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Does democratization pacify states-and thus their respective regions-or does it make them more war-prone? This is both a theoretical issue within the literature on democracy and peace, and an empirical issue, as in some regions democratization led to peace and in others it resulted in violence. To answer the posed question, this study probes the 'state-to-nation balance' model as it makes the preliminary argument that democratization is not the underlying cause of either large-scale violence or peacemaking. Democratization, thus, is at best an intervening variable and in some cases has no major effects on war and peace. Rather, it is the state-to-nation balance model that better explains the war- and peace-proneness of states and regions. For an exploratory probe of this argument, the study examines Germany and Iraq-two key powers in their respective regions-and the changes they have gone through since World War I until today. The paper shows that when democratization takes place within a state-to-nation balance, it tends to have stabilizing effects and warms the peace. In contrast, within a state-to-nation imbalance, it is probable that democratization will have destabilizing effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important developments in the incipient Berlin Republic's memory regime has been the return of the memory of German suffering from the end and aftermath of World War II. Elite discourses about the bombing of German cities, the mass rape of German women by members of the Red Army, and, above all, the expulsion of Germans from then-Eastern Germany and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe have gained massive visibility in the last decade. Although many voices have lauded these developments as liberating, many others within Germany and especially in Poland—from where the vast majority of Germans were expelled—have reacted with fear. Yet, do these elite voices resonate with mass publics? Have these arguments had demonstrable effects on public opinion? This paper delves into these questions by looking at survey results from both countries. It finds that there has been a disjuncture between the criticisms of elites and average citizens, but that the barrage of elite criticisms leveled at German expellees and their initiatives now may be affecting mass attitudes in all cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany at the end of the Second World War was not only a shattered place, but also a shattered time.1 The physical scattering of populations through the mass movements of war and the atomisation of individuals through the oppressive Nazi regime, followed by occupation and the division of Germany into four occupation zones, left Germans with very few collective ‘events’ into which they could place their individual experiences. Oral history and other histories of everyday life consistently reveal that the major milestones of political history, the start of the war in 1939, its end on 8 May 1945, and the founding of the two German states in 1949, did not represent biographical milestones for most of those who lived through the period. Instead, they more frequently remember the war's interruption of their ‘normal’ everyday lives and the markers of the onset of normality at some point in the years that followed. In the place of the war's beginning on 30 September 1939 stand memories of the defeat of the German army at Stalingrad, the first major Allied bombing raid, or the news that a loved one at the front had died. In memory, the first sight of Allied troops or the return home, sometimes years later, of a captive soldier stand in place of the war's official end on 8 May 1945, and (in the West) the currency reform, the first real butter, the first real coffee, the first banana stand in the place of the founding of the two German states.2 But while public political events did not form the most significant rallying points in the everyday experience of many Germans, the continuing presence of the radio, broadcasting from the same stations and received in the (relatively) familiar space of the home, did provide an opportunity for collective ‘private’ experience, both during and after the war. It was not until the final months of the war that the German radio stations began to experience serious disruptions, and even before the four occupation zones were established in Germany in early July 1945, almost all existing radio stations had resumed operation under the control of the respective Allied occupation armies.3 Monthly radio license fees were collected continuously by the post office without interruption by the collapse of the state and the establishment of occupation.4 In the American zone, radio stations in Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich operated roughly independently of each other, while in the British and French zones, centralised broadcasting institutions had been set up which broadcast a more or less uniform programme from all of the stations in the area. In the British Zone, the Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk , or NWDR, had its main centre in the northern city of Hamburg, and a secondary base in the western city of Cologne, as well as, a short time later, a third centre in the British sector of Berlin. In the French Zone, where there had been no major radio stations before the end of the war, a new network of stations, the Südwestfunk , or SWF, was established with its centre in Baden-Baden, site of the French occupation headquarters, connected to a number of former relay stations in the territory.5 In the Soviet Zone, the station at Berlin became the central station, with a secondary hub in Leipzig. On one level, this division of radio broadcasting among the Allied powers and their zones was a further mark of the defeat and division of Germany. On another level, however, the new radio order also represented in many ways a return to the decentralised broadcasting system that had been established in the