Search

In this article, I argue that life is a strongly emergent phenomenon. For the project of drawing a real distinction between living and non‐living beings cannot but appeal to strongly emergent powers. First, I introduce some features whose possession is typically taken to be sufficient for possessing life, i.e., Life‐Sufficient Features (or LS‐Features). I also clarify what I mean by "strongly emergent powers". And I fully develop and illustrate my argument. Subsequently, I examine no less than 17 possible reactions to my argument. I show why all of such reactions turn out to be troublesome or inadequate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I am persuaded that the anti‐reductionist stance of the Mistake‐Making Theoretical Framework is fundamentally sound and will prove heuristically fruitful. But the very success of this framework generates a challenge. Many biologically informed metaphysicians have drawn striking conclusions from the fact that biology cannot be reduced to physics and chemistry. One such conclusion is John Dupré's "disunity of the sciences" thesis which follows upon the alleged "disorder of things." These conclusions threaten to undermine assumptions underpinning the Mistake‐Making Theoretical Framework. In this paper I argue that metaphysicians need to find a middle path between an unattainable reductionism one the one hand and the unwelcome disunity thesis on the other. This is no easy task, as a survey of various proposals makes clear. I argue that adverting to the long‐discredited Aristotelian notion of Prime Matter is the most economical way of achieving unity without reduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite predictions that neuroscientific discoveries would revolutionize psychiatry, decades of research have not yet led to clinically significant advances in psychiatric care. For this reason, an increasing number of researchers are recognizing the limitations of a purely biomedical approach in psychiatric research. These researchers call for reevaluating the conceptualization of mental disorders and argue for a non‐reductionist approach to mental health. The aim of this paper is to discuss philosophical assumptions that underly neuroscientific research in psychiatry and offer practical tools to researchers for overcoming potential conceptual problems that are derived from those assumptions. Specifically, we will discuss: the analogy problem, questioning whether mental health problems are equivalent to brain disorders, the normativity problem, addressing the value‐laden nature of psychiatric categories and the priority problem, which describes the level of analysis (e.g., biological, psychological, social, etc.) that should be prioritized when studying psychiatric conditions. In addition, we will explore potential strategies to mitigate practical problems that might arise due to these implicit assumptions. Overall, the aim of this paper is to suggest philosophical tools of practical use for neuroscientists, demonstrating the benefits of a closer collaboration between neuroscience and philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventionalism about necessity was deemed hopeless for a long time. The philosophical landscape, however, is shifting now with recent work in modal metaphysics locating the source of necessity in some kind of convention, albeit non‐linguistic. Modal neo‐conventionalists claim that a proposition is necessary just when it is true and is classified as such as a matter of convention. But what is the function of adopting a convention about necessity? And what are these conventions that distinguish what is possible from what is impossible, anyway? In this paper, I first offer an elucidation of the two accounts of neo‐conventionalism, which I call 'worlds‐based neo‐conventionalism' and 'axiom‐based neo‐conventionalism'. Then, I discuss a number of pressing questions that modal neo‐conventionalism faces. The moral is that neo‐conventionalists have some work to do in order for the account to be explanatorily satisfactory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The quantitative design of functionalities for functional materials is highly attractive for materials research, which must be based on a thorough understanding of the behavior of fundamental particles. Reductionism advocates for the understanding of complex materials through dissection into the constituent parts, providing a robust framework for investigating functional materials. In an ion battery system, this review utilizes reductionism to deconstruct cathode materials into phase, atom, and even electron, building the intrinsic connections between the macroscopic properties and fundamental particles across four degrees of freedom. This aims to enable the quantitative design of cathode materials. Specifically, the microscopic origins of the macroscopic properties, that is, capacity, potential, rate, and cycling reversibility, based on lattice, charge, orbital, and spin degrees of freedom are elucidated. Additionally, current strategies are summarized and proposed future development directions for improving these properties. These insights contribute to achieving the goal of quantitative design of energy storage materials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Notwithstanding the huge progress in molecular and cellular neuroscience, our ability to understand the brain and develop effective treatments promoting mental health is still limited. This can be partially ascribed to the reductionist, deterministic and mechanistic approaches in neuroscience that struggle with the complexity of the central nervous system. Here, I introduce the Context theory of constrained systems proposing a novel role of contextual factors and genetic, molecular and neural substrates in determining brain functioning and behavior. This theory entails key conceptual implications. First, context is the main driver of behavior and mental states. Second, substrates, from genes to brain areas, have no direct causal link to complex behavioral responses as they can be combined in multiple ways to produce the same response and different responses can impinge on the same substrates. Third, context and biological substrates play distinct roles in determining behavior: context drives behavior, substrates constrain the