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Presents a historical overview of communal medical care. Medical care in ancient Assyria and Babylonia; Medical facilities established in ancient Ceylon; Clinics for the sick established in ancient and middle age China; History of medicine in ancient Egypt.

The article focuses on the demographic significance of organized population transfers in communist China. Communist China has initiated and implemented a large number of policy decisions relating to population. Population growth aside, moreover, decisions must be and have been taken with respect to the ways in which the existing population of 600 million may be accommodated, fed and gainfully employed. Of obvious importance in the context of the sustenance of existing population is agricultural expansion which, in China, as in many emerging nations, has also been called upon to sustain industrialization. The beginning of the post-1949 population policy in China, in fact, had much to do with the spontaneous or blind out-migration from rural areas to cities which came to official notice some time in 1952. The official approach to the population problem was in terms of better organization and effective employment of rural manpower, and is clearly institutional. Innumerable factors help to shape the making of a nation's population policy.

The article presents a study to estimate a long-term crude birth rate of the Chinese agricultural population. Two groups of data have been utilized in pursuing this objective. One group consists of data on crop-yield density in China according to divisions by province and the other on crude birth rates for areas. From the data, the following conclusions can be drawn: a negative relationship holds between crop-yield density and the birth rate in China and area differences in birth rates are real and not due to errors in the data. It should be noted that the negative relationship observed refers to the group aspect of the provinces in their general association of above median crop-yield density with below median birth rate, and vice versa. The reference to group aspect should also be borne in mind in the interpretation of the area differences in birth rates. Different estimates of the birth rate were obtained from the age data for the two sexes. However, when a uniform level of mortality is assumed, the average birth rates calculated for either sex on the basis of age data from certain groups of surveys are not far apart.

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This article focuses on C. K. Yang of the University of Pittsburgh as the first U.S. sociologist to visit the People's Republic of China. After receiving an invitation on short notice, Yang spent roughly one month in China during last October-November 1971. During this period he returned to a number of places he had known prior to the revolution. His trip took him to six cities and two communes. Because Yang was afforded this unique opportunity to compare the present with the past, he was asked to respond to several queries for the American Sociological Association (ASA) members at large. He is presently writing at greater length on the topic, though he notes that his role was that of the tourist-sociologist rather than sociological researcher. Yang said what impressed him most deeply was the information gap between what he saw in China and the China depicted in Western literature in general, including partly his own writings on communist China during the past twenty years. The inaccurate and in some cases unrealistic impression on China poses a serious problem for educators who have a responsibility to inform the U.S. public, most especially the younger generation.

Academic sociology has vanished in the Peoples Republic of China since 1952, while it has been growing in all other nations, capitalist or socialist. This perplexing phenomenon calls for an explanation. The view advanced here is that a nameless sociology has not only remained quite alive in China today, but has also become the intellectual property of the people. Evidences in support of this view will be shown in the present article, which attempts a general review of the development of sociology in China from its beginning to the present time. The review will deal with the emergence of a Chinese sociology, critical comments on Western sociology during the anti-sociology campaign in 1957, sociological elements in Mao Tse-tungs writing and the rise of the "mass sociology." The early form of sociology as represented by the works of its founding fathers made its debut in China in 1903 when Yen Fu, an articulate interpreter of Western classics, published his translation of the book "Principles of Sociology." In the academic world, departments of sociology first appeared at St. John's University in Shanghai in 1914 and Yen-ching University in Peking in 1922 and later gained acceptance by several other major universities in Peking, Shanghai and Nanking.

This article is a first non-marxist attempt to explain the evolution of the Chinese economic order theoretically, using Bergsonian welfare economics and the Tinbergen theory of the optimum regime. After a discussion of the Maoist attempt to create a new type of human being, the aims of Chinese economic policy are identified as the drive to achieve a rapid rate of growth, a paternalistic preference for social goods, and a more or less egalitarian system of income distribution in which the relationship between individual income and individual achievement is broken. The actual pattern of Chinese economic (de)centralisation and (de)concentration can be explained by the Chinese decision makers' gradual acceptance of an optimum economic order, which does not depend solely on objective factors but also on the subjective choices made when deciding on the aims. The Chinese optimal order is characterised, on the one hand, by a pattern of centralisation which is similar to the Western type of centralisation, and, on the other hand, by a degree of concentration which is lower than in any other economy of comparable size and living standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses various aspects of institutionalization and bureaucracy in China based on the Maoist revolutionary and organizational experience. Positivistic and normative views of institutionalization; Interrelated categories of the causes of bureaucratism; Aspects of restoration merged in the concept of revisionism; Difficulties of dealing with the categories of sociological phenomena, highlighted by the Maoist experience.

