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This article studies whether the pursuit of foreign aid for counterterrorism purposes militarizes or mitigates terrorism. It focuses on the USAID and official development assistance (ODA) flows to Pakistan, which recently has experienced an increase due to the presence of deadliest terrorist organizations. By using the time series data from 1985 to 2016, the paper investigated the foreign aid and terrorism nexus for pre‐9/11 and post‐9/11 periods. The empirical estimations of autoregressive distributed lag bound testing approach reported that an increase in military expenditures fuels terrorism in post‐9/11 period and the ODA helps to control terrorism from the country. On the contrary, USAID reported insignificant response toward terrorist attacks in pre‐ and post‐9/11 periods, suggesting that the foreign aid from the United States has no significant impact on counterterrorism policies for Pakistan. The outcomes of the current study can be utilized in policymaking of counterterrorism and to explore the nexus between foreign aid, terrorism, and military expenditures. The paper concludes that the concerns about the use of foreign aid as counterterrorism tool are warranted, but that actual manifestations are nuanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a critical analysis of how and why US-led drone warfare is conducted in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. First, we provide detailed statistics on the scale and funding of US drone operations, noting a rapid acceleration of its adoption by the military. This is then situated within an overarching narrative of the logic of 'targeting'. Second, we study a legal document called the 'Frontier Crimes Regulation' of 1901 that defines the relationship of FATA to the rest of Pakistan as an 'exceptional' place. In the third section, we argue that the drone is a political actor with a fetishized existence, and this enables it to violate sovereign Pakistani territory. In this sense, the continued violence waged by robots in Pakistan's tribal areas is a result of the deadly interaction between law and technology. The paper concludes by noting the proliferation of drones in everyday life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the centrality of Mexico–US border policing to pre- and post-9/11 US immigration geopolitics, perhaps the most significant yet largely ignored immigration-related fallout of the so-called war on terrorism has been the extension of interior immigration policing practices away from the southwest border. As I outline in this paper, these interior spaces of immigration geopolitics—nominally said to be about fighting terrorism, but in practice concerned with undocumented labor migration across the Mexico–US border—have not emerged accidentally. Rather, the recent criminalization of immigration law, the sequestering of immigration enforcement from court oversight and the enrollment of proxy immigration officers at sub-state scales have been actively pursued so as to make interior enforcement newly central to US immigration geopolitics. I argue here that these embryonic spaces of localized immigration geopolitics shed new light on the spatiality of US immigration governance, which has typically been thought of by geographers as active predominantly at the territorial margins of the state. I conclude the paper with some thoughts as to how geographers might rethink the what and where of contemporary US immigration geopolitics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Involvement in terrorism has traditionally been discussed in relatively simplistic ways with little effort spent on developing a deeper understanding of what involvement actually entails, and how it differs from person to person. In this paper, we present the results of a three-year project focused on 183 individuals associated with the global jihadist movement who were convicted in the United States, for terrorist offenses, between 1995 and 2012. These data were developed by a large-scale, open-source data collection activity that involved a coding dictionary of more than 120 variables. We identify and explore the diversity of behaviors that constitute involvement in terrorism. We also compare lone actors and those who acted as part of a group, finding that lone actors differed from group-based actors in key demographic attributes and were more likely to be involved in attack execution behaviors. Implications for counterterrorism are then discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the biopolitical logics of current US counterinsurgency doctrine in the context of the multiple forms of biopower that make up the 'war on terror'. It argues that counterinsurgency doctrine aims to prevent spectral networked insurgencies by intervening on the 'environment' of insurgent formation-the relations between three different enactments of 'population' (species being, logistical life and ways of life) and a fourth-affectively imbued perception. Counterinsurgency is best characterised, then, as an 'environmentality' (Foucault M 2008 The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collége De France, 1978-1979. Translated by G Burchell. London: Palgrave Macmillan) that redeploys elements from other forms of biopolitics alongside an emphasis on network topologies, future-orientated action and affective perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

