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This article makes moral sense of the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. It does so by applying classical just war thinking. The classical bellum justum, it argues, can make a distinctive contribution toward evaluating the decision to leave Afghanistan, a decision that continues to be discussed controversially. The article points out that classical just war thinking did not introduce distinct moral categories beyond jus ad bellum, such as jus in bello or jus post bellum. Exactly because classical just war thinking was meant to apply to all phases of a war, the article goes on to argue, it provides important lessons for just war as a tool of statecraft that seeks to inform political decision-making. Applying the wisdom that is encapsulated in the classical bellum justum to the withdrawal decision in Afghanistan, the article, although it is critical of its execution, generally sides with the Biden administration's course of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special themed issue on likelihood of success in the just war tradition introduces the problems associated with this prudential jus ad bellum principle, and summarizes the key findings and arguments of the articles in the issue. It concludes that the likelihood of success must be understood organically and cohesively, within the larger tradition, with a special emphasis on the practical applications for justice to which the just war is dedicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, human rights scholarship has progressively turned its gaze to the topic of taxation. As a growing body of literature has shown, both the tasks of raising and spending tax revenue may impinge on the realisation of socio-economic rights, a relationship here termed tax and human rights nexus. Notably, however, sovereigns' fiscal powers are, to a large extent, curtailed by the international tax regime. Whereas appeals for a normative alignment between international tax law and human rights are mounting, a closer look at what exactly international human rights frameworks allow with respect to taxation is still largely missing. This article seeks to fill this gap by systematically analysing regional human rights court's jurisprudence on taxation where it intersects socio-economic rights. In doing so, it aims at illuminating the opportunities and challenges for human rights judicial review of international fiscal policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Uchena Okeja, inspired by sources in African philosophy and military ethics, argued that war by agreement is the only morally justified war. The present piece is a response to Okeja's contention that agreement is both necessary and sufficient for waging war. Contrasting with Okeja, I contend that agreement is neither necessary nor sufficient for initiating a war. Regarding necessity, I contend that there may be overriding values at risk in a conflict and protecting these values may require engaging in war without agreement. Further, I contend that in cases of self-defense, it is not necessary to have consensus for defending oneself from an attacker. With respect to sufficiency, I uphold that Okeja's perspective fails because his model does not provide just cause, conditions for meaningful consent, or the tools with which to avoid exclusion, elitism, and manipulation in deliberative settings. I conclude that Okeja's arguments are indeed valuable and provide inspirational ideas for how to avoid war, but overall, they do not hold up as a full-fledged theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the movie "Walnut Tree" directed by Mohammad Hossein Mahdavian, which depicts the aftermath of Iraq's chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq War. The movie focuses on the concept of just conduct during war, specifically Jus in Bello and Jus post Bellum. It highlights the violation of criteria for just conduct by Iraq, such as targeting residential areas and using chemical weapons. The movie also explores ethical dilemmas faced by non-combatants during war, such as forced entry into private property and difficult medical decisions. Overall, the article suggests that just war theory is not sufficient to address all ethical dilemmas during war. [Extracted from the article]

This article examines the legal and political implications of the anti-Zionism provisions in the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) and 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights (Arab Charter), considering the International Law Commission’s current work on peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens). The Banjul Charter and Arab Charter present what appear to be rare test cases of treaties that conflict with a jus cogens norm, which self-determination—in the case of the Banjul Charter and Arab Charter, this would be Zionism, which this article understands as Jewish self-determination—at least arguably is. This article has three parts. First, it sets forth the nature and parameters of jus cogens under international law, paying attention to the operation of these norms under international treaty law. It then examines the anti-Zionism provisions in the Banjul Charter and Arab Charter and explores their drafting history. Finally, on the assumption that self-determination qualifies as a jus cogens norm, this article applies the black letter law of jus cogens to the Banjul Charter and Arab Charter and looks at the political implications of the two treaties’ anti-Zionism provisions, whether or not self-determination qualifies as a jus cogens norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we focus on the jus in bello principle of necessity for guiding the use of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). We begin our analysis with an account of the principle of necessity as entailing the requirement of minimal force found in Just War Theory, before highlighting the absence of this principle in existing work on AWS. Overlooking this principle means discounting the obligations that combatants have