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Retailers often employ professionals known as retail buyers to determine the right quantities of products to order. However, in many economies and industries, a manufacturer may seek to unduly influence the buyer through various means. One such means is to offer the buyer kickbacks (incl. entertainment, travel, gifts) in return for a large order. Despite prominent examples of retailers taking initiatives against kickbacks, the practice persists in many economies and industries. To aid initiatives combating kickbacks, one needs to do the right diagnosis and identify the root cause. To this end, in this paper, we introduce the retail buyer as a distinct player in the retail channel and study the implications of the tug-of-war between the retailer and the manufacturer to influence the buyer. Interestingly, we find when kickbacks are feasible, the manufacturer need not always benefit, and the retailer need not always be the victim. We show a well-designed buyer compensation plan is key for the retailer to avoid kickbacks from distorting the buyer's demand assessments. Moreover, when the reputational harm from kickbacks is not too high, the retailer may be the one tacitly facilitating kickbacks by undercompensating the buyer and influencing her demand assessments such that it can leverage kickbacks for shifting some of its buyer compensation cost to the manufacturer. This sharing of cost may allow for better channel coordination. Furthermore, this cost-shifting mechanism of kickbacks we have identified in this paper can explain their persistence. No retailer tolerates kickbacks when the reputational harm is high. This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.01646. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Internet provides an additional channel for manufacturers to provide information about and sell their products. The electronic channel has the advantage of reduced search cost and its reach is increasing, but it has limited capability to provide product information. This paper examines how Internet technology affects a monopoly manufacturer's distribution problem in an environment where product information is important for consumers to identify their ideal product. The model suggests that a manufacturer uses the electronic channel in addition to the physical channel when the product information is very valuable and product information is largely about digital attributes, or when the product information is not valuable. The model also suggests that when the manufacturer chooses to sell through both channels, there is an increase in price competition between the two channels such that the manufacturer need not sell through the electronic retailer with the highest reach. Also, when a large proportion of consumers have access to both channels, the manufacturer may sell through only one channel. The paper also examines the case where the manufacturer operates in the electronic channel and the case where the retailers are integrated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effect of product substitutability on the equilibrium profits in a distribution channel of two symmetric manufacturers selling substitutable products to consumers through a nonexclusive retailer. Conventional wisdom suggests that when the products are more substitutable, the retailer will be better off while the manufacturers will be worse off, owing to the dominance of the competition effect of substitutability. In this work, we identify the hitherto neglected demand effect of substitutability and show that the relative strength between the competition and demand effects is the key to this result. As the products become more substitutable, the upstream competition does intensify, but vitally, the demand may expand. We show that the interests of the retailer and manufacturers can be aligned in terms of product substitutability, depending on both the demand and supply factors. Surprisingly, the conventional result can even be completely reversed such that the manufacturers benefit from a certain level of substitutability for some demand patterns. Assuming linear demand, we further isolate the important role of the bargaining power balance and the alternative of agency selling format in moderating the competition effect. For example, as the retailer gains more bargaining power, the (negative) demand effect can overshadow the (positive) competition effect such that a higher degree of substitutability can actually hurt the retailer. Our findings provide valuable implications for persuasive advertising and category management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the influence of national culture on customers' behavior and customers' choice of channel through the customer life cycle stages. An exploratory in-depth single case study in a multinational organization in Egypt was conducted. Specifically, 31 in-depth interviews were conducted with members of staff in marketing, IT, retail and customer services departments, and external prospects/customers. Based on an interpretive approach, the authors have articulated a situated cultural approach based on structuration theory to identify the cultural dimensions that have provided an understanding of the cultural influence on customers' channel choice. The results highlighted that verbal, human interaction, traditional shopping, and cash based were the themes for customers' channel choice through the four stages of customer life cycle. The results also show that the customers' channel choices were linked to the following Egyptian cultural dimensions: collectivism, market price relationship, emotional, power distance, low trust, uncertainty avoidance, and universalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes how the market power in a supply chain affects a manufacturer's hybrid marketing channel strategies, considering market transaction costs and the ratio of market size of the online market and the offline market. Also, this paper investigates a price-matching strategy when a manufacturer adds an online channel. This paper shows a number of interesting results: generally, when a manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg follower, the manufacturer chooses a hybrid marketing channel strategy as online costs become very much smaller and the size of the online market is much larger. However, when a manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer has more chances to use a hybrid marketing channel