United States foreign assistance to Pakistan has always been driven by security considerations. By 2010, US counter-terrorism and stabilisation objectives resulted in Pakistan becoming the second largest recipient of US foreign aid globally. Given the policy impact of the assumption that aid promotes US security objectives in Pakistan, there is surprisingly little analysis or evidence of its effectiveness in this regard. This paper helps to address this gap by first reviewing the history and assumptions underpinning current US aid and stabilisation policies. It then uses field research on the 2005 earthquake relief efforts in northern Pakistan to assess the impact of the ‘War on Terror’ on the humanitarian response. In particular, it examines the assumption of influential US policymakers that humanitarian aid following the earthquake was an effective way to promote US security objectives by ‘winning hearts and minds’—an assumption that has been used to justify all subsequent major US foreign aid commitments to Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an effort to address some of the gaps in homeland security policy analysis—at present a relatively understudied topic from an analytic perspective—Professor Mueller offers an examination of policy decision making for a subset of low probability–high consequence events; particularly the idea of passive asset defense. This article provides a critical examination of Professor Mueller's work, tendering what we identify as a number of critical limitations with his framework and argues it does not provide an adequate basis for sound analysis in this policy area. We also offer several suggestions where one could build upon a portion of the groundwork his paper lays, especially in moving toward a greater appreciation of what terrorism means for an all-hazards management system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on several military strategies implemented in the war against terrorism by the U.S. presidents. The Franklin A. Roosevelt administration prioritized the defeat of Germany and the George W. Bush administration prioritized the war against al-Qaeda. Roosevelt mobilized the public and the economy to fight in the World War II while Bush cut taxes and encouraged the citizens to shop to rise the economy and sacrificed the armed forces. Joseph Stalin, Josip Broz Tito, Ching Kai Shek and the Vichy governments are the alliances of Roosevelt while Bush is supported by Great Britain only. The paper elaborates the conditions of the existence of the al-Qaeda including the extremist ideology, inflammataory civil and international wars and the anger towards the Bush administration.

Conventional thinking about war is encumbered by an inappropriate geographic paradigm that conceptualizes “targets” in terms of fixed latitudinal/longitudinal locations. This paper reconceptualizes terms such as “war” and “targets” to recognize intangible problems and develop appropriate counter-terrorist strategies. This requires geographic inquiry focused on spatiality, not on location. We frame our discussion about terrorist networks (Al-Qaeda in particular) in terms of understanding a network's sense of place and sense of space. The former “places” a network's meeting and recruiting grounds; the latter clarifies the operational dynamics of a network across space, at different scales, from the body to the neighborhood, to the region, and across nations. We argue that the roots of terrorism lie in conditions of disenfranchisement in particular types of places, understanding, however, that the socio-cultural fabric of a terrorist network such as Al-Qaeda evolves across space as well as time. Counter-terrorist strategies should target neither people nor places but rather the conditions that give rise to terrorism; further, “intelligence” should focus on network dynamics, beyond particular people in particular places. We draw from network theories (specifically actor network theory and network approaches in economic sociology) to unravel network dynamics, and we draw from the literature on spatiality to interpret such dynamics in space, over time. We advocate a non-military engagement with terrorism on both moral and strategic grounds; here we focus on the strategic dimension, the value of which has received scant attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can countries balance demands for national security while remaining committed to humanitarian protection? In 2016, the United States and European Union agreed to resettle significant numbers of refugees. Some politicians, including President Trump, argued that refugees are a security threat, even though there are few refugees connected to terrorism. This article investigates how the United States and Sweden screened for terrorism with Iraqi asylum seekers from 2003‐2013, in order to discover how states balance protection and security. This study finds significant policy convergence in three areas (security checks and databases, interagency cooperation, and safety valve programmes), but retains different definitions of terrorism. Policy convergence was driven by international law, UNHCR guidance notes, and international conferences. The study concludes by discussing the policy implications for "extreme vetting" and the use of future safety valve programmes. Policy ImplicationsFrom 2003‐2013, both the US and Sweden added new security checks, databases, and interagency cooperation. One lesson is that in response to perceived security threats, states often add new layers of bureaucracy and technologies, resulting in slower, more burdensome processes.To overcome these barriers, both the US and Sweden created safety value immigration programmes to relieve the pressure from