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The annual report of the IFLA National Committee Germany for the period September 2023 to June 2024 provides information on the current developments of the international library association IFLA. Due to discussions about the venue for the World Congress in 2025, the invitation was withdrawn and instead smaller section meetings and conferences will take place. Under the presidency of Vicky McDonald, measures have been taken to improve the weaknesses of the institution and secure the association financially. A change in the statutes also enables the association to enter into new partnerships. Renate Behrens was honored with the IFLA Scroll of Appreciation for her achievements. There are 41 people from German institutions active in IFLA committees. In Germany, 52 institutions, individuals, and 5 professional associations are members of IFLA. The IFLA National Committee Germany consists of various representatives. The website www.ifla-deutschland.de provides information about the activities of the association in Germany and in the international context. [Extracted from the article]

In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron as inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), which requires courts to decide "all relevant questions of law" and therefore prohibits them from deferring to agency interpretations because the relevant statutory language is ambiguous. A different approach now governs judicial review of the countless routine, often specialized questions of statutory interpretation that agencies answer in the normal course of implementing their statutes--the "ordinary" questions. But Loper Bright did not provide direction on how courts should determine which of these questions are questions of law. This issue arises because many, if not most, ordinary questions involve questions of law that depend on questions of policy for resolution and can be characterized either way for purposes of judicial review. Under Chevron, courts did not need to decide how to characterize such mixed questions because the doctrine instructed them to treat statutory ambiguities as presenting questions of policy for the agency to decide. That directive eased the pressure of determining how to handle such questions for purposes of judicial review under the APA. Loper Bright has altered the doctrine but not the nature of ordinary questions. Even though courts may no longer treat these questions as ones of policy "simply because the statute is ambiguous," they do not need to characterize every question as one of law simply because a statutory term or phrase is involved. Many agency interpretations are no different in kind or degree from the agency policy decisions subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard of review in the APA. Courts determine which of the underlying questions are for them to decide independently and which are for the agency to decide, subject to the arbitrary and capricious test. This is a judicial policy choice, and we should be interested in how courts make it. Before Chevron, courts made the choice on an ad hoc basis. After Loper Bright, the temptation is for courts to ignore the problem and decide what they can. This Foreword contends that courts should make the choice mindful of established judicial norms for questions of policy. More specifically, a court should consider whether resolving a question itself would amount to judicial policymaking in the relatively concrete ways that the arbitrary and capricious test discourages. The claim is not that courts should apply the arbitrary and capricious test straight away to ordinary questions. Rather, the considerations for applying that test are useful in the first instance to discern whether a question is best regarded as one of law or policy, consistent with the APA and the normative values that undergird the allocation of authority between courts and agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Financial & Economic Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Financial & Economic Law Review is the property of Angle Publishing Co., Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the legal issues related to pay-to-stay statues of U.S. states, particularly the provisions allowing the seizure of inherited property to recompense for a person's incarceration costs. Also cited are the claim that property seizure is an interference by states on a decedents' freedom to choose their beneficiaries, and the alleged disadvantages of said statutes like perpetuating a cycle of poverty and reducing the urgency of decarceration.

