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PROLOGUE: ROGER, HUEY, AND SAFFRON 189 INTRODUCTION 190 I. WHAT IS SURROGACY? 191 II. A HISTORY OF SURROGACY LAWS IN THE U.S. AND IN CALIFORNIA 193 A. Surrogacy in the [...], California is considered one of the most surrogacy friendly places in the world, attracting intended parents from around the globe who are seeking to avail themselves of California's laws and bustling surrogacy industry. However, California's statutory scheme overlooks the needs of intended parents who seek to have children through the traditional (rather than gestational) surrogacy route. Laws designed to facilitate commercial gestational surrogacy arrangements make traditional surrogacy arrangements difficult and more costly. This Note discusses the history behind California's surrogacy laws. It centers the story of Roger, Huey, and Saffron (two intended parents and one prospective traditional surrogate), discussing the barriers that they and similarly situated families face in California. It dives into the (often flawed) reasoning behind California's laws, the profit motives that influence the industry as a whole, and the impact on aspiring traditional surrogates and intended parents who cannot afford (or do not desire to engage with) the more expensive gestational surrogacy process. This Note explores the approach of the United Kingdom, where there is no legal distinction between gestational and traditional surrogacy arrangements and there are strict limitations on third parties profiting from facilitating surrogacy arrangements. While acknowledging the imperfect nature of the UK's system, the Note suggests that California might consider a similar alternative route for traditional surrogacy arrangements. This Note fills an important gap in the academic literature by centering the lived experiences of those impacted by California's laws. Whereas much of the literature available on surrogacy focuses on gestational surrogacy arrangements in the commercial context, this Note considers persons who are pursuing traditional surrogacy arrangements in an altruistic context. It explores misconceptions that have led to traditional surrogacy's unpopularity and challenges the industry's paternalistic view and failure to the meet the needs of the U.S.'s changing family structures. This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of surrogacy and explains the terminology that will be used throughout the paper, with particular emphasis on the legal distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacy. Part II briefly describes the history of surrogacy in the United States, with particular focus on California's "surrogacy-friendly" statutory scheme. It explores the legislative history behind California's laws, including the tendency for changes in surrogacy laws to occur after major scandals. Part III describes the practical impact of California's statutory scheme for families like Huey, Roger, and Saffron, such as difficulty finding counsel, difficulty attaining medical and psychological support, and increased costs. It also discusses how traditional family structures are increasingly less common, particularly in queer communities, and explains why some practitioners are hesitant to accommodate these new structures. Part IV addresses the common argument that traditional surrogacy is more psychologically dangerous and risky, and it explains some of the risks involved in gestational surrogacy arrangements. Finally, Part V explores approaches to surrogacy in the U.K. and suggests a need for alternative systems that support altruistic surrogacy arrangements and traditional surrogates.

A concept recently developed by scholars in psychology and biology is 'pathological altruism.' (Oakley 2013, Oakley et al. 2012). A pathological altruist is defined as 'a person who sincerely engages [...]

We posit that parent-child relationships lead to subsequent leader-member exchange (LMX) differentiation in family firms. This differentiation shapes a child's behavior toward the firm. Altruism is proposed to further increase [...]

James Hinton was a charismatic thinker who influenced the mid-Victorian concept of altruism and later sexologists such as Havelock Ellis. Secretly, he also believed that polygamy would solve the problems of sexual frustration, prostitution, and female poverty. His obsessions with polygamy are evident in five volumes of largely unpublished manuscripts found in the British Library. However, in examining the roots of Hinton's beliefs, we can see that Hinton should not be understood only as a precursor to later sexual radicalism; rather, he should be anchored in the very different context of mid-Victorian struggles over individualism in religion and culture., James Hinton was a charismatic thinker at the heart of mid-Victorian intellectual life. His philosophy of altruism rivaled Herbert Spencer's individualism, inspiring the settlement house movement of the 1880s (Koven [...]