The article presents the origin and development of written records on crime and punishment in China from the third millennium Before Christ (B.C.) to the 20th century. The Shun Code is known as the earliest Chinese listed law where four types of punishment were listed including exile, spanking and monetary fine followed by the Da Yu Code during the Hsia Dynasty and the political and legal systems in China during the Chou Dynastry from 1027-256 B. C. It mentions the first written criminal law in China in 535 B.C. that was cast in bronze which stressed equality as to the argument of conservatives particularly Confucius. It notes the four schools of rulemaking in China including Legalism, Confucianism and Taoism.

The article focuses on China's socialist revolution and the peasant families. Peasants, far more than proletarians, have been decisive agents in the successful communist revolutions of the twentieth century, many within the Marxist tradition have been moved to seriously reappraise classical views of the peasantry's capacity for progressive social action. However, by placing feminist questions and categories at the center of the inquiry, the author has encountered a glaring oversight in this theoretical corpus that further complicates its analytical task. He brings the nature of the theoretical difficulty into focus. It begins by briefly characterizing the emerging revisionist view of peasants and revolution with especial regard to the Chinese case. Then the author summarizes his interpretation of the role played by the rural family system in the Chinese Revolution. Finally, he discusses the implications of this interpretation for theoretical attempts to understand the progressive aspects of the Chinese Revolution and for Marxist-feminist analyses of social change generally.

Since the mid-1970s the People's Republic of China has entered into a transitional phase of political and economic uncertainty, following its first quarter-century of development under the leadership of Mao Ze-dong. In this article the author seeks to determine the extent to which lessons can be drawn from the Chinese experience under Mao by people concerned with the prospects for economic development in the rest of the third world. He focuses on the basic institutions and elements of economic strategy which have distinguished the Chinese development model sharply from that of most other countries. This discussion is directed to people in a position to consider broad alternative approaches to development, whether they be academic scholars or participants in movements for social, political, and economic change in the third world. The author begins with a brief review and discussion of some of China's major development achievements in the quarter-century following the Revolution. Next, the author identifies ten lessons in development strategy that are suggested by the Chinese experience, which analyze the extent to which the applicability of these lessons is linked to conditions obtaining in the People' Republic of China; focuses on the importance of the political-economic system; and considers the geographical and historical setting. Finally, the author concludes with some observations about the transferability of lessons from the Chinese experience to other parts of the third world.