Disagreement on law's relationship to morality has long been driven by disagreement about our ordinary concept. Until recently, however, there had been no systematic investigation of lay intuitions. In this paper, we advance this nascent effort. Across two studies (N = 697), our findings reveal that most people consider law to be more than a matter of political circumstance alone. Contrary to the expectations of most contemporary philosophers, morality (both substantive and procedural) emerges as a key influence on judgments of legal validity: many people say that conduct prohibited by immoral statutes is not truly illegal, and that immoral conduct which was never explicitly prohibited is truly illegal. This suggests that people often treat law as a dual character concept that, like the concepts of scientist or of artist, features autonomous concrete and abstract dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although presidential vetoes are central to the legislative process, the role of total versus line item vetoes (LIV) is largely unclear. While total vetoes are a sign of conflict between the branches, as the literature has emphasized, we argue that LIV function as a negative agenda setting mechanism that enables presidents to coordinate within their coalition. To test our argument, we use an original dataset on all statutes and executive decrees approved and vetoed in Brazil for the period 1988–2010. In both, statutes and decrees, we show that while total vetoes occur when conflict between branches is stronger, LIV happen when such conflict is minimal and presidents have tight control over their coalition. The results are robust across dependent variables, model specifications, and estimation strategies. Our findings highlight that while the total veto is a blunt bargaining mechanism, the LIV provides a scalpel, a much finer tool that helps presidents manage and sustain their congressional coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not all statutes are created equal. Contributing to the literature on "super statutes," I suggest that an analogy to the philosophical concept of weakness of will can illuminate circumstances under which some statutes ought to stand above others. Analogizing to philosopher Richard Holton's account of weak will, I develop an account in which some statutes express long-term commitments, are intended to foreclose future deliberation, and enact reasons into the law. Such statutes have the status of what Holton calls "resolutions." Like an individual resolving to stop eating meat, yet finding themself unable to resist, Congress can be weak willed when it violates such statutes, and this weak-willed action jeopardizes the advantages of enacting such statutes in the first place. I then propose that courts may apply familiar canons of statutory interpretation--the presumption against implied repeal, appropriations canon, and Charming Betsy canon--to hold Congress accountable to its commitments. This account also provides a new normative justification for each of these canons of statutory interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The death penalty debate intensifies when condemned women are considered, at least in part because of the associations society holds between womanhood and motherhood. Consequently, the concept of motherhood inherently permeates every condemned woman's sentence. Using qualitative document analysis, we examine how pregnancy is accounted for in the death penalty statutes and execution protocols. In half of U.S. states, exceptions exist in the statutes preventing executions of pregnant people, but pregnancy is rarely mentioned in execution protocols. The findings highlight aspects of reproductive injustice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Restorative justice practices are popular alternatives for youth conflict resolutions in the juvenile justice system and in schools. However, we do not know the extent to which states have formalized the use of restorative justice. This study reviews state legislation to identify whether restorative justice has been codified in juvenile justice and public education statutes. Through a content analysis of relevant statutory provisions, we find considerable variation in how restorative justice is defined and implemented in the juvenile justice and public‐school systems. We conclude with policy implications aimed at standardizing the understanding and application of restorative justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Statutes that create or codify causes of action sometimes contain jurisdiction provisions. The wording of these provisions can differ widely. Some of them purport to give exclusive jurisdiction to a specific court. In the private international law context, this raises the question of whether such a provision precludes the courts of any other jurisdiction from hearing a claim under the statute. This article analyses how these provisions have been interpreted. It focuses on Canadian law but draws on American, Australian and New Zealand jurisprudence. The article contends that the Canadian jurisprudence is uneven and insufficiently rigorous. Several of the decisions cannot be reconciled with each other, such that some must be regarded as incorrect. Several of the decisions fail to identify the important questions that are posed by alleged assertions of exclusive jurisdiction and also fail to answer them. Moving forward, courts should treat the claim that such a provision deprives a court of jurisdiction with caution and even scepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Arab Journal for Scientific Publishing is the property of Research & Development of Human Recourses Center (REMAH) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite apparent agreement on the approach to the interpretation of statutes in Canada, a system of limited parliamentary sovereignty, judges differ on a fundamental point: how purpose is used in interpretation. Some judges craft arguments that view the text as the medium through which the legislature expresses its intention, using purpose to shed light on the meaning of the text in defined ways ('text-as-medium' interpretation). Others