Search

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00505.x Byline: David C. Earnest (*) Abstract: How do states solve n-choice cooperation problems? Although classical game theory offers useful insights into how states achieve cooperation, its focus on equilibria means that it is largely silent on the processes of negotiation, particularly when multiple solutions to a cooperation problem exist. To explore the path histories of international cooperation, this article uses an agent-based model to explore how states solve a coordination game with three equilibria. To further enrich the analysis, the model explores how domestic constraints may affect coordination games. Such state-level constraints may present negotiators with considerable informational costs and high barriers to understanding each other's preferences. The model finds that the process of communicating preferences can greatly affect the prospects for cooperation, independent of distributional consequences and concerns about cheating. It also finds that, contrary to collective goods theory, a large number of states coordinate a solution to the problem easier than small groups. This is because larger groups create denser networks that communicate preferences more efficiently. The agent-based model thus illustrates how simulation as a method can challenge our extant thinking about cooperation among nation-states. These findings have implications for research on interstate coordination, since it suggests transnational linkages may help states overcome information barriers that frustrate agreements. Author Affiliation: (*)Old Dominion University

Political cooperation under private information between two countries or districts is analyzed with regard to conditions for uniform policies and determining when it is efficient to not allow side payments in negotiations. Findings show how political centralization performs better than decentralized cooperation and how differentiation and side payments create conflict.

The frame-selection model is employed to study the occurrence of arguing and bargaining in several international negotiations and to loosen the unitary-actor assumption underlying state behavior. The research shows that there exists fundamental differences between a person's and a state's frame, leading to differences in the effectiveness of bargaining at the international level.

In order to study the players behavior in the three player ultimatum bargaining game, their opposing motives of altruism and payoff inequality are analyzed. It is concluded that while responders most probably behave altruistically towards a non-decision-making player, there is higher probability that they reject a given offer, if the pay-off is inequitable compared to the hostage.

A method of structured modeling for intergovernmental negotiations for improving European air quality is presented. The model integrates object-oriented programming, simulation methods, multiple-criteria decision-making methods and database management systems.

Previous formal models of two-level games to determine whether a domestic ratification constraint provides an executive with bargaining leverage in international negotiations and a game theoretic model to show that an executive with a national constituency such as a nationally elected president benefits by being constrained is used. Hence, testable hypotheses are derived on the effect of the party composition of the legislature on the executive's constraint.

Human resource managers everywhere have to deal with a host of disturbing disputes. Unfortunately, or fortunately, managers in a diverse world differ about how to deal with problems emanating from [...]

Proposals to resolve conflicts and obtain negotiated agreements might be greatly improved and gain greater acceptance by exploiting recent evidence of people's economic preferences and motivations. For example, numerous studies [...]

Negotiations at the United Nations climate summit in Paris this December will adopt a 'pledge and review' approach to cutting global carbon emissions. Countries will promise to reduce their emissions [...]

The debates generated by non-UN peace operations during the Cold War in the past few years and the limitations imposed by thinking of these developments in terms of regionalization are discussed. It is revealed that in the longer term a consistent trend toward non-UN peace operations could undermine international peace and security.

A sudden climate truce between China and the United States has renewed hopes that a two-decade stand-off between developed and developing nations over addressing climate change may at last be [...]