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment. altruism | economic games | inclusive fitness | psychological drives | utility doi/ 10.1073/pnas.1000829107

Whether competition among large groups played an important role in human social evolution is dependent on how variation, whether cultural or genetic, is maintained between groups. Comparisons between genetic and cultural differentiation between neighboring groups show how natural selection on large groups is more plausible on cultural rather than genetic variation. altruism | cultural FST | group selection | prosociality doi/ 10.1073/pnas.0903232106

A persistent puzzle in the social and biological sciences is the existence of prosocial behavior, actions that benefit others, often at a cost to oneself. Recent theoretical models and empirical studies of indirect reciprocity show that actors behave prosocially in order to develop an altruistic reputation and receive future benefits from third parties. Accordingly, individuals should stop investing in reputations via prosocial behavior when a future benefit (via indirect reciprocity) is unlikely. The conclusion that the absence of reputational incentives necessarily leads to egoistic behavior contrasts sharply with models of heterogeneous social preferences. Such models demonstrate the theoretical plausibility of populations composed of egoists and altruists. Results of Study One show that actors classified a priori as egoists respond strategically to reputational incentives, whereas those classified a priori as altruists are less affected by these incentives. Egoists act prosocially when reputational incentives are at stake but not when opportunities for indirect reciprocity are absent, while altruists tend to act prosocially regardless of whether reputational incentives are present. These results suggest that altruistic behavior can result from non-strategic altruism or reputation-building egoism. Study Two replicates these results and explores indirect reciprocation of others' prosocial acts. We found that altruists indirectly reciprocate at higher levels than egoists, and individuals tend to discount others 'prosocial behaviors when they occur in the presence of reputational incentives. As a result, public prosocial behaviors are indirectly reciprocated less than private prosocial behaviors. In line with our argument that altruists pay less attention to reputational incentives, egoists showed a greater tendency than altruists to discount others 'public prosocial behaviors. The results support the growing focus on heterogeneity of individuals 'social preferences in models of altruism and indirect reciprocity.

A three-generation OLG model with one-directional altruism and two-directional intra-family transfers is presented. Adults invest in their children's education and make transfers to their elderly parents. However, due to lack of altruism, adults with high earnings do not share consumption equally with their elderly parents but spend a larger share of their earnings on own consumption and on their children's education. This allows the model to be consistent with three empirical observations that are difficult to reconcile with traditional altruistic frameworks of intergenerational social interactions and mobility: (i) consumption is not perfectly shared between members of an extended family, (ii) consumption is not equally persistent over the lifecycle as across generations, and (iii) the intergenerational persistence of earnings is particularly high at the top end of the earnings distribution. JEL classification: D31; D64; D91 Keywords: Altruism; Social mobility; Consumption; Education

The moderating effect of power distance and Chinese traditionality on relationship between perceived organizational support and work outcomes were studied.

What drives policymakers to put the interests of others above their own? If human nature is inherently selfish, it makes sense to institutionalize incentives that counter decision makers' temptations to use their positions to benefit themselves over others. A growing literature rooted in evolutionary theories of human behavior, however, suggests that humans, under certain circumstances, have inherent predispositions towards 'representational altruism,' i.e., to make an authoritative decision to benefit another at one's own expense. Drawing on Hibbing and Alford's conception of the wary cooperator, a theoretical case is made for such behavioral expectations, which are confirmed in a series of original laboratory experiments.

Microeconoimc models, which examine altruistic behavior of humans, are presented.

Neurosciences models, which examine social interaction of humans, are presented.

Models of neural networks, which examine altruistic behavior of individuals, are presented.

Most analyses of children's stories share the assumption that stories are told to children to influence their behavior. This paper explores how the analysis of stories can provide insight into social strategies used by people interacting within their cultural context. To demonstrate the potential of this approach, we created multiple versions of an original children's story to explore attitudes of college students toward the form of social interaction known as reciprocal altruism. Some versions portrayed the protagonist of the story as following a tit-for-tat strategy, while in other versions the protagonist was altruistic toward all the other characters regardless of their past behavior. Subjects read one of the versions and rated it in terms of how likely they would be to read it to a child of the appropriate age. The highest rated version involved the protagonist being altruistic even to characters that had cheated in the past. We discuss this finding and suggest future applications of this methodology. KEYWORDS: Children's stories; Culture; Indirect reciprocal altruism; Parental behavior; Reciprocal altruism; Tit-for-tat strategy

Norms are established by the powerful in their own interests, and with the acclaim of responsible intellectuals. Law is a living instrument, its meaning determined by practice, and practice demonstrates that new norms are established permitting anticipatory self-defense that is another euphemism for aggression at will.

