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This paper argues that amid intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, middle powers in East Asia have contributed towards regional peaceful change through the exercise of good regional citizenship, a concept which draws on and modifies from the more commonly known good international citizenship which is closely associated with middle powers. Specifically, good regional citizenship involves proactively strengthening inclusive multilateralism, enhancing the rules-based order, and contributing to bridging efforts in East Asia. The paper examines the good regional citizenship of two middle powers, namely Australia and Indonesia. It finds that while both countries have exercised good regional citizenship, their specific strategies or the outcomes of their initiatives on regional dynamics have varied as a result of their relations with the respective major powers and their general foreign policy approaches. Australia's good regional citizenship has supported the preservation of U.S. leadership in East Asia vis-à-vis the rise of other regional powers, while Indonesia's good regional citizenship has helped to narrow the gaps among regional actors through mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia offers a fertile ground for applying dominant theoretical perspectives in International Relations and understanding their relevance and limitations. As this region has seen much conflict and cooperation historically and is re-emerging as a key theater of great power competition in the 21st century even when states maintain high levels of economic interactions, our understanding of the regional order will be enhanced by the theoretical tools available in the larger mainstream IR perspectives. The existence of a peculiar regional order of no war, yet a number of simmering disputes (along with high levels of economic interdependence) can be characterized as cold peace which deserves an explanation. The paper applies two variants of realism—balance of power and hegemonic stability – and the key arguments in liberalism to analyze the cold peace in Northeast Asia and normal peace in Southeast Asia from a historical perspective. It finds both grand theoretical approaches have partial applications for understanding the East Asian order. A hybrid approach is more valuable to better explain regional order during diverse time periods and different sub-regions of East Asia. Although the presence of both hegemony and balance of power can prevent major wars for a period, they do not help resolve the pre-existing disputes. Deepened economic interdependence mitigates some spiraling tendencies as states fearful of losing too much economically do not escalate crises beyond a point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Yeung H. W.-C. Regional development and the competitive dynamics of global production networks: an East Asian perspective, Regional Studies. The debate on the nature and dynamics of regional development in both academic and policy circles has now moved on from the earlier focus on endogenous regional assets to analysing the complex relationship between globalization and regional change. This position paper attempts to engage with this debate through the experience of regional development in East Asia. The paper shows that regional development cannot be understood independently of the changing dynamics of global production networks. While the existing literature on East Asia tends to focus on the state as the key driver of economic development at the national and regional levels, it is argued that the developmental state is a necessary but not sufficient condition for regional development to take place. Instead, one needs to study the complex strategic coupling of those economic actors, particularly large business firms, operating in specific regions in Asia with their lead firm counterparts orchestrating production networks on a global basis... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen a revival of discussions on American decline. This paper intervenes in this debate by suggesting that there is a tendency towards partial conceptualisations of US power. It suggests a new historical materialist perspective that makes it possible to theorise American Empire as a relational social totality embedded within global capitalism. The paper then analyses the social limits of China’s rise and the integration of East Asian regionalisation into American Empire, suggesting the extent to which world power has shifted east has tended to be overestimated. It also analyses the emergence of Brazil, India, and the BRICS meetings, suggesting these developments have a limited, but overstated, capacity to challenge American Empire. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper assesses the relative merits and demerits of different East Asian models by placing them in a historical perspective. It re-interprets Gerschenkron's model of late industrialization, and extends it to compare East Asian economies in view of substituting and complementing models, ft then explains divergent performances among East Asian economics from the late 1990s by examining the different Challenges they faced as their economies became mature and more fully open to forces of globalization. fn conclusion, the paper discusses the applicability of the East Asian models for today's developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the fact that the Bolshevik Revolution took place in 1917, the Cold War is typically seen as a conflict that only emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. This