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Given the highly infectious nature of COVID-19, social distancing practices are key in stemming the spread of the virus. We aimed to assess the complex interplay among psychological factors, socio-demographic characteristics and social distancing behaviours within the framework of the widely used Capability, Opportunity, Motivation-Behaviour (COM-B) model. The present research employed network psychometrics on data collected during the first UK lockdown in April 2020 as part of the COVID-19 Psychological Research Consortium (C19PRC) Study. Using a network approach, we examined the predictions of psychological and demographic variables onto social distancing practices at two levels of analysis: macro and micro. Our findings revealed several factors that influenced social distancing behaviour during the first UK lockdown. The COM-B model was successful in predicting particular aspects of social-distancing via the influence of psychological capability and motivation at the macro-and micro-levels, respectively. Notably, demographic variables, such as education, income, and age, were directly and uniquely predictive of certain social distancing behaviours. Our findings reveal psychological factors that are key predictors of social distancing behaviour and also illustrate how demographic variables directly influence such behaviour. Our research has implications for the design of empirically-driven interventions to promote adherence to social distancing practices in this and future pandemics. Supplemental data for this article is available online at [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: In this paper we present and defend a hybrid theory of the development of delusions that incorporates the central ideas of two influential (yet sometimes bitterly opposing) theoretical approaches to delusions—the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory. Method: After introducing the central ideas of the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory, we describe the motivations for our conciliatory project, explain the theoretical details of the hybrid theory we propose, and answer potential objections to our proposal. Results: According to the hybrid theory we advance, the first factor of a delusion is physically grounded in an abnormal prediction error, and the second factor is physically grounded in the overestimation of the precision of the abnormal prediction error. Against anticipated objections, we argue that the hybrid theory is internally coherent, and that it constitutes a genuine hybrid between the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory. Conclusion: A rapprochement between the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory is both possible and desirable. In particular, our hybrid theory provides a parsimonious and unified account of delusions, whether monothematic or polythematic, across a wide variety of medical conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corlett (Corlett, P. (this issue). Factor one, familiarity and frontal cortex: A challenge to the two-factor theory of delusions. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry) provides a robust critique of the two-factor theory of delusions. The heart of his critique is two challenges he derives from a paper by Tranel and Damasio (Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (1994). Neuroanatomical correlates of electrodermal skin conductance responses. Psychophysiology, 31(5), 427–438), who illuminate the autonomic responses and brain damage of four patients often cited in support of the two-factor theory of Capgras delusion. I defend the two-factor theory against Corlett's two key challenges, arguing that his first challenge has been previously addressed, and that his second challenge is overstated. In my view, these challenges do not negate the two-factor account. Nevertheless, two-factor theorists – and computational psychiatrists – should continue to devise and test falsifiable predictions of their respective theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction:It has been proposed that deluded and delusion-prone individuals gather less evidence before forming beliefs than those who are not deluded or delusion-prone. The primary source of evidence for this “jumping to conclusions” (JTC) bias is provided by research that utilises the “beads task” data-gathering paradigm. However, the cognitive mechanisms subserving data gathering in this task are poorly understood. Methods:In the largest published beads task study to date (n = 558), we examined data gathering in the context of influential dual-process theories of reasoning. Results:Analytic cognitive style (the willingness or disposition to critically evaluate outputs from intuitive processing and engage in effortful analytic processing) predicted data gathering in a non-clinical sample, but delusional ideation did not. Conclusion:The relationship between data gathering and analytic cognitive style suggests that dual-process theories of reasoning can contribute to our understanding of the beads task. It is not clear why delusional ideation was not found to be associated with data gathering or analytic cognitive style. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parrott and Koralus argue that a particular cognitive factor – “impaired endogenous question raising” – offers a parsimonious account of three delusion-related phenomena: (1) the development of the Capgras delusion; (2) evidence that patients with schizophrenia outperform healthy control participants on a conditional reasoning task; and (3) evidence that deluded individuals “jump to conclusions”. In this response, I assess these claims, and raise my own questions about the “erotetic” theory of delusional thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: That delusional and delusion-prone individuals "jump to conclusions" on probabilistic reasoning tasks is a key finding in cognitive neuropsychiatry. Here we focused on a less frequently investigated aspect of "jumping to conclusions" (JTC): certainty judgments. We incorporated rigorous procedures from experimental economics to eliminate potential confounds of miscomprehension and motivation and systematically investigated the effect of incentives on task performance. Methods: Low- and high-delusion-prone participants (n = 109) completed a series of computerised trials; on each trial, they were shown a black or a white fish, caught from one of the two lakes containing fish of both colours in complementary