Indirect reciprocity, defined as a beneficial act whose return comes from someone other than the act's recipient, is a common phenomenon in human societies. However, it is a poorly analyzed phenomenon with respect to payoffs. Are the expectations of return realistic, or not? Are these expectations pro-social attitudes, or illusions induced through manipulation? I discuss four categories of putative indirect reciprocity, two of which pertain to interaction between individuals and two of which involve social systems. The conclusion is that two of these categories, reciprocal reputation and institutionalized reciprocity, are strongly linked to reciprocity, whereas the other two categories, generous reputation and metaphysical reward, are likely to involve only an element of illusionary reciprocity and a substantial degree of altruism.

The study focuses on the issue of remittances and other non-monetary transfers among individuals. The study made an attempt to assess the purpose of monetary and/or non-monetary transfer that take place among the slum dwellers.

This article begins with the observation that people often cooperate in social dilemmas. Specifically, they may do so either for altruistic reasons or for reasons indirectly linked to self-interest. Because these competing motivations exist in different contexts, we explore the consequences of the incorporation of altruism in the economic framework in the context of a series of prisoner's dilemma experiments. Our experiments involve student subjects in groups of three. Each student plays two rounds of a monetary prisoner's dilemma game with the other two subjects in that group. We find evidence for recognizably different levels of the altruistic behavior of cooperation due to personal attributes and specific experimental conditions. Cooperation rates are higher for female students and more senior students. Of more interest is the evidence that economics majors tend to behave more cooperatively than noneconomics majors.

Byline: David Archard (1) Keywords: altruism; blood; domino argument; Eric Mack; gift; imagined community; market; personal attributes; Peter Singer; Richard Titmuss Abstract: This article defends Richard Titmuss's argument, and PeterSinger's sympathetic support for it, against orthodoxphilosophical criticism. The article specifies thesense in which a market in blood is ``dehumanising'' ashaving to do with a loss of ``imagined community'' orsocial ``integration'', and not with a loss of valued or``deeper'' liberty. It separates two ``domino arguments''-- the ``contamination of meaning'' argument and the``erosion of motivation'' argument a which support, indifferent but interrelated ways, the claim that amarket in blood is ``imperialistic.'' Concentrating onthe first domino argument the article considers theview that monetary and non-monetary meanings of thesame good can co-exist given the robustness of certainkinds of relationship and joint undertakings withinwhich gifts can figure. It argues that societalrelationships are vulnerable or permeable to theeffects of the market in a way that those constitutiveof the personal sphere are not.General, more broadly political questions remainunanswered but the core of Titmuss's original andchallenging argument remains and can be presented ina defensible form. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, UK Article History: Registration Date: 12/10/2004

Byline: Marc Willinger (1), Anthony Ziegelmeyer (2) Keywords: experimental economics; public goods; interior equilibria; altruism; decision error; logit equilibrium Abstract: We present the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in the interior of the strategy space. The treatment variable is the equilibrium contribution level. By increasing the equilibrium contribution level, we reduce the 'strength' of the social dilemma. Though we observe that the average level of contribution rises with the equilibrium contribution level, the average rate of over-contribution is not affected in a systematic way. Over-contribution is statistically significant only at the lower level of equilibrium contribution but not at the higher levels. We show that the Anderson et al. (1998, Journal of Public Economics. 70, 297--323) logit equilibrium model which combines altruism and decision errors fits quite well our laboratory data. Author Affiliation: (1) Institut Universitaire de France, BETA-Theme--, Universite Louis Pasteur, 61, avenue de la Foret Noire, F--67085, Strasbourg Cedex, France (2) BETA-Theme--, Universite Louis Pasteur, 61, avenue de la Foret Noire, F--67085, Strasbourg Cedex, France Article History: Registration Date: 12/10/2004

A study of charitable donations by different genders proves that when charity is expensive, women tend to be kinder and when it is cheaper, men tend to donate more. In other words, men are more sensitive towards price changes for charitable purposes.