behavioral repertoire that can be implemented. Fourth, since behavior is the interface between the central nervous system and the environment, it is a privileged level of control and orchestration of brain functioning. Such implications are illustrated through the Kitchen metaphor of the brain. This theoretical framework calls for the revision of key concepts in neuroscience and psychiatry, including causality, specificity and individuality. Moreover, at the clinical level, it proposes treatments inducing behavioral changes through contextual interventions as having the highest impact to reorganize the complexity of the human mind and to achieve a long‐lasting improvement in mental health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the biography of a philosopher have any relevance to assessing their philosophy? After considering and rejecting three distinct treatments of this question, a different answer is articulated here. Distinguishing between the content and approach of a philosophical text, this article argues that biography is relevant to assessing the approach of the text in three ways: in its socio‐historical context, its philosophical context, and its personal context in the life of the philosopher. Such a strategy offers new ways of comparing very different texts and assessing them in terms of the aims of the philosopher writing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Origins research currently rests on a vitalistic foundation and requires reconceptualization. From a cellular perspective, prokaryotic cells grow and divide in stable, colloidal processes, throughout which the cytoplasm remains crowded (concentrated) with closely interacting proteins and nucleic acids. Their functional stability is ensured by repulsive and attractive non‐covalent forces, especially van der Waals forces, screened electrostatic forces, and hydrogen bonding (hydration and the hydrophobic effect). On average, biomacromolecules are crowded at above 15% volume fraction, surrounded by up to 3 nm layer of aqueous electrolyte at ionic strength above 0.01 molar; they are energized by biochemical reactions coupled to nutrient environments. During cellular growth, non‐covalent molecular forces and biochemical reactions stabilize the cytoplasm as a two‐phase, colloidal system comprising vectorially structured cytogel and dilute cytosol. From a geochemical perspective, Earth's rotation kept prebiotic molecules in continuous cyclic disequilibria in Usiglio‐type intertidal pools, rich in potassium and magnesium ions, the last cations to precipitate from evaporatig seawater. These ions impart biochemical functionality to extant proteins and RNAs. The prebiotic molecules were repeatedly purified by phase separation in response to tidal drying and rewetting; they were chemically evolving as briny, carbonaceous inclusions in tidal sediments until the crowding transition allowed chemical evolution to proceeed toward Woesian progenotes, the Last Universal Common Ancestors (LUCAs) and the first prokaryotes. These cellular and geochemical processes are summarized as a jigsaw puzzle of the emerging and evolving prokaryotes. Their unavoidable cyclic fusions and rehydrations along Archaean coastlines initiated the emergence of complex Precambrian eukaryotes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

C.S. Peirce offered an evaluation of Bentham's philosophy to the effect that on some points Bentham's performance was of great value, but essentially, he was 'a shallow logician' confined to analysis of 'lower motive'. This paper argues that Bentham's logic is deeply metaphysically based, multi‐levelled, and comprehensive. There are at least three constituent parts in his utilitarian logic: the first is his ontology, with its distinction between real and fictitious entities, and with pain and pleasure constituting the core real entities; the second is his reductionism in, and analytical view of, simple and complex pleasures and pains; the third is the distinction between private ethics and public ethics. Bentham's logic is staunchly based on empiricism and truth and he developed a pragmatic utilitarian solution to overcome the potential impasse of Hume's scepticism through a mechanism of reflection. Even the doctrines of belief and abduction embraced and developed by Peirce are contained in Bentham's utilitarian logic. Bentham would certainly take Peirce's philosophy as ipse dixitism. Peirce was not in fact a serious reader of Bentham and failed to employ the distinction between argument and argumentation in his study of Bentham's logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a matter of debate whether the discipline independence in discipline formation narrows its interdisciplinarity. It is also less well understood how disruptive works emerge in investigative practice rather than a theory‐driven approach. Aggregation‐induced emission (AIE) is an atypical photophysical phenomenon, in which the whole (aggregate) is brighter than the sum of its parts (single molecule). Through measuring and computing the cognitive extent and evolution of research on AIE, including topics, epistemic‐social collaborative networks, interdisciplinarity, emergent concepts, core concept networks and knowledge flow, this study shows that a cross‐research scales concept and its practice can establish new bridges in the sciences and promote disruptive work. Focusing on mesoscale entities, scientists from many different branches of science are involved in theoretical research on mechanisms, as well as developing different AIE systems for applications. The data analysis in this study provides details showing how non‐reductionist concepts based on new scientific discoveries cross traditional disciplinary boundaries and aggregate interdisciplinary research. The emergence and evolution of the AIE field implies that scientists may be motivated to embrace nonreductionist ideas at different research scales, leading to a more permeable field boundary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent philosophy has seen a resurgence of the realist view of sensible qualities such as colour. The view holds that experienced qualities are properties of the objects in the physical environment, not mentally instantiated properties like qualia or merely intentional, illusory ones. Some suggest