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A hidden facet of democratization in the world over the past two centuries has been the increased weight of people's voice in electing presidents. On the basis of new data on all presidential elections in the world since 1789, we show that they evolved from systems in which the final decision was made by someone other than voters, to systems in which the choice of voters was decisive only if it generated a majority, to systems in which the final decision is made by voters. This means that in countries where presidents have executive powers, elections may not be the mechanism by which the people, as a collectivity, always selects its rulers, thus violating the fundamental norm of democracy. We document the history of presidential election rules, offer some tentative explanations, and explore the consequences of particular systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The aim of this study is to examine whether Americans have a latent attitude toward comprehensive electoral reform the determinants of this attitude. Methods: The article creates and validates an index of election reform attitudes; examines the independent and interactive roles of partisanship, political interest, electoral fortunes, and satisfaction with democracy on these attitudes. Results: While a majority of Americans favor comprehensive election reform, this desire is strongest among Democrats, independents, people who feel they regularly lose in elections, and individuals who are dissatisfied with democracy, with no independent effect of political interest. Multivariate results find the effect of partisanship is conditioned by whether the respondent feels they generally win or lose in elections and satisfaction with democracy. Partisanship also interacts with political interest. More interested Democrats (Republicans) are more (less) supportive of comprehensive reform. Independents who are electoral losers or dissatisfied with government strongly favor election reform and resemble Democrats, while independents who feel they regularly win or are more satisfied are more opposed and resemble Republicans. Conclusion: Two‐thirds of Americans favor modernizing and updating U.S. election laws, but these attitudes are colored by partisanship, with evidence suggesting both elite messaging and expected electoral advantage as potential influences. Additionally, asymmetric partisan interactive effects are uncovered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some Member States, doctrine and case law of national courts have highlighted that, under currently applicable European electoral law, elections to the EP are of a second‐order, whereby European issues give way to purely domestic ones. In any event, this does not hinder the position of the EP as a genuine legislative chamber, which, above all, demands effects from electoral law that it cannot provide, since the intensity with which an election is experienced depends on circumstances external to the system itself. What electoral law can guarantee instead is the periodic holding of free elections. And that requires ensuring that the EP is appointed by the free expression of the opinion of all (and only) European citizens; that the weight of the vote is determined by rational criteria; that the electoral formula allows access to significant political currents; and that the "rule of law" is respected in the electoral process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When should the criminal law intervene to deter and punish the promulgation of falsehoods that are intended to influence political – electoral or referendum ‐ campaigns? I will scrutinise the protection that UK criminal law provides for the interests of candidates, referendum campaigners and voters, from the (potential) effects of damaging falsehoods. I suggest that neither the protection of candidates' or campaigners' reputations, nor the promotion of the public good of collective decision‐making by voters based on accurate and adequate information, in themselves provide sufficient reasons for criminal law intervention. Falsehoods must normally be intended to threaten, undermine or prevent effective participation in the political process before the intervention of the criminal law is justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how state tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) affect the size of fiscal reserves over election cycles. Using a panel data set of 47 U.S. states from 1986 to 2013, we find that the persistent pattern of electoral cycles in general fund balances (GFBs) disappears in states with stricter TELs. Regarding a budget stabilization fund balances (BSFs), the preelection and election downward effect diminishes and becomes statistically insignificant while the postelection upward effect increases and becomes significant in states with stricter TELs. Our findings reveal that the stringency of TELs not only eliminates electioneering's impact on GFBs but also coincides with increases in BSFs, particularly in postelection years. Consistent with the principal–agent theory, politicians tend to use a budget stabilization fund (BSF) as a secondary saving account to circumvent stronger TELs and save more BSFs after elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the regulation of third parties in UK election law. During the 2019 general election campaign, media reports noted an increase in non‐party organisations spending money on electoral advertisements on social media. Such advertisements raised a number of ethical questions, related to spending, transparency, and the content of the messages. Despite such recent concerns, third party electoral activity in the UK is not new, and the existing legal framework regulates campaign spending. That framework has its roots in Victorian‐era election law and has been periodically updated. This article will look at the challenges in designing laws to regulate third party electoral activity, as a difficult line has to be drawn to ensure the laws are effective, while at the same time not imposing too many burdens on independent political activity. Moreover, the move to digital campaigning poses some further challenges, such as monitoring compliance by third party campaigners. While there are no simple solutions to some of the issues raised by third party electoral activity, this article will note some of the measures that could at least improve the transparency of such campaigning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislators are political actors whose main goal is to get re‐elected. They use their legislative repertoire to help them cater to the interests of their principals. It is argued in this article that we need to move beyond treating electoral systems as monolithic entities, as if all legislators operating under the same set of macro‐rules shared the same set of incentives. Rather, we need to account for within‐system variation – namely, candidate selection rules and individual electoral vulnerability. Using a most different systems design, Germany, Ireland and Portugal are leveraged with both cross‐system and within‐system variation. An original dataset of 345,000 parliamentary questions is used. Findings show that candidate selection rules blur canonical electoral system boundaries. Electoral vulnerability has a similar effect in closed‐list and mixed systems, but not in preferential voting settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an evolving debate about how to strengthen elections in Asia, amidst widespread concerns about electoral malpractice in the region. While contests in some countries match or surpass international standards of electoral integrity, there are deep‐seated problems of violence and conflict, corruption and clientelism, or vote rigging and fraud in others. This review of policy practice draws on the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI Release 6.0) to map the state of electoral integrity in Asia and to draw lessons for public policy. The empirics rely on the assessment of 535 experts who evaluated 47 elections in 27 countries in South, Southeast, Northeast, and Central Asia between July 2012 and December 2017. The review identifies three cross‐cutting challenges for electoral integrity in Asia. Policymakers and other stakeholders should (i) curb incumbent advantage enshrined in electoral laws regulating candidate registration and voting district boundaries; (ii) introduce regulation of political finance in order to reduce the influence of money in elections; and (iii) increase the transparency of the electoral process by encouraging nonpartisan domestic election monitoring and advocacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: One of the enduring questions regarding third parties is how to prevent collusion between them and political parties. Collusion raises the spectre of third parties being used as vehicles to evade the spending and contribution limits imposed on political parties. I will argue in this article that federal election laws are inadequate at deterring collusion. The episode involving the “HarperPAC” and similar groups around the 2015 election helped to shine a spotlight on the vulnerabilities of the Canada Elections Act. I argue that the model deployed by the U.S. Federal Election Commission to regulate independent expenditures represents a promising path for reform if carefully adapted to the Canadian context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June, Interior Minister B Martin Niteretse b suspended the opposition party's activities, to allegedly "avoid clashes between CNL activists" after splits emerged following party elections. I (Africaguinee 14/7) i Meanwhile the opposition party Rally for the Guinean People ( B RPG-Arc-en-Ciel b ) has announced that it will hold protests to demand the return of former president B Alpha Conde b to the country. [Rwasa] is accused of plotting against the party's organs, misappropriation of funds and violation of party texts", I SOS Medias i said. [Extracted from the article]

