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The article focuses on fallibilism, epistemic possibility and concessive knowledge attributions (CKA). The author mentions that if knowing requires believing on evidence that entails what is believed, then they have hardly any knowledge at all. It stresses that the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology is because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence seems not an option if they are to preserve the very strong appearance that they do know many things. It mentions how author Jason Stanley defended fallibilism against the Lewisian worry that openly fallibilistic speech is incoherent.

The article presents a philosophical exploration into the meaning and semantic purposes of the vocabulary of declared knowledge. The interaction between the foundations of epistemology and the practicalities of linguistic communication is discussed. Challenges within the grounds of assertion, motivation and intention are reflected upon.

Discusses the controversy over how exactly we should conceive of the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Incontrovertible claim that knowledge attributions are somehow 'context-sensitive'; Invariance of the truth conditions of knowledge-attributing sentences depending on context; Considerable advantage of contextualism over invariantism.