that this move rids us of the explanatory gap between physical properties and the qualitative features of consciousness. Others say it just relocates the problem of qualities to physical objects in the environment, given that such qualities cannot be derived from the non‐qualitative properties of objects, and it does not resolve the problem of consciousness either. I argue that such an outcome is welcome: if the physical world is full of explanatory gaps, then the mind–body explanatory gap is not so special. Moreover, the explanatory gaps regarding qualities of objects are less puzzling than the brain‐qualia gap. In order to counter the usual worries concerning realism about objective qualities, I introduce 'imperfect realism' as an alternative to colour pluralism and complex reductionism, which accommodates realism in the face of widespread perceptual error. I conclude with a discussion of how this 'multiple‐gaps view' sits better with a naturalistic framework compared to the Galilean‐Cartesian account of qualities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the concept of corporate responsibility and challenges its validity. The author examines the arguments made by defenders of corporate responsibility, particularly focusing on the work of Pettit. However, the author disagrees with Pettit's view and argues that groups cannot meet the necessary conditions for responsibility, such as self-control. The article also discusses different procedures for aggregating individual attitudes into collective attitudes and emphasizes the role of individual agency and responsibility in group decision-making. The author highlights the importance of considering manipulability and individual responsibility when assigning blame or praise for group decisions. [Extracted from the article]

It is now—at least loosely—acknowledged that most health and clinical outcomes are influenced by different interacting causes. Surprisingly, medical research studies are nearly universally designed to study—usually in a binary way—the effect of a single cause. Recent experiences during the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic brought to the forefront that most of our challenges in medicine and healthcare deal with systemic, that is, interdependent and interconnected problems. Understanding these problems defy simplistic dichotomous research methodologies. These insights demand a shift in our thinking from 'cause and effect' to 'causes and effects' since this transcends the classical way of Cartesian reductionist thinking. We require a shift to a 'causes and effects' frame so we can choose the research methodology that reflects the relationships between variables of interest—one‐to‐one, one‐to‐many, many‐to‐one or many‐to‐many. One‐to‐one (or cause and effect) relationships are amenable to the traditional randomized control trial design, while all others require systemic designs to understand 'causes and effects'. Researchers urgently need to re‐evaluate their science models and embrace research designs that allow an exploration of the clinically obvious multiple 'causes and effects' on health and disease. Clinical examples highlight the application of various systemic research methodologies and demonstrate how 'causes and effects' explain the heterogeneity of clinical outcomes. This shift in scientific thinking will allow us to find the necessary personalized or precise clinical interventions that address the underlying reasons for the variability of clinical outcomes and will contribute to greater health equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use recent developments within philosophy of science and within certain strands of linguistic research to throw light on each other. According to Ronald Giere's perspectivist philosophy of science, the scientific understanding of reality must proceed along different, mutually irreducible lines of approach. Giere's proposal, however, leaves unresolved the problem of how to integrate the ever‐growing multitude of highly diverse scientific accounts of what is, after all, one and the same world. We propose a technique for the alignment of different perspectives that will permit cross‐perspectival explanation, and thus allow for a more holistic picture of reality to emerge. With respect to modern linguistics, however, Giere's perspectivism merely legalises a de facto state of affairs, as this discipline displays the peaceful coexistence of a multitude of different theoretical perspectives. Still, this makes it all the more important to show how the different aspects of language picked out by these different perspectives combine to form one single complex reality. During our investigation, a largely overlooked type of reduction within linguistics comes to light, prevalent in classical as well as current work within speech act theory and politeness theory. We suggest how a more holistic understanding of language can be attained through our technique for integrating different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beyond abiotic conditions, do population dynamics mostly depend on a species' direct predators, preys and conspecifics? Or can indirect feedback that ripples across the whole community be equally important? Determining where ecological communities sit on the spectrum between these two characterizations requires a metric able to capture the difference between them. Here we show that the spectral radius of a community's interaction matrix provides such a metric, thus a measure of ecological collectivity, which is accessible from imperfect knowledge of biotic interactions and related to observable signatures. This measure of collectivity integrates existing approaches to complexity, interaction structure and indirect interactions. Our work thus provides an original perspective on the question of to what degree communities are more than loose collections of species or simple interaction motifs and explains when pragmatic reductionist approaches ought to suffice or fail when applied to ecological communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that we can explain how we acquire knowledge from what a speaker tells us by appealing to facts about the speaker's reasons for telling. That is because (1) among our reasons for telling somebody that P can be the fact that P; and (2) these reasons that are facts can be made manifest to our audiences by our telling them that P. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The standard event‐causal theory of action says that an intentional action is caused in the right way by the right mental states. This view requires reductionism about agency. The causal role of the agent must be nothing over and above the causal contribution of the relevant mental event‐causal processes. But commonsense finds this reductive solution to the "agent‐mind problem", the problem of explaining the relationship between agents and the mind, incredible. Where did the agent go? This paper suggests that this challenge against event‐causal reductionism is importantly related to debates about fundamentality. It also suggests that extant event‐causal answers to the agent‐mind problem, ones that suggest that part of an agent's mind can stand proxy for the agent herself, fail against the challenge. It sketches an alternative reductive view that appeals to entity grounding. This view resolves the commonsense challenge and promises to be theoretically fruitful with respect to other longstanding problems with the event‐casual view. The paper concludes with a burden‐shifting argument against emergentist agent‐causal theories and non‐reductive event‐causal theories of agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies two distinct dimensions of what might be called testimonial strength: first, in the case of testimony from more than one speaker, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that a greater proportion of the speakers give identical testimony; second, in both single‐speaker and multi‐speaker testimony, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that each speaker expresses greater conviction in the relevant proposition. These two notions of testimonial strength have received scant attention in the philosophical literature so far, presumably because it has been thought that whatever lessons we learn from thinking about testimony as a binary phenomenon will apply mutatis mutandis to varying strengths of testimony. This paper shows that this will not work for either of the two aforementioned dimensions of testimonial strength, roughly because less testimony can provide more justification in a way that can only be explained by appealing to the (non‐binary) strength of the testimony itself. The paper also argues that this result undermines some influential versions of non‐reductionism about testimonial justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article contests the dependence of patient-oriented research (POR) on reductionistic quantitative evidence and argues for the inclusion of wholistic qualitative evidence in POR to deliver quality healthcare and remedy shiny object syndrome in western medicine. It provides information on the history of POR and raises the issue of evidence with respect to POR implementation into clinical practice. It discusses the postmodernist critique and autocratic approach of evidence-based practice.

Ross's Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis pertains more to moral philosophy than to the philosophy of law, even if its contents are important for the latter, too. Its main objective is to show the theoretical groundlessness of any evaluative judgment. This happens when Ross takes the behaviourist approach of reducing psychology to physiology, which opens up fruitful comparisons with Marxist materialism, and in particular with that of Georges Politzer. Another fundamental question concerns the assumption that theoretical nihilism would lead to practical nihilism, as argued by Theodor Geiger (but denied by Ross). And yet, if Geiger is right, can this have no effect on people's everyday lives? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to epistemic reductionism about practical reasons, facts about practical reasons can be reduced to facts about evidence for ought‐judgements. We argue that this view misconstrues practical conflicts. At least some conflicts between practical reasons put us in a position to know that an action ϕ is optional, i.e. that we neither ought to perform nor ought to refrain from performing the action. By understanding conflicts of practical reasons as conflicts of evidence about what one ought to do, epistemic reductionism fails to account for this. In conflict cases in which ϕ‐ing is optional, epistemic reductionism suggests that we have equally strong evidence for and against assuming that we ought to ϕ, and thus cannot be in a position to know that it is not the case that we ought to ϕ. This is a serious flaw. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief‐credence connection. Even on the anti‐reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief‐credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational person, how closely connected are belief and credence?) I argue that those committed to minimal normative independence should accept more radical normative independence, and that cases of descriptive independence support belief‐credence dualism. This suggests that belief and credence are more independent than one might think. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partiality is the special concern that we display for ourselves and other people with whom we stand in some special personal relationship. It is a central theme in moral philosophy, both ancient and modern. Questions about the justification of partiality arise in the context of enquiry into several moral topics, including the good life and the role in it of our personal commitments; the demands of impartial morality, equality, and other moral ideals; and commonsense ideas about supererogation. This paper provides an overview of the debate on the ethics of partiality through the lens of the domains of permissible and required partiality. After outlining the conceptual space, I first discuss agent‐centred moral options that concern permissions not to do what would be impartially optimal. I then focus on required partiality, which concerns associative duties that go beyond our general duties to others and require us to give special priority to people who are close to us. I discuss some notable features of associative duties and the two main objections that have been raised against them: the Voluntarist and the