B The opposition threatens a boycott of the delayed local polls. b A major opposition platform in the Central African Republic has vowed to boycott forthcoming local elections, unless certain pre-conditions are met, I RFI (3/5) i reported. "According to these Russian mercenaries, the protocol aims to improve CAR legislation on elections and especially on referendum elections, the main battle of [2023]. "The National Elections Authority must be independent, the constitutional court must be legitimate, and members of opposition political parties must be represented in all the structures of the body tasked with organising the elections", Mboli-Goumba told a media briefing on May 2nd in the capital, Bangui. [Extracted from the article]

The literature on party system nationalisation has yet to provide a better understanding of the impact of short-term factors upon the nationalisation of politics. This article helps to fill this literature gap by analysing the effect of economic conditions on party system nationalisation. The argument is that economic crises will decrease levels of nationalisation by amplifying territorial variation in preferences for redistribution, limiting political parties' capacity to coordinate divergent interests across districts and triggering the emergence of new political forces. Data on 47 countries for the 1960-2011 period confirm this hypothesis and show that lower economic growth during the years prior to the election is associated with a decrease in levels of party system nationalisation in the next election. The result is robust to variation in the specification of the econometric model and to the use of different measures of nationalisation. Results also show that federal institutions increase the impact of economic conditions on the nationalisation of politics, whereas any moderating effect of electoral system proportionality on the economy is not found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Opportunistic electoral fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that all subnational officials will raise fiscal spending during elections. Ideological partisan fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that only left-leaning governments will raise election year fiscal spending, with right-leaning parties choosing the reverse. This article assesses which of these competing logics applies to debt policy choices. Cross-sectional time-series analysis of yearly loan acquisition across Mexican municipalities-on statistically matched municipal subsamples to balance creditworthiness across left- and right-leaning governments-shows that all parties engage in electoral policy cycles but not in the way originally thought. It also shows that different parties favored different types of loans, although not always according to partisan predictions. Both electoral and partisan logics thus shape debt policy decisions-in contrast to fiscal policy where these logics are mutually exclusive-because debt policy involves decisions on multiple dimensions, about the total and type of loans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Opposition Peoples Democratic Party ( B PDP b ) candidate B Atiku Abubakar b came second with 6,984,520 votes while Labour Party's B Peter Obi b came third with 6,111,533 votes, according to INEC's final tally. B The opposition cry foul over alleged irregularities. b B Bola Tinubu b of the ruling All Progressives Congress ( B APC b ) has been declared president-elect following Nigeria's February 25th election. Nigerian elections have often been marred by vote-rigging, ballot buying, violence and clashes between rival parties. [Extracted from the article]

Literature on comparative institutions shows that electoral and constitutional rules affect the behavior of politicians, while the literature on political control of bureaucracies demonstrates how politicians exercise control over bureaucracies and affect their performance. This article explores how electoral rules affect bureaucratic effectiveness. In particular, I hypothesize that personal vote-seeking incentives drive legislators to specialize in legislative committees to develop their personal reputations. Once legislators specialize in legislative committees, they are in a better position to increase bureaucratic effectiveness. Drawing on the World Bank index of bureaucratic effectiveness, this article finds significant associations between the personal vote-seeking incentive, legislative specialization, and bureaucratic effectiveness. However, these associations are restricted to presidential systems, where the separation of powers makes legislative specialization in committees a key mechanism for effective bureaucratic oversight. Related Articles [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

B The aim is to limit group influence at election time. b Tunisia's election commission has announced a set of regulations barring political parties from funding individual candidates' election campaigns as well as prohibiting public financing. Rivals of Ennahdha, which dominated Tunisian politics from 2011 until Saied's power grab, accuse the party of helping them leave. [Extracted from the article]

B Chadema is seeking institutional reform. b Tanzania opposition party Chadema will boycott all the by-elections scheduled for December 17th, 2022 across the country, and is threatening not to take part in the 2024 local authorities' elections and the 2025 general elections. Speaking to journalists on November 22nd at the party headquarters, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam, deputy secretary-general, mainland, B Singo Kigaila b said the position of the party is not to take part in any by-election during this period. [Extracted from the article]

