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The possibility of a massive oil spill in the Red Sea is increasingly likely. The Safer, a deteriorating oil tanker containing 1.1 million barrels of oil, has been deserted near the coast of Yemen since 2015 and threatens environmental catastrophe to a country presently in a humanitarian crisis. Here, we model the immediate public health impacts of a simulated spill. We estimate that all of Yemen's imported fuel through its key Red Sea ports would be disrupted and that the anticipated spill could disrupt clean-water supply equivalent to the daily use of 9.0-9.9 million people, food supply for 5.7-8.4 million people and 93-100% of Yemen's Red Sea fisheries. We also estimate an increased risk of cardiovascular hospitalization from pollution ranging from 5.8 to 42.0% over the duration of the spill. The spill and its potentially disastrous impacts remain entirely preventable through offloading the oil. Our results stress the need for urgent action to avert this looming disaster.

Routine asymptomatic testing strategies for COVID-19 have been proposed to prevent outbreaks in high-risk healthcare environments. We used simulation modeling to evaluate the optimal frequency of viral testing. We found that routine testing substantially reduces risk of outbreaks, but may need to be as frequent as twice weekly.

BackgroundRoutine viral testing strategies for SARS-CoV-2 infection might facilitate safe airline travel during the COVID-19 pandemic and mitigate global spread of the virus. However, the effectiveness of these test-and-travel strategies to reduce passenger risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection and population-level transmission remains unknown.MethodsIn this simulation study, we developed a microsimulation of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in a cohort of 100 000 US domestic airline travellers using publicly available data on COVID-19 clinical cases and published natural history parameters to assign individuals one of five health states of susceptible to infection, latent period, early infection, late infection, or recovered. We estimated a per-day risk of infection with SARS-CoV-2 corresponding to a daily incidence of 150 infections per 100 000 people. We assessed five testing strategies: (1) anterior nasal PCR test within 3 days of departure, (2) PCR within 3 days of departure and 5 days after arrival, (3) rapid antigen test on the day of travel (assuming 90% of the sensitivity of PCR during active infection), (4) rapid antigen test on the day of travel and PCR test 5 days after arrival, and (5) PCR test 5 days after arrival. Strategies 2 and 4 included a 5-day quarantine after arrival. The travel period was defined as 3 days before travel to 2 weeks after travel. Under each scenario, individuals who tested positive before travel were not permitted to travel. The primary study outcome was cumulative number of infectious days in the cohort over the travel period without isolation or quarantine (population-level transmission risk), and the key secondary outcome was the number of infectious people detected on the day of travel (passenger risk of infection).FindingsWe estimated that in a cohort of 100 000 airline travellers, in a scenario with no testing or screening, there would be 8357 (95% uncertainty interval 6144-12831) infectious days with 649 (505-950) actively infectious passengers on the day of travel. The pre-travel PCR test reduced the number of infectious days from 8357 to 5401 (3917-8677), a reduction of 36% (29-41) compared with the base case, and identified 569 (88% [76-92]) of 649 actively infectious travellers on the day of flight; the addition of post-travel quarantine and PCR reduced the number of infectious days to 2520 days (1849-4158), a reduction of 70% (64-75) compared with the base case. The rapid antigen test on the day of travel reduced the number of infectious days to 5674 (4126-9081), a reduction of 32% (26-38) compared with the base case, and identified 560 (86% [83-89]) actively infectious travellers; the addition of post-travel quarantine and PCR reduced the number of infectious days to 3124 (2356-495), a reduction of 63% (58-66) compared with the base case. The post-travel PCR alone reduced the number of infectious days to 4851 (3714-7679), a reduction of 42% (35-49) compared with the base case.InterpretationRoutine asymptomatic testing for SARS-CoV-2 before travel can be an effective strategy to reduce passenger risk of infection during travel, although abbreviated quarantine with post-travel testing is probably needed to reduce population-level transmission due to importation of infection when travelling from a high to low incidence setting.FundingUniversity of California, San Francisco.