Weimar Republic and slowly centralised by the Nazi state in the years leading up to the war. In addition, while they were controlled by Allied officers, many of whom were returned exiles from Germany, the bulk of the station staff were Germans who had lived in Germany during the Nazi era and had experience—at least as listeners—with the radio programming of that time.6 Particularly at a time when print media were plagued by paper shortages, radio had unprecedented dominance among the mass media. At once the most widely available source of news and one of the cheapest sources of entertainment, Germany's domestic radio stations served audiences that were large, constant, and by and large loyal to their home station.7 The dominance of the radio during this period is widely acknowledged, and it is with some justification that it is one of the better-researched periods both in terms of institutions and programmes.8 Nevertheless, much of this attention has been focused around specific genres of broadcasting, especially radio drama, as well as issues of denazification and re-education.9 It is only recently that scholarship has begun to look at more popular aspects in the programme and the continuities in the programme from previous eras.10 While providing valuable insights into the development of the programme, however, most of the available research on the period has been focussed around the presence and qualities of specific genres of show, and as such has talked past what is most remarkable about the radio as a medium. The aspects of the radio highlighted by the British broadcast historian Paddy Scannell, specifically its ability to create and maintain temporal routines, mark certain times as special or exceptional, and refer to common spaces routinely are precisely the aspects that are perhaps most important to consider when studying its role during a time when the physical, political and symbolic spaces of Germany were being restructured.11 In this article, I will explore some of these aspects through an analysis of the Sunday programmes of the occupied stations. Within all of the routines of radio scheduling, Sunday has long occupied a unique position. On the one hand, it is a site of tradition: in many ways, it can be seen as the most regularly occurring holiday, and indeed it is the site of some of the longest-running broadcast ‘traditions’ in Germany.12 In addition to its status as ‘tradition’, Sunday is also when, until the 1950s, people have had the most free time, as the 2-day weekend did not become standard in the Germany until the 1950s. Until the late 1950s the radio was recognisably the ‘dominator of domestic free-time’ in most households.13 As surveys from the 1930s through the 1950s consistently reveal, the ‘valleys’ in the curve of radio listening percentages on Sundays were often on a level with some of the ‘peaks’ of weekday use.14 The position of Sunday as both individual free time and collective traditional time goes hand in hand with a number of both concrete and imagined spaces that range from individual homes to the entire nation. These various visions work through and across a number of different genres, and indeed are integral to understanding them. Although the popularity of Sunday programming has been widely recognised, both in the use-statistics from the stations and in the lives and memories of the listeners,15 the Sunday programme, as a concept and category unto itself, has been largely overlooked as a topic of academic discussion in German broadcasting history.16 Some work has focused on individual Sunday shows, to be sure, but the study of how these shows worked together, and how these practices were maintained over time has yet to be conducted for even a short period of time.17 By pointing to conventions of the Sunday programmes that were adopted in relatively uniform fashion by the various radio stations shortly after the war, this article will look at how these programmes functioned during a particular period of time, as well as highlight a fruitful realm for further historical study. My primary purpose here is to call historical attention to a series of programmes and genres that have gone largely unnoticed, and argue for their importance, particularly during this critical period of time in Germany's history. In particular, I will show how the Sunday programmes of the Occupation era helped to shape visions of the space of Germany and, as such, played a vital role in legitimating the new radio stations to their audiences. In order to do this, I will first explore in further depth the historical interconnections between the radio, the spatial and temporal ideas of Heimat , and practices surrounding Sunday in Germany. I will then go on to explore the development of Sunday programmes in the occupation era and show how such visions were integrated into them. For the most part, this account is primarily of the stations in the western occupation zones, which would go on to become the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. This is due mostly to the greater availability of appropriate primary material from the era. As becomes clear through comparing schedules, however, the Soviet-controlled zone followed most of the broadcasting conventions laid out here. Indeed, in many cases there were far greater programming continuities there before and after 1945 than in the western zones.18 The consistency of such programmes through time and between zones point at once to their not being considered detrimental to the re-education effort by the occupation authorities, as well as to a level of general popularity among radio audiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the role of mediators in the process of cultural transfer in the American-occupied Germany during the years 1944 to 1947. United States Office of Military Government in Germany's creation of the newspaper `Die Neue Zeitung'; Newspaper's transmission of cultural values to Germany; Staff's understanding of how to present American values to a German audience.