overwhelming demand from Iraqi asylum‐seekers. Policymakers should consider the strategic use of safety valve programmes to speed up processing, allocate additional resources, and provide temporary protection without revising the wider immigration systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Front & Back cover caption, volume 24 issue 5 Iron Mike (see back cover) represents a generic soldier at Fort Bragg, one of the world's largest military bases, in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Here he appears to patrol streets under martial law, empty and grey. The Pawn Shop Target Practice (see front cover) is also in Fayetteville. At the back of the shop you can buy guns, bullets, jewellery and more, and also take aim at various targets – images of a woman in a bikini, an anonymous silhouette, a deer. Violence is found in Fayetteville as a symbol of protection, as entertainment, and certainly as a commodity. The absence of living people in these photographs underscores a clinical attitude cultivated in the military towards the largely dehumanized adversary other – a long way from the kind of engagement anthropologists seek through participant-observation. It may well be that the military would benefit from being ‘anthropologized’. However, given Keenan's and Besteman's experiences in Africa, as described in this issue, what is the guarantee that the African peoples will actually benefit from militarization at this time of US military expansion? MILITARIZING THE DISCIPLINE? US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates approvingly cites Montgomery McFate: ‘I'm frequently accused of militarizing anthropology. But we're really anthropologizing the military’.* This issue of ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY draws attention to the launch of two initiatives in October this year, both of which will have an impact on the peoples we work with and on anthropology as a discipline. The first is the launch of Minerva, a new Pentagon initiative to recruit social scientists for research, for which proposals are due this month. As Catherine Lutz argues in her editorial, this programme may soon outspend civilian funds within our discipline, and will thus undoubtedly influence our research agenda and restrict the public sphere in which we work. If the Pentagon wants high-quality research, why not commission this from reputable and experienced civilian research agencies, who should be able to manage peer review at arm's length from the Pentagon? The second initiative is AFRICOM, the newly unified regional US command for Africa. Although presented benignly as supporting development in Africa, it was originally cast in the security discourse of the global ‘war on terror’, with the aim of securing North America's oil supplies in Africa. In this issue, Africanist anthropologists Jeremy Keenan and Catherine Besteman criticize AFRICOM's destabilizing and militarizing effect on the regions in which they work, which collapses development into military security. Once deployed to the ends of military securitization, can anthropology remain non-partisan? Alf Hornborg, in his editorial, asks if we can continue to rely on the cornucopia of cheap energy, arguing that military intervention to securitize oil supplies, and academic discourse that mystifies the logic of the global system, benefit only a small minority of the world's population. In the light of developments such as Minerva and AFRICOM, can anthropology continue to offer an independent reflexive ‘cultural critique’ of the socio-political system from which our discipline has sprung? *Montgomery McFate, quoted by Robert M. Gates (‘Nonmilitary work essential for long-term peace, Secretary of Defense says’. Manhattan, Kansas State University, Landon Lecture, 26.11.2007), as cited in Rohde, David, ‘Army enlists anthropology in war zones’ (New York Times, 05.10.2007). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article estimates situational awareness in a diverse collection of police officers with respect to their individual ability to identify nine key behaviors that are indicative of terrorism activity. The selected group of police officers was drawn from state, county, and municipal law enforcement organizations. The terrorist-centric behaviors were presented to the test group in multicomponent text-based scenarios that emulate real-world police events and respondents were instructed to rate each scenario component on an 11-point Likert-type suspicion scale. With the exception of terrorist fundraising, law enforcement personnel tended to view all of the terroristcentric activities and behaviors as at least "somewhat suspicious." The activities that could also be associated with "conventional" criminality such as weapons acquisition received higher ratings than those activities more exclusively related to terrorism such as recruiting. We also noted statistically significant differences based on agency type, officers' assignment (patrol or detective), experience, gender, agency size, and education. Race had no effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the involvement of Russia in the civil war of Syria focusing on the government's discourses on wars on terror in Syria and Chechnya along with expectations on the development of rewards for the conflicts from the U.S. It states the counterterrorist argument of Moscow in wars in the country. It mentions the impact of proclamation of former U.S. President George W. Bush of a Global War on Terror (GWOT) on the perception of Russia' war in Chechnya by President Vladimir Putin.