Heart failure is a leading cause of mortality, yet our understanding of the genetic interactions underlying this disease remains incomplete. Here, we harvest 1352 healthy and failing human hearts directly from transplant center operating rooms, and obtain genome-wide genotyping and gene expression measurements for a subset of 313. We build failing and non-failing cardiac regulatory gene networks, revealing important regulators and cardiac expression quantitative trait loci (eQTLs). PPP1R3A emerges as a regulator whose network connectivity changes significantly between health and disease. RNA sequencing after PPP1R3A knockdown validates network-based predictions, and highlights metabolic pathway regulation associated with increased cardiomyocyte size and perturbed respiratory metabolism. Mice lacking PPP1R3A are protected against pressure-overload heart failure. We present a global gene interaction map of the human heart failure transition, identify previously unreported cardiac eQTLs, and demonstrate the discovery potential of disease-specific networks through the description of PPP1R3A as a central regulator in heart failure.

Objective: We determined the annual suicide rate of migrants detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the past decade. Methods: We performed a retrospective cohort analysis of the annual suicide rates for ICE detainees from federal fiscal years (FY) 2010-2020. Death date and cause of death were directly extracted from publicly available ICE Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Library, ICE death reports, and ICE press releases. Annual suicide rates were calculated as suicides per 100,000 person-years and suicides per 100,000 admissions. Results: From 2010-2019, the mean number of suicides per 100,000 person-years was 3.3 (standard deviation (SD): 2.6). In 2020, the suicide rate increased 5.3 times the prior 10-year average to 17.4 suicides per 100,000 personyears. When calculating suicide rate based on admissions per FY, the mean number of suicides from 2010-2019 per 100,000 admissions was 0.3 (SD: 0.3). In 2020, the suicide rate increased 11.0 times the prior 10-year average to 3.4 suicides per 100,000 admissions. Conclusion: In 2020, the detainee suicide rate increased substantially compared to the past decade. This may point to a worsening mental health crisis in ICE detention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This cross-sectional study explored the moderating effect of religious service attendance on the relationship between discrimination and suicidal behaviors in a community sample of immigrants. A convenience sample of 348 individuals with immigrant experience to the U.S. completed a survey in either English, Portuguese or Spanish. The relationship between discrimination and suicidal behaviors was moderated by religious service attendance, equipping help from religious communities (RCs) and not having experienced discrimination in RCs. Other protections included being born outside the U.S. First-generation immigrants also reported less discrimination, which was a risk factor for suicidal behaviors. Other risk factors were refugee status, higher acculturation, discrimination in RCs, and certain types of help from RCs. Help that equipped them to navigate the U.S. system was associated with lower suicide risk. Community partners and RCs can help immigrants by collaborating to promote immigrant mental health because of the high religious affiliation of immigrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. The transmission trend of SARS-CoV-2 is continuously evolving. Understanding the dynamics in different settings is crucial for any effective containment measures. We aimed to study the characteristics of household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Bhutanese households by determining the transmissibility within household contacts of confirmed COVID-19 index cases and their factors of infectivity. Methods. We conducted a retrospective observational study on household transmission in 306 household contacts of 93 COVID-19 positive index cases diagnosed from April 16, 2021, to June 30, 2021. A pro forma was used to collect data on the epidemiological, demographic, and clinical profile of all recruited individuals. Secondary attack rates (SAR) were calculated, and risk factors for transmission were estimated. Results. 180 of 306 household contacts developed secondary household transmission (SAR 58.8%; 95% CI: 53.2-64.2). The median age of household contacts was 22 years. The median household size was 4 (mean 4.3 ± 2.199) members. Contacts exposed to adult index cases (aPR 1; 95% CI 1, 1.02, p = 0.01) and vaccinated index cases (uPR 0.41, 95% CI 0.25, 0.66, p < 0.001) had a higher SAR and prevalence of secondary infections. Conclusions. Our findings suggest substantial evidence of secondary infections among household contacts, especially in the context of public health mandated lockdowns. Aggressive early contact tracing and case identification with subsequent case isolation from other household members remains a crucial step in preventing secondary transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]