The author reviews conceptual and empirical issues regarding the interaction of neurasthenia, somatization and depression in Chinese culture and in the West. The historical background of neurasthenia and its current status are discussed, along with the epidemiology and phenomenology of somatization and depression. Findings are presented from a combined clinical and anthropological field study of 100 patients with neurasthenia in the Psychiatry Outpatient Clinic at the Hunan Medical College. Eighty-seven of these patients made the DSM-III criteria of Major Depressive Disorder; diagnoses of anxiety disorders were also frequent. Forty-four patients were suffering from chronic pain syndromes previously undiagnosed, and cases of culture-bound syndromes also were detected. For three-quarters of patients the social significances and uses of their illness behavior chiefly related to work. Although from the researcher's perspective 70% of patients with Major Depressive Disorder experienced substantial improvement and 87% some improvement in symptoms when treated with antidepressant medication, fewer experienced decreased help seeking, and a much smaller number perceived less social impairment and improvement in illness problems (the psychosocial accompaniment of disease including maladaptive coping and work, family and school problems). These findings are drawn on to advance medical anthropology and cultural psychiatry theory and research regarding somatization in Chinese culture, the United States and cross culturally. The author concludes that though neurasthenia can be understood in several distinctive ways, it is most clinically useful to regard it as bioculturally patterned illness experience (a special form of somatization) related to either depression and other diseases or to culturally sanctioned idioms of distress and psychosocial coping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A cross-cultural study of adolescent sex-role stereotypes illustrates possible methodological solutions to problems in measuring sex-role identification. A study was conducted with a sample of Hong Kong Chinese adolescents to develop a rating scale that would (1) define the sex-role stereotypes held by adolescents in Hong Kong and (2) serve as a measure of identification with sex-role stereotypes valid for use with Hong Kong samples. The Chinese Sex-Role Inventory (CSRI) was constructed, therefore, following the procedures of Bern in the creation of the Bem Sex Role Inventory. Creation of the CSRI illustrates the feasibility and value of using such procedures in research with adolescents in any society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While interest in doing business continues to rise steadily, information concerning the evolving social ethics of Chinese managers is sparse. This study reports the findings obtained from intensive interviews with thirty-nine Chinese advertising executives. In general, there appears to be developing a cautious optimism about the role of advertising in the Chinese economy. Findings are compared with earlier studies of American and Hong Kong managers and it is suggested that further research and observation is needed to track the development of business ethics in this largest of the world's developing nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers a number of ways in which China in the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties did in fact interact with the economy: to discuss these policies and measures in the context of the potential means by which a premodern state may influence a premodern economy; and at times to compare the Chinese historical experience with that of early modern Europe from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The author is concerned with such questions as the extent to which Chinese administrators in the late imperial period deliberately intervened in the economy, how they did so, and with what results. In considering the policies or actions of the state that can affect the economy, it is useful to distinguish those that require direct fiscal expenditures by the state from those that do not entail a direct expenditure of economic resources. The various measures undertaken by the government may primarily affect either the supply side of the economy or the demand side. Their consequences may be measured, in other words, by changes in the values of a large variety of different indicators: for example, size of total output; size of output per capita; composition of output; relative importance of the sectors of the economy; levels of technology; price and wage levels; the ratio of consumption, savings, and investment; and the level of imports and exports.

This article examines the aspect of the Chinese political economy under the old regime. For more than a century Chinese governments--imperial, republican, communist, have made economic development of their main objectives. And for more than a century one failure has followed another. True, some progress has been made: but because Western development has meanwhile speeded up, China appears even more underdeveloped than in the period 1840-1869 when it was forcibly opened up by the European powers over which the industrial revolution had first dawned. For half a century Western historians of Chinese economy and society have worked in the shadow of Weber's thesis that Confucianism posed an obstacle to creativity, competition and development. Deprived of initiative, integrated into a constrictive familial framework, subjected to an ethos that thought acceptance of a social hierarchy dominated by bureaucratic mandarins bound by the shackles of imperial institutions ill-adapted to the imperatives of economic progress, the Chinese were incapable of experiencing that disquiet, that autonomous moral quest, that taste for action and innovation that fostered the development of the puritan societies of Western Europe and America. It was this benumbed and stagnant China that would brutally awakened in the mid-nineteenth century by the Opium Wars.

This article examines the grain procurements during the Great Leap Forward in China. A central issue in the relationship between Marxist-Leninist states and their peasantries is the extent to which resources are extracted from the countryside in support of the goal of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The extreme case of relentless extraction was Stalin's Soviet Union, where the state's relationship to the peasantry amounted to an instance of internal colonialism. The state's procurement program imposed compulsory grain delivery quotas on the collective farms, the unconditional fulfillment of which, regardless of objective conditions, became the first commandment for all rural officials. At times, extraction was carried to the point of inducing not only severe food shortages in the countryside, but also widespread famine, particularly in 1932-1933 and to a lesser extent in 1947. The enforcement of the procurement program necessitated the imposition of tight bureaucratic straightjacket on the countryside, not only in the form of collective farms but also of associated institution such as the Machine Tractor Stations. The Great Leap Forward, an unprecedentedly intense mobilization effort launched in 1958 to achieve a developmental breakthrough suggests that the prevailing image of Maoist China as differing fundamentally from Stalin's Russia must be reexamined. That the Great Leap Forward should have brought China closer to Stalinist practice is at first glance a paradox. The Leap was Mao Zedong's effort to chart an independent developmental and ideological road by breaking with the preceding years of emulation of the Soviet model.