Objective. Some scholars report that the partisanship of local election administrators affects which voters will cast provisional ballots and which ballots will be rejected, raising serious questions about voting rights and the application of uniform election laws within the American states. Our goal is to demonstrate that casting a provisional ballot and rejecting a provisional ballot are separate processes, the discrete dynamics of which have not been adequately assessed empirically. Methods. Drawing on a county-level data set spanning three general elections in the battleground state of Florida, we look beyond the partisanship of local elections administrators, focusing instead on how voter registration issues in local election jurisdictions may condition both the casting and rejection of provisional ballots. Results. Our findings suggest that voter registration maintenance issues in a county affect the number of provisional ballots cast and rejected. Most importantly, we find that counties with greater numbers of voters who register after the registration cutoff date prior to a general election (and who are thus ineligible to vote) tend to have greater numbers of provisional ballots cast and rejected. Conclusions. Provisional ballots are the stepchildren of local election administration. Voters deemed by poll workers to be ineligible to vote a regular ballot are permitted to cast provisional ballots; these ballots are verified by local canvassing boards after the election results are tabulated and the unofficial winners declared. We find that the partisan leanings of local elections officials play a minimal role in the number of provisional ballots cast and rejected, which we hope will encourage scholars to scrutinize other local factors that might cause disparities in these votes of last resort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most accounts of electoral system change tend to consider it as being driven by purely partisan interests. Political parties are expected to change the electoral rules as a way to maximise gains or minimise losses. However, little work has been done on the question of why electoral reforms are so scarce in spite of these potential benefits. In this study, a wide range of both factors that may foster ('catalysts') and ones that may hinder ('barriers') the change of electoral institutions are investigated. A statistical analysis is performed of 16 West European countries from 1975 to 2005, covering 23 reforms of the proportionality of their electoral systems. It is found that procedural barriers are more effective for explaining the likelihood of electoral reforms than (most of) the catalysts. Additionally, there are indications that courts may play a more active role in triggering reform than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide a game-theoretical model of manipulative election campaigns with two political candidates and a Bayesian voter. The latter is uncertain about how good the candidates are. Candidates take unobservable, costly actions to manipulate voter's opinion about their positions. We show that if the candidates differ in campaigning efficiency, and the voter receives the biased campaign messages with some noise, then the cost-efficient candidate can win the election with higher probability than her opponent even when she is ex-post an inferior choice for the voter. Our paper offers a novel informational justification for imposing limits on campaign spending and encouraging diversity in the supply of political information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the representative peers for Scotland from 1707 to 1963 and for Ireland from 1800 to 1961. It tackles the statutory provisions on the election of the representative peers, the corrections made to J. Fergusson's list "The Sixteen Peers of Scotland 1707-1959," and the last representative peer for Ireland.

National gender quotas-policies that require a certain percentage of women candidates or legislators-are becoming more effective over time. Using data on 145 countries from 1990 to 2010, we document this trend with latent growth-curve models. Part of the explanation for increasing effectiveness is that countries have ratcheted up targets for women's inclusion and that quotas are increasingly written in ways that make them more effective at achieving stated goals. Activists, political elites, and policy makers have learned over time which quota policies are most effective, resulting in quotas with provisions that more often lead to success. But, changes in rules alone do not account for the increasing effectiveness of quotas over time. It appears that changing norms about women's incorporation in politics are also increasing quota effectiveness regardless of policy design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do institutional factors shape district competition in mixed legislative systems? Preliminary evidence suggests the distinction between sub-types of mixed systems alone poorly explains variation in district results. Consistent with the contamination thesis, this analysis suggests three additional national-level factors at play: fused ballots, the electoral threshold for proportional representation seats, and the existence of compulsory voting laws. Regression analysis on an original dataset covering 90 mixed system elections in 23 