see the background purposes or values of the statutory context as binding constraints in a coherent legal order, with text as merely a signal to meaning ('purpose-as-medium' interpretation). This paper argues that text-as-medium interpretation offers the most persuasive account of the use of purpose in interpretation, especially in a system of legislative sovereignty, which constrains interpretive choice. By bringing to light the commitments of these two interpretive arguments in the Canadian context for the first time, the paper also raises deeper normative questions about how to view legislation in a Westminster parliamentary democracy. These questions are fundamental to the relationship between sovereign legislatures and courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an evaluative review of the supervision and prudential regime of the banking sector of Mauritius. It assesses the normative framework that provides for the basis of bank supervision in Mauritius using relevant international standards as applicable. It can be observed that the banking sector of Mauritius is quite advanced and compliant with international standards though there is room for improvement. The Bank of Mauritius has been proactive in ensuring that the supervision and prudential regime meets the exigencies of the standards of an international financial centre which Mauritius aspires to be. The aim of this evaluative review is to provide an overview of bank supervision and the prudential regime of Mauritius to the academic and research community since there is a dearth of literature on this aspect coming from Mauritius. Additionally, there are certain lessons that can be learnt from the Mauritian experience regarding bank supervision especially for African countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More than 50 years have passed since the first proposal of a crime of ecocide under international criminal law. What seemed to be slow progress at first reached a peak of proliferation in public-legal discussion over the recent years. This paper is an effort to recapitulate the development of ecocide as a crime, analysing the different proposals from a critical point of view that will attempt to crystallise the challenges that they present. This analysis will be based on four main criteria: (a) the punishable conduct described, which will necessarily raise the discussion of the anthropocentric vis-à-vis an ecocentric vision; (b) the subjective element proposed and its compatibility with the Rome Statute; (c) the possible perpetrator; and (d) the legal instrument through which it is sought to be enshrined. Finally, we present certain guidelines regarding an International Criminal Court for the Environment and its compatibility with the International Criminal Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in United States ex rel. Martin v. Hathaway that the Anti-Kickback Statute’s (AKS) language of “resulting from” requires a but-for causal standard for prosecution through the False Claims Act (FCA). Although courts agree that some causal link is necessary, they disagree on how direct that link must be. The Sixth Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit before it, based its holding on the Supreme Court’s prior analysis of “results from” in Burrage v. United States, which provided the basis for but-for causation. The Third Circuit’s interpretation, however, resulted in a broader reading of the ordinary language of the statute. This Comment argues that the Third Circuit’s approach of requiring “some connection” between the AKS violation and FCA prosecution is correct because a broader reading is more consistent with the AKS’s purpose and benefits both the government and individual healthcare consumers alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 28, 2023, in United States ex rel. Martin v. Hathaway, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied a textualist approach when it held that to bring a False Claims Act (FCA) action “resulting from” a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), a plaintiff must show but-for causation. In 2018, in United States ex rel. Greenfield v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit looked to the legislative history of the AKS, ultimately finding that the same phrase “resulting from” conveyed a more relaxed causation standard. This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit employed the proper approach to statutory interpretation and that future litigants should plead a but-for causal relationship when bringing such claims under the FCA. By confining statutory interpretation to a textual analysis, lower courts will ideally exercise judicial restraint and defer to the legislature to amend the causal standard should Congress see fit to do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses updates in the statutes in Florida covering the construction industry in a bid to bolster building safety, ensure prompt payment of construction services, and reduce insurance claims. Also cited are some fatal accidents that inspired said statutes like the Fidenae ampitheater collapse in A.D. 27, and the exemptions in areas like licensing, coding, and permitting.

The present reflection is based on the idea that all matter is subject to movement and therefore is also subject to change. Thus, the question arises if is possible to consider the text as matter, it can behave in the same way, that is, show itself conditioned by the processes of alteration, change and subordinate to human experience. According to the above, it would be necessary to contemplate the possibility of a relative stability in the textual structures and the knowledge they support and review concepts that point to certain textual statutes that are unalterable in the face of the need of culture to preserve regulations, values and consensus, for example: textual longevity. This would explain the phenomenon of change in languages, narratives and later cultural transformations and that under a structural linguistic paradigm would be difficult to clarify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Gaceta Médica de Caracas is the property of Academia Nacional de