paper questions that orthodox interpretation by studying the tense relations that existed in the inter-war period between Britain and the Soviet Union. In particular it looks at Anglo-Soviet rivalry in East Asia in the mid-1920s when the Comintern inspired the Kuomintang in China to challenge British commercial interests in that country and the consequences that this competition had for relations down to 1940 and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High economic growth rates, the revolution in telecommunications and the end of the Cold War have brought about rapid and profound changes to the domestic as well as regional environments of Northeast Asian governments. The maritime sphere, where increasingly militarized state boundaries delineate political authority and economic activities link increasingly interdependent communities therein, bears high significance for the study of regional cooperation. This paper looks at how the maritime sphere of Northeast Asia is represented in common political and academic discourses of international relations. It finds that maritime affairs are firmly cast in the language of national security, and that empirical evidence against perceived threats and related security imperatives is often neglected if not completely ignored. The paper argues that the maritime space, due to its special character, has become the stage on which the consequences of modernity appear particularly strong. The relentless quest to develop and control the ocean clashes with the notion of the sea as a space of global trade and communication flow. At the same time, the ocean as an entity itself is excluded from the discourse because it is irreconcilable with the conception of the international system of sovereign territorial units. As a result, the maritime sphere is seen as a dividing element between nations rather than a connecting element, and salient environmental problems of the maritime space remain low on political and academic agendas. This is also a consequence of mainstream methods of political science that continue to reproduce discourses of territorial division and fail to offer alternative approaches suitable for the study of contemporary Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is rising as the fastest growing largest economy and thereby leading a market-driven economic integration in East Asia. At the same time, nationalism is also rising and constraining East Asian countries from forming a state-driven regional community. This paper examines the political economy of interdependence and nationalism that is taking place in East Asia. Simply put, its central theme is that the degree of interdependence, especially between China and other countries, is deepening, and as a result, is pulling East Asia toward regional integration, but due to the rising tide of nationalism, it is far short of forming an actual community. In order to build a community, therefore, such economic trend must be propelled by political leadership and will. In elaborating on this thesis, the paper analyzes the trade and production networks centered on China, the efforts to promote regional integration in ASEAN + 3, the nationalist rivalry between Japan and China in negotiating FTAs, and the difficulties in achieving Sino-Japanese reconciliation. Finally, the paper proposes a Northeast Asian Forum among Japan, South Korea and China while the US remains as a stabilizing force in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ancient East Asia is the second oldest "protobeilic area" and pristine state system of international relations within the global international system, after West Asia (ancient Near East). In a previous study Cioffi-Revilla and Lai (1995) reported the first findings on the origins and evolution of war and politics in ancient China (Legendary, Xia [Hsia], Shang, and Western Thou [Chou] periods), Ca. 2700 B.c. to 722 B.C. In this paper we make public an expanded data set (N = 104 cases, 12 variables; version 2.0), explaining our sources, measurements, and data quality control procedures. The new data set will permit investigators to test hypotheses about warfare distributions, ethnic and protracted conflicts, time series, periodicity, system dynamics, and structural relationships (e.g., war-polarity theories). This new long-range data set should also promote a new stage in comparative analyses of the universal and particular properties of warfare and international systems, both cross-polity and longitudinally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper studies the roles of co-chairs in international negotiations. This study attempts to fill the research gap by scrutinizing co-chairs' effectiveness, defined as an ability to shape agreement details in one's direction, to better understand chairs' and co-chairs' influence in negotiations. I argue that a co-chair's effectiveness is not a function of resource possession, but is rooted in its resource management, or ability to convert the existing resources into bargaining influence. To validate my argument, I analyze the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) negotiation rounds from 2005 to 2010, focusing on the members' financial contributions and vote shares. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Presents an overview of the April 2003 issue of the 'Cambridge Review of International Affairs.' Collection of papers on the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998; Inclusion of political-cultural factors; Asian economic crisis as threshold event in modern international affairs; Return to high rates of economic growth.