Distributive objections. I then turn to the justification of partiality, focusing on underivative approaches and reasons‐based frameworks. I discuss the reductionism and non‐reductionism debate: the question whether partiality is derivative or fundamental. I survey arguments for 'the big three', according to which partiality is justified by appeal to the special value of either projects, personal relationships, or individuals. I conclude by discussing four newly emerging areas in the debate: normative transitions of various personal relationships, relationships with AI, epistemic partiality, and negative partiality, which concerns the negative analogue of our positive personal relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Christensen's style is one expressive of the world of bourgeois rationality (this is part of what justifies my comments above about this world in Christensen's book). This is all very well, but part of the problem here is that egoism - vanity, greed, etc. - is clearly central to much that we value, including those things we value morally, e.g. love, and Christensen wholly overlooks this (but then so does virtually all moral philosophy). Christensen follows thinkers such as Nussbaum, Murdoch and others in telling us that we have to develop our faculties of moral discernment, overcome our egoism, avoid wishful thinking etc. (88-9). [Extracted from the article]

Reductionism and complexity theory are two paradigms frequently found in language research. There exist a number of conflicts in terms of concepts and methodologies between reductionism and complexity theory, which are not conducive to creating a unified language research framework. This paper starts by discussing the adaptability of complex dynamic systems and combines cognitive processing model and artificial neural networks to construct and verify an adaptive weight model, showing that the study of reductionism is induction of high-weight elements and the study of complexity theory is a discussion of system complexity from adaptability, meaning that there is a good fit between the two frameworks. The adaptive weight model is conducive to developing a unified interpretation of language research results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Say you like anti‐reductionism; one question that you will need to answer is how come testimonial entitlement comes so cheap; after all, people are free to lie. This paper has two aims: first, it looks at the main anti‐reductionist answers to this question and argues that they remain unsatisfactory. Second, it goes on a rescue mission on behalf of anti‐reductionism. I put forth a novel, knowledge‐first anti‐reductionist account, which I dub 'Testimonial Contractarianism'. According to the view defended here, in virtue of the social contract in play, compliance with the norms governing speech acts is the default position for speakers. Insofar as norm compliance is the default for speakers, I argue, all else equal, entitlement to believe is the default for hearers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an attempt to analyse the concept of literary autonomy, to explore its various manifestations in previous and current theories of literary studies and literary aesthetics, and to fit it into a broad outlook of literature's specificity and uniqueness. It defends the idea of literature's separate identity, however, not at the expense of breaking free of the concept of meaning in the strict sense, seeking special literary value in the independence of aesthetic value from other values, or in the claim that literature has no purpose outside of itself, and then argues that such position need not be confounded with reductionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uncertainty is an irreducible part of predictive science, causing us to over‐ or underestimate the magnitude of change that a system of interest will face. In a reductionist approach, we may use predictions at the level of individual system components (e.g. species biomass), and combine them to generate predictions for system‐level properties (e.g. ecosystem function).Here we show that this process of scaling up uncertain predictions to higher levels of organisation has a surprising consequence: it tends to systematically underestimate the magnitude of system‐level change, an effect whose significance grows with the system's dimensionality. This stems from a geometric observation: in high dimensions there are more ways to be more different, than ways to be more similar.We focus on ecosystem‐level predictions generated from the combination of predictions at the species level. In this setting, the ecosystem's relevant dimensionality is a measure of its diversity (and not simply the number of species). We explain why dimensional effects do not play out when predicting change of a single linear aggregate property (e.g. total biomass), yet are revealed when predicting change of nonlinear properties (e.g. absolute biomass change, stability or diversity), and when several properties are considered at once to describe the ecosystem, as in multi‐functional ecology.As an application we discuss the consequences of our theory for multiple‐stressor research. This empirical field focuses on interactions between stressors, defined as the error made by a prediction based on their observed individual effects. Our geometric approach can be visualised and explored with a web application (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4611133), and we provide pseudocode outlining how our theory can be applied. Our findings highlight and describe the counter‐intuitive effects of scaling up uncertain predictions, effects that can occur in any field of science where a reductionist approach is used to generate predictions. ​ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current studies in the tourism‐environmental domain often take a reductionist approach towards the complex issue of human behaviour that is criticized for its shortcomings. Therefore, to fill this gap, the authors developed and tested a theoretical model drawing on the complexity theory with emerging concepts, that is, dualistic‐passion paradigm, and mindfulness notion to predict the potential source of pro‐environmental behaviour. Following Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of