Medicina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Peacekeeping has been used as a significanttool for the past six decades in solving crises that are dangerous to peace and security at the international level. Over the years the missions regarding peacekeeping have not only grown in size but have also seen an increase in complexity. A lot of personnel including police, military, civilians, and others deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world have reached unprecedented levels since the commencement of the latest millennium. When the peacekeeping missions began, they were largely governed by the body of principles that was unwritten and were more affected by the events people went through while working for decades rather than any specific statute. The conservation of global safety and tranquility was the main objective behind the formationof the United Nations. The main tool to achieve thisobjective is the process of peacekeeping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917—or the “TWEA”—is the precursor to the modern statutory sanctions framework of the United States. Though significantly amended since its passage—and even replaced in part by a successor statute, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977—the TWEA’s origins are important both to an understandingof modern sanctions law and to an understanding of the developmentof American governance. In enacting the TWEA, Congress sought to codify aspects of preexisting prize and trading-with-the-enemy cases. This Article explores the cases that formed the backdrop against which Congress enacted the TWEA, as well as relevant aspects of the TWEA’s drafting history. It examines the cases that emerged in the aftermath of the TWEA’s passage, especially those that confronted Congress’s later decision to make TWEA applicable in times of “national emergency,” as well as in times of “war.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, the idea that the President possesses at least some constitutional authority to direct administrative action is accepted by the courts, Congress, and the legal academy. But it was not always so. For most of American history — indeed until relatively recently — Presidents derived their authority over the administrative state largely from statute. Any role for the White House in agency rulemaking or adjudication had to be legally specified. Scholars mostly agree about when this change occurred. But the dominant shared narrative — exemplified by then-Professor Elena Kagan’s seminal article Presidential Administration — is Whig history. It offers a depoliticized interpretation that presents White House primacy as the product of steady progress toward greater administrative rationality. This Article offers a historical corrective. It explains how “administration under law” was lost and replaced with a new constitutional baseline, “presidential administration.” It is both an account of constitutional change — how one understanding of constitutional text and structure gave way to a different one — as well as a history of the regulatory state and how, beginning in the 1980s, federal officials reworked the relationship between the President, Congress, and administrative agencies in order to expand the role of market actors in governing economic activity. The Article draws attention to the intense political conflict that accompanied the advent of presidential administration. What is today bipartisan was originally nothing of the sort. It also reveals how a new interpretation of Article II took hold without any fundamental doctrinal or statutory change or shift in formal law. It highlights the emergence of a neoliberal consensus around aspects of economic regulation that incentivized and buttressed presidential administration as an approach to administrative governance. And it reveals the relative novelty of originalist arguments about the “Unitary Executive.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A federal statute restricts the habeas corpus remedy, but do federal judges also have equitable discretion to deny relief to unlawfully detained prisoners? Over the last several terms, the Supreme Court has begun to embrace this novel, ambitious view of habeas law. Although the Court has long cited what I call “negative” equity as a source of authority to devise its own limits on habeas relief, it had never — until recently — suggested that lower courts have free-floating discretion to deny relief to which prisoners are otherwise entitled. This Article, which consists of three parts, considers and refutes the “new negative equity.” In Part I, I set forth the older version of negative equity and then describe the recent departure therefrom. In Part II, I explain why the new negative equity doesn’t follow from any text-centered approach to statutory interpretation — relying substantially on context and drawing heavily from a statutory history that decisional law and academic discourse have thus far neglected. In Part III, I focus on the most troubling register of the new negative habeas equity, which involves a rule against habeas relief for those who are not “factually innocent.” Equitable power to refuse relief might be consistent with “comity, finality, and federalism,” as it were, but orphaned policy preferences are not law. Under the text-centered approach to law endorsed by most who favor habeas restrictions, such a practice is impossible to justify. Although no interpreter can be perfectly certain of statutory meaning, the new negative equity is both inconsistent with habeas history and a least-plausible reading of the modern statute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on three fundamental aspects related to the international protection of the environment. Thus, after a brief overview of the environmental situation concerning the climate emergency we face, the issue of the environment as a human right is addressed. Subsequently, the historical development of ecocide in the context of the United Nations is examined. Finally, there is an in-depth analysis of the proposed definition of ecocide and the modifications suggested for the Rome Statute, highlighting the work of the Stop Ecocide Foundation and other