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Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way.

Authors :
Breitmoser, Yves
Source :
International Journal of Game Theory. 2009, Vol. 38 Issue 2, p183-191. 9p.
Publication Year :
2009

Abstract

We consider a demand bargaining model where the formateur (proposal maker) is appointed before the players state their demands. In a general continuous framework, we show that if the decision has a distributive dimension, then the formateur gets his way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00207276
Volume :
38
Issue :
2
Database :
Academic Search Index
Journal :
International Journal of Game Theory
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
40405183
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0144-3