Transatlantic co-operation and conflict over air passenger information, financial transactions records and maritime container security illustrate the European Union's reaction to the transboundary assertion of US counter-terrorism regulation in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11. A close examination of the cases suggests that the EU- US agreements on the transfer and use of PNR and SWIFT data were made to safeguard the integrity of the EU data protection regime and more importantly the European norm of data privacy from the undermining effects that might arise from the extraterritorial exercise of authority by the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the 'SWIFT affair', whereby United States security authorities acquired access to financial data of European citizens, and argues that it is a powerful lens through which to understand current shifts in European security governing. The affair demonstrates the institutional challenges produced by the deployment of private, commercial data for security, and analyzes the ad hoc innovations produced in European Union (EU) governing as a result. Furthermore, the SWIFT affair has allowed the EU to position itself in the global security landscape as a normative power that promotes the values of privacy and data protection. However, the development of a European Terrorism Financing Tracking System, coupled with the way in which the EU itself is keenly implementing risk-based and data-led internal security measures, means that critical attention to the EU's own security practices remains urgent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the policy science movement was born with the purpose of counseling the Department of Defense on a plethora of security matters, modern research within the field of public policy has tended to neglect issues of defense and security focusing instead on a wide variety of domestic problems. This nearly exclusive focus on domestic issues remained largely intact until September 11, 2001, when the threat of terrorism propelled defense and security back onto the disciplinary research agenda. Though exceptionally slow to adjust, policy scholars are gradually coming to terms with this new reality and are beginning to focus on security and defense in a way that informs policymakers and advances policy theory. This research note is meant to introduce interested readers to this trend by exploring broad themes and exemplar works within the field over the last few years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the development of a strategic relationship between Israel and U.S. It provides an overview of the guidelines presented by an Israeli leader regarding U.S.'s strategy in the war on terror. It also notes the advantages and disadvantages of the special relationship of both countries. Moreover, other issues concerning the strategic relationship between Israel and U.S. are also discussed.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government instituted rigorous new rules and procedures for screening incoming cargo, with the aim of averting a future catastrophe delivered via the nation's global trade infrastructure. While the efficacy of these policies in curbing terrorism is difficult to assess, sophisticated statistical techniques can be used to help gauge the performance of homeland security policies in mitigating risks. Abnormal weight analysis is one such technique. This study examines the weight characteristics of import transactions processed by U.S. Customs before and after the terrorist attacks to identify patterns of abnormalities that could indicate foul play. Abnormalities are calculated by first determining average weights by commodity, and then estimating and analyzing dispersion among reported weights. Our results indicate that while the vast majority of import transactions are being reported more accurately since 9/11, a small percentage of extreme outliers exist, and this should be cause for concern for multinational managers, policymakers, and society at large. Based on these results, conclusions are drawn and recommendations for policy and practice are offered. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information about the ongoing military and political action carried by the U.S. government in Afghanistan. It mentions that despite of losing around 1, 000 men and 250 billion dollars, the U.S. government under President Barack Obama chose to continue their counterterrorism strategy and additional military personnel have been posted in Afghanistan. It further presents the views of Bruce Riedel, former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer, Peter Bergen, national-security analyst and expert on terror and Al-Qaeda and Marc Sageman, an independent researcher on the U.S. government's strategy concerning Afghanistan.