a sample from visitors to marine turtles in Cyprus, the study found seven unique causal recipes that lead to a high level of pro‐environmental behaviour. Implications and guidelines for further research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the "Normativity Objection," that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non‐reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. We argue that the exclusively negative attention that the objection has received has been a mistake. On our reading, Parfit's Normativity Objection poses a serious threat to reductivism, as it exposes the uneasy relationship between our a priori knowledge of a range of distinctly normative truths and the package of semantic commitments that reductivists have typically embraced since the Kripkean revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sartre and Kant are not often compared, especially because the former is frequently considered a theorist of a totally arbitrary free will. Nevertheless, this is not a fair interpretation of Sartre. Starting already from Being and Nothingness, he conceived an ethical difference between bad faith and authenticity. More unequivocally, in Notebooks for an Ethics he developed an existentialist ethics, which is more Kantian than expected. In that text, the ethical ideal of authenticity is not so different from the ethical ideal of autonomy in Kant. The aim of this article is to characterize Sartrean authenticity as a radicalization of Kantian autonomy. In both cases, there is a normative criterion, which implies a correct exercise of freedom towards oneself and others. This correct exercise of freedom implies for Kant the exclusion of the will determined by material conditions. For Sartre, this correct exercise means the rejection of bad faith. There is also a similar connection between autonomy and respect in Kant, and between authenticity and generosity in Sartre. Highlighting this little‐known affinity between the two most radical philosophers of freedom could also reveal a non‐ideological Sartre, ready to dialogue with contemporary ethical debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of nations and nationalism have serious problems when dealing with the concept of charisma. Besides frequent conceptual confusion, the concept of charisma is predominantly observed from either the structuralist position or the perspective of psychological reductionism. Charisma is so often sought in the properties of an office, within an ideology, character of a leader or general socio‐economic circumstances of an epoch. In the example of the commonly examined case—that of Hitler—this article argues that charisma is a property of experience and it is the emotional reaction of the audience that validates it. This article builds on Erika Fischer‐Lichte's theory of performance to argue that successful performances of charisma create a type of community that is not based solely on common beliefs but more importantly on shared emotions and experiences. Studying charisma as a property of experience is a step toward understanding the emotional character of nationalism itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an overview of Joseph Margolis's philosophy of culture, highlighting how Margolis's radical historicism is not inconsistent with our realistic intuitions regrading facts and objectivity. While Margolis identifies interpretation as the work of culture, the paper suggests that a much more basic sense of human labor needs to be thematized more fully than Margolis does in any defensible account of culture. Margolis of course appreciates work in this sense, but he does not consistently make it integral to his conception of culture. Even so, what he so forcefully defends is, as one commentator has put it, "beautiful. It's also erudite, elegant, and insightful (and frightfully, dialectically intricate)." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I clarify and defend a provocative hypothesis offered by Bernard Williams, namely, that modern people are much more likely to speak in terms of master‐concepts like "good" or "right," and correspondingly less likely to think and speak in the pluralistic terms favored by certain Ancient societies. By conducting a close reading of the Platonic dialogues Charmides and Laches, I show that the figure of Socrates plays a key historical role in this conceptual shift. Once we understand that our narrow, reductionist focus on "thin" ethical concepts is a contingent historical development, we are, I claim, in a much better position to evaluate it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, the study of nutrition has been based on a reductionist approach, reducing a food to its constituent nutrients and then investigating the effects of these nutrients, either singly or together, on metabolism and metabolic outcomes. Nutrients are not consumed in isolation but, rather, are consumed in the form of foods. For this reason, the complex food matrix itself influences nutritional outcomes, which often cannot be fully explained on the basis of the effects of 'the sum of the nutrients' alone. Nutrient additivity effects, nutrient interactions, effects of food components other than the classical nutrients, effects of the food matrix for single foods and combinations of foods consumed as meals on the kinetics of nutrient digestion and subsequent metabolism and metabolic outcomes are discussed. A paradigm shift in human nutrition is needed, with more consideration being given to the holistic effects of specific foods and mixtures of foods constituting meals and diets. © 2018 Society of Chemical Industry [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Network science has allowed varied scientific fields to investigate and visualize complex relations between many variables, and psychology research has begun to adopt a network perspective. In this paper, we consider how leaving behind reductionist approaches and instead embracing a network perspective can advance the field of parental burnout. Although research into parental burnout is in its early stages, we argue that a network approach to parental burnout could set the scene for radically new vistas in parental burnout research. We claim that such an approach can allow simultaneous investigations (and clear visualizations) of