This article examines the complex interplay between the American military governor and German political leaders through an analysis of two crises that occurred over the making of the Basic Law. Why did a trial of strength between General Lucius Clay and the Social Democratic Party leadership in March and April 1949 come about? Understanding Clay's intervention in the politics of constitution-making in occupied Germany requires a more probing investigation than references to the temperament of a “proconsul” or a bias against a left-wing party. The analysis of Clay's intervention in this account shows how the Social Democrats evaded and challenged directives from the occupation authorities, and illuminates the limits of his influence over German framers of the Basic Law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the diplomatic implications of United States troop movements in Germany before and after V-E Day. Existing accounts emphasize American good will and Soviet refusal to cooperate, pointing to the example of an American convoy en route to Berlin in June 1945. Citing an “agreement” of which the American convoy commander had never heard, the Russians would allow only one-half of his troops to proceed. The agreement did exist, however, and the episode must be seen against the backdrop of Soviet suspicions regarding Western willingness to withdraw from the Soviet occupation zone. United States President Harry S. Truman did overrule British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's calls to link withdrawal to concessions from the Soviets, but he waited two months before doing so. Prior accounts have ignored the delay's effects on Soviet perceptions. The article argues that American actions had the unintended consequence of reinforcing Soviet Chairman Joseph V. Stalin's belief in Western bad faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the years after 1945, German Protestant church leaders and lay intellectuals emerged as ubiquitous critics of the war crimes trials conducted by the Allied occupation governments. Marshaling the financial resources and international connections of the newly formed Protestant Church in Germany, a network of church administrators, theologians, and jurists petitioned occupation authorities for the release of hundreds of convicted Nazi perpetrators. While a generation of critical scholarship has linked the campaign against war crimes trials to the persistence of Protestant nationalism in Allied-occupied Germany, this article argues that the campaign also marked an inflection point in postwar German politics. Protestant church leaders and jurists not only echoed popular attacks on Allied "victors' justice" but also developed a novel language of human rights that would shape their later interventions in West German politics. Rejecting the dominant contemporary discourses of human rights, rooted in Catholic natural law or American exceptionalism, Protestant trial opponents recentered human rights around a theology of human fallibility in order to criticize the alleged excesses of political justice. Yet even as they promoted tendentious accounts of the Nazi past, Protestant leaders contributed to institutionalizing human rights in West German politics. By the 1950s, veterans of the postwar amnesty campaigns would defend the rights of conscientious objectors and recognition of Germany's territorial losses. The Protestant campaign against war crimes trials demonstrates how human rights gained power in postwar Germany as a political language that bridged nationalist and internationalist commitments, with ambiguous consequences for the consolidation of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reviews the microfilm collection "Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files." "Germany: Internal Affairs, 1943-1949: Political, Governmental, and National Defense Affairs," Part I; "Germany: Internal Affairs, 1943-1949: Social, Economic, and Industrial Affairs," Part II.

In postwar Germany, Allied personnel and displaced populations competed with local Germans for housing. Examining group interactions and conflicting interests in this competition sheds light on issues of responsibility and reconciliation in the occupied country. In the East, Germans quickly grasped the key political interests of the Soviet occupiers: inhospitable landlords were denounced as "Nazis," and many East Germans rewrote their pasts to claim "victim-of-fascism" status. In the West, Germans cast themselves as allies in the battle against Communism. Wartime and postwar victims in both East and West struggled to gain a moral status that would facilitate access to resources and authority; yet in neither East nor West did they create united fronts. Meanwhile, the alliance between local Germans and ethnic German expellees against the DPs and Communists did facilitate integration of the ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into western German society, changing the social and political landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a case study of the Protestant churches in the British zone in occupied Germany after the Second World War, the article explores church responses to an often-neglected aspect of the Allies' purge of post-Nazi Germany: their mass internment of German civilians. Whereas the literature is critical of church support for former Nazis and opposition to Allied measures, the article argues for differentiation. Church assistance for internees was even more extensive than previously recognized and erred on the side of assisting undeserving former Nazis, while also being somewhat selective and discerning. Much church activity was in opposition to the British, yet there was also a degree of cooperation and negotiation. The article argues that ecclesiastical criticism of civilian internment was not merely a symptom of a refusal to confront the past or an expression of nationalist ideology. Internment was a genuine object of criticism in its own right and a source of wider church objections to denazification. Ultimately, Allied internment policy, pressure from below, interconfessional rivalry, national solidarity and the lack of a German government all contributed to the Protestant churches becoming outspoken critics of the Allies and advocates for those members of the German people who found themselves in civilian internment camps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Second World War, the British, American and French believed education could be used to promote democracy in Germany. The Western powers faced particular difficulties with the field of physical education because of the strong Nazi influence in this area during the Third Reich. The premier pre-war physical education teacher training institute was located in the Soviet sector of Berlin. To help solve that problem as well as the dearth of qualified physical education teachers in post-war Germany, the Western Allies wanted to create a new institution for physical education. This article places the creation of the Deutsche Sporthochschule in Cologne within broader Allied education plans and goals for the occupation of Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a case study of the major decision points taken by government officials during the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin, Germany, in 1948 and 1949. The article discusses the decision by former U.S. president Harry S. Truman to retain a U.S. presence in Berlin, the construction of diplomatic strategies, and the decision by the U.S. to conduct an airlift to attempt to thwart the blockade.