This article outlines doubts about Max Weber's analysis of the Chinese economy. In summary, the author maintains that an economic and ecological explanation of China's failure to create her own industrial capitalism is possible, and that it is simpler in its assumptions, more internally consistent, and more amenable to empirical verification than the cultural and ideological analysis offered by Weber. Where political or cultural factors are important, they are not linked to characteristic Weberian themes, such as inner-wordly asceticism. Examples are China's lack of a modern science, her failure to persist in long-distance overseas exploration and trade, and her substitution of commercial-type relationships for direct management in much industrial organization. Furthermore, the Sinha-Elvin approach is effective in explaining the differential response in modern times of different parts of the Chinese culture-area to the challenge of imitative modern economic growth, while the Weberian approach is not. The explanation in terms of economic and ecological factors does not deny the general importance of cultural factors in economic life on the contrary! but suggests that late-traditional Chinese values and ideas were in most respects already suitable for modern economic growth, and that the key inhibiting constraints were not cultural. The first part of the article discusses the general issues of Weberian theory and method are looked at insofar as they bear on Weber's understanding of the historical Chinese economy. In the second part, the accuracy of Weber's appraisal of specific aspects of China's economy is subjected to scrutiny, topic by topic.

This article seeks to revitalize Max Weber's sociology of domination and show it to be a useful, discerning approach to the study of historical societies. The author's effort to renew a Weberian perspective is based upon a critical evaluation of Weber's work, following the lead of Roth, Schluchter, and Turner. The point of criticism is Weber's interpretation of Imperial China. In particular, the author criticizes his insistence that patriarchalism in China was the same as patriarchalism in the Mediterranean societies of Antiquity, and his conclusion that Imperial China was a static civilization because it was unable to break the fetters of the sib. These criticisms are not petty ones because Weber's analysis of China is central to his understanding of world history and of the West's unique place in that history. Weber made China the archetype of patriarchal, patrimonial societies, and hence the standard against which all changes in the West can be assessed. Weber misread the character of a patriarchal domination in China and this misreading throws into question the adequacy of Weber's typology of domination for the analysis of non-Western societies. But, on the positive side, understanding Weber's misinterpretation of China provides a way to view and to appreciate Weber's penetrating analysis of the developmental trends of Western civilization.

This article provides information on collective violence in China from 1880-1980. Since much of China's collective violence has been fueled by peasants, it is tempting to search for our explanation in the writings of what is sometimes called the peasant studies school of analysis. Members of this school, struck by the frequency and scale of rural protest around the world, have located the origins of the violence in peasants' resistance to the pernicious effects of two historical trends: state building and capitalism. In much of the Third World, imperialism brought with it both colonial governments and capitalist markets. Work by Eric Wolf, James Scott and Joel Migdal suggests that the unsettling effects of this sudden intrusion and responsible for the unparalleled incidence of rural rebellion and revolution in the past century. By their accounts, peasants live traditionally in strong, semi-autonomous local collectivities: Wolf's closed corporate community, Scott's moral economy or Migdal's inward-oriented village. These local collectivities had provided certain basic securities that promoted peasant survival in the face of outside threat. However, they proved unable to withstand the unprecedented demands that accompanied the onslaught of imperialism. As state agents and capitalists drained off local resources, traditional institutions lost their power and legitimacy. Suddenly peasants were free to engage in political action.

This article discusses the problem of enlightenment in modern China. The rise of modern nationalism, the unfolding of a rural based revolution, and the quest for a new world view are the distinguishing characteristics of twentieth-century Chinese history. This complex of simultaneous processes makes the Chinese experience a paradigm for much of the Third World. It has also captured the interest of Western social theorists because of the tension between the external imperatives of modernization and the internal prerequisites of social change. Our dimension of that intention, most apparent in the lives and work of critical intellectuals, has been the conflict between jiuguo and qimeng, between national salvation and enlightenment. Beneficiaries of modern education in China and abroad, these intellectuals share their compatriots' commitment to a strong, independent China. They have been integral to the success of the Chinese Revolution while, at the same time, never quite identifying its success with the realization of a new world view. Advocates of enlightenment in twentieth-century China face a problematic quite different from that of their European predecessors. Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Europe was a program for disenchantment. The philosophers had tried to free their societies from theological versions of reality. In the process, they took it upon themselves to assault the religious superstitions of their contemporaries with truths derived from the realm of nature. In twentieth-century China, on the other hand, enlightenment did not have religion as its main target of attack.

