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The provision of expert testimony in litigation has become a big business. The paradigmatic testifying expert is no longer the "amateur" expert who maintains a separate professional identity and testifies only once, or at most sporadically, in litigation to which their expertise is uniquely pertinent. Rather, they are a professional provider of litigation support services who spends a substantial part of their time, and derives a substantial part of their income from, consulting on pending or contemplated lawsuits. Legal rules concerning the provision of expert testimony continue to apply the former, obsolete paradigm of the testifying expert. This conflict of paradigms becomes especially acute when a former client accuses a testifying expert of professional malpractice. In other contexts, professional service providers are liable for injuries caused to their client by the service provider's failure to act with professional competence. In the case of testifying experts, however, some courts and scholars maintain that the absolute immunity extended to participants in judicial proceedings preempts the law of professional malpractice that would otherwise apply. This Article makes two contributions to the discussion of expert malpractice liability. It is the first Article to construct a typology of expert malpractice claims and to evaluate systematically the rationales offered for absolute immunity of testifying experts as applied to each type of claim. The Article concludes that absolute immunity against expert malpractice claims is in all cases either unwarranted, insofar as it does not serve the purposes of witness immunity, or unnecessary, insofar as existing tort and contract law serve adequately to prevent the undesirable outcomes that proponents of immunity identify while permitting injured plaintiffs to recover for experts' professional misconduct. Second, the Article offers guidance as to how expert malpractice liability should be implemented, proposing reforms to substantive state law as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence intended to accommodate the concerns raised by advocates of absolute immunity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a response to Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini's thought-provoking article, '"Hospital Shields" and the Limits of International Law', published in this issue. The authors advocate reforming the law to allow hospitals absolute protection, even in cases where they are also used by combatants for military purposes that are harmful to their adversary ('shielding hospitals'). Defining the contour of the desired protection for hospitals should start with both the institutional and personal attributes justifying their special protection as well as with the empirical data relating to the prevalence of attacks on hospitals – who and what triggers them. Against this background, this reply presents the prevailing law that grants strong protection to hospitals, albeit a contingent one that may be removed in exceptional cases of their abuse. It advocates retaining the contingent protection, though with some adjustments, and argues that the suggested absolute protection – in fact, immunity – for shielding hospitals is neither feasible nor normatively desirable. It would damage the current balance and rationale of the entire body of international humanitarian law in general and have a counter-effect upon the treatment of the sick and wounded in particular. Contrary to its apparent humanitarian rationale, absolute immunity for shielding hospitals would damage their ability to function as medical institutions and allow an adversary who controls a hospital full discretion in selecting its priorities regarding the use of its space and resources and might turn the sick and wounded into a means of warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the development of qualified immunity doctrine in the context of the Fourth Amendment to U.S. Constitution. Topics discussed include interests of Supreme Court related to the same; Harlow v. Fitzgerald court case involving the doctrines of qualified immunity and absolute immunity; Wilson v. Layne court case on the same; and impact of lack of constitutional development and subjectivity on the same.