ratios. In the betting condition, participants were given £4 to distribute over the two lakes as they wished; in the control condition, participants simply provided an estimate of how probable each lake was. Deviations from Bayesian probabilities were investigated. Results: Whereas high-delusion-prone participants in both the control and betting conditions underestimated the Bayesian probabilities (i.e. were conservative), low- delusion-prone participants in the control condition underestimated but those in the betting condition provided accurate estimates. In the control condition, there was a trend for high-delusion-prone participants to give higher estimates than low-dclusion- prone participants, which is consistent with previous reports of "jumping to conclusions" in delusion-prone participants. However, our findings in the betting condition, where high-delusion-prone participants provided lower estimates than low- delusion-prone participants (who were accurate), are inconsistent with the jumping-to- conclusions effect in both a relative and an absolute sense. Conclusions: Our findings highlight the key role of task incentives and underscore the importance of comparing the responses of delusion-prone participants to an objective rational standard as well as to the responses of non-delusion-prone participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reduced strength of lateralisation in patients with schizophrenia has been reported in a number of studies. However the exact nature of this relationship remains unclear. In this study, lateralisation for processing emotional faces was measured using the chimeric faces test and examined in relation to paranoia in a non-clinical sample. For males only, those with higher scores on a paranoia questionnaire had reduced lateralisation for processing negative facial emotion. For females there were no significant relationships. These findings suggest that atypical patterns of lateralisation for processing emotional stimuli may be implicated in, or associated with, increased levels of paranoia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

False claims are a key feature of confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia. In this paper we consider the role of motivational factors in such claims. We review motivational accounts of each symptom and consider the evidence adduced in support of these accounts. In our view the evidence is strongly suggestive of a role for motivational factors in each domain. Before concluding, we widen the focus by outlining a tentative general taxonomy of false claims, including false claims that occur in clinical settings as well as more garden-variety false claims, and incorporating both motivational and nonmotivational approaches to explaining such claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. The present study was designed to replicate and extend the findings of Bentall and Swarbrick (2003). It was hypothesised that patients with a history of persecutory delusions would display higher need for closure and a more extreme jumping to conclusions bias than healthy control participants. Methods. Twenty-two patients with a history of persecutory delusions and nineteen healthy control participants were administered a probabilistic reasoning task, along with self-report measures of depression and need for closure. Results. The clinical group scored higher on need for closure than the controls, but showed no greater tendency to jump to conclusions. No relationship was found between need for closure and a jumping to conclusions bias. Conclusions. The results confirm an association between persecutory delusions and need for closure, yet suggest that persecutory delusions in an outpatient sample can be seen in the absence of a jumping to conclusions bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction. Bentall and colleagues (Bentall & Kaney, 1996; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996, 1997) claim that persecutory delusions are constructed defensively, for the maintenance of self-esteem. A central prediction of their model is that such delusions will be associated with discrepancies between overt and covert self-esteem.Methods. The present study employed a new methodology that has been widely used in investigations of implicit attitudes, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), to assess covert self-esteem and to test the above prediction. Overt self-esteem was assessed using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and an adjective self-relevance ratings measure. These measures were administered to 10 patients with acute persecutory delusions, 10 patients with remitted persecutory delusions, and 19 healthy control participants.Results. Patients with persecutory delusions were found to have lower covert self-esteem (as assessed using the IAT) than healthy controls and patients with remitted persecutory delusions. On two measures of overt self-esteem, however, the persecutory deluded group did not differ significantly from the other groups once the effects of comorbid depression had been taken into account.Conclusions. These results are thus consistent with a model of persecutory delusions as serving the defensive function of maintaining self-esteem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two different modes of theorising about delusions are explored. On the one hand is the motivational approach, which regards delusions as serving a defensive, palliative, even potentially adaptive function. On the other, is the cognitive deficit approach, which conceptualises delusions as explicitly pathological, involving abnormalities in ordinary cognitive processes. The former approach, prominently exemplified by the psychoanalytic tradition, was predominant historically, but has been challenged in recent years by the latter. Some grievances against psychoanalytic theory are briefly discussed, and it is argued that although the reasons for psychoanalysis falling into scientific disrepute are partly justified, the psychodynamic notion that motivation has access to the mechanisms of belief formation is of potentially crucial theoretical utility. A variety of possible syntheses of the two theoretical modes are therefore explored, in the belief that the most comprehensive account of delusions will involve a theoretical unification of both styles of explanation. Along the way, an attempt is made to locate the notions delusion, defence, and self‐deception in a shared theoretical space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]