towards one another in times of war. We argue that the requirement of minimal force is an important requirement for considering ethical uses of force. In particular, we distinguish between lethal and non-lethal purposes of use of force and introduce the prospect of non-lethal AWS before reviewing a number of challenges which AWS pose with respect to their non-lethal use. The challenges arise where AWS generate unpredictable outcomes impinging upon the situational awareness required of combatants to ensure that their actions meet the requirement of minimal force. We conclude with a call for further research on the ethical implications of non-lethal uses of AWS as a necessary contribution for assessing the moral permissibility of AWS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Caribbean Court of Justice was established in 2005 to have a determinative role in the further development of Caribbean jurisprudence, and, during its sixteen years of existence, the CCJ has made many important pronouncements on the rule of law. A recent study of these pronouncements suggests that the Court appears to be headed towards the acceptance of a substantive conception of the rule of law which is hierarchically superior to the Constitution and which limits the legislative power to amend the Constitution. But any such court-determined rule of law may be difficult to reconcile with orthodox principles of Caribbean constitutionalism and the orderly development of Caribbean Constitutional democracies. This paper identifies an alternative method of disciplining legislative action in the norms of jus cogens and explores the conceptual methodologies and precedents for making these norms applicable in domestic law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The just-war framework neatly distinguishes between jus ad bellum, the criteria that address political leaders' decisions for waging war, and jus in bello, the criteria that address soldiers' conduct during war. Yet developments in the empirical science of civil wars, the U.S. military's recent preference that ground-level soldiers exercise initiative and autonomy, and the wartime experiences of U.S. soldiers fighting in the twenty-first century converge to reveal an unappreciated overlap between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I examine three firsthand accounts of service in Iraq and Afghanistan to show how military leaders' contingent decisions – insofar as they choose whom to marginalize politically, befriend as allies in combat, and oppose as mortal enemies – are susceptible, theoretically if not yet practically, of jus ad bellum critique. Drawing on the work of Avishai Margalit, Michael Walzer, and James Murphy, I then argue that military designations of friend and foe implicate ethicists, political authorities, and military educators in a network of obligations. Ethicists must discern how to evaluate commanders' political decisions, polities must prepare soldiers for political work, and military educators must teach the relevant scholarship. This argument has significance for regnant conceptions of military expertise and military education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fazal suggests one such comparison when she notes that, during World War II, several states issued war declarations without actually participating in the war. We also agree that declarations of war have important implications for domestic politics and that, more generally, they help bound war in time; that war has fuzzy borders at both its start and end today is not cause for celebration.[3] IS take issue with my "provocative" claim that the proliferation of IHL is related to the decline in declarations of war. Indeed, I found that war initiators were significantly less likely than noninitiators to issue formal declarations of war.[18] Additionally, a perplexing feature of World War II war formalities is that many countries issued formal declarations of war without ever committing troops, and toward the end of the war. Our theory suggests governments worried about the sort of signal a declaration of war would send about the legitimacy and extent of their war aims, complicating efforts to control escalation and manage third-party responses. [Extracted from the article]

State immunity is an inalienable concept in international law designed to prevent abuses of inter-State relations; on the other hand, state immunity removes the threat to the State of being forced to face justice for its sovereign acts as it relates to the most serious of human rights abuses. For these reasons, the granting of immunities to the State may lead to impunity from jurisdiction in cases in which certain human rights recognised as peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) have been violated. This article analyses the tension between the violation of certain human rights and the preservation of State immunity by considering a landmark judgment by the International Court of Justice (Jurisdictional Immunities of the State – Germany v Italy). At the heart of this article lies a significant argument: State immunity (procedural rule) should not equate to State impunity when certain human rights recognised as jus cogens norms (substantive rule) are violated. It also highlights some exceptions to immunity ratione materiae against the backdrop of violations of jus cogens norms by applying State practices in order to support the criticism of the ICJ judgment and that the claim of immunity does not equal to impunity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the practice of jus primae noctis during the feudal age. Jus Primae Noctis (Right of the first Night) was a subject of much interest and considerable controversy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Scholars debated whether it was a custom, a right, or even a myth. Recent evidence would emphasize the so-called right was simply the abffity of the powerful to subject the less powerful to their will. Rape might be a better term to apply since husbands and families had to resort to subterfuge to thwart the desires of the powerful.

Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war. Or, if it is necessary, it is said to be a trivial requirement, as mobilization for war requires some political authorization. Those who would retain the legitimacy requirement have differing views about who the proper authority is. I argue that, reasonably understood, legitimate authorization is necessary for jus ad bellum. Considerations of agency and consent in force combine with the social contract to commit us to deferring to recognized authorities. These obligations are strengthened by the epistemic reliability and pragmatic value conferred by governing institutions and procedures limiting recourse to war. These same rationales imply that the U.N. Security Council should regulate the international use of force. I qualify that if higher authorities fail to act, other subsidiary authorities may then authorize force. However, the move to each subsequent level of authorization must be justified. Understood in this way, the requirement that wars not be fought without legitimate authorization is a non-trivial, necessary procedural jus ad bellum condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article unearths German international lawyer and pacifist Hans Wehberg's plan to outlaw war in the interwar period. It begins by identifying Wehberg's criticism of the permissibility of defensive war with reference to the Locarno Pact, the Geneva Protocol, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It then turns to his plan to transfer the sovereign jus belli ac pacis to the Council of the League of Nations. In the last section, the article examines Wehberg's engagement with American pacifists such as James Shotwell and Charles Morrison, as well as politicians such as Senator William Borah, to explain Wehberg's proposal for the creation of a 'Court for the Outlawry of War.' In so doing, this article seeks to reclaim a German voice in the interwar movement to outlaw war as well as to solidify the connection between international law and pacifism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Citizenship by birth on territory (jus soli), versus by blood (jus sanguinis), is associated with liberal democracies and the Americas. Yet Azerbaijan and Moldova, part of the "buffer zone" between Russia and the West, have used unconditional jus soli. No such law exists in Europe or elsewhere in the post-Soviet space, including in Georgia, a third country that is part of this "buffer zone." The three countries cannot forge closer links to the West due to Russia's support of "frozen" separatist conflicts on their territories. The article finds that territorial citizenship in Azerbaijan and Moldova, as well as its absence in Georgia, are linked to territorial integrity concerns, a multi-century historical context that had thwarted or facilitated ethnic collective identity, and geopolitical fears of dual citizenship. Both authoritarian (Azerbaijan) and liberal-democratic (Moldova) states have used the resulting territorial concept of national identity to combat ethnic separatism, whereas Georgia remains an ethnocracy with difficulties integrating ethnic minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Craig's relationship to, and emergence from, the French legal humanist tradition has always been widely recognized, this paper constitutes a deeper analysis of the specific threads connecting Craig to the humanist literature of the sixteenth century. It examines the first chapter to the Jus feudale and, by studying Craig's aetiology of law and society, assesses the literary and cultural influences on his historiographical product. It demonstrates that Craig's understanding of the earliest human society and of law's evolution was highly dependent on continental humanist literature and, above all, on the writings of Jean Bodin. Yet it also shows that Craig was capable of independent thought and rigorous critical analysis of sources. The article examines Craig's relationship to the writings of his fellow Scot and humanist, George Buchanan, whose De jure regni apud Scotos constitutes a vital intertextual frame for many aspects of Craig's thought, particularly as it relates to sovereignty, monarchy and the limits of royal power. Moreover, it will be seen that the first chapter, though seemingly an antiquarian digression, actually reflects Craig's thoughts on many significant political issues that were current in Scotland at the time he was writing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to most accounts of just war theory,jus ad bellumis concerned with the morality of initiating war. This givesjus ad belluma temporal dimension, making it a set of principles that are applied to judge belligerents’ actions at the outset of a war, but that cannot be revisited after a war begins. I challenge this synchronic conception ofjus ad bellumby arguing that the considerations the principles ofjus ad bellumare meant to judge can, and often do, change substantially over the course of wars. It is inappropriate to determine thead bellumjustice of a war solely based on how the principles ofjus ad bellumare satisfied at a war’s outset. Because of the mercurial nature of war,jus ad bellumprinciples should be applied diachronically, as moral norms that can be used to guide or to judge belligerents even after a war has been initiated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International law concerning outer space is developing at a steady pace since humankind's first step towards space exploration in 1958with the launch of Sputnik 1 and Explorer 1. Since then, space is a growing area of political and economic significance. While significant steps by the international community of states in the form of treaty obligations and principles in international space law are apparent, it is yet to be ascertained whether, and if at all, there are customary international laws or jus cogens principles