countries (1990-2012) finds that while mixed member majoritarian systems correlate with fewer district candidates, these three often overlooked factors are also statistically significant. This analysis highlights the complexity of mixed systems and suggests why many of them diverge from Duverger's Law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meanwhile, Prime Minister B Abdul Hamid Dbeibah b of the incumbent Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) is seeking to proceed with a plan for holding nationwide elections in the summer of 2022. The eastern-based HoR separately announced a longer timescale for holding a vote and appointed Fathi Bashagha as prime minister in a bid to replace the GNU, the mandate of which the HoR considers expired. B Cairo b B Talks b Intra-Libyan talks ended in the B Egyptian b capital, Cairo on May 20th, with delegates from the east-based House of Representatives (HoR) and the Tripoli-based High Council of State (HCS) agreeing on 137 out of 221 constitutional articles. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines why after 35 years of repeatedly rejecting the secret ballot, the British House of Commons enacted it with the Ballot Act of 1872. Drawing on roll-call votes, I show that parliamentary opposition to the secret ballot was invariant between 1832 and 1867. In 1867, however, the Second Reform Act significantly extended the electoral franchise and substantially redistributed parliamentary seats; the House elected immediately following these changes to pass the Ballot Act of 1872. I show that a key reason for the change in the House's attitude on the ballot was that anti-ballot MPs whom the redistribution threatened to expose to electoral competition were disproportionately likely to retire prior to the 1868 election. These results imply that it was the anticompetitive effects inherent in the gross malapportionment of the older electoral system rather than the restricted nature of the franchise that insulated MPs from public pressure and kept parliamentary opinion on the secret ballot in stasis. This is a useful lesson because while almost all modern democracies operate on a universal adult suffrage, many continue to be marked by significant malapportionment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission [2010] from the outset has been a contested, highly politicized case, where judicial interpretation affected more than just election finance law; the majority's opinion explicitly intervened in a wider political struggle over personhood and the boundaries of citizenship. This article moves beyond questions of legal doctrine to highlight the social-theoretical-political contexts of the decision and its consequences for anthropological understanding of American citizenship. I trace how the majority decision appropriated and reshaped a discourse of identity. In its first formulation in social movements, 'identity' was offered as a positive basis for rights and inclusion; however, the Court's appropriation reformulated identity on a negative basis, barring both regulation and recognition of identity-based claims by the State. It also went further than a traditional liberal demarcation of rights by specifically attributing agency and authoritative representation to corporate speech. Drawing on previous theoretical discussions of the corporate form and American citizenship and personhood, this article concludes that Citizens United not only allowed for new corporate power in the political sphere, but actively worked against the flourishing of a more humane and inclusive American citizenship in ways that legal anthropologists may wish to address as a matter of theory as much as politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What can past electoral cycles tell us about each party's electoral prospects next May? John Curtice finds that three factors without recent precedent - a fixed-term parliament, an incumbent coalition government and an insurgent fourth party in the form of Ukip - mean that there are more 'known unknowns' than clear indications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To enhance explanations for party polarization in the U.S. Congress, we focus on an unappreciated legal structure known as the sore loser law. By restricting candidates who lose partisan primaries from subsequently appearing on the general election ballot as independents or as nominees of other parties, these laws give greater control over ballot access to the party bases, thus producing more extreme major party nominees. Using several different measures of candidate and legislator ideology, we find that sore loser laws account for as much as a tenth of the ideological divide between the major parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much literature on political behaviour treats politicians as motivated by re-election, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a re-election hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for re-election. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the June 1-30, 2014 issue of the publication "Africa Research Bulletin." Topics covered include the protests in Egypt, reappointment of Prime Miinister Ibrahim Mahlab in Egypt and changes in the election law in the country. Also mentioned is the release of a video showing the sexual assault of a woman in Egypt.