strategy even when the online costs are relatively higher. In addition, a manufacturer may use a price-matching strategy by lowering its prices with the aim to eventually drive the retailer out of the market if the manufacturer perceives that a retailer has more advantages in the offline market and the size of offline market is larger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to investigate the challenges e-tailers are confronted with when synchronizing clicks with bricks into an omni-channel perspective; and second, to shed light on the possible ways to overcome these challenges in order to successfully implement an omni-channel strategy. Design/methodology/approach – To answer the research questions, the authors draw on an in-depth longitudinal case study conducted within the French on-line eyewear retailer Direct Optic from January 2013 to March 2015. From an ethnographic perspective, the authors document the evolution of the retailing company’s decisions and processes as they moved towards defining and implementing an omni-channel strategy. Research was carried out using primary (1,500+ hours of participant observation and 118 interviews) and secondary data sources. A conceptualizing content analysis was conducted both manually and with NVivo software. Findings – First, the results show that the challenges faced in shifting to omni-channel strategy are so numerous and so engaging that, de facto, it is impossible to evolve directly from a multi-channel, siloed strategy to an omni-channel strategy without any transition. Second, throughout this transformative process, the result show that the challenges faced by the company evolved gradually in terms of scope and priority, and can be categorized into two main categories: the strategy-related challenges (organizational, cultural, managerial, marketing and resources) which were the highest priority in the first stage and the development-related challenges (retailing mix, information systems and customer relationship management (CRM)) which became the highest priority during the second stage. Research limitations/implications – The authors emphasize the importance of carefully orchestrating how strategy- and development-related challenges are addressed as, for retailers engaged in going omni-channel, this involves a complete transformation of their configuration. Originality/value – The study contributes to channel management and retailing research by deepening the conceptualization of multi-, cross- and omni-channel retailing; exploring the nature, importance and sequence of the strategy-related challenges and development-related challenges when shifting to an omni-channel strategy; and providing insights into how successfully navigating the transformative process to be omni-channel requires investigating different possible solutions, and further testing and re-testing them, before deploying the appropriate ones. Up to the knowledge, it is one of the first studies to empirically investigate the challenges of an e-tailer when moving towards an omni-channel strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a subscription platform that offers services to variety-seeking consumers who incorporate transportation costs in their decision of how many and which vendor services to consume. ClassPass in fitness and MoviePass in entertainment are examples of such platforms. We find that for the platform to be successful, it should enter markets where consumers' added benefit from patronizing more than one vendor is relatively high, thus strengthening the position of the platform in negotiations with the vendors. As well, managers should consider entering markets where competition between the vendors is relatively weak and in particular, where vendors benefit from local monopoly positions because of high transportation costs incurred by consumers. When entering such markets, offering the subscription contract is likely to attract new customers who are not active when the platform does not exist. Moreover, appropriate crafting of the agreement with the vendors in this case allows the parties to fully extract the surplus derived by platform customers. Last, the platform's managers should be cognizant of the need to identify tools that facilitate alleviated price competition with vendors. Negotiating over an appropriate transfer fee per customer to pay the vendor or imposing restrictions on the level of service that their customers can use may be such tools. Offering customers lower-quality services when using the vendor in comparison with the quality they could obtain by buying directly from him may not be a successful tool to alleviate price competition. This paper was accepted by Duncan Simester, marketing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quota-based and partial-refund return policies abound in practice between manufacturers and their resellers. While the literature has provided insights into the design of the partial-refund policy, little attention has been directed at the design of the quota-based return policy. Accordingly, this paper explores the relative preference of a quota-based policy vis-à-vis a partial-refund policy. We do this, first, in the context of risk-neutral channel partners to identify the strategic decisions of each party and the effect of demand uncertainty on the variation of their respective profits. Our results reveal that the manufacturer faces higher profit variation (between the different demand realizations) under the quota policy. The variance in profits for the reseller is, however, higher under the partial-refund policy. We explain the source of profit variations by comparing it across different channel structures (centralized and decentralized). Next, we formally extend the model to include a disutility associated with profit variation and show that when the manufacturer has a variation-induced disutility, the partial-refund contract should be used, as it is the dominating contract. Similarly, when the retailer has a variation-induced disutility, the quota contract should be used. This is consistent with the pattern of profit variations in the risk-neutral case where the manufacturer has lower variation with the partial-refund contract while the reseller has lower variation with the quota contract. Finally, our analysis also shows how the manufacturer may employ a combination policy to better manage its own profit variation while providing adequate overstocking protection for the reseller. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2018.1094. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internet channels have grown rapidly in recent years due to advances in information technology. However, many leading manufacturers opt not to sell online. In this paper, we construct a theoretical model with competing manufacturers and an active retailer to explain this market phenomenon. We document the possibility of asymmetric channel structure despite the ex ante symmetry between the manufacturers. Moreover, the increasing prominence of online shopping behaviors does not necessarily lead to the increased adoption of Internet channels. The prevalence of dual-channel strategies can be regarded as a form of prisoners' dilemma, and the manufacturers may intentionally intensify the product or channel substitution to escape from this undesirable outcome. We explain how demand expansion and competition mitigation drive these unintended consequences and provide some general guidelines for the managerial choice of channel structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose a virtual forward-buying model that allows for forward buying but reduces the channel cost with no major behavioral change on the part of manufacturers and retailers. Design/methodology/approach – Using simulations, the authors compare the proposed virtual forward-buying model with the traditional forward-buying and everyday-low-price approaches. Findings – The authors find that the proposed model leads to lower overall channel costs that are shared equitably between both the manufacturer and the retailer. Research limitations/implications – No primary or secondary is used, a situation that is usually very difficult to find in this area. Practical implications – The paper presents a new method to improve trade promotion efficiencies that does not require a drastic change of habits for either the manufacturer or the retailer; allows the practice of forward buying to continue; and leads to channel cost reductions for both parties. Originality/value – The paper presents research in an area that is under-researched due to lack of data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In designing a cognitive radio sensor network (CRSN), we need to take account of energy both efficiency and primary user (PU) protection since the CRSN consumes additional energy to support CR functionality such as channel sensing and switching, which can shorten the network lifetime. In this paper, we propose a new channel management scheme for CRSNs, which heightens the energy efficiency while not greatly disturbing a PU. The CRSN with the proposed scheme adaptively selects its operation mode among channel sensing, channel switching, and data transmission/reception, according to the channel-sensing outcome. Considering that the sensing outcome can be erroneous due to noise uncertainty, we design the proposed scheme on the basis of the partially observable Markov decision process framework. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme energy-efficiently operates while properly protecting a PU. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Both traditional retailers and e-tailers have been implementing omnichannel strategies such as buy online, pick up at store (BOPS). We build a stylized model to investigate the impact of the BOPS initiative on store operations from an inventory perspective. We consider two segments of customers, namely store-only customers who only make purchases offline and omni-customers who strategically choose between offline and online channels. We show that BOPS may either benefit or hurt the retailer depending on two fundamental system primitives: the store visiting cost and the online waiting cost. If the online waiting cost is relatively low and the store visiting cost is even lower, BOPS can induce omni-customers to migrate from online buying to BOPS, leading to demand pooling at the brick-and-mortar (B&M) store. Such demand pooling provides two benefits for the retailer: it reduces the overstocking cost, and after inventory reoptimization, it results in a higher fill rate at the B&M store, which benefits existing customers and potentially attracts more customers to the store. In contrast, if both store visiting and online waiting costs are relatively high with the latter even higher, introducing BOPS can result in demand depooling as a result of the migration of the omni-customers from offline purchasing to BOPS. This leads to a lower fill rate after inventory reoptimization, likely the result of a lower profit margin under BOPS, which turns away store-only customers and hurts the retailer. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

WirelessHART is a networking technology that is widely used in industrial wireless sensor networks. Its reliability and real-time performance are essential to industrial production. Many works have studied these two aspects, primarily focusing on a single WirelessHART network. However, multiple WirelessHART networks usually coexist in a real industrial environment. Applying existing approaches to such coexisting networks would cause performance degradation due to communication interference among these networks. In this paper, we propose a holistic framework that optimizes both reliability and temporality for multiple coexisting networks. The framework consists of two levels. The upper level targets communication channel management, and the lower level addresses data flow scheduling. For the upper level, we propose a network isolation algorithm that improves the data transmission reliability through dynamically adjusting channel assignments to different WirelessHART networks. For the lower level, we propose data flow scheduling algorithms that guarantee the temporality of data flows within each isolated network. These algorithms minimize the number of channels reserved by each isolated network and further enhance the transmission reliability through alleviating channel resource contention. We conduct trace-driven simulations of the channel management algorithm, and the results demonstrate that our algorithm exhibits stable performance and reduces packet loss by $36\%$. For the scheduling algorithms, the simulations demonstrate that in contrast with existing algorithms, the greater the number of coexisting networks, the fewer resources our algorithms use. When eight networks coexist, our algorithms outperform existing ones by consuming up to $63\%$ fewer channel resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]