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Recent efforts in a range of scientific fields have emphasised research and methods concerning individual differences and individualisation. This article brings together various scientific disciplines—ecology, evolution, and animal behaviour; medicine and psychiatry; public health and sport/exercise science; sociology; psychology; economics and management science—and presents their research on individualisation. We then clarify the concept of individualisation as it appears in the disciplinary casework by distinguishing three kinds of individualisation studied in and across these disciplines: IndividualisationONE as creating/changing individual differences (the process that generates differences between individuals: intrapopulation or intraspecific variation/heterogeneity); IndividualisationTWO as individualising applications (the tailoring or customising of something—information, treatment, a product or service, etc.—for an individual or specific group of individuals); and IndividualisationTHREE as social changes influencing autonomy, risk, and responsibilities (the process discussed under the rubric of sociological individualisation theory). Moreover, we analyse conceptual links between individualisation and individuality, and characterise different sorts of individuality that the disciplines study. This paper aims to promote interdisciplinary research concerning individualisation by establishing a common conceptual-theoretical basis, while leaving room for disciplinary differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the static second-price auction (private values), noting that dominance is theoretically obvious in the former but not the latter. We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate auction formats that decompose the designs' differences to quantify the cumulative effects of (1) simply seeing an ascending-price clock (after bid submission), (2) bidding dynamically on the clock, and (3) getting (theoretically irrelevant) drop-out information about other bidders. The theory predicts dominance to become obvious through (2), dynamic bidding. We find no significant behavioral effect of (2), however, while the feedback effects (1) and (3) are highly significant. We conclude that behavioral differences between second-price and ascending-clock auctions offer rather limited support for the theory of obviousness and that framing has surprisingly large potential in mechanism design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a decision maker choosing from a set of options when options have multiple real-valued attributes. Assuming DM chooses all options with positive probability, four invariance assumptions are necessary and sufficient for choice probabilities to take McFadden's conditional logit form: independence of irrelevant alternatives, translation invariance, presentation independence and context independence. Variations on these assumptions yield generalized logit and contextual logit models. This shows that even specific logit models have behavioral foundations in simple invariance assumptions involving observables only, which therefore are directly testable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise, a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F' s opponents may publicly pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F' s opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why 'important' coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses experimental 'solidarity games' with two benefactors and one beneficiary. Depending on their motive for giving-e.g., warm glow, altruism, or guilt-the benefactors' response functions are either constant, decreasing, or increasing. If motives interact, or if envy is a concern, then more complex (unimodal) shapes may emerge. Controlling for random utility perturbations, we determine which and how many motives affect individual decision making. The main findings are that the motives of about 75% of the subjects can be identified fairly sharply, that all of the motives discussed in the literature co-exist in the population, and that for any given individual no more than two motives (out of six motives considered overall) are identified. We conclude that a unifying motive for solidarity cannot be derived even when we allow for individually heterogeneous parameterization: different subjects give for different reasons and all existing social preference theories are partially correct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By parliamentary practice, the members of the committee reporting a bill are granted priority recognition for the purpose of moving amendments. If they seek recognition, the committee members are recognized in order of seniority. We extend the random proposer model of parliamentary bargaining by allowing for priority recognition of T > 1 committee members. In contrast to the T = 1 case considered in the literature, the payoff of the first proposer is not unique if T > 1, and even at the lower bound of the outcome continuum, it is substantially higher than with T = 1. Hence, priority recognition strikingly improves the bargaining power of the proposing committee member, and pure random proposer models overstate predictability and understate bargaining power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an experimental study of dynamic indefinite horizon R&D races with uncertainty and multiple prizes. The theoretical predictions are highly sensitive: small parameter changes determine if we should expect technological competition, and if so whether it is sustained, or if the market converges into one with entrenched leadership and lower aggregate R&D. The subjects’ strategies are far less sensitive. In most of the treatments, the R&D races tend to converge to entrenched leadership. We propose and apply a quantal response extension of Markov perfection that is qualitatively and largely quantitatively consistent with the experimental observations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a demand bargaining model where the formateur (proposal maker) is appointed before the players state their demands. In a general continuous framework, we show that if the decision has a distributive dimension, then the formateur gets his way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]