Since 2001, ten governments in Canada have passed fixed election date legislation. The typical assumption in the literature is that governments did so as a way to address public concerns about the undemocratic nature of calling and timing elections. This argument, however, does not explain the timing (that is, when the legislation was passed by each jurisdiction) of this policy change. We approach this puzzle deductively by applying the theoretical insights of multiple streams theory to the Canadian experiences. Our findings suggest that although all three streams were important, the political stream is crucial for explaining the timing of the legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electoral rules can motivate politicians to cultivate a 'personal vote' through their legislative voting records. However, I argue that candidate-selection procedures have the ability to overpower these electoral incentives. This study-the first systematic study of how candidate selection and electoral rules interact-takes advantage of Lithuania's unique mixed electoral rules and fortuitous candidate-selection procedures. Regardless of electoral rules, MPs whose future careers depend on getting renominated by central party leaders vote against the party less than those whose careers do not. This evidence of a 'selectoral connection' suggests candidate-selection procedures must be studied much more seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presentations of the history of Australian democracy inevitably dwell on the innovative and early democratic practices of the colonies and, later, the nation. Compulsory voting is typically placed in this frame. This article challenges three key pillars of the accepted narrative of the Australian adoption of compulsory voting by placing nineteenth-century debates over the mandatory franchise in the Australian colonies in the context of other similar democracies in North America. It shows that compulsory voting debates in the colonies were contentious, protracted and motivated by negative experiences of democracy and a desire to limit or order democracy to ensure that engaged minorities did not overwhelm an apathetic majority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