in place regarding outer space and the issues of governance therein. This paper enumerates and discusses the different principles of outer space law and determines if these principles attain the status of jus cogens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Enlightenment thinkers like Emer de Vattel in his epic work The Laws of Nations (1758) argued that engaging in warfare should comply, as much as possible, with humane rules in the treatment of both combatants and noncombatants. Encapsulated by the phrase jus in bello, or justice in warfare, the question remains whether this idealist doctrine had application in military actions conducted during the Revolutionary War fought over the issue of American independence (1775–1783). This essay concludes that in such frontier regions as the Mohawk Valley of New York, the doctrine of jus in bello had virtually no impact in restraining wartime cruelties. What actually occurred in such areas was vicious partisan warfare, or a contagion of violence characterized by brutal retribution and retaliation among combatants, along with merciless actions directed against civilian noncombatants. The Revolutionary War, at least in regions like frontier New York where partisan fighting predominated, had more in common with the blood-soaked realities of Europe's Thirty Years War (1618–1648) than the ideals promulgated by Vattel and other thinkers who wanted to infuse warfare with basic rules of constraint to limit uncontrolled human brutality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the pairings of citizenship and immigration, territory and mobility – pairings often considered distinct to or even opposite of one another – are critically interconnected. These links are particularly visible in the experiences of Chinese-born children of U.S.-born fathers. These children secured jus sanguinis birthright citizenship from their fathers, fathers who secured jus soli birthright citizenship under the Wong Kim Ark decision. They were 'immigrant citizens' who were allowed to immigrate to the United States only because they were U.S. citizens. Wong Kim Ark's children, along with other Chinese Americans under exclusion, upend the assumed teleology of immigration preceding citizenship and the association of citizenship with territorial presence. Although they were targeted by U.S. immigration authorities, Chinese immigrant citizens fought for their right to migrate between China and the United States. In the process, they exposed some of the ways in which presumed distinctions between citizenship and alienage were blurred during Chinese exclusion, as well as the ways in which citizenship is legally constructed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the issue of jus contra bellum as a particular development within just war thought. At its heart, the jus contra bellum amounts to an attempt to apply the principles of jus in bello (discrimination and proportionality) in order to negate the jus ad bellum. This approach was rather prevalent throughout the Cold War era, as concerns over the prospective use of nuclear weapons facilitated an increasingly sceptical attitude towards the use of force. Whereas the vast majority of just war thinkers have tended to overlook this phenomenon, James Turner Johnson has adeptly recognised the perils of jus contra bellum, and its rather disastrous implications for just war thought. In this respect, Johnson's analysis of this issue constitutes one of his most significant contributions to the tradition. However, as this article will suggest, his assessment of this approach, and consequent efforts to counter it, do not go far enough. As will be noted, the roots of the jus contra bellum can be traced to the prevailing structure of just war thought - a structure which has been consistently championed by virtually every just war thinker. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States' continuing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused reflection on how best to wage counterinsurgency, recognizing that the blurred lines between combatants and noncombatants that characterize this type of fighting broaden the range of opportunities and obligations counterinsurgents face. While many have looked to jus in bello constraints on the just conduct of war to guide this effort, jus post bellum requirements for the just cessation of conflict provide a better framework in which to discuss how soldiers and marines may effectively and ethically pursue insurgents while simultaneously building host-nation capacity to govern politically, economically, and militarily. This paper demonstrates how jus post bellum obligations provide an important structure within which counterinsurgents may understand the full range of their obligations to the host nation and its population, best pursue insurgents while honoring their commitment to noncombatant immunity, and set the standard for what constitutes the end of the conflict and the appropriate point for military disengagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