President Donald Trump's use of Twitter portends a turning point in presidential communication. His Tweets animate his base and enrage his opponents. Tweets, however, like any form of communication, can ruin reputations. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court determined that a president retains absolute immunity for all actions that fall within the "outer perimeter" of his official duties. This Article explores the "outer perimeter" of presidential immunity. It suggests the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments inform the demarcation of the "outer perimeter," and that when a president engages in malicious defamation, his speech falls outside this perimeter and is not protected by presidential immunity. The Article begins by examining Twitter as a social media platform and how it facilitates and affects the way we communicate. It then focuses on how Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump incorporated the use of Twitter into their presidencies. I then explore four distinct lines of jurisprudence that I argue inform how to identify the "outer perimeter" of a president's official duties: (1) presidential immunity; (2) immunity for executive branch officials; (3) the constitutional implications of defamation; and (4) the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition on government action motivated by animus. I posit that considering these four doctrines, along with the method and manner of communication facilitated by Twitter, malicious defamation falls outside the "outer perimeter" of official presidential duties, and thus, presidential immunity is inapplicable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contract rules can be justified by utilitarian theories (such as efficiency theory), which are concerned with promoting rules that enhance societal wealth and utility. Contract rules can also be justified by rights-based theories (such as promissory and reliance theories), which are concerned with protecting the contractual freedom and interests of the individual parties to the contract. Or, contract rules can be analyzed through the lenses of a host of other theories, including critical legal theory, bargain theory, and so on. Because no single, unitary theory can ever explain the complex body of laws and societal conventions surrounding contracts, the best rule to govern any particular situation is the one that can be justified by multiple normative theories. Such an approach would stand the best chance of achieving consensus, and would acknowledge the insight of pluralism theorists--that no single unified theory can explain the civil law. This Article applies a concordant approach to selecting contract rules to address the question of whether a parent company should be held liable in tort for directing the termination of a contract entered into by its subsidiary. Under ordinary circumstances, a simple breach of contract does not give rise to tort liability and punitive damages; one cannot tortiously interfere with one's own contract. But the courts around the country are deeply divided on the question of whether parent companies are immune from tort liability for inducing a subsidiary to breach a contract. Some courts hold that because the parent and subsidiary share common interests, the parent is completely immune from tort liability, just as though it were a party to the contract (Category 1). Some courts take the similarly formalistic approach that because the parent and subsidiary are technically separate entities, the parent enjoys no immunity from tort liability (Category 2). Some courts impose tort liability only if the parent acted against the business interests of the parent and subsidiary or committed an independent tort (Category 3). Some courts impose tort liability even if the breach of contract was in the business interest of the parent and subsidiary if the parent company's actions were "wrongful," which can be something less than tortious behavior (Category 4). This Article presents an exhaustive survey and categorization of these conflicting rules and then applies normative contract theory to determine which is the best approach. In particular, the two most dominant contract law theories of our time are applied to the issue: efficiency theory and rights-based theory. Applying efficiency theory to the problem at hand, this Article begins with the proposition that, in order tofacilitate efficient breaches of contract, no tort liability should be imposed. However, once one takes into account the underlying false assumption of efficiency theoiy that commercial actors always act rationally, allowing for tort liability to be imposed in those situations where the parent does not act out of business judgment makes sense. When rights-based theory is applied to this issue, it raises questions as to whether breach should be penalized to honor the promise made to the nonbreaching party and to protect the non-breaching party's reliance on that promise. However, rights-based theoiy would also argue for protecting the parent company's autonomy by allowing it to reject a promise it never accepted and to decline to honor reliance it never induced--but only if the parent is acting out of rational business interest. Accordingly, the parent company should be afforded autonomy in choosing to terminate a contract it did not bargain for (so long as it pays compensatory damages). If the parent company's actions are not taken for rational business reasons, but rather for reasons of spite, malice, or oppression, then the law should punish and deter such behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the doctrinal evolution of state and foreign sovereign immunity in America as of 2015, and it mentions the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the historical aspects of federalism in America, and rulings by the nation's Supreme Court in constitutional law cases such as Chisholm v. Georgia and Hans v. State of Louisiana. Injunctive relief and an absolute immunity legal doctrine are examined, as well as the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and abrogation.

The article discusses how several lower courts in America have misinterpreted and misapplied the implicit immunities that are contained in Title 42, Section 1983 of the U.S. Code which is also known as the nation's Civil Rights Act of 1871. The expansion of an absolute immunity legal doctrine to government officials is mentioned, along with American common law and the concept of transferred immunity. Quasi-judicial immunity and legislative immunity in the U.S. are assessed.

The article discusses the U.S. government's decision to file a statement of interest and a supplementary letter in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York endorsing the absolute immunity of the United Nations (UN) and several UN officials to claims of liability based on the alleged introduction of cholera into Haiti by UN peacekeeping forces. The Haitian Ministry of Health states that as of June 2014, over 8,500 people have died as a result of contracting cholera.

The article discusses the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's determination in the 2011 case FG Hemisphere Associates v. Democratic Republic of Congo that sovereign states enjoy absolute immunity in the courts of Hong Kong which cannot be waived in predispute contractual documents. Public international law and international commercial arbitration cases are mentioned, along with the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

This Note examines the unsettled relationship between defamation and negligence. The law of defamation, through the torts of libel and slander, constitutes a well-developed and complex body of state common law and constitutional considerations. However, some claims for reputational harm may fall outside of this framework, as the law of defamation does not account for all of the ways that an individual's reputation may be injured. Thus, plaintiffs sometimes bring negligence claims to seek redress for damage to reputation. When a plaintiff brings a negligence claim for pure reputational harm, the court is faced with a variety of options for handling the claim. This Note argues that courts should adopt a multistep approach to handling such claims. The court should first determine whether the claim is communication-based or not. If it is a noncommunieative claim, it should be allowed to stand as a simple negligence claim. If however, the claim is communication-based, it should be presumptively displaced by the torts of libel and slander. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the reported reasons why those people who were apparently damaged during social networking company Facebook Inc.'s initial public offering (IPO) in 2012 will likely recover almost nothing from NASDAQ, focusing on self-regulatory organization (SRO) liability in America under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The absolute immunity legal doctrine is addressed, along with for-profit business activities and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regulations.

The article discusses the law of remedies as of April 2014, focusing on the relationship between substantive and remedial law, as well as evidentiary exclusions and violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Rules of qualified and absolute immunity are addressed, along with injunctive and monetary relief in America. A harmless error legal rule is examined, along with public law adjudication in the U.S. Efforts to achieve disaggregation in the law are also examined.

The article discusses the U.S. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 in relation to violence against American Indian women and the authority of tribal governments in regards to pursuing criminal charges against individuals. According to the article, the law includes special domestic violence jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants. The U.S. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, absolute immunity, and the nation's Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 are examined.

