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Marine biological resources are likely to come under increasing stress over the course of the 21st century as global climate change and ocean acidification interact with other stresses, including heavy fishing pressures and marine pollution, to create far reaching and difficult-to-predict changes in species abundance, spatial distribution, and trophic interactions. The governance systems in place for marine fisheries and for the marine environment, more broadly, will be critical in determining the extent to which these resources can be managed for sustainability. The paper focuses on the governance of internationally shared fisheries, and draws on a body of game-theoretic research to discuss present-day governance problems and to evaluate the implications of global environmental change for future efforts to maintain cooperative and effective governance of shared fishery resources. In particular, the increased likelihood of abrupt and unpredictable changes in the productive potential and migratory behavior of exploited fish stocks may threaten to disrupt cooperative management arrangements. The paper discusses the value of contingency planning based on anticipation of the possibility of such events and concludes with a discussion of future directions for both research and policy development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses implications of persistent, irreducible scientific uncertainty pertaining to marine ecosystems. It discusses combination of levels of uncontrollability of catches and incidental mortality with uncertainty that implies traditional approaches to fisheries management would be persistently unsuccessful. It also propose the use of protected areas marine reserves as components of future fisheries management programs.

Focuses on the straddling fish stocks that extend beyond the boundary of Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone where they are subject to exploitation by distant water fishing nations. Progress in developing the economics of management for straddling fish stocks; Use of the Canada-Spain turbot war to illustrate non-cooperative transboundary fishery games.

This article provides an overview both of recent theoretical developments in fisheries economics and of major policy issues in Canadian fisheries. It is argued that the chief theoretical development over the past fifteen years consisted of a decisive shift from static to dynamic analysis. The major policy issues reviewed are the limitation of entry to fisheries, the management of transboundary stocks, and co-operative arrangements with distant water nations. Far from being unique to Canada, the issues are common among coastal states implementing Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract. This paper investigates the question of the optimal management of renewable resources jointly owned by two states. A dynamic model of fisheries is combined with Nash's theory of two-person co-operative games. Conflicts in the management strategies of the two states arising from differences in perceptions of the social rate of discount, fishing effort costs, and consumer preferences are examined. Cases are considered in which the two partners can and cannot make side or transfer payments to one another. It is concluded that side payments greatly ease the resolution of resource management conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the effects of irreversibility of capital investment upon optimal exploitation policies for renewable resource stocks. It is demonstrated that although the long-term optimal sustained yield is not affected by the assumption of irreversibility (except in extreme cases), the short-term dynamic behavior of an optimal policy may depend significantly upon the assumption. It is suggested that the results may have profound implications for problems of rehabilitation of overexploited fisheries and other renewable resource stocks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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