This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American ‘pivot,’ and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly ‘hedge’ China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Soaring prices for minerals and energy are posing a major threat to the resource security of economies in Asia. As a result, many regional governments have launched new resource security strategies in the last few years. Most recent attention to resource security in Asia has focused on debating whether the Chinese government’s resource policies are mercantilist or liberal. This China-focused debate is too narrow to fully capture the nature of resource politics in Northeast Asia, since the governments of Japan and Korea have also recently launched their own resource security strategies. This paper considers regional-level trends in Asian resource politics by examining the causes, content and implications of the resource security strategies deployed by the consumer governments in Northeast Asia. It argues that growing resource security concerns, combined with a process of competitive policy emulation, have seen the Chinese, Japanese and Korean governments each adopt mercantilist resource security strategies over the last decade. Furthermore, the competitive nature of these mercantilist strategies is acting to intensify political and economic competition for resources between the Asian region’s three main economic powers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The ‘rise of China’ is proving to be one of the most consequential developments of the early 21 century One of the key questions it raises is about the impact this historically unprecedented process will have on the East Asian region in particular and the world more generally. Will Chinese policy makers will be able to translate the country’s growing material importance into other forms of political power and influence? Equally importantly, will Chinese elites be ‘socialised’ into the practices and norms of extant institutions, or will they attempt to redefine them to further Chinese foreign policy goals? This paper explores these questions by initially looking at the overall historical context in which East Asian regionalisation has occurred, before considering the operation of some of the more important regional institutions. It is suggested that China’s ability to offer regional leadership is constrained both by its own security policies―which are seen as increasingly threatening by many of its neighbours―and by the actions of the USA, which is trying to reassert its own claims to regional leadership. While the outcome of this process is inconclusive, it helps us to understand the more general dynamics reshaping the international system as a result of the emergence of new centres of international power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China has rapidly re-emerged as a major regional power in East Asia. Although this represents a return to a long-established historical pattern, the ability of China's political elites to reassure nervous neighbours about the implications of its rise will be a major test of its evolving and increasingly sophisticated foreign policies. In this paper we focus primarily on China's regional engagement strategies, detailing the way such initiatives are understood in China, and the way they are received elsewhere. We focus primarily on the political and economic impacts of China's policies, and briefly consider their reception in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. We highlight the different dynamics and issues that China's policymakers must consider in each area, and suggest that despite some difficulties and tensions, on balance, China's policies are proving surprisingly effective. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper explores how China's strategic motivations and calculations have both motivated and constrained its participation in East Asian regional cooperation. It argues that China's participation in regional economic and security cooperation is motivated first of all by the calculation of China's domestic interests to create a peaceful peripheral environment for its economic growth and political stability, particularly its frontier security and prosperity. The realist interests to enhance China's position in power competition with other major players in the region, particularly Japan and US, also play an important part in China's strategic calculation. These interest calculations, however, also set limits on China's participation in regional cooperation. These interest calculations have also shaped China's preference for an informal approach, emphasizing voluntarism and consensus building rather than legally binding resolutions, toward regional cooperation. This soft approach is a major barrier for many regional institutions to move beyond the stage of talking shops to effectively resolve conflicts in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The composition of Greater China among the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan entails an emerging form of micro governance where an ecological evolution of sub-group interaction and crossover of economic and social activities has been generating a dynamic of change within the East Asian region. The constitution of Greater China by social, economic, political, business and even daily commuting creates some soul searching questions about the possible outcomes of their intense interaction. To what extent has integration been made within Greater China through these interactions? Is China the economic linchpin or does China need to cooperate in one way or another to facilitate the modes of economic development? What are the attitudes and strategies used by Hong