Altruism is said to pertain to a matter of choosing to provide a benefit to another at the expense of one's self. If so, a good deed for a family member or a member of one's own group cannot be an act of altruism, since the concept of self-interest need not be interpreted so narrowly. In managing the organizational culture, the self-fulfilling expectations that match people's views of who belongs to an ingroup and their interests should always be taken into account.

Outside of economic history, it is rare for a recent Ph.D. in economics to publish a dissertation as a book and rarer still for the publisher to be one of [...]

Exchange and altruism may be interchanged with each other. Private transfers may be motivated either by exchange or by altruistic behavior. An altruistic transfer occurs when the donor considers the recipient's well-being. An exchange-driven transfer is positively correlated with the income of the recipient. A recipient will provide better service or support to a donor with a much higher income. However, when empathy is motivated by gratitude, altruism and exchange may be interwoven such that a low income of the recipient is positively correlated with an altruistic transfer because such income is related to a stronger sense of gratitude.

Incomplete market insurance gives rise to nonmarket arrangements for coinsurance. We find that the effort altruistically linked individuals take to avoid an accident increases with the degree of altruism. If the degree of altruism is sufficiently high, an economy with nonmarket insurance yields higher social welfare than an economy without nonmarket insurance. As altruism increases, the equilibrium level of effort approaches the second-best solution without the need for costly monitoring. Coinsurance is above (below) the socially optimal level if individuals place greater weight (less weight) on their own utility than on that of their partners., I. INTRODUCTION Nonmarket transactions are commonplace, even in situations in which market substitutes are available. The provision of insurance is one such case in which both market and nonmarket products [...]

The relationship between altruism and the decision to migrate from rural to urban areas is analyzed based on data from the US and Korea. An urban-to-rural income ratio suggested by the dynastic model is used. The weighted income ratio performs better compared to other types used in previous research. The model shows that higher familial altruism is directly related to a higher weight of white-collar income.

This study presents and empirically tests a simple model of attitudinal and personality influences on individual willingness to take action in support of the environment (agentic disposition) in a sample of 367 residents of Fairfax County in Virginia. The model, comprised of items from Schwartz's theory of norm activated altruism and an abridged version of Levenson's three-dimensional conception of locus of control, fits the data well. Results of the study indicate that 1) locus of control is best viewed as multidimensional rather than previous unidimensional conceptualizations, 2) each of the Levenson locus of control dimensions plays a unique role in the model of environmental agentic disposition, and 3) agentic disposition can be conceptualized as a type of norm activated altruism. The role of agentic disposition in legitimating the positions taken by social movement organizations is discussed.

In his recent book, The Human Factor, Philip Hefner proposes to deepen theological understanding of the natural world and the place of humans within it. He describes humans as products of converging streams of genes and culture, and as possessors of freedom that requires them to be 'created cocreators.' In accordance with the requirements of 'the way things really are' (God), humans are to become divine agents in enlarging the realm of freedom in the world through self-sacrificing altruism. While Hefner's insights are admirable, his work could be viewed, in part, as a covert expression of nineteenth century liberal beliefs in progress. In fact, human culture and freedom are more ambiguous products of both good and evil, and hence we must take more cognizance of the pervasiveness of what theology has termed sin. Keywords: altruism, created cocreator, culture, dualism, freedom, genetics, myth, ritual, sin.

Introduction A frequent criticism of economics from those outside the field is illustrated by the statement of psychologist David McClelland when he argues that economics often appears to be 'an [...]