None of the numerous modern proposals for jus post bellum models has gained wide acceptance. The proposals tend to resemble laundry lists, often enumerated without an obvious and coherent ethical rationale. Recognizing the importance of jus post bellum, this article seeks to move the jus post bellum discourse forward. First, the article constructs a foundation of seven principles for jus post bellum models by modifying and integrating the separate proposals advanced by Bellamy and Evans. Then building on that revised set of foundational principles, this article incorporates selected criteria and research from prior proposals to erect a five-part jus post bellum framework: (1) respect for persons; (2) establish justice; (3) exercise ecological responsibility; (4) engage multinational commitment and support; and (5) maintain progress toward closure. The article concludes by arguing that the proposed jus post bellum model is comprehensive, parsimonious, pragmatic, and has a universally applicable framework analogous to Just War Theory's other two components. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Iraq War, which provoked discussion about ethical criteria for going to war, has opened a conversation about ending wars properly. While ending wars ethically may appear oxymoronic, badly ended wars often cause new wars. Although the just war tradition has no distinct category for ending wars (jus post bellum), the 'go to war' category (jus ad bellum) includes criteria that provide the genesis of the new category. The time has come to consider formally what constitutes the just ending of a war. A jus post bellum has both ethical and practical value, not only at the end of a war but also before it begins. Jus post bellum emphasizes that the goal of war is a more just peace than existed prior to the war, and the victor has an obligation to assist that peace in becoming a reality, both in the defeated nation and in the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to US government statements, drones succeed in killing terrorists while minimizing the risk to noncombatants, thus suggesting that they satisfy thejus in belloproportionality criterion. Scholars, however, are divided on whether drones are truly proportionate. What does it really mean to say drones are, or are not, proportionate? How are we to judge the proportionality of the CIA's drone program? We expose the fallacy of drone proponents who claim they are proportionate by repudiating what we call proportionality relativism – the use of impertinent comparisons to argue that drones are proportionate because they cause less collateral damage than other uses of force. We then analyze the existing data on drone strikes to expose problematic differences in how the US military and the CIA understand proportionality balancing. Finally, we employ what Walzer calls the category ofjus ad vim– the just use of force short of war – to assess the ethics of drones.Jus ad vimdemands a stricter relationship between the use of force short of war and thejus in belloprinciples of proportionality and discrimination, as well as human rights concerns of civilians not usually considered in the proportionality calculus, that severely restricts the scope of proportionality balancing. Assessing the CIA's use of drones in Pakistan according to this standard casts a dark shadow on claims that CIA drones are proportional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Unauthorized network intrusions affect us all. Worse yet, certain classes of unauthorized network intrusions are a very serious matter; ones in which there are minimal defensive actions to prevent such attacks." Denial-Of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDoS) attacks are the class of attack vectors this paper examines and demystifies. We will examine certain aspects (multi/polyaspectuality) of these class-attacks by investigating the following: • The online statement from Carnegie Mellon's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT/CC Timeline, May 2001). • The interplay of three types of justice: Legal Justice (Jus Ad Rem), Social Justice (Jus Civile), and Natural-Moral Justice, or Ethics (Jus Naturalis), while asking the reasonable question, "Can these three types of justice co-exist?" • The application of Lonergan's ethics, whose employment allows for the examination of the good, obligation, and value. In doing so, we hope to arrive at some preliminary answers that will (1) serve as a concrete foundation that will verify the authenticity of positions and further develop those positions; and (2) serve to undermine and destroy weak positions, the ones which are in fact counterpositions and reverse them to concrete positions that are attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible to the individual, the group that said person is a member of, and the society in which they are situated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to just war theory, a resort to war is justified only if it satisfies the right intention condition. This article offers a critical examination of this condition, defending the thesis that, despite its venerable history as part of the just war tradition, it ought to be jettisoned. When properly understood, it turns out to be an unnecessary element ofjus ad bellum, adding nothing essential to our assessments of the justice of armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper considers whether an act of aggression can subsequently become a justified occupation. I use John Lango's theory of the temporalization of just war principles to argue that the jus ad bellum criteria should be reapplied over time, such that they can be newly met over the course of an intervention. Discussing each traditional principle of jus ad bellum, I outline inherent challenges in remaking an unjust war as a valid humanitarian intervention. In particular, I argue that right authority is a complex and difficult hurdle for a former aggressor's occupation. The US occupation of Iraq is used as an example of an intervention that initially violated most or all just war principles but came to satisfy them during later phases of the occupation. This paper contributes not only to the question of how to apply just war principles over time but also to the underdeveloped ethics of occupation and jus post bellum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article concerns contemporary common-sense politics around language, integration, and citizenship that pervade Western European countries, where language is at the basis of a new model of citizenship – jus linguarum. I situate jus linguarum as the product of two seemingly different logics: the logics of neoliberalism and the logics (and legacies) of colonialism. I argue that jus linguarum obscures the fact that 'national language' is a historically constructed category with roots in imperialism, and allows for the disappearance of other categories, such as whiteness and middle-classness. The chapter shows how a form of 'provincialised national languages' arise from the tensions between the inevitability of multilingualism in today's global world, on the one hand, and the insistence of one-nation-one-language, on the other. The analysis of jus linguarum developed in this paper forces a new understanding of citizenship where regimes of seeing and regimes of hearing combine in definitions of citizenship and citizens, through intersecting inequalities of language, race, and class. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores Brian Orend's contribution to the just war tradition, specifically his proposed jus post bellum criteria and his idea of pre-commitment to jus in bello and jus post bellum as part of an expanded jus ad bellum criterion of right intention. The latter is based on his interpretation of Kant's work: that as part of the original decision to begin a war, a state should commit itself to certain rules of conduct and appropriate war termination, and if it cannot so commit, it should not continue further down the path to using force. Orend's revised right intention brings jus post bellum 'into the fold' of the just war tradition, requiring that state obligations go beyond correct conduct in war. The article argues that whatever the nature of the just cause, there is a compelling argument for committing to jus in bello and jus post bellum as part of jus ad bellum right intention. The justness of the cause in the contemporary era requires strictness rather than leniency in the conduct and termination of war for a state to remain legitimate in the eyes of the world. In the context of Orend's proposals, this would require that states 'do their homework' and 'tie themselves to the mast'; this includes providing proof that the situation on the ground is understood, conducting a feasibility test on the proposed intervention and publicly identifying and committing to their obligations and responsibilities during and after war. Recognising the practical and political obstacles to adopting this idealistic revision of the just war tradition, the paper nevertheless concludes that Orend's contribution is significant and worthy of exploration: it offers a kernel of hope for counteracting pressures to lower the threshold of resort to force, delivering greater justice for the innocent victims of war and providing greater probability of durable peace post-war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering forensic psychotherapy, what are the chances of a psychoanalytical treatment of a subject with a perverse clinical structure reaching a positive outcome? The deconstruction of fantasy as a moral experience considering drive satisfaction and desire fulfillment would have to be possible for that to happen. Kruel S.S Summum jus, summa injuria Wie steht es mit einem günstigen Resultat einer psychoanalytischen Psychotherapie in einem forensischen Fall, bei dem das Subjekt eine perverse psychische Struktur aufweist? Für ein befriedigendes Resultat müsste im Sinne eines moralischen Experimentes die Dekonstruktion der Phantasie betreffend triebhafter Befriedigung und Wunscherfüllung erfolgen. Kruel SS. Summum jus, summa injuria Considerando la psicoterapia forense, cuáles son las posibilidades de un tratamiento psicoanalítico para un sujeto con una estructura clínica perversa alcanzando un evolución positiva? La deconstrucción de la fantasía como una experiencia moral considerando la satisfacción pulsional y el cumplimiento del deseo podría posibilitar que eso sucediera. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to explore the place of phantasmatic structures in the production of discourses on the past and the instrumentalization of historiography in the framework of the construction of a European identity. During the last decades, in strong connection with European institutional framing, a heterogeneous discourse tries to impose by means of symbolic violence and authoritative arguments its own truth about Europe's 'Common Legal Past' in order to legitimize European politics in the field of legal integration. In doing so, it conjures both a shared legal tradition and a paradigm for understanding the status of the legal, the jus commune, a kind of Roman Law, a patchwork of Canon Law and scholar interpretation techniques, that emerged in the twelfth century and might have been at work throughout Europe as late as the beginning of nineteenth century. What this discourse also brings to the fore is the idea of a common legal culture that has been largely informed by the religious milieu where most of modern legal concepts have been forged. From this point of view this arguments reveal themselves as variations on Carl Schmitt's problematic stand of a political theology. This paper tries to unravel the internal tensions that undermine the discourse and questions its relation to historical truth and the phantasmatic dimension of meaning construction in historical enterprise. On the other hand, it tries to give an account by means of genealogy of the uncanny relation between this contemporary emergence of the jus commune and other legal ontologies of European modernity that presuppose a strong relation between the legal and the religious. In respect to this, I try to sketch the image of the contemporary discourse on the European 'Common Legal Past' as a discursive strategy that hasn't dealt with its own idiosyncrasies and proffers a doubtful legal ontology with dubious intellectual links that places it in an history of exclusionist and essentialist conservative thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

