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This document is a correction notice for an article titled "Social status and prosocial behavior" published in the journal Experimental Economics. The correction states that there was a mistake in the paper, where "Theorem 1" should have been labeled as "Lemma 1" on page 18. The publisher, Springer Nature, apologizes for any inconvenience caused. The article was authored by Jin Di Zheng, Arthur Schram, and Tianle Song, and their contact information and affiliations are provided. The original article can be found online at the given link. [Extracted from the article]

This paper studies the effects of social status—a socially recognized ranking of individuals—on prosocial behavior. We use a laboratory experiment and propose a theory to address this issue. In a one-shot game, two players, whose social status is either earned or randomly assigned, jointly make effort contributions to a project. Player 1 first suggests an effort level for each player to player 2 who then determines the actual effort levels. Deviation from the proposal is costly. We find causal evidence that high-status players are less selfish than their low-status counterparts. In particular, high-status players 2 provide relatively more effort, ceteris paribus, than those with low status. The experimental results and theoretical framework suggest that a high social ranking yields more social behavior and that this can be attributed to the sense of responsibility that it gives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]