Kong or Taiwan when confronted with such an economic cum social entity? More importantly, where, and, under what conditions, will the interactions among the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong lead to? In this paper, I am going to use a conceptual model which includes four interactions: integration, interdependence, identity and independence (Four Is) to capture the catalyst of change that collectively entails these intermingled economic, social and cultural elements. People who live in the vast context of this geographical region experience the change. Through daily interaction, they help write the context of change through business activities, investment, migration, trade, culture, academic exchange, political and social development along the Four Is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese foreign policy six decades after the end of World War II stands at a crossroads. The forces of globalization and the rise of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) seem to herald the end of the unipolar post-Cold War international system and the emergence of a new era defined by multi-polarity and multilateralism. Such global trends are manifest most clearly in Japan's own backyard, where phenomenal region-wide economic growth, a gradual redistribution of power (in particular the rise of China and India), and the increasingly important role of multilateral cooperation and regional institutions are dramatically transforming East Asia. This trend shows no signs of slowing down, much less reversing itself; nor would it be in Japan's interest to pursue any policy that seeks to do so. Nevertheless, the transformation itself remains almost on auto-pilot, lacking a clear long-term guiding vision. After presenting a brief overview of Japan's past policy toward the region, the goal of this paper will be to articulate such a vision through a series of policy proposals through which to ensure future peace, stability, and prosperity in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explains the relationship between Japan and its neighboring countries, and the influence of Japanese neo‐nationalism on the idea of an East Asian community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With an increasing regional integration and development, there are many competing ideas of, and proposals for, regional development in Asia. This article examines the historical evolution of the idea of regionalism, the meaning of Asian regionalisms, variations of Asian regionalisms and their impact on regional cooperation in East Asia. It discusses Mahathir's idea of neo-Asianism, Japanese new Asianism. Chinese ideas of regionalism, and variations of Korean ideas of regionalism. It also examines a normative basis of religionalism with special reference to the sovereignty question. The paper concludes that behind East Asian regionalism is nationalism which constitutes drilling force5 for regionalism; that two competing orders (Asia-Pacific regionalism versus pan Asianism) create different expectations and visions of how East Asia region should evolve and they are in tensions and lead to different directions; and that East Asia lacks a convincing and acceptable normative framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the comments elicited by Ross Garnaut's report on Australia and its relations with Northeast Asian countries particularly Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. In his report, he suggested that Australia should not be threatened by the growing economies of these countries but rather it should establish a beneficial relationship with them. The report suggests that Australia should adopt a set of appropriate policies that focuses on education and research that helps in the understanding of the language, cultures, and economics of Asia. The article mentions five papers published within the issue that are drawn from the Garnaut Report.

Copyright of International Interactions is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

East Asia is essential to the UK's post-Brexit international strategy. Within a complex web of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, the UK needs to manage historical ties, new strategic objectives and ongoing partnerships. Underpinning these interactions is trust and some of the dynamics more commonly associated with formal security alliances. Post-Brexit, there is a need to assure these states of the UK's place in the world and particularly its commitment to, and strategic objectives in, the region, but also recognise that there is an increasing risk of moral hazard for the UK in seeking to achieve some of its objectives. Catherine Jones offers a framework for understanding the challenges and opportunities for the UK's current planning in the region.◼ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the coverage of Sun Yatsen's pan-Asianism speech in November 1924 by three colonial-era Korean daily newspapers (Dong-A Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo and Mai-Il Shinpo), in the context of the events immediately before and after the speech. My interest lies in illuminating how Sun's message was interpreted differently by these dailies. On the one hand, the Dong-A Ilbo, as a nationalist newspaper, sought to evoke anti-Japanese sentiments and the desire for national independence in its readers through Sun's voice. For the Dong-A's Korean readers, Sun was a symbol of anti-colonial nationalism. On the other, the Mai-Il Shinpo, which was published by the Japanese colonial government, reported enthusiastically on Sun's pan-Asianism speech to promote the idea of Japan–China cooperation and a Japan-centred regional order in East Asia. A closer examination of Sun's anti-colonial