as an important step in protecting religious freedom. Others have derided it as an affront to the civil rights of corporate employees. This Article suggests a third perspective, namely, that Hobby Lobby harms, rather than helps, religious freedom. Both legally and politically, Hobby Lobby is likely to lead to a reduction in protection for religious individuals and entities that have traditionally been included under the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. This is particularly troubling because the Hobby Lobby decision is legally flawed. The Article takes seriously the reality that many religious people do not experience religion as a divisible phenomenon that they can separate from the rest of their lives. Sometimes this requires exemptions to generally applicable laws if there is a legal mechanism for doing so, but cases involving large, for-profit entities like Hobby Lobby raise additional concerns. In these cases, religious individuals seek exemptions in the name of the company, which imposes the owners' religious tenets on corporate employees. This creates a confrontation between "lived religion" and the legal or civil rights of others. Over time, as courts create precedent in cases involving for-profit entities, the rights of religious individuals and religious entities will likely be weakened. Moreover, the legislative, legal, and public response to Hobby Lobby does not bode well for religious accommodation claims in the long run, and, sadly, will have a negative impact on accommodation claims brought by religious individuals and entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's (USSC's) ruling in the civil rights- and same-sex marriage law-related case Obergefell v. Hodges (Obergefell), and it mentions the author's claim that the USSC missed an opportunity to address children's legal interests in the Obergefell case. Children's rights advocates and the equal protection rights of children are assessed, along with legal precedent and information about the harms that same-sex marriage bans cause children.

An essay is presented which serves as a tribute to the late U.S. Supreme Court (USSC) Justice Antonin Scalia and a critique of the book "A Case Against the Supreme Court" by author Erwin Chemerinsky, and it mentions Scalia's views about American constitutional rights and the bad-cases reasoning that is examined in Chemerinsky's book. The USSC's failure to protect certain constitutional rights is assessed in relation to cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson, Buck v. Bell, and Dred Scott v. Sandford.

During the violent storm that marked the Civil Rights Era that overturned the "Southern Way of Life " marked by racial segregation and the virtual removal of any participation by African-Americans in civil affairs such as voting and serving on juries that followed U.S. Supreme Court rulings at the end of the nineteenth century, no individual judge did more to restore such rights than Frank M. Johnson, Jr. on the Middle District of Alabama. Those Supreme Court cases a half-century earlier of course included Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, but also the almost unknown case o/Williams v. Mississippi in 1898, and the two still littleknown Giles cases from Alabama that soon followed. Essentially they gave constitutional approval for Southern states to all but eliminate African- Americans from voting. It is the historic background that provides the exceptional importance of Judge Johnson's unprecedented order in restoring full voting rights for African-American Southerners. At thirty-seven, the youngest federal judge in the nation, Johnson called for a three-judge District Court on which he voted first in the 1956 Montgomery Bus Boycott case. Fifth Circuit Judge Richard Rives of Montgomery joined Johnson in a 2-1 ruling that for the first time expanded the Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education beyond the issue of segregated schools. And as is well known, the outcome of that case launched the civil rights career of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who would later call Judge Johnson "the man who gave true meaning to the word justice.' ". But no single ruling by Judge Johnson was as controversial or transformative in its impact as Williams v. Wallace, which allowed the Selma March that led directly to passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. As told in my book Taming the Storm: The Life and Times of Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. and the South's Fight Over Civil Rights, here's the story of what happened. The book, published by Doubleday in 1993, received the 1994 Robert F. Kennedy Book Award. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the early American jury's near-mythical role as a check on overreaching government agents, the contemporary jury's role in constitutional adjudication remains opaque. Should the jury have the right to nullify criminal statutes on constitutional grounds? Should the jury apply constitutional doctrine in civil rights suits against government officers? Should courts o f appeals defer to the jury's application of constitutional law, or review it de novo? This Article offers the first holistic analysis of the jury's role in constitutional adjudication. It argues that the Constitution's text, history, and structure strongly support the jury's authority to apply constitutional law to the facts of a case and offer solid, though mixed, support for the longstanding doctrine against the jury's right to nullify statutes on the basis of its own constitutional view. The Article furthermore makes a case for the jury's unique "constitutional competence." Composed of a diverse group of lay people, the jury brings popular values to bear on the application of constitutional law. By deferring to the jury's reasonable constitutional judgments, courts make room for popular constitutional norms on a case-by-case basis without forgoing the responsibility to "say what the law is. " The resulting constitutional construction is a middle ground between judicial supremacy and judicial abnegation that promises a more symbolically and substantively democratic constitutional law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The law of campaign finance pits two important First Amendment interests against each other: disclosure and privacy. The Supreme Court has recognized the need to balance these two interests to allow for effective elections and to safeguard individual rights. However, through the years the Court has failed to balance these interests equally, resulting in vacillating decisions that unfairly sacrifice one for the other. From Burroughs v. United States in 1934 to Citizens United v. FEC in 2010, the Court has failed to provide a workable roadmap for legislatures in the creation of campaign finance disclosure laws and for lower courts in determining their constitutionality. This Article argues that a balance between privacy and disclosure can be struck by employing a "zone of constitutionality" test. The Article proposes factors the Court could weigh in determining whether a disclosure law falls within the zone of constitutionality. Finally, the Article argues that clear guidelines are essential to balance both interests; protect citizens and corporations' First Amendment rights; and avoid unnecessary litigation to the lower courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses situations where American constitutional rights are non-absolute, and it mentions the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the 2014 case McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), which deals with the legality of an aggregate limits provision in the country's Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. A Sufficiency Question involving the justification of a rights limitation under one of America's constitutional doctrines' "ends" tests is examined.

This article discusses the writ of amparo, the concept of the protection of constitutional rights in Latin America. The author comments on the influence of the writ of amparo on judicial resolutions, judgments, and procedural law. The importance of the writ of amparo in the protection of human, constitutional, and civil rights is also examined.

The Iowa Supreme Court adopted an unpopular but unanimous ruling in Varnum v. Brien, which established same-sex marriage. Using a unique panel study conducted immediately before and after the court decision, we evaluate the impact of policy adoption on changing opinions on minority rights. The signaling of new social norms pressured some respondents to modify their expressed attitudes. We find that respondents whose demographic characteristics would predict support for marriage equality, but previously did not, were more likely to shift their opinions to be consistent with the new state law. A policy feedback mechanism may be responsible for the rapid diffusion of laws legalizing same-sex in the states. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]