National courts have long understood the UN to have absolute immunity from their jurisdiction, based upon provisions in the UN Charter and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the UN. While state immunity has evolved over recent decades, allowing restrictive immunity that distinguishes between acts jure imperii and those jure gestionis, questions have arisen as to whether that doctrine applies to international organizations and, specifically, the UN. The counterbalance to the UN’s absolute immunity is the requirement that it provide alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes. This raises concerns about accountability and internal review. Case law from various courts demonstrates an increasing willingness to attempt to challenge absolute immunity on the basis that the bar to jurisdiction violates claimants’ rights to access a court and to a remedy. In all of those cases, individuals’ ability to access alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution has been used to show that their rights have been realized. Recent events concerning the 2010 cholera outbreak in Haiti may lead to a challenge to the UN’s absolute immunity. The UN has deemed those claims to be ‘not receivable’, which denies the claimants their rights to access a court and to a remedy. In October 2013, lawyers for the Haiti cholera victims filed a class action in the Southern District of New York, seeking to challenge the UN’s immunity by bringing the Organization before a national court. This article explores whether the events in Haiti may provide the first successful, human rights-based challenge to the UN’s absolute immunity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the law of foreign sovereign immunity in the U.S. and analyzes the role of legal enforcement in the sovereign debt markets. It reflects on the abandoning of the doctrine of absolute immunity by the U.S. and examines court cases by private claimants against foreign governments. It explains the effect of debt litigation on ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone.

The article discusses the absolute immunity from civil liability protection that is provided to arbitrators in the U.S. as of November 2013, focusing on the business judgment rule and the proposed development of a rule of arbitral liability which will hold arbitrators accountable for the professional services that they provide. Gross negligence and director liability are mentioned, along with civil lawsuits and good faith efforts by arbitrators to resolve disputes.

The article offers information on the history, developments and significance of the application of the qualified immunity defense in U.S. Supreme Court decisions under the Section 1983 of the Title 42 of the U.S. Code. It informs that U.S. Supreme Court clarified the line of distinction between absolute immunity and qualified immunity in its opinion in the Rehberg v. Paulk case. It discusses the rulings in qualified immunity cases Richardson v. McKnight, Wyatt v. Cole, and Filarsky v. Delia.

The article focuses on the adoption of traditional doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity in Hong Kong by China. It informs that under absolute immunity, foreign sovereign is always immune from suit irrespective of the claim. It discusses the court case of FG Hemisphere Associations v. Dem. Rep. Congo (Congo I) regarding Chinese regression from the restrictive to the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Questions of whether prosecutors should be immune from liability for constitutional torts, and if so, whether that immunity should be qualified or absolute, have been the source of considerable controversy for the last half century. Some argue that absolute prosecutorial immunity is indispensable, a necessary tool to protect public servants who, without immunity, would be buffed under a mountain of frivolous § 1983 suits. Others see absolute prosecutorial immunity as unjust because it prevents genuinely wronged individuals from rightfully collecting damages from constitutional tortfeasors. As the debate over the Supreme Court's prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence continues, the current scope of protections afforded to prosecutors outside of the judicially created immunity regimes has received decidedly less attention. This Note will argue that states and local municipalities have created a number of protections for public officials, including prosecutors--such as indemnification legislation, private insurance, and other alternative liability mechanisms--to cover losses from torts they commit in the line of duty. These protections prevent prosecutors from shouldering the burden of personal financial liability even in instances in which they cannot don the cloak of absolute immunity. Considering the breadth of the protections that are currently afforded prosecutors coupled with the opportunity for their expansion to additional jurisdictions, the Court's decades-old justifications for maintaining absolute prosecutorial immunity are no longer a concern. Therefore, the Court should abandon its confusing absolute prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence once and for all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses American judges and absolute judicial immunity from civil litigation under U.S. law as of June 2012, focusing on an examination of U.S. Supreme Court case law on the subject and a call for legal reforms to prevent abuses of power from taking place within the American judicial system. It states that judges in the U.S. are immune from civil lawsuits when they act within their subject matter jurisdiction in regards to a judicial act.

In March 2003, FBI agents pretextually arrested Abdullah al-Kidd under the federal material witness statute. As a result, al-Kidd brought a Bivens action in federal district court against U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft. The court denied Ashcroft's assertions of absolute and qualified immunity, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In Aschroft v. al-Kidd the U.S. Supreme Court correctly held that qualified immunity protected Asheroft against al-Kidd's lawsuit. But the Court's unnecessary conclusion that Ashcroft did not violate the Fourth Amendment is troubling. Not only did the Court expand the "objectively reasonable" test that is typically applied to law enforcement officers in the field but it also proposed a definition of "suspicion" that is at odds with its own precedent. The combined effect of these developments is an alarming ability on the part of authorities to avoid the probable cause requirement for arrest warrants. When an arresting authority's state of mind is shielded from constitutional scrutiny, and when the definition of suspicion is as broad as the Court has construed it, the result is the erosion of basic Fourth Amendment protections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]