many variables related to parental burnout and their interactions, integrates smoothly with prior family systems theories, and prioritizes dynamic research questions. We likewise discuss potential future clinical applications, such as interventions targeting central nodes and treatment personalized to a specific family's network system. We also review practical considerations, limitations, and future directions for researchers interested in applying a network approach to parental burnout research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive science began as a multidisciplinary endeavor to understand how the mind works. Since the beginning, cognitive scientists have been asking questions about the right methodologies and levels of explanation to pursue this goal, and make cognitive science a coherent science of the mind. Key questions include: Is there a privileged level of explanation in cognitive science? How do different levels of explanation fit together, or relate to one another? How should explanations at one level inform or constrain explanations at some other level? Can the different approaches to the mind, brain, and culture be unified? The aim of this issue of topiCS is to provide a platform for discussing different answers to such questions and to facilitate a better understanding between the different strands of thinking about the right levels of explanation in cognitive science. Introduction to "Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science: From Molecules to Culture" This paper introduces the topic "Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science: From Molecules to Culture", puts into focus some key questions, and provides an overview of the contributions in this topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high‐level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture different, cross‐cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. Patterns in cognitive phenomena and pluralism of explanatory styles This paper focuses on three general approaches to explanation in cognitive science, namely: reductionist, mechanist and pluralist approaches to explanation. On the basis of various case studies from cognitive psychology, Potochnik and Sanches De Oliveira argue that these three explanatory approaches are best understood as different styles of explanation. Each of these styles would be best suited to explain different, cross‐cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I give a unified account of three phenomena: bullshit, pseudoscience and pseudophilosophy. My aims are partly conceptual, partly evaluative. Drawing on Harry Frankfurt's seminal analysis of bullshit, I give an account of the three phenomena and of how they are related, and I use this account to explain what is bad about all three. More specifically, I argue that what is defective about pseudoscience and pseudophilosophy is precisely that they are special cases of bullshit. Apart from raising interesting philosophical issues, gaining a clearer understanding of these phenomena is also of practical importance, in that it bears on how best to tackle the threat that they pose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Henry Pollock, in "Parfit's Fission Dilemma: Why Relation R Doesn't Matter", examines the options available to Parfit for defending his "argument from below" from Johnstonʼs reductio objection. Pollock argues that Parfitʼs proposed defence against Johnston fails. In this article, I argue that Pollockʼs objections to Parfitʼs defence can be resisted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses that are number of contemporary genealogical accounts of the modern self that trace its adverse cultural consequences. It mentions that well-worn genealogical stories urge us to move away from scientific reductionism to a more holistic understanding of the self, proposed as an anthropological salve; and also mentions the underlying medium of selfish egoism remains consistent, but the spectacle of critique sets upon liberal democracy.

The world religions paradigm (WRP), often regarded as hegemonic in research and education in religious studies, has long been criticized for being modeled on predominantly Protestant, Christian, and Western ideas about religion, and thus running the risk of reductionism and of a failure to recognize expressions of religion that do not fit this framework. Despite this, it is difficult to get rid of the prevailing WRP, especially in education. In addition, nonconfessional, nonreligious, secular education in religion may be biased by norms and values that assume that religion as such is outdated and irrational. The seemingly neutral, nonreligious, or agnostic position that is present in religious studies at the higher education level can then be seen as aligned with an institutional, not necessarily personal, secular bias that rules out religion from the very outset. Consequently, higher level education about religion runs the risk of presenting religion in terms of flawed stereotypes. In this article, Daniel Enstedt addresses these two interrelated and subject‐specific problems by examining them through the lens of Gert J. J. Biesta's educational philosophy, and in particular in relation to his discussion about the three domains of education: qualification, socialization, and subjectification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The historiography dealing with New Zealand's colonial period (1814 – c.1900) underwent a substantial revision during the second half of the twentieth century. In particular, the role and activities of the missionaries in the country during the colonial era was subject renewed scrutiny, which served as a much‐needed antidote to the largely uncritical depiction of these proselytisers in earlier histories. However, this revisionism sometimes took a reductionist approach to the work of the missionaries, and in the process, overlooked some of their accomplishments in a colonial environment that was at best unsympathetic and often hostile towards the Māori culture and language. Since then, a more nuanced and considered historiography has emerged – one which also incorporates the histories of imperial missionary activity in the realms of literacy and indigenous languages in other parts of the world into New Zealand's experience. This