James Turner Johnson has played a pivotal role in bringing just war thinking to the fore in international relations. This has brought with it increased interest in the relationship between the just war tradition and the laws of war. Whilst Johnson maintains that the legal rules relating to the conduct of war correspond with the requirements of jus in bello, he is more critical of the legal regime relating to recourse to force and has occasionally argued in favour of the superiority of just war thinking to international law in this area. This article discusses Johnson's thinking on the relationship between ethics and law on recourse to force. It begins by outlining Johnson's approach before suggesting that it is overly critical of the post-1945 order. The paper concludes by calling for reconciliation between law and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are there situations where military coups can be considered justified, such as the overthrow of a collapsing, genocidal dictatorship? I argue that under certain circumstances there is an opening for "just coups." I propose a theoretical assessment of coups based on an adaptation of just war theory. I bring the comparative literature surrounding civil–military relations into conversation with the literature on just war theory in order to develop a theory of just coups. By adapting the categories of just war theory into jus ad coup, jus in coup, and jus post coup, I show that these categories create a framework for understanding the ethical status of coups. Doing this gives us a more subtle understanding of the problem of coups and lets us understand how a hypothetical just coup may be possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay offers a case study injus in belloin the American Revolutionary War by focusing on responses to sexual violence committed against American women by soldiers in the occupying British army and their Loyalist auxiliaries. Two main bodies of sources are juxtaposed in order to explore the contexts and manner in whichjus in bellowas adjudicated: British courts-martial and American Congressional investigations documenting British and Loyalist breaches of the codes of war. By putting the fragmentary evidence of instances of rape in the context of contemporary legal and sociocultural practices of sexual violence in peacetime, as well as of the British army's disciplinary regime, we can elucidate the horizon of experiences and expectations against which survivors, assailants and prosecutors acted. The British army disciplined some soldiers for sexual offenses that violated military law and the codes of war, and it executed a few of them at a time when even their home society featured very low prosecution and conviction rates for the capital crime of rape. Prosecutorial discretion on the part of individual British officers helps explain the discrepancy between the formal law of rape and its application in the theater of war. The inconsistency in British responses to rape in turn supported American allegations that the British violatedjus in bello. The new American state invested in unprecedented legalistic, empiricist efforts to expose enemy violations of the codes of war. In their quest to assert national difference and to claim the moral high ground vis-à-vis Britain, and to establish America's place among the ‘civilized’ nations of the world, the Revolutionaries both reflected existing notions ofjus in belloand sought to define them further. The ethical dimension ofjus in bellothus resided in formal law, in the choices made by British officers concerned with force discipline, military–civilian relations, and the codes of war, as well as in the American state's forensic exposure of the enemy's illegitimate violence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The international law on the use of force has emerged as a distinct yet central pillar of international law. Although it may be intuitively understood to be connected to the promotion of human rights, it cannot be said to have emerged exclusively or even primarily as a result of human rights concerns. The rise of international human rights law has tended, coming late to that debate as it were, to neglect questions of war, deferring to specialised regimes on a largely functionalist basis. This article asks instead how one might reimagine the international law of the use of force if one takes the axiological primacy of human rights in international law seriously. This will involve a critique of the emphasis on the mere humanitarian regulation of war and a human-rights rereading of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello traditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can guerrilla wars be fought morally? This essay explores this question by using a single case study, that of the Lebanese Hizballah. The intention of this study is to contribute to our understanding of the jus in bello of guerrilla warfare. Because this case study involves an Islamic resistance movement, a second intention is to contribute to a greater understanding of a movement of people condemned as terrorists in U.S. law and popular perception. I find evidence to indicate a jus in bello principle unique to guerrilla warfare. This principle, which I call the principle of respect, requires that guerrillas show respect for the lives and property of noncombatants. I find the morality of ordinary people to be the source of the jus in bello of guerrilla warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Features Mary Sheepshanks, the pacifist socialist feminist and editor of jus suffragii which highlights the division between early twentieth-century feminist concerning the aims of suffrage and the internationalism of an international movement. Impact of World War I; Issue of being a suffragist; Discussion on equal educational access and employment rights of every married woman to choose her nationality including the abolition in every country of state regulation of prostitution.