De jure judicial independence ( JI) is the single most important predictor of de facto JI. In this article, we describe under what conditions countries are likely to include JI in their constitutions. We describe and analyze both their original choice in this regard as well as change over time using a newly constructed data set comprised of 100 countries and covering the years between 1950 and 2005. Particularly robust findings are that former British colonies are less likely to address JI explicitly, as are states in the Caribbean. Electoral rules appear to matter and so does the form of government. A higher percentage of urban dwellers reduces the likelihood of mentioning JI in the constitution. Finally, we show that the likelihood that a constitution is altered with regard to JI is quite small: after a period of more than 50 years, 85 percent of all constitutions have remained unchanged in this regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sun website added that Adamu is a former governor of Nasarawa state and that Abubakar Kyari was picked as the party's deputy chairman." Nigeria's ruling party appointed a new chairman at a national convention meant to end infighting as it prepares to select a candidate to replace President Muhammadu Buhari in the 2023 election. Buhari, who was first elected in 2015, spent weeks negotiating with the party's state governors and delegates to push a consensus position before the convention on March 26th.Late in the day, the party agreed on Abdullahi Adamu, a senator who had been backed by Buhari to avoid more infighting, according to All Progressives Congress (APC) party electoral committee. [Extracted from the article]

President B Muhammadu Buhari b on February 25th approved an amended electoral law that will allow electronic transfer of vote results during the 2023 elections in a bid to improve transparency. The bill allows the INEC election commission to authorise electronic transmission of voting results and the electronic registration of voter identities to help prevent fraud. The country's independent electoral commission INEC came under fire after Buhari's re-election in 2019 over claims the ballot was not free or transparent. [Extracted from the article]

This paper analyses the regulation of company political donations in the UK. It argues that UK policy makers have failed to understand the nature of company donors and, consequently, that the UK Companies Act 2006 requirement for shareholder consent for company donations is not an effective solution to concerns about company donors. To this end, the paper presents a comprehensive empirical analysis of company donations to show that the vast majority of donor companies are closely held or owner-managed entities where shareholder consent rules are ineffective. The paper highlights particular concerns that arise with donation by such companies and argues for a more accurate understanding of company donations in order to formulate effective policy responses to concerns about the role of company donors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the current rate of progress it will be another century before parity of representation between men and women is achieved in the House of Commons. This article explores why and how legal guarantees may now be the best available route to secure equality of representation following the repeated failure of the political parties to deliver any significant improvement in numbers through their own preferred, voluntary mechanisms. It explores how the concepts of equality and political representation need to be recalibrated in order to place greater emphasis on democracy rather than meritocracy, and on outcomes as much as opportunities, and offers a broad outline of how a legislative guarantee might be structured and operate in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the impact of the 1883-5 electoral reforms on the political culture of elections and electioneering in the constituencies, using the borough of Ipswich as its focus. It argues that historians have underestimated the extent to which the Franchise and Redistribution Acts of 1884-5 transformed political cultures outside the countryside and large cities, and that the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 had a major impact on the modernisation of party organisation. Principally, however, it challenges the prevailing historical consensus that the basis of post-reform constituency politics remained, to a large extent, local in nature, by suggesting that electioneering cultures were placed under considerable 'nationalising' influences from the early 1880s on. Rather than resisting these influences, the established Ipswich parties largely embraced them. Moreover, a general decline in corruption, and a general increase in the number of speeches reported in local newspapers from 'carpetbagger' candidates and national leaders, created a climate in which it was now more difficult for any constituency, however idiosyncratic, to insulate itself from 'national' politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By March 1977, the Labour government which had narrowly been re-elected in the October 1974 election, had lost its parliamentary majority, and was facing a vote of confidence tabled by the Conservative opposition. Senior Labour figures thus desperately sought to secure support from one of the minor parties. Unable to broker a deal with either the Ulster Unionists or the Scottish National Party (SNP), largely due to ideological differences, the Labour leadership entered into negotiations with the Liberal leader, David Steel. The result was that the Liberal Party agreed to provide the Labour government with parliamentary support, in return for consultation, via a joint committee, over future policies, coupled with the reintroduction of devolution legislation, and a pledge to provide for direct elections for the European parliament (ideally using some form of proportional representation). There was some surprise that Steel had not pressed for more, or stronger, policy commitments or concessions from the Labour prime minister, James Callaghan, but Steel was thinking long term; he envisaged that Liberal participation in the joint consultative committee would foster closer co-operation between Liberals and Labour moderates/social democrats, and eventually facilitate a realignment of British politics by marginalising both the Labour left, and the increasingly right-wing Conservatives Party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The regulation of party political funding and expenditure in the United Kingdom is an issue of continuing political and public debate. Campaign expenditure by candidates has been regulated since the late nineteenth century, but this has applied only during the short campaign period between the dissolution of Parliament and polling day. Concerns have been raised about earlier expenditure levels, but these were not regulated until legislation in 2009 which limits the amount that candidates can spend in the months prior to Parliament's dissolution-in 2010 this covered the period between 1 January and 15 April: the election was held on 6 May. The Electoral Commission has released information on all candidates who made a return of their expenditure during both periods. This article provides descriptive data on those amounts, by party and type of constituency, plus analyses which show that the more that a party spent the better its performance at the polls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws upon insights from theoretical and empirical studies of coalition behaviour in multiparty politics to examine the formation of the United Kingdom coalition following the general election of 6 May 2010. It argues that the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition is not unusual in historical terms or in the context of contemporary European politics; and that although it is a break from the more recent pattern of postwar British politics it nevertheless does conform to expectations in the light of the coalition literature. The article also provides a comparative analysis of the impact of Britain's 'First-Past-The-Post' (FPTP) electoral system on party competition and an examination of the performance of the Alternative Vote (AV) system and argues that if the United Kingdom retains FPTP then a return to single-party government in 2015 is highly likely; and it is not inevitable that the introduction of AV would significantly advantage the Liberal Democrats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scandal over MPs' expenses that erupted in 2009 was followed by a surge in discussion of electoral reform. A range of reforms to Westminster's existing electoral system are now high on the political agenda. This article examines the extent and the nature of the scandal's impact on the electoral reform debate and draws out comparative implications for the sorts of conditions that can force politicians to accept electoral reforms that they do not want. It finds that the expenses scandal significantly changed debate about some electoral reform topics, but not about others. It proposes three factors likely to increase the impact of scandal in sparking reform: that the scandal is seen as harming ordinary people in their daily lives; that reforms can readily be understood as likely to mitigate the sources of scandal; and that those reforms do not seriously harm politicians' own perceived interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reprints the 1734-1735 political journal entries of Edward Harley, third Earl of Oxford (1699-1755), while he served as a Member of Parliament in Great Britain's House of Commons. Some of the events discussed include his appointment as a Knight of the Shire for the county of Hereford, England on May 8, 1734; issues of military and naval spending and the size of the Great Britain's Navy and Army; and details of several parliamentary debates regarding elections, election fraud, and election laws.