Using recent scholarship on memory and German identity formation as a springboard, this article examines the illicit trade that flourished in the immediate postwar period to probe the creation of a community of fate, one that emphasized its victimhood. It explores both contemporary perceptions and the memory of the black market from multiple viewpoints, the occupiers, the Germans and the Displaced Persons (DPs). Rather than treating the illicit trade as solely one activity, it explains its gradations, in terms of what was exchanged, by whom, and the perceived morality of the exchange. This approach highlights the disconnection between ubiquitous participation by Germans in illicit trade and their memories of it as primarily a foreign phenomenon. In other words, Germans saw their trading outside of official channels as necessary and moral, whereas the trade by foreigners, either DPs or occupation troops, was seen as both exploitative and immoral. Given the high visibility of Jews among the DPs, it also provides a window into the continuation of antisemitism in the immediate postwar period. It argues that the conjunction in 1948 of the currency reform, the noticeable drop in black market activity, and the emigration of Jewish DPs have cemented two of the prevailing myths of the postwar period: the economic miracle and Jews as black marketers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent military interventions by the West highlight persistent and unresolved problems regarding future foreign policy. Reconsidering the wider legacy and precedent of the British occupation of Germany from 1945 is critical in understanding these debates. Addressing a neglected topic, this article examines whether Britain reconciled its liberal democratic values as an occupying power, and in particular how its government tried to invoke the Christian ‘moral mandate’ of the British churches and voluntary organizations as an instrumental feature of policy, part of its civilizing mission in Germany. Central to this, however, were manifest contradictions between the churches’ rhetorical efforts to help the presentation of the moral case for military rule, and a policy vacuum that offered few practical measures to help German civilians, and especially expellees and refugees. Moreover, Britain's claims of moral leadership were at odds with its decision to delegate refugee matters to the German authorities. There were major differences in approach by church leaders, Whitehall ministers and civilian administrators in Germany in assessing how magnanimous to be in their treatment of Germany. With greater unanimity of purpose, humanitarian initiatives might have had greater success and become a more uniting symbol for reconciliation. The main failing was in the churches’ inability to modify government policy. Compassionate rhetoric and humanitarian relief efforts could not repair the damage caused by earlier political decisions to marginalize forced migrants that effectively punished them as Germans, a legacy of the occupation often sidestepped in order to focus on greater British achievements. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

German post-war psychoanalysis was marked for many years by a strong narrative that assured its professional identity: psychoanalysis in Germany had been liquidated by National Socialism and had been rebuilt from scratch after 1945. The psychoanalyst Alexander Mitscherlich was both an integral part of this narrative and its most important propagator. The author analyses the genesis of this narrative, its moral and political function and finally its demise. In doing so he gives a short account of the first years of the reconstruction of psychoanalytic life in Germany after 1945. He draws on new research on Alexander Mitscherlich to describe his relationship with organized psychoanalysis. He explains why the biography of Mitscherlich and the history of German post-war analysis became interrelated to the point where both provided an integral part of each other's self-understanding. Finally, he documents how the narrative was gradually deconstructed after the death of Mitscherlich in 1982. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the transition of (West) German archivists from the Nazi period to the time of Allied occupation and on into the early years of the Federal Republic of Germany. After considering the extent of the profession's nazification, the article focuses on Allied denazification efforts after the war and discusses the strategies archivists devised in order to maneuver through these dangerous times. In the end, the archival profession mastered the transition with only minor ''denazification damage.'' The article closes with an examination of the consequences of the continuity of personnel especially among the leading archivists of the former Prussian Archival Administration (Preussische Archivverwaltung) for the reconstruction of the archival profession in West Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Franz Alfred Six, a German university dean, a senior officer in the Reich Security Service, leader of an Einsatz unit, diplomat and a leading Nazi idealogue. He was sentenced at Nuremberg for war crimes, then freed and recruited into the Gehlen organization. His career trajectory raises questions about hot de-Nazification was undermined by sections of Western intelligence.

This article presents information on the German education system. It cites some recent references to the strengths of various aspects of the German education system. A number of these systems are to be grafted on to the British system as a result of the Education Reform Act of 1988. Excellence in German education, tends to be characterized by indicators as the reduction of youth unemployment and the stimulus to the economy and understandably warrants consideration in the light of Great Britain's social and economic problems. It is further noted in this article that consideration of the origins of the educational system of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and attempts to conceptualize its evolution lead to examine the post-World War II period of denazification and reconstruction. Similarities to the British tripartite system resulting from the 1944 Education Act will be apparent to any observer of the German federal school system. As education in the FRG is a matter for the individual, it is a mistake to refer to a national curriculum in the German context.

Discusses stereotyping of Germans in occupied Germany by American journalists following the end of World War II. Identification of the so-called Nazi type of German; Description of pre- and post-war reportage on Germans which represents this stereotype; Representations of German youth; Psychological aspects of the German defeat; Notion of the collective guilt of Germans for the atrocities committed by Germany during the war; Attitudes toward antisemitism; Policy implications of recognizing stereotyping trends.