Compared to other developing countries, China has a low urbanization level as a result of government policy to control urban development since 1949. However, there is much regional variation in urbanization and urban primary among its 26 provinces. This paper attempts to analyze the provincial variation in urbanization and urban primacy of China In 1978 by factor analysis and regression techniques. In China, government policy does not only slow down the overall rate of urbanization but also has profound Influence on provincial variation in urbanization and urban primacy. Low urban primacy In the eastern provinces la mainly the result of the urbanization policy of controlling the development of large cities that favours the development of small and medium cities. The spatial Industrial policy of decentralizing industries from the coastal provinces to interior provinces encouraged high urbanization and urban primary in the western Interior provinces of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The amphibious Chinese mudskipper fish Periophthalmus cantonensis liver in complex, variable, tropical intertidal mangrove forest and mudlfat habitats. Within these macrohabitats, an array of microhabitats are available to this species which spends most of its time out of water. It is subjected to, and tolerates, wide ranges of salinity and temperature. It is primarily diurnally active and uses dark, usually water-filled burrows in the mud as refuges and breeding places. Individuals of P. cantonensis were captured at night from intertidal mudflats of mangrove forests in the northeastern New Territories, Hong Kong in 1971 and 1972. Using choice experiments in the laboratory, we determined behavioural preferences of this fish for five combinations of abiotic environmental variables relevant to its selections of microhabitats. P. cantonensis usually preferred being out of water, resting on damp mud, to being in direct contact with water of any salinity. In salinity-choice experiments it showed no preference for any particular salinity, but avoided exposure to fresh water. Offered choices between various water temperatures it displayed a strong preference for higher temperatures (30° to 35°C), even though these temperatures were close to those known to cause distress or death. In light-dark choice experiments in very shallow water P. cantonensis preferred darkness to light. Experiments combining watertemperature differences with light-dark choices showed that these two factors interact in complex ways. We discuss implications of these results for understanding of behavioural selection of microhabitats by this fish. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

First, the process whereby developing countries become developed is discussed in terms of complexity, neutrality in social relations, and the achievement ethic. An examination of managerial attitudes in eight South-East Asian countries is followed by the results of a comparative study of manufacturing industry in Hong Kong and Singapore. It was concluded that in Singapore participation leads to higher productivity (rs≏0.71, p < 0.05) but only because the context is mainly foreign. This relationship was not found in Hong Kong probably because Hong Kong enterprises remain non-bureaucratic, i.e. non-western. A more participative style of management requires radical changes in non-managers' expectations of their employers, as well as a significant increase in the extent to which superiors trust their subordinates. The evidence suggests that Asian managers (except those in Japan and, possibly, Singapore) favour an autocractic approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a two-group discriminant analysis of the characteristics of problem firms in Hong Kong. The purpose of this study is to identify and describe the common financial characteristics which distinguish problem firms from nonproblem firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This analysis has identified several factors contributing to the dramatic decline in infant mortality since World War II in Malaysia, as well as one factor that prevented the infant mortality rate from declining even more rapidly. Our main findings are the following: On average, mothers' education more than doubled over the study period, contributing to the decline in their infants' mortality. In addition, the beneficial effect of mothers' education on infant survival appears to have become stronger over the study period. Hence, further advances in education should lead to further improvements in infants' survival prospects. Another analysis of these data (Peterson et al. 1985) found that education is somewhat more influential in affecting child mortality in low-mortality, high-income areas than in the opposite type of areas. Therefore, socioeconomic development may have complemented, instead of substituted for, the the beneficial effect of mothers' education in promoting infant and child survival in Malaysia. Improvements in water and sanitation also contributed to the infant mortality decline, especially for babies who did not breastfeed. However, unlike education, these influences have become less important over time, especially for babies who are not breastfed. Hence, further improvements in water and sanitation, a goal of Malaysia's Rural Environmental Sanitation Programme, may have smaller relative effects on infant mortality than did previous improvements. Targeting such improvements on areas where women breastfeed little or not at all, however, will increase their effectiveness in promoting infant survival. The substantial reductions in breastfeeding that have taken place since World War II have kept the infant mortality rate in Malaysia from declining as rapidly as it would have otherwise. We estimate that, in our sample, the detrimental effects on infant survival of the decline in breastfeeding have more than offset the beneficial effects of improvements in water and sanitation. Unlike some other researchers (e.g., Palloni 1981), we find that changes in fertility levels and in the timing and spacing of births have had negligible effect in explaining the decline in infant mortality within the samples we have considered. We have excluded births to older women from our analysis, however; this exclusion may have led to an understatement of the influence of changes in the age pattern of childbearing.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Period fertility rates show a recent rise in the fertility of the Malay population of Peninsular Malaysia that became evident in the late 1970s, after more than fifteen years of slow but steady declines. Detailed analysis of age-parity-specific fertility rates suggests that the recent rise is largely due to a "making up" of lower order births (first, second, and third) that had been postponed by a rapid increase in age at marriage. The period trend in higher order births and cohort trends of cumulative fertility from census data point to a continued reduction in completed Malay fertility. Regional analysis shows several states on the east coast with persistent high fertility, although the revolution in marital postponement is national in scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on age patterns of chinese marital fertility. Chinese marital fertility in rural and urban sectors and finds unusual and distinctive patterns of transition from uncontrolled to controlled fertility. The general shape of marital fertility curves is indicative of the presence or absence of conscious limitation of the number of children. Age-specific marital fertility rates were constructed for total, urban and rural data from the One-per-Thousand Fertility Survey. In populations that do not deliberately control fertility, the age pattern of marital fertility conforms to a common pattern corresponding to the fecundity of women at different ages. For the urban population, the marital fertility transition started in 1963 in conjunction with a national birth control campaign begun the previous year. For rural China, although there are mild increases in the 1960s, rapid transition begins only in 1971. The most probable cause of the departure is the administration of China's birth control policy. In most of rural China, until 1980, newly weds and couples with one child were not constrained to control their fertility.