This article examines the impact of counter-terrorism measures on non-profit regulation in the USA, where some of the most interventionist legal and policy responses took hold soon after the brutal attacks of September 2001. It highlights the sternness of these measures by comparing the US approach to counter-terrorism and charity regulation with that of the UK. It suggests that the different institutional arrangements for charity regulation in the two countries account in part for different treatment and policy choices, with implications for civil society groups working domestically and overseas. The article particularly analyses the impact of legislation and policy on the American philanthropic sector, and the responses of civil society to measures enacted and undertaken in the USA. It argues that groups directly affected by the new legislation and hardened policy, especially Muslim charities and some civil liberties group, have openly resisted these measures, while mainstream non-profit sector and philanthropic institutions have often acquiesced in the introduction of new policies, ‘guidelines’ and legislation, opposing them only when they felt directly threatened. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some general parameters are proposed for evaluating homeland security measures that seek to make potential targets notably less vulnerable to terrorist attack, and these are then applied to specific policy considerations. Since the number of targets is essentially unlimited, since the probability that any given target will be attacked is near zero, since the number and competence of terrorists is limited, since target-selection is effectively a near-random process, and since a terrorist is free to redirect attention from a protected target to an unprotected one of more or less equal consequence, protection seems to be sensible only in a limited number of instances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I would like to thank Warren Eller and Brian Gerber for their extensive comments. It would be impossible to cover all of them in the space available, but I would like to center my discussion on three issues: a point of strong agreement, an assessment of the key issue of dealing with the probability of a terrorist act, and corrections of some of their mischaracterizations of my argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global war on terror was used by the Bush administration and its allies to defend a US dominated geopolitical configuration. To this end, counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) were introduced which strengthened the alignment of development aid with diplomacy and defence. The broad, adverse effects of CTMs on civil liberties and human rights are well documented. Despite the advent of a new US administration and a ‘soft power’ approach to international relations, the legacy of the war on terror remains embedded in the laws, policies and attitudes of many states and regimes that continue to enclose the lives of citizens. This article describes the experiences of civil society organizations (CSOs) as ‘securitization’ processes unfolded. Studies over two years involving some forty countries provide an on-the-ground view to probe the gains and losses of securitization, both for governments in the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ and for civil society in terms of the pressures emerging from a development-for-security agenda. The authors identify some of the perverse zero-sum effects on governments of CTM philosophy and the means employed. Findings also show asymmetry between northern and southern CSOs in terms of their negative-sum subordination, found in the definition of security and in the vulnerability to new risks involved in undertaking development work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We address theoretical and empirical aspects of policy disruptions that affect multiple areas of policymaking. Our theorizing leads us to consider the effects of widespread disruptions in gaining the attention of elected officials, in affecting policymaking, and in reshaping the involvement of federal agencies. Our empirical analyses concern the threat of terrorism in the United States and its implications for public risk subsystems over the past 25 years. Our analyses of the attention of policymakers and resultant policymaking volatility show selective patterns of subsystem disruption related to the threat of terrorism. We show that capturing the attention of policymakers in multiple subsystems is insufficient to motivate heightened levels of policymaking across the board. In addition, we find more muted impacts for federal agency involvement than might have been expected from the massive reorganization that created the Department of Homeland Security. More generally, the disjunctions we observe show the powerful influence of policy subsystems in buffering against widespread policy disruptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distribution of State Homeland Security Grants has been characterized as pork barrel spending, where political considerations and not terrorism risk are determining the allocation each state receives. Using revealed preference analysis, we test this claim. From 2004 to 2006, measures of terrorism risk are found to be positive determinants of funding while measures of political influence and party affiliation of elected officials show no positive relationship with grant funding. These results are not compatible with the assertion that funding is distributed due to political factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the US has revamped its intelligence community by creating the Department of Homeland Security, little seems to have happened at the European level. The article seeks to explain why some intelligence co-operation takes place within the EU and why the bulk does not. It uses a new model, the ‘intelligence cube’, to develop a discussion on co-operation in distinct areas. Following a functionalist approach, suggesting that collaboration is utility driven, it proposes that efficiency considerations offer the most convincing explanation why no new European Intelligence Agency has been created and why so little co-operation takes place within EU structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss how the Registered Traveler (RT) program can enhance simultaneously aviation security and passenger convenience. We point out some of the potential weaknesses in the program from both a security and civil liberty perspective. The RT program is a public–private partnership between the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) and the private sector. As in any partnership between private enterprises and the public sector, there are tensions that must be monitored, managed, and resolved. We note that financial distress of a RT service provider will place increased pressure on TSA resources. We review the resources allocated by the public and private sectors and the natural tensions that exist between companies investing capital with the expectation of earning a market rate of return and an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, the TSA, with one of its responsibilities being to assure the safety and security of air travel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article evaluates the legislative mandate which authorizes the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) final interim rule to take effect. The executive order imposes new requirements on agencies before the can draft regulations or issue guidance documents for chemical facilities. Several critics claim that it will further politicize the rulemaking process and impede the exercise of federal agency discretion. The article also outlines the key issues that continue to influence debate on chemical plant security against terrorism.