Britain is facing a referendum on electoral reform for Westminster in 2011, yet there is little debate over the goals of such a change. Arguably, the purposes of political representation should determine the choice of a new system. Thus, ten modernising goals that go further than merely giving more seats to the Liberal Democrats are proposed. In a society made up of women and men, both need balanced representation. In an educated society, citizens need to be kept abreast of their MPs' performance as legislators so they can engage with parliamentary affairs. In an increasingly diverse society, the electoral system needs to improve who gets to be represented by whom, by providing citizens with more than one representative per district. The proposed Alternative Vote would provide few advantages and additional drawbacks, but could stimulate consensus around a modern system in tune with Westminster traditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the development of constitutional reforms in Great Britain, with particular focus given to the period dominated by Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Labour Party. The author explains how the modernization of the constitution during this period demonstrated the government's disassociation with social democracy. Reforms include direct elections for the National Assemblies of Wales and Northern Ireland, referendums on devolution in Scotland, and access to government information. The author explains Britain's electoral system, the behavior of Members of Parliament (MPs), and the process of passing legislation. He is critical of efforts to redistribute political power as well.

Objectives. This article is a test of general electoral theory in the case of Taiwan's 2008, postreform legislative election. In light of Taiwan's electoral reform, I test several hypotheses related to choice in electoral design and winning conditions, effective number of parties, proportionality, and regionalism. Methods. I run a simulation of the new rules and districting using the previous (2004) election results and compare this to the actual results. By comparing simulated and actual outcomes, I can compare theoretically-driven, a priori expectations with election outcomes. Results. Primary findings are that a dominant seat share for the Nationalist Party, decline in third-party representation, and disproportionality were largely predicated on the transition to a majoritarian system. Conclusion. General electoral theory holds robust predictive power in the case of Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]