and pro-Japanese political stance and how these newspapers interpreted his pan-Asian vision provides an opportunity to reconsider how political East Asia was envisioned differently from the Korean, Japanese and Chinese perspectives. In addition, analysing Sun's speech, in which a Sinocentric mindset was incorporated into the newly conceptualised trans-national vision, deepens our understanding of the complicated relationship between nationalist and internationalist thinking in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues for a pluralist, integrative, ‘post-Washington Consensus’ view of an East Asian financial architecture in the post-global crisis world. What are the key architectural problems and how might such problems be resolved? The article aims to address these general questions and to develop a policy-applicable theory about a post-crisis regional financial architecture by focusing on the case of East Asia. The generic problems identified in the study include sovereignty, power struggles, structural diversity, collective action problems and weak regional identity and norms. Herein, I present a conceptual model of logically possible solutions to such problems, which comprises principled minimalism and host regulation, decomposition and issue linkage, and informal intermediaries. The proposed solutions reflect and reinforce the normative fragmentation and decentralization of global financial governance in the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article's Vaultage section, Peter Malone reflects on the themes and characters of John Duigan's Far East (1982). Malone offers a synthesis of responses to the film, whilst highlighting the film's cinematic and cultural points of reference - namely, Casablanca (Curtiz, 1942) and developing Australasian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

British policy in Eastern Asia, 1948-55, aimed to combine the attainment of change leading to stability, to be secured through cooperating with nationalism against the growing threat from communism. After initial errors, ministers and officials revealed realism and flexibility, as shown in policies towards Burma, Malaya, and China. As regards Japan, the United States dominated decisionmaking and British views were rather negative towards the viability of political reform in the longer term and towards economic revival. The collapse of French authority in Indo-China pushed Anthony Eden towards compromise with the communist powers at the Geneva conference in 1954: Britain diverged from the US in supporting a strictly defensive alliance (SEATO), which was linked with an ambivalent approach to the future of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Without direct fieldwork access, one can nevertheless imagine what possible changes can happen in the everyday life of North Koreans, by references with conditions elsewhere in East Asia which resonates with current conditions in North Korea. First, the division between North and South Korea can be referenced with the other instances of nations divided by a communist and a capitalist regime; namely, the present China and Taiwan and the previous North and South Vietnam. In contrast to these references to possible routes to reunification, it also can be referenced to instances of peaceful separations, such as the case of Malaysia and Singapore. Second, now that a nascent private market economy has been introduced, the experiences of Vietnam and China in marketizing their respective centrally planned economy can serve as references to imagine the possible economic transformation of North Korea. Third, the penetration of imported media/popular cultures into North Korean media consumption may stimulate new aspirations of local population for a different material future, as it has done in other parts of East Asia. Drawing on the experiences of other East Asian nations as reference points, potential and possible changes in the everyday life in North Korea can be imagined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of East Asian Science, Technology & Society is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Critically reviewing David Kang’s China-centred hierarchical model, his interpretation of historical interactions between China and Vietnam favours Sinocentrism whilst claiming to rescue historical East Asian international relations theories from Eurocentrism. This analysis provides a nuanced account of Vietnam’s agency in pursuing its national interests in the context of a rising China, showing that Vietnam today continues to draw on the historical tradition of deference/resistance to China to orient its strategies and tactics in dealing with its northern neighbour. Vietnam’s stance toward China is akin to balancing Great Power influence, which entails enlisting other Great Powers to defend its core interests vis-à-vis China. The result is that Vietnam simultaneously pursues a mixture of deference and resistance to China that does not resemble balance of power—against China, or balance of threat—bandwagon with China's behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2013, Japan established its first-ever National Security Council (NSC) as the leading edge of ambitious reforms to its foreign-policy-relevant institutions. Within weeks, Japan’s new national security tripod was firmly in place: the top-level, political NSC ‘control tower’ as well as Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy and National Security Secretariat. Ever since, the NSC has played a central role in every major aspect of the Japanese strategic trajectory that has attracted so much global attention (and controversy) in the ‘Abe era’. This study analyzes the motivations driving Japan’s decision to establish