1. Firm Strategy and CEO−VP Pay Differentials in Equity Compensation.
- Author
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Abernethy, Margaret A., Dong, Yunhe, Kuang, Yu Flora, Qin, Bo, and Yang, Xing
- Subjects
WAGE differentials ,CHIEF executive officers ,ENTERPRISE value ,BUSINESS enterprises - Abstract
We examine whether pay differentials between the chief executive officer (CEO) and vice presidents (VPs) can be explained by firms' strategic priorities. We find that firms that pursue prospector-type strategies have a larger CEO−VP difference in equity compensation. We argue that such a pay differential relates to the relative authority that CEOs have in strategic decision-making, and we find that authority allocation based on a firm's strategic priorities is consistent with the relative ability of the CEO vis-à-vis the VPs. Our results remain consistent after considering alternative explanations including CEO power, risk-taking incentives, and tournament incentives among VPs. Further analyses reveal that a large CEO−VP equity pay differential enhances firm value for prospector-type firms, and that shareholders and proxy advisors tend to incorporate firm strategy in their say-on-pay votes and proxy recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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