similar proposals. This approach aims to contribute to the development of international environmental criminal protection by exploring these three central axes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We like to think that courts are, and have always been, the primary and final interpreters of statutes. As the conventional separation-of-powers wisdom goes, legislatures "make" statutes while judges "interpret" them. In fact, however, legislatures across centuries of American history have thought of themselves as the primary interpreters. They blurred the line between "making" and "interpreting" by embracing a type of legislation that remains overlooked and little understood: "expository" legislation--enactments that specifically interpreted or construed previous enactments. In the most exhaustive historical study of the subject to date, this Article--the first in a series of Articles--unearths and explains that lost tradition of legislative statutory interpretation from an institutional perspective. To do so, it draws on an original dataset of 2,497 pieces of expository legislation passed from 1665 to 2020 at the colonial, territorial, state, and federal levels--the first effort of its kind. It shows how expository legislation originated as a colonial-era British import that Americans came to rely on beyond the creation of new constitutions. Lawmakers used expository statutes to supervise administrative statutory interpretation and to negotiate interpretation in the shadows of courts. Judges accepted and even encouraged legislative statutory interpretation. In the mid-nineteenth century, judges increasingly fought back, emboldened by growing calls for judicial independence. Yet even as the backlash entered into treatises, and even as some lawmakers began to balk, legislatures and judges continued to accept and use legislative interpretations of statutes well into the nineteenth century. The early history of expository legislation offers an alternative constitutional vision to the oft-repeated notion that statutory interpretation is necessarily and has always been an intrinsically and exclusively "judicial" power. As the Article ultimately argues, strict and formalist conceptions of separation of powers in statutory interpretation are misguided, for the extent to which statutory interpretation was considered a judicial power has fluctuated in ways that were intertwined with broader transformations in American society. This history teaches us to think of statutory interpretation as a shared task among branches but exercised in different contexts and domains. It also illuminates the historically contingent nature of legislation, revealing new ways that statutes can contain an inherent interpretive openness. These particular forms of openness raise new questions about the validity of subsequent legislative history. They also reveal how legislatures have embraced a paradoxical concept of original intent and meaning--one that legislatures recognized was rarely a "pure" kind but more often a fictional, dynamic kind intertwined with the changing views of post-enactment interpreters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the development and evolution of the income tax nexus rules in New Zealand statutes, and at how these developments are related to the main economic events and other factors that have together shaped New Zealand's income tax base. The primary aim is to identify the sources of the most common income tax nexuses in New Zealand statutes, and the reasons behind substantive changes to them over time. This largely historical research project provides the important contextual background necessary to understanding the inconsistencies in the existing statutory income tax nexus rules and to develop proposals for reform. It also helps advance a scholarly discussion about convergence and divergence of tax systems and tax rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how state authorities in New York struggled to control and influence local government in the state during America's early republic era, and it mentions various aspects of the powers and responsibilities of justices of the peace (JPs) during that time period. The judicial and administrative roles of JPs are addressed, as well as local magistracy, statutes, and party politics in the state of New York.

The application of a statutory limitation period to the recovery of mistaken payments by the Commonwealth to a former naval serviceman is not a place one would expect to locate the practical influence of jurisprudence. Yet it emerges in Sims v Commonwealth. The issue concerns the accurate identification of the ultimate foundation of Australian law. It is contended that the foundation is materialised by the interaction between the Australian Constitution and the common law: the Constitution is incomplete without common law doctrines. Therefore, there must be limits to the extent to which legislatures can abolish or amend the operation of common law rules in order to safeguard the constitutional allocation of powers. This necessarily includes limitation of action provisions. The contention is derived from recent High Court authority which was apparently not cited on appeal in Sims. A limitation period must be sourced elsewhere in the interaction between the Constitution and the unified common law of Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the leadership clause of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute in light of a possible case against a legal counsel who advises a government on its course of action. After examining the origins of the crime of aggression in the jurisprudence of the post-World War Two tribunals, a comparison between the historic "shape or influence" standard and the contemporary "control or direct" requirement is made to find out whether the Rome Statute follows its historic precedents or goes beyond them by establishing its own stricter requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Australia's arbitrator bias test to reveal its underlying contradictions and ambiguity and suggests that the legislation is amended to remedy these flaws and ensure Australia stays in line with international best