an NSC, the institution’s key characteristics and functioning, and offers a preliminary assessment of the current and likely future implications of this historic institutional reform. Beyond the NSC’s impact on policy, of potentially greater long-term significance is its effects on Japan’s foreign-policy decision-making processes: in particular, expanded Kantei-centered political leadership of national security affairs and more ‘whole-of-government’ approaches specifically designed to transcend the ‘vertical hurdles’ traditionally dividing Japan’s powerful bureaucracies. The goal of these reforms is as straightforward as it is ambitious: to transform Japan’s ability to flexibly and independently cope with a rapidly changing, increasingly complex, and ever more uncertain security environment in East Asia and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia currently faces mounting issues (including a wide range of political, military, and security conflicts), and the ever-intensifying crisis in the region unfolds in sharp contrast with ever-growing economic cooperation and cultural exchange. The term ‘Asia Paradox’ is loaded with such overtones, and it is directly related to East Asian regionalism. Since the 1990s East Asian regionalism has been widely developed in various spheres, but the reality in East Asia today shows that rich experiences of economic and cultural cooperation are powerless to ease current conflicts in the region. Where then can we discover possible ways of overcoming the Asian paradox? This article attempts to find a clue in the perspective of East Asian critical regionalism, focusing on its dynamism of trans-boundarisation as a coexistence of re-boundarisation and de-boundarisation. To that end, this work will first examine the characteristics of boundaries, globalisation, regionalism and critical regionalism theoretically, using trans-boundarisation as a key word. Second, it will examine the possibility that East Asian critical regionalism can show a way forward toward the resolution of conflicts in East Asia, or for the solution of the Asian paradox, using East Asian border disputes as the empirical case. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We may expect regional response to the tension and conflict in Asia begun by China in 2009 gradually to transform the international order in that region, where the United States has been the active great power. Today the United States is so overextended in commitments and so lacking in force structure (and political will) that she can no longer play that role. Nor, however, has China succeeded in her initial assumption that regional powers would defer to her vastly increased military power. Unless China finds a way to extricate herself, we may expect regional powers, each strengthening herself, to grow closer together as a group in which Tokyo plays an unaccustomed central role, both in diplomacy and arms supply, although in coordination with the United States. North Korea is also highly dangerous. The likely outcome is greater military strength generally, with South Korea and Japan nuclear powers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Social Sciences in China is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on significant changes to Japan's defense policies under the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is behind the initiative for the country's return as a "first-tier" power and the vision for a U.S. - Japan "Alliance of Hope." Topics discussed include efforts to reform the geographical and substantive scope of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) before the Abe administration, changes made in the country's security policy since Abe's return in 2012 including the National Security Strategy and an updated National Defense Program Guidelines and the truth behind concerns over Japan's return to militarism and threat to regional peace and stability under Abe's leadership.

The rise of a non-democratic China as the world ‘s second largest economy, still officially subscribing to Communism or ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ as its ideology1, has raised the spectre of the return of the Cold War to Asia with the United States and China on opposing sides, with China backed by Russia, its former Cold War ally. But to what extent are there historical parallels between the Cold War and the current East Asian international relations system? [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Debates about the future of American seapower in East Asia turn on the argument that American seapower presents a risky and costly luxury that undercuts the cooperative potential of US–China relations. This article asks whether accommodation between China and the United States on the possession and exercise of American seapower in East Asia is possible. Accommodation on this front could significantly lower the risks of unintended escalation and in turn undermine arguments that favour an American retreat from East Asia. The article outlines how accommodation can be achieved on the exercise of American seapower in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of fisheries in the East China Sea and the South China Sea as an aspect of China's food security policy. Topics include the notion of wild fish as a strategic natural resource in light of fishery depletion, a 1974 conflict between China and South Vietnam regarding fishing rights in the Paracel Islands area, and maritime boundary disputes with the Philippines, Japan, and Indonesia. Also addressed are problems with Chinese maritime security interagency cooperation, possible international cooperation in resolving fisheries disputes, and efforts to avoid international conflict over fisheries.