This paper argues that the context of the wider society and national culture places barriers, if not limits, upon the possibilities for the management and engineering of corporate cultures. The formal `espoused' corporate cultures, contained in Corporate Mission Statements (CMS's), of two Hong Kong companies are. examined and compared to descriptions of the cultural values of Hong Kong. Important differences on `key' dimensions are found; and thus it is argued that the companies may face difficulties in fully implementing their cultures in Hong Kong. The paper argues in general terms that transportable `supra-cultures' will not work and attention needs to be paid to the specifics of national cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses social movement by groups of workers, called Luddites, in England during nineteenth century. These workers smashed new labor-saving textile machinery in protest against unemployment and reduced wages. Further, the article compares the movement in England with that in China. Chinese society led an unsuccessful uprising called Boxer Rebellion, against foreign powers and foreigners in China. As a result of the rebel, China was forced to make economic and territorial concessions. The Chinese insurgents, known for their 1900th siege of the foreign legations in Beijing and English weavers, who gained fame by destroying looms during the second decade of the nineteenth century, were unlike each other in innumerable ways. Among many obvious points of dissimilarity are the simple facts that, unlike the Boxers, the Luddites did not believe themselves to be invulnerable to bullets and never received government support for their actions. As different as the Boxers' and Luddites' lives may have been, however, their symbolic and historiographic afterlives have been remarkably similar in some important ways.

The article examine the thought of a minority group in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who tried to justify political reforms in China and even democratization, by resurrecting the question of Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP). The debate over AMP in China, reflects both the common and potentially diverging interests of fractions of the Leninist state elite. For analyzing politics in China, a new communist theory is needed, given the failure of the totalitarian model to explain the growing change and divergence within and between Communist systems. In China, the present situation can be viewed as one in which a new coalition of state elites came to dominate the mainstream of the CCP under leader Deng Xiaoping. This coalition formed after an extreme lack of social cohesion had led elements to defect to Deng's side from the previous mainstream coalition. Deng's coalition differed radically from the mainstream under the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, when elites favoring ideological and coercive incentives were dominant in previous ruling coalition.

Examines the nature of economic reforms in China since 1978. Evaluation of the success of the reforms in increased economic performance; Impact of policies and reforms on the economic geography of China; Examination of the performance of agriculture, trade and urban-industrial enterprises; Readjustments in agriculture.

Discusses the economic reform agenda of China since 1978. Focus on rural reforms; Policy continuity in the urban and industrial sectors; Primacy of industry over agriculture and commerce in state resource allocation; Reassessment of collectivization, market control and self-reliance; Economic gains by rural people and poorer communities.