The author responds to the responses to his essay on the relationship among the National Mall, the U.S. Capitol and the White House. The author explores how the U.S. national security is affected by the protests, riots and the assassination of public figures in the country. He also notes the conflict among federal officials and the efforts taken by the American country against terrorism.

The fabric and faces of threat, and the expediency and efficiency in the communication of threat, are examined with a threat appraisal model. This model is empirically tested on an ongoing communication challenge, the issuance of terror alerts by the United States' Department of Homeland Security (DHS), focusing on how threat is appraised by both the conservative and liberal audiences. Findings showed a shared view by the DHS and conservative audiences on the levels and nature of threats; liberal audiences thought otherwise. Though there appeared to be a consensus between the conservative and liberal audiences on the efficacy of threat communication, more internal consistency within DHS is needed to optimise its effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the homeland security situation that the U.S. is facing after the terrorists attack on September 11, 2001. According to the author, the counterterrorism measures put in place in the country since the event as part of the global war on terror. The effort has been dubbed as an alternate system of justice. Regardless of the intentions of those who originally invoked the emergency regimes, the government still tends to perpetuate itself in several international scenes. The author said that as originally authorized, the declaration of a state of emergency was considered a temporary and a transition mechanism to be operative only for the duration of the war of independence.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the reaction to them has been the gravest challenge to date to the Human Rights Act 1998. The Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 has expanded the remit of the Terrorism Act 2000 and there has been a new concentration on antiterrorism by government. This article assesses the impact of human rights law on the debate about liberty and security following 11 September. It considers how the provisions of the Human Rights Act have influenced the formulation and interpretation of anti-terrorism laws, and examines the role of the judiciary in adjudicating on disputes between the individual and the state. It ends with some general discussion about the security-driven challenges to human rights that lie ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses a brief history of the decision to deploy the computer-assisted passenger prescreening system II (CAPPS II). Not only might CAPPS II not improve safety, it could even reduce security if it crowded out other initiatives or if scrutiny were reduced for people not flagged by the system. In as much as CAPPS II threatens privacy, involves some direct cost to taxpayers and risks complacency, it would seem incumbent on the U.S. Transportation Safety Administration to prove to the taxpayer that CAPPS II works. The impetus for CAPPS II came from the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, signed into law on November 19, 2001 in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. It called for improved passenger screening and invited the use of advanced information technologies, although it did not specify that data mining or any other specific method should be employed. Indeed, the vision for CAPPS II has evolved considerably as more has been learned about the capabilities of various technologies. The permanent deployment of CAPPS II was not a done deal from the outset. Provision was clearly made for reviews with opportunities for corrective action, both between inception and the present and still to come.

The terrorist attacks suffered by the United States of America on 11 September 2001 have caused a considerable increase in legislation at national and European level with the same objective: the fight against terrorism. The special nature of this crime makes judicial cooperation among states indispensable. In this context, both kinds of instruments are contemplated in order to provide the necessary measures especially—and not especially—addressed to prevent and repress terrorism: they give place to substantial and procedural rules, such as the European Arrest Warrant in the territory of the European Union. But in this claimed fight against terrorism there are also two important risks, namely the creation of a kind of ‘Security Criminal Law’ from a material point of view and the arguable breach of human rights infringed by some of those procedural measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides tips on how electric utilities prevent blackouts in the U.S. Reevaluation of the reliability criteria; Examination and testing of the safeguard schemes; Update of the existing protection systems; Assessment of the disaster recovery and business continuity plans; Protection of the system from terrorism.