Drawing on philosophy, theology, comparative religion, spirituality, Holocaust studies, physics, biology, psychology, and personal experience, I argue that continued human existence depends on our willingness to reject nihilism - not as an expedient 'noble lie' but because faith in a meaningful cosmos and the power of love is at least as validly grounded in human experience as insistence on cosmic indifference and ultimate futility. I maintain that hope will free us to develop nonimperialistic methods of bridging cultural differences by forming a mutually intelligible vocabulary that celebrates diversity, enters the worlds of others in respectful dialogue, and fosters a postmechanistic, organic, ecological, holistic, dynamic, interactive, open-ended model of reality. I lay the foundation for a 'hermeneutics of love' to complement Paul Ricoeur's 'hermeneutics of suspicion' and invite speculation on the ways science, technology, and society would be transformed if those 'glasses of friendship' were widely applied. Keywords: Altruism; cross-cultural dialogue; cross-disciplinary dialogue; hemisphericity; hermeneutics; hesed; holism; hope; mysticism; religion as language; second naivete; truth and meaning; two-culture split.

The proposed relationship between altruism and social work is a provocative, but flawed, thesis. Analysis of the social service profession reveals that social work practitioners engage in it for professional and social recognition, rather than for altruistic reasons. Further conceptual analysis suggests that desire for social control, rather than altruism, accounts for the existence of the social service profession. Other arguments against Wakefield's thesis are made based on issues of gender and human nature.

A previous article argued for the egoist explanation for social service against an altruistic rationale. In particular, it supported the social control thesis, which states that social workers engage in this profession out of a desire for social control rather than altruism. However, these arguments are flawed because of an inadequate definition of the social control concept as well as two incompatible accounts of social work motivation. Replies to the article's criticisms are further supported with analyses of gender and human nature issues.

Repeated optional prisoner's dilemma games suggest how human altruism could have evolved. The game model demonstrates that discriminating altruism can invade an asocial population and become established. Altruism can also develop indirectly from antisociality according to this model. Altruistic behavior can be represented with a secondary payoff matrix based on transformation of a primary selfish matrix by giving some weight to the interests of others. Suggested extensions and refinements include accounting for varieties of altruism, different qualities of partners, dynamics and population genetics, as well as optional, compulsory or multiple games.

Theology and the life sciences are mutually dependent on one another in the task of understanding the origin and function of moral behavior. The life sciences investigate morality from the perspective of the historical and communal dimension of humanity and point to survival as the primary function of human behavior. A Christian ethic of self-sacrifice advances the preservation of the entire human and nonhuman creation and should not, therefore, be objected to by the life sciences. Religion, however, is more than a survival mechanism. It points to a preserving agency beyond humanity and prevents the life sciences from reducing life to its strictly biological side.

Most social and political theory since Hobbes is constructed on the norm of self-interest. Yet even in the most vicious of Darwinian worlds, altruism and selfless behavior continue to exist. Why? The work described below examines altruism to answer three specific questions. Are there systematic sociocultural predictors of altruism and related forms of selfless behavior? Are there corresponding systematic similarities in cognitive schema among altruists with respect to their self-perception and identity? And, finally, how can we explain f differences between altruists and the self-interested rational actors of economics and rational choice theory? The research described here analyzes entrepreneurs as paradigmatic rational actors and contrasts them with philanthropists, heroes, and rescuers of Jews in Nazi-Europe. Findings from in-depth interviews suggest none of the traditional sociocultural factors predicts altruistic behavior. Explanations from social psychology work no better for selfless individuals than they do for typical rational actors. Reciprocity, clusters of altruists, and group or kin selection have no predictive power, nor does the psychic gratification hypothesis of economics. The economists' resource hypothesis has a limited explanatory power for traditional rational actors but has none for altruists. Anthropological explanations stressing birth order and stable family relations fail, but familiarity with the recipient predicts charitable activities by the entrepreneur. Both familiarity and empathy explain the philanthropist's actions but neither of these explains acts by rescuers or heroes. What does explain the actions of all our selfless individuals is a common perception of themselves as individuals strongly linked to others through a shared humanity. Their cognitive frameworks differ consistently and significantly from traditional rational actors in this regard., .