work examines the seminal role that Protestant missionaries and their parent churches played in the colonial era in converting Māori into a written language, in spreading the use of literacy within Māori society, with consideration given to the role of Māori agency in this process, and the challenges in policy and practice that the Protestant missionaries had in this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to anti‐reductionism, audiences have a default (but defeasible) epistemic entitlement to accept observed testimony. This paper explores the prospects of arguing from this premise to a conclusion in ethics, to the effect that speakers enjoy a default (but defeasible) moral entitlement to expect to be trusted when they testify. After proposing what I regard as the best attempt to link the two, I conclude that any argument from the one to the other will depend on a strong epistemological assumption that has not yet been discussed in this connection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Degeneracy, defined as the ability of structurally disparate elements to perform analogous function, has largely been assessed from the perspective of maintaining robustness of physiology or plasticity. How does the framework of degeneracy assimilate into an encoding system where the ability to change is an essential ingredient for storing new incoming information? Could degeneracy maintain the balance between the apparently contradictory goals of the need to change for encoding and the need to resist change towards maintaining homeostasis? In this review, we explore these fundamental questions with the mammalian hippocampus as an example encoding system. We systematically catalog lines of evidence, spanning multiple scales of analysis that point to the expression of degeneracy in hippocampal physiology and plasticity. We assess the potential of degeneracy as a framework to achieve the conjoint goals of encoding and homeostasis without cross‐interferences. We postulate that biological complexity, involving interactions among the numerous parameters spanning different scales of analysis, could establish disparate routes towards accomplishing these conjoint goals. These disparate routes then provide several degrees of freedom to the encoding‐homeostasis system in accomplishing its tasks in an input‐ and state‐dependent manner. Finally, the expression of degeneracy spanning multiple scales offers an ideal reconciliation to several outstanding controversies, through the recognition that the seemingly contradictory disparate observations are merely alternate routes that the system might recruit towards accomplishment of its goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Your replica is created on Mars and you, on Earth, are destroyed. Parfit claims that your replica may still have what prudentially matters for you – provided that you are psychologically connected and continuous with your replica. If someone accidently destroys the tapes containing your psychological profile used in the production of your replica and this same action fortuitously produces a functionally equivalent tape, Ehring claims that Parfit should maintain that the resulting new individual may still have what matters. Nihilism about what matters follows, or so Ehring claims. I argue that Ehring is wrong and that the difference between the two ways of creating a replica is not trivial – there is no trivial survival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper consists of the opening chapter of Andrew Samuels' book The Political Psyche, published in 1993, together with a retrospective introduction. In the chapter, the author discussed the possibilities and limitations of applying depth psychological thinking to social and political problematics. He situates the attempt to make such applications within a wider movement to refresh and reform Western political endeavours. He terms this wider project 'resacralization'. The author cautions against psychological reductionism and a simplistic approach to market-based capitalism, calling for a transformation of the latter to the degree possible. He links sociopolitical criticism and psychological writings on numinous experience, thereby connecting the worlds of politics and depth psychology without losing their separate and unique qualities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Macroecology is a growing and important subdiscipline of ecology, but it is becoming increasingly diffuse, without an organizing principle that is widely agreed upon. I highlight two main current views of macroecology: as the study of large‐scale systems and as the study of emergent systems. I trace the history of both these views through the writings of the founders of macroecology. I also highlight the transmutation principle that identifies serious limitations to the study of large‐scale systems with reductionist approaches. And I suggest that much of the underlying goal of macroecology is the pursuit of general principles and the escape from contingency. I highlight that there are many intertwined aspects of macroecology, with a number of resulting implications. I propose that returning to a focus on studying assemblages of a large number of particles is a helpful view. I propose defining macroecology as "the study at the aggregate level of aggregate ecological entities made up of large numbers of particles for the purposes of pursuing generality". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to draw attention to an explanatory problem posed by the existence of multiply realized or universal behavior exhibited by certain physical systems. The problem is to explain how it is possible that systems radically distinct at lower‐scales can nevertheless exhibit identical or nearly identical behavior at upper‐scales (typically everyday length and time scales). Theoretically this is reflected by the fact that continuum theories such as fluid mechanics are spectacularly successful at predicting, describing, and explaining fluid behaviors despite the fact that they do not recognize the discrete (atomic/molecular) nature of fluids. A standard attempt to reduce one (continuum) theory to another (atomic/molecular theory), is shown to fail to answer the appropriate question about autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]