practice. In 2010, section 18A of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) introduced the arbitrator bias test into Australian statute. The provision failed to specify both limbs of the test and relied on Gough, an outdated English case. This produced two opposing decisions from Australia's federal judiciary: Sino Dragon and Hui. The uncertainty of Australia's arbitrator bias test strikes at the heart of the process as the independence and impartiality of arbitrators is a fundamental pillar of international commercial arbitration. After critically analysing the progression of England's approach to the arbitrator bias test over the past century to date, I conclude that the inherent unclearness of Australia's approach needs to be remedied by the real possibility test being codified in Australian statute. This test reflects the Australian federal judiciary's most recent approach. My analysis also reveals it is the most appropriate test. By clarifying Australia's arbitrator bias test those associating with Australia's international commercial arbitration system have the requisite certainty and clarity to engage with ease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2023 marks the 50th anniversary of legal regulation of acupuncture in the United States, as the first acupuncture law was enacted in Nevada. Acupuncture, like any other medical modality, is regulated at the state level, with each state formulating and enforcing its own laws and statutes over time. This article narrates the legislative process and major developments of the acupuncture profession in Minnesota, in the context of legislative developments across the country. It tells how this midsize, Midwest state's acupuncture profession became regulated, and examines the challenges faced by the profession before and after state statutes were enacted. Minnesota stands as a representative example of the legislative process in other states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bayesian approaches to legal reasoning propose causal models of the relation between evidence, the credibility of evidence, and ultimate hypotheses, or verdicts. They assume that legal reasoning is the process whereby one infers the posterior probability of a verdict based on observed evidence, or facts. In practice, legal reasoning does not operate quite that way. Legal reasoning is also an attempt at inferring applicable rules derived from legal precedents or statutes based on the facts at hand. To make such an inference, legal reasoning follows syllogistic logic and first order transitivity. This paper proposes a Bayesian model of legal syllogistic reasoning that complements existing Bayesian models of legal reasoning using a Bayesian network whose variables correspond to legal precedents, statutes, and facts. We suggest that legal reasoning should be modelled as a process of finding the posterior probability of precedents and statutes based on available facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonly known that the whistleblower suffers from public disgrace. In defiance of his important role for the preservation of the public interest, he does not have a privileged place in society and in the professional field. Therefore, we find necessary that he finds a statute at the juridical level and consequently an emerging protection. We state that the European Court of Human Rights forged some important instruments for his necessary protection. Moreover, at the European level, the Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, transposed at the national level, provided some minimum criteria commonly for all the member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over time, inclusive education has evolved in the search for more appropriate designations for its target audience, aiming to promote inclusive language and combat prejudiced and discriminatory behavior. More current paradigms, such as the Universal Design for Learning and the Multilevel Approach, propose completely abandoning the use of designations for students (1). This qualitative study uses a documentary analysis to examine how the statutes of 26 Portuguese public higher education institutions (HEIs) designate students who need academic support and to understand the educational concepts associated with these designations (2). The results revealed that Portuguese HEIs still adopt various student designations, often based on a medical model of classification and diagnosis. Furthermore, these designations do not fully encompass academic diversity, nor do they consider the diverse needs that students may present throughout their academic journey, which consequently limits access for all to inclusive practices in higher education (3). Considering these findings, there is an urgent need to abandon student designations in Portuguese HEIs and promote inclusive practices that cater to everyone, ensuring that students remain in and succeed in higher education, regardless of medical validation (4). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho de la Seguridad Social, Laborum is the property of Ediciones Laborum S.L. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Language & Law / Revista de Llengua i Dret is the property of Revista de Llengua i Dret and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper examined the criminal responsibility for war crimes. International Humanitarian Law sets out established rules to be followed during Armed Conflict and conduct of warfare. A gross violation or derogation from the set - out rules and conduct of warfare may constitute grave breaches of International Humanitarian Law and the State or individuals may be held accountable for such breaches. The paper further examined the Geneva Conventions, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) and the judicial pronouncements of the International Criminal Court in order to determine grave breaches of International Humanitarian Law and who will be held responsible for such grave breaches. The paper categorised criminal responsibility into State responsibility, Individual responsibility and Command responsibility, (a variant of Individual responsibility). The paper particularly highlighted a