With his new book,A Theory of Truces, Nir Eisikovits has succeed in producing the most comprehensive and insightful book to exist on the nature and morality of truces during international military conflict. In it he plausibly argues that thought about such conflict should avoid binary terms such as long-lasting peace and all-out war, and instead must readily acknowledge conditions ‘in between’ them, such as cease-fires and agreements to limit belligerence to certain times. In this critical notice of Eisikovits’ book, I have two major aims, in light of the fact that in it he does not systematically engage with the contemporary literature on and positions in just war theory. One aim is to situate Eisikovits’ analysis of truces in that context, and to contend that he has implicitly founded a new field that would be aptly labelledjus interruptus bellumas distinct fromjus in belloandjus ex bello. Another is to build on Eisikovits’ ethical appraisal of truces, by considering what principles of just war theory entail for them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a place where land was scarce and military security paramount, population growth was perceived as Gibraltar's most insidious curse. While British law protected the rightful residence of those who were recognized by the early 19th century definition of Gibraltar "native," colonial authorities realized that the local population was also increasing by other means. The tenet of the jus soli became one of Gibraltar's most notable weaknesses in attempting to control local population growth. Laws were enacted in a patchwork fashion, attempting to defeat any loopholes that might encourage large-scale immigration and the birth of alien offspring on the Rock. So far as alien/alien unions were concerned, the laws were straightforward, but problems ultimately arose for those local women and men who married aliens and who intended to remain in Gibraltar. Concerns over alien contributions to population growth seemed to reach crisis proportions in the 1860s and 1870s, but thereafter the burdens and difficulties imposed on that portion of the local population that opted to marry out eased substantially under the authority of a new governor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Selective conscientious objection, a refusal to participate in a specific war due to reasons of conscience, has recently gained attention. A combatant confronted with such a decision needs guidance to help decide whether and how to object. Furthermore, those judging a combatant's objection or failure to object need guidance. After introducing the prima facie duty override criteria, I will apply the criteria to the case of selective conscientious objection. Ultimately, I argue that the jus ad bellum criteria rebranded as the prima facie duty override criteria can help provide guidance regarding selective conscientious objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work suggests how much human sciences can learn from a booklet almost all cultures know, The Little Prince. It stimulates to read them in their anthropological aspects of behavior facing alterity, highlighting its value without proposing it as educational element to homogenize the different. The reflection is thus focused on the demolishing and lasting effects of European culture during its colonization of American and African people. The contribution ends with Ferraioli and De Vitoria's considerations on a society based on the axiom of the free circulation of men and goods, and the legitimization of thinking given by natural law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our challenging times individuals in military services may find themselves in the position of being called to contribute to a war whose overall justice they personally find morally suspect, or about which they have moral qualms. The right course of action in this situation can be a serious dilemma. Applying the principle of double effect to this dilemma recognizes essential state responsibility for war, but does not discount the soldier's personal moral responsibilities or individual will. This novel application of the principle of double effect treats damage produced by participating in a questionable war as a side-effect of pursuing other—clearly justifiable—intentions. The just war tradition already uses the principle of double effect when weighing the permissibility of individuals' acts in war, such as choosing bombing targets. The proposal here is to evaluate the decision to contribute to the war effort at all. This adaptation of the classic just war principle of double effect can be used to justify some—but not all—individual participation when a war's state-level justification is suspect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traces the core elements of the the Groatian tradition of war. Values of the tradition which drew on the writings of Hugo Grotius; Central ambition of the Groatian tradition of war.

In this paper I focus on duties we owe refugees from conflict zones. I argue that it is important to distinguish between two types of duties one might have with respect to refugees from conflict zones. Belligerents from wars that resulted in excess numbers of refugees, I argue, have a stringentduty to remedy past harmsand provide for resulting refugees. Other states have aduty to aidwhich is context-dependent and can be in some cases as stringent as the duty to remedy past harms. I argue that making a distinction between the grounds and types of duties different actors have with respect to refugees from conflict zones has significant consequences both for just war theory (and in particular proportionality calculationsad bellumandin bello), but also for practical questions about how best to discharge our duties to refugees from conflict zones. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The results of beneficiation studies of high-ash fine coal using the Oleo-flotation process are presented. The influence of three key variables (diesel oil dosage, wash oil [a product of crude oil obtained during the process of refining at 275 to 300°C] dosage, and impeller speed) of the Oleo- flotation process on yield % and ash % is presented in this article. An attempt is made to develop a three-layer feed-forward artificial-neural-network (ANN) model based on the experimental data set, which was trained using an error-back-propagation algorithm. The results indicated that the predictions from the ANN model are in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with the experimental observations, thereby validating the applicability and accuracy of the developed ANN model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]