What are the obstacles to greater cooperation in Northeast Asia and why have the nations of the region not been entirely successful in moving beyond history, toward greater cooperation? Conducting a brief survey of Northeast Asian IR and power alignment patterns from the Imperial/Dynastic era to the present, this essay utilizes the constructivist approach to assess regional alignment patterns in Northeast Asian history corresponding to six historical time periods, ranging from Ming China to the present. It does so by employing Wendt's system-level cultures of anarchy (Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures) at the dyadic/second level of analysis and the regional level of analysis (level 2.5), rating the various eras as to levels of cooperation vs enmity, with an eye to identifying the reasons for today's tension points. It concludes that despite such tension points and unresolved historical issues, anarchy in Northeast Asia today is not Hobbesian (enmity), but rather Lockean (rivalry). Consequently and first, war, nuclear proliferation and security spirals may be avoidable with proper sensitivity to the issues that continue to pose as obstacles to regional cooperation, including historical grievances, uncertainties over China's rise and the US role in the region, the North Korean nuclear issue and others. Second, attention to improving the dyadic cultures (China–Japan, South Korea–North Korea, etc.) that together comprise the region's relational culture (either Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian) make greater regional cooperation possible and even more likely. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article considers the regional order-building challenges that Australia presently confronts in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). The author argues that while regional stability within the IOR constitutes an increasingly important Australian security interest, policy makers will struggle to translate the order-building strategies they have previously pursued in East Asia into an Indian Ocean context. In East Asia, Australia has historically pursued a ‘dual track’ order-building strategy centred on its participation in a US-dominated ‘hub and spokes’ alliance system alongside multilateral regional engagement. The absence of an equivalent alliance system or an established tradition of multilateral security diplomacy conversely precludes an extension of this strategy into the IOR. Growing tensions between the USA and China and between China and India, meanwhile, further complicate IOR security dynamics, while underscoring the urgent need for a more coherent approach to regional order-building. With these challenges in mind, the author concludes by proposing a range of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral initiatives that Australia should pursue to stimulate the emergence of a more cooperative IOR security environment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Political elites in East Asia tend to view the concept of human security with scepticism. On the one hand, broader notions of security are acknowledged. However, traditional views on sovereignty and deeply embedded norms relating to non-intervention and consensus politics have fostered conservative views towards parts of the human security agenda that challenge state/elite perspectives. This article identifies and explores this tension, and comments on the potential for different ‘strands’ of human security to inform future regional cooperation and dialogue, and concludes that human security's breadth continues to fuel an endless debate about its clarity and utility in East Asia. Such confusion is a challenge for its future relevance in the region, both as a conceptual tool and as a policy agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The introduction of the term ‘colonial modernity’ in historiography of the early 1990s provided an alternative to ‘modernization theory’ and an international focus to writing about Japanese and other imperialisms on the China mainland. This neologistic phrase also raised many other questions: the historicity of the national focus versus ‘regionalism’ in Asian Studies; the role imperialist social science in US Asian studies; the project of globalizing historiography and what units of comparison – value, nation, subalterneity, etc. – were viable in global studies; and the importance of ephemera and immanent critique in colonial modernist studies. Here the essay takes earlier debates about colonial modernity and modernization theory as a given foundation. The further step is to take seriously questions of selling, buying, investing, marketing and advertising under colonial modern conditions during the mobilization of international capital into aggressive corporate form. This historical focus is a means of opening to scrutiny ephemera and its likely role among people who were reinventing their given historical conditions, creating a material and intellectually viable colonial modernity. Thus, the essay begins with a discussion of the ‘other scene of use value.’ A particularly artful mise en abyme of a modern girl advertising shows the efficacy of this ‘other scene’ as a speculative, psychoanalytically coherent, fantasy form of intellection that may have prefigured and predisposed future, compulsory, class-striated modes of consumption and regimes of modern pleasure. The avenue that ‘other scenes of use value’ open to historiography may enhance the way the term colonial modernity is used and defined. The essay's general argument thus seeks to illustrate some of the stalemates facing the colonial modernity debate and to propose another possible line for historiographic work. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the recent growth in multilateral security processes, the efforts to forge a ‘security architecture’, and focuses particularly on the role that China's rise has played in this process. It sketches out growth in Asian security cooperation and the efforts to forge a new security architecture. It then considers the question of China as a cause of this increase in security cooperation as well as China's own motives in actively engaging with this process. The final section then reflects on the contribution that security cooperation currently makes to the regional order. The article argues that China's rise has been an important prompt to the efforts to devise new security arrangements, but has not been the only source of this trend. It concludes that while multilateral security cooperation will be important in the emerging regional order, alone it will not provide a robust foundation for regional stability and security. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the end of the Cold War, India's strategic horizons have moved beyond its traditional preoccupations in South Asia. India is developing a strategic role in East Asia in particular. At the same time India's strategic thinking has undergone a revolution, as the country that prided itself on non-alignment has moved closer to the West. But India's culture, history and geography still fundamentally shape its worldview. In engaging with East Asia, India is guided by a mosaic of strategic objectives about extending its sphere of influence, developing a multipolar regional system and balancing against China. The interplay of these objectives will frame India's role in East Asia in coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The gradual institutionalization of defence diplomacy is becoming an increasingly prominent and potentially important feature of security dialogue in the Asian region. This stands in marked contrast to Asia's recent history, where across the region multilateral defence or military interactions have traditionally been regarded with suspicion. This article examines the emergence of Asia's most prominent exercise in defence diplomacy: the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD). Within a relatively short space of time, this forum has developed into one of the most important opportunities for regional defence ministers and senior military officers to meet and exchange views on security issues. Yet despite its growing standing, the SLD has received virtually no scholarly attention. The article begins by reviewing the origins and development of the SLD, before outlining its operating modalities. It seeks to account for the apparent appeal of the SLD, measured in terms of its capacity to consistently attract high-level representation and favourable reviews. The article explores how the SLD might develop in the future and outlines some of the challenges it faces, including the rise of potentially competing mechanisms for defence diplomacy in East Asia. The article closes by outlining a number of areas for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1997-98 East and Southeast Asia experienced a region-wide financial crisis that saw national currencies lose 75 per cent of their value and stock markets wiped out. The financial crisis became an antagonistic and racialised referendum on Asian values between certain Asian governments and their Western critics. What was the larger political significance of this focus on Asian values? Focusing on the Malaysian government's controversial decision to go against the international financial community by implementing capital controls during the crisis, I argue that the debate over Asian values can be understood as performances to challenge and psychologically defend the conventional hierarchy of international relations that followed its symbolic disruption through the economic success of the regional economies before the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's 2008 proposal for an Asia-Pacific community, while ambitious and likely to be resisted by many in the East Asian region, raises important concerns about Asia's regional architecture at a time of profound change and challenge from economic uncertainty, human insecurity, environmental problems and intrastate conflict. This article examines how historic Australian and Asian discourses of identity have shaped Asian-Australian relations and how identity discourses now interact with profound contemporary struggles over the pace and direction of normative and institutional change, as exemplified by struggles over the ASEAN Charter or approaches to Burma. One key to this process of change will be how the region defines 'community' in both ideational and institutional terms. Will it be people- or elite-centred? Will it be exclusivist and conservative, or open and cosmopolitan? The article critiques older discourses that conceived Australian identity as radically different from Asia and Asian identity as homogenous and anti-Western, arguing that these enabled repressive forms of politics at home and hobbled the ability of the region to grapple collectively with new challenges and insecurities abroad. It argues for homogenising and egoistic models of identity to be abandoned in favour of a more pluralist and cosmopolitan orientation - a new vision of 'unity in diversity' where there are no civilisations to clash. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]