Comments on China's economic reform program which began in 1978. Income inequality in the countryside; Impact of policy changes with respect to what can be learned in the broader realm of economic geography as well as on income distribution; Exacerbation of the differential earning capacity of localities based on resource endowment.

Discusses a study by Clifton Pannell about various economic reforms in China since 1978. Geographical implications of such reforms; Impact of investment in agriculture on the long-term development of agriculture in China; Increase in the contribution of rural industry to the Chinese economy; Gap between urban and rural income level.

Presents the author's response to comments about his study on economic reforms in China since 1978. China's operation of a reform policy without a theoretical base; Process of urbanization in China; Ways in which market reforms in China continue to be buttressed by socialist principles of control and egalitarianism; Significance of specific environmental factors in the future development of China.

Examines the balance between permanent migration and circulation, which may well be a function of the levels of urbanization and development in China. Problems related to the urban-rural distribution of the population; Rates of urban growth; Relations between employment opportunities and rural and urban development; Value of temporary mobility.

A random sample of 306 Singaporean Chinese were interviewed using a structured interview schedule which contained twenty true-to-life situations. The situations were associated with four predetermined value areas: Relational, Temporal, Man-nature and Activity. The general value structure of the Chinese in Singapore appears to be as follows: In the Relational area, the values are in the order of collaterality above individualism which in turn is above lineality. In the Temporal area, it is present and/or future above past. Mastery over nature, and harmony with nature subjugation to nature is shown to be the hierarchy in the area of Man-nature. In the Activity area, the value is for doing rather than being. The implications of these value orientations of the Chinese are discussed in relation to organizational behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hofstede has identified four important work-related values, but he imposes his "mental programming" on the interpretation of other cultures, which are qualitatively different from those on which he relies to develop his constructs. This criticism is evidenced by Hofstede's treatment of Chinese and Japanese values. This paper discusses the treatment along the four value dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity, and their integration. The paper concludes that Hofstede's analysis of Chinese and Japanese values is inadequate because Japanese and Chinese (including people in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) may either have different interpretations of the same value scale, or have other value dimensions not tapped by Hofstede's value framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates ethical perceptions among Hong Kong Chinese managers of themselves and peers according to age, location of education and employment (local vs. multinational), based upon responses to thirteen potentially unethical situations. The major conclusions of the study are: (1) there is little consistency among perceptions of ethical situations; (2) Hong Kong managers perceive their peers as more unethical than themselves; (3) ethical perceptions in some situations are affected by age and to a lesser extent, place of education; and (4) significant interactions were found between age and the nature of employer, as well as between the place of education and the nature of employer. To conclude, the management implications of these findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract. Choosing a methodology determines what we can study as well as the range of possible results and conclusions. This study took an instrument that had been developed in the West and used extensively in Europe and North America to investigate managerial behavior in the People's Republic of China. For a number of reasons, it failed to produce a valid and reliable description of Chinese managerial behavior. This paper investigates some of the methodogical issues involved in extending western organizational knowledge to the East. It raises some fundamental questions about being "outside, looking in". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of women in the People's Republic of China has changed dramatically in the last 40 years. This study assesses what impact these changes have had on the attitudes of Chinese youth. The sample consisted of 164 subjects (77 men and 87 women) who completed the Bern Sex Role Inventory, the Objective Fear of Success Measure, a locus of control scale, and a personal goals questionnaire. They also evaluated a painting attributed to artists of different gender and status. The results indicate that the sex role orientations of Chinese students were similar to those of American students. On the Bern inventory, the direction of the sex differences on the sex role scales was the same for U.S. and Chinese students, but the latter had a sex role orientation that, in our culture, is regarded as more ‘traditional.’ Chinese women were significantly more likely to endorse statements expressing fear of success than were Chinese men. On the locus of control measures, Chinese women were more likely than men to attribute their achievement successes to luck and failures to a lack of ability. The women students also attributed affiliation outcomes more to luck than did the men. The most important personal goal cited by both men and women was that of career success. Chinese men placed greater importance than women on achieving wealth, and their expectancy of actually becoming wealthy was higher. Finally, in an evaluation of a painting, Chinese men, but not the women, devalued a painting when it was supposedly the work of a female student artist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent political debate concerning the influence of corruption on the "new economic order" in the People's Republic of China is unique not only for its detailed and public manifestations, but also because it works around the acceptance of some degree of corporate private ownership of the means of production within China. The concern for corruption in Chinese government and commerce is not, of itself, novel. We prefer in this paper briefly to focus on the economic and political environment from within which this concern has been generated, to comment on the significance for the Government of the PRC in associating the pall of corruption with the undermining of more capitalist economic reform, and then to examine how the legal definitions and controls on corruption have been transformed to complement a new political agenda. Associated with this, it has been necessary to advance some rather tentative predictions concerning the development of new anti-corruption initiatives in the PRC, their justifications, and pressures on the economic transition which is said to be corruption generative. Speculation about the future face of economic corruption in China is of limited value when one is interested in questions of regulation and control. As the definition, indication and interpretation of corruption is a political process which may pay little regard to realistic indicators, so too the creation of control initiatives may not be dependent on predictions of actual developments in graft. We have endeavoured to show that recent regulatory programmes in the PRC themselves indicate much about the commercial contradictions that underly the new economic order, as well as evidencing the socio-legal dilemmas inherent in anti-corruption official discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While researching concepts of neurasthenia as described by patients and physicians of various backgrounds, it was found that there is a great discrepancy between the two groups. In this study, questionnaires were administered to 70 psychiatric patients, 6 Chinese medicine men, 44 general physicians and 35 neuropsychiatrists, to inquire into the reasons for positive or negative attitudes toward neurasthenia. Half of the clinical patients believed that they were suffering from neurasthenia. Neurasthenia is a predominate term used for various types of distress arising mainly from psychiatric diseases. Chinese medicine men are aware that this term is a medical diagnosis introduced from the West. Through experience they regard neurasthenia as a kind of deficit of nerve. Apparently, the concept of neurasthenia has been integrated into the Chinese medical system, a fact substantiated by its longstanding, nosological use by the public. Younger generation physicians within both general and neuropsychiatric disciplines on the whole reject neurasthenia as a diagnostic term. However, one-third of neuropsychiatrists and 40% of general physicians use this term in their practice in order to improve the treatment of and to establish good communication and rapport with the patients whom they treat. Most of them, however, do not use the term in their formal diagnosis. The concept of the illness, neurasthenia, is historically rooted and today presents a nosological dilemma. It will eventually be transformed conceptually and disappear from the public mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international industrial relations literature has devoted little attention to the Chinese experience. Yet during the last ten years China has adopted a number of labor reforms that represent a significant departure from previous policies. This paper reviews the employment problems that motivated these reforms, describes the nature and limits of these new policies, and analyzes the effect of these reforms to date. Particular attention is devoted to reforms officially implemented in the summer of 1986 that change the "labor system" for nonprofessional workers in the largest enterprises. In theory, the reforms will increase the mobility of these workers between enterprises as well as give employers greater flexibility in making decisions about staffing and termination. The likely success of these policies is evaluated using both secondary sources and a limited survey of Chinese enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests, a series of student-led demonstrations that was held at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China from April to June 1989. Turmoil was the Chinese government's word for the six weeks between mid-April and early June, the label with which officials chose to brand the student protest movement. On April 27, columns of students pushed through the only slightly resisting ranks of police officers and into Tiananmen Square. Apparently the government would not make good its threats of harsh repression. The police barriers were spaced every few hundred yards, and each successive breakthrough drew greater cheers than the last, building the momentum of protest. Students were marching on Tiananmen Square as part of China's third substantial pro-democracy movement in a decade. This one had been touched off by the death of Hu Yaobang, who as premier had presided over the last in 1986-1987. His inability to contain it had cost him his job. Now he was transformed from somewhat liberal party leader to revered martyr. Mourning him provided a pretext for taking to the streets and putting forward renewed demands: rehabilitate Hu; end corruption; hold a serious dialogue between party leaders and students.

The objective of this brief paper is very specific: to test with data from the People's Republic of China (PRC) an earlier model by the author on regional relative dynamics. Originally, that model was used to replicate the regional relative population and income growth of Nine Divisions in the United States for the period 1929-1979. Only one component of the original model is replicated in the case of the PRC, due to data limitations. Although the full regional dynamics model contains a system of two simultaneous differential equations, with a linear and a non-linear isocline respectively, here only the equation with the linear isocline is confirmed. This particular component of the model has also been independently verified for the case of Japan's regional growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]