major distinction between the Rome Statute and other legal frameworks in relation to individual criminal responsibility. The paper also elaborated on war crimes in respect of its definition, constituent and culpability. The paper recommended that combatants who are found liable of grave breaches of the Geneva conventions or the Rome Statute in the conduct of warfare would be held responsible and prosecuted for war crimes. This will provide a check to combatants during Armed Conflicts in fighting war according to the rules and conduct of warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Jurídica de Castilla y León is the property of Junta de Castilla y Leon, Direccion de Servicios Juridicos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Relying on 1868 abortion statutes, the 2022 Supreme Court held in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization that no federal constitutional right to abortion exists. Mere months later, a petition for certiorari asked the Court to determine that “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment includes prenatal existence, which would require criminalization of abortion in all states. The petitioners cited Dobbs and claimed the authority of legal history in 1868 and before. These arguments will be heard again, and they are increasingly framed in terms of the “original public meaning” of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article refutes these arguments on their own terms. It looks at 1868, but it doesn’t stop at statutes, treatises, or dictionaries. Instead, it looks at the reality of pregnancy in 1868, as experienced by the public—in particular, by women and their doctors. This was a reality full of ambiguities. Pregnancy was not medically diagnosable until quickening; ideas of prenatal development were fluid and women let doctors take their miscarried fetal tissue and stillborn babies away for scientific study; and pregnancy loss was common, expected, and impossible to distinguish from abortion. Women and their doctors lived these ambiguities. Nothing in the laws in 1868 changed them. These ambiguities similarly negate any possibility that the original public meaning of “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment included prenatal existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chevron deference is an integral part of administrative law. However, the Supreme Court has not applied Chevron consistently throughout Chevron's nearly forty-year history. While trying to apply what facially appears to be a simple test, the Court has added more steps to the test, contradicted prior cases applying Chevron, and undermined Chevron itself. The Court has been especially unclear in four areas: deciding when a statute is ambiguous and applying the canons of construction, determining if an agency's interpretation has the "force of law," choosing whether prior precedents or an agency's new interpretation control when they conflict, and deciding whether to defer to an agency' s interpretation of the scope of its own authority . This confusion has made Chevron unworkable and undermines its durability as a precedent. Litigants have little confidence in how the Supreme Court will apply Chevron, let alone how the lower courts will apply it. Chevron has outlived its usefulness and should be replaced with de novo review. De novo review frees courts to find the right answer, and although not easy to apply, it is much more straightforward than Chevron. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Editorial statutes are standardizing documents that organize and structure the media. They are a legal provision allowing them to define their ethical principles and conduct, establish their identity and ideology, and create a communication pact with their audiences. Editorial statutes can thus be considered mechanisms of media responsibility, accountability, and transparency. In Portugal, such statutes are legally required and are often perceived as formal, general, and bland documents. This paper presents a study of sixteen editorial statutes of the Portuguese press, designed to understand the issues and values of these documents. Thirty-eight categories were identified across three key dimensions: self-definition, normative values, and ideological elements. While these dimensions seek to address the requirements set out in the Portuguese Media Law, this analysis defies the common concepts of superficiality and homogeneity of editorial statutes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the jurisprudence of transcendentalism in Antebellum America by examining the works of transcendentalists like Henry David Thoreau, George Ripley, and Theodore Parker. Other topics include the jurisprudence's negativity regarding law and legal institutions, the transcendentalists' anger about slavery and Fugitive Slave Law, and the importance of local ordinances and state statutes during the period.

This article dives into the pivotal role of national regulatory authorities in applying, monitoring, and enforcing the ever-expanding body of EU rules governing railways. It particularly examines the alignment between the Dutch and European legal frameworks, flagging predicaments arising in theory and practice, employing the classic lenses of the 'law in the books' and the 'law in action'. Through document analysis, with the aid of case studies and empirical data highlighting the role of key authorities in the sector, it exposes several domestic implementation gaps. Moreover, the contribution draws attention to a series of practical dilemmas that play up in the application and enforcement stage, owing seemingly to the shift from a rule-based to a risk-based philosophy --alongside an over-zealous cleaning-up of the national statute book, attempts to accommodate specific political preferences, as well as a continuous pressure to keep up with supranational modifications. Planned amendments to the tasks of the discussed authorities, together with coping strategies that are already in the pipeline, offer viable solutions that should at least mitigate, if not resolve, the main issues this study brings to the fore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]