Conditions of war lead to a style of teleocratic governance and administration that is at odds with the idea of civil association reflected in the American constitutional state. As a result, war can put our traditional notions of humanity, pluralism, and limited government at risk. In order to defend the values of civil association, public administrators should understand and appreciate the principles undergirding our constitutional system of governance and administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of September 11, 2001, have raised troubling questions regarding the reliability and security of American commercial air travel. This article applies the concepts and logic of high-reliability organizations to airport security operations. Contemporary decision theory is built on the logic of limited or buffered rationability and is based on the study of error-tolerant organizations. The concept of high-reliability organizations is based on the study of nearly error-free operations. For commercial air travel to be highly secure, there must be very high levels of technical competence and sustained performance; regular training; structure redundancy; collegial, decentralized authority patterns; processes that reward error discovery and correction; adequate and reliable funding; high mission valence; reliable and timely information; and protection from external interference in operations. These concepts are used to inform early-stage issues being faced by both local airports and the newly established Transportation Security Administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The network of public agencies, private firms, nonprofit organizations, ad hoc groups, and individual volunteers that deals with natural and technological hazards and disasters did a remarkable job of responding to and helping us recover from the September 11th attacks. That national emergency management network, along with the national security and law enforcement networks, provides a foundation for our war on terrorism, helps us mitigate the hazard of terrorism, and improves our preparedness for future violence. However, coordinating the efforts of the networks will be a real challenge for the director of homeland security and his or her state and local counterparts. Coordination will necessitate using legal authority to assure compliance, economic and other incentives to encourage compliance, formal partnerships to encourage collaboration, informal understandings to encourage cooperation, and personal encouragement to influence appropriate action. A top-down, command-and-control approach to the war on terrorism, such as the proposed Department of Homeland Security is intended to provide, may be counterproductive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. government is considering how it should reorganize for homeland security. Consequently, attention has focused on the new Office of Homeland Security (OHS). Much debate focuses on two issues related to OHS: (1) whether the OHS should be a separate executive agency; and (2) whether the OHS director has sufficient authority to direct changes in policies and resource allocation of other departments and agencies. The authors believe the emphasis on these areas of interest is misplaced as measures of the eventual success of the OHS. Rather than focusing on these political issues, this article outlines several questions about how the OHS might approach its complex mission and highlights some organizational and bureaucratic realities that are likely to survive the debate over placement of the OHS within the executive branch and the authorities of the OHS director. This article concludes with a discussion of some organizational tools that the OHS or any coordinating office will require to fulfill its mandate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the tragic, massive terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, many antiterrorist laws, policies, and institutions have emerged to wage war on terrorism. These antiterrorist initiatives have major consequences for individuals, societies, and nations all over the world. Although controversies have proliferated with regard to the implications of counterterrorism for people's basic rights, the debate remains fragmented and often unfocused. This article examines the critical impact of new antiterrorist initiatives on the fundamental rights and responsibilities of citizens and others, with special reference to public administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses alternatives for organizing homeland security in the U.S. federal government and the issues that will need to be addressed in choosing among them. It examines major factors and concepts that should be considered in taking an organizational approach to homeland security. Several extant approaches for organizing homeland security, organizational approaches for covering emergency management and drug control, and future implications for the approaches used in homeland security management are analyzed.

The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Governor Parris N. Glendening of Maryland on his first essay as being a governor, and another by H. George Frederickson and Todd R. LaPorte on the analysis of airport security.

The article reports on claims that the Somalian militia alliance Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) is receiving weapons from Ethiopia and Yemen which are being paid by the U.S. It is claimed that the weapons are being used by ARPCT against the Islamic Courts' militias. There are allegations that ARPCT has received the funds from the U.S. through some convoluted channels.

This article examines the role of risk analysis in making rational decisions for terrorism prevention and protection. Modern theories of risk perception and cognition inform people that, besides risk analysis, they have another mode of thinking that is essential for rational decisions in the face of danger. This is the experiential mode, which enabled them to survive during the long period of human evolution and remains the most natural and most common way to respond to threat, even in the modern world. Experiential thinking is intuitive, automatic, and fast. It relies on images and associations, linked by experience to emotions and affect. The article also claims that a startling feature of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and the subsequent anthrax exposures and deaths is the degree to which a handful of determined individuals, in a very short time, so greatly disrupted the world's most powerful nation. The author suggests that risk analysis should be supplemented by vulnerability analysis, which characterizes the forms of physical, social, political, economic, cultural, and psychological harms to which individuals and modern societies are susceptible.