1. Short Paper: An Update on Marked Mix-Nets: An Attack, a Fix and PQ Possibilities
- Author
-
Thomas Haines, Olivier Pereira, Peter B. Rønne, and UCL - SST/ICTM - Institute of Information and Communication Technologies, Electronics and Applied Mathematics
- Subjects
Scheme (programming language) ,Computer science [C05] [Engineering, computing & technology] ,050101 languages & linguistics ,Computer science ,business.industry ,05 social sciences ,Short paper ,Proof of security ,02 engineering and technology ,Computer security ,computer.software_genre ,Encryption ,Sciences informatiques [C05] [Ingénierie, informatique & technologie] ,Order (exchange) ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,020201 artificial intelligence & image processing ,0501 psychology and cognitive sciences ,business ,computer ,ElGamal encryption ,Quantum computer ,computer.programming_language - Abstract
Marked mix-nets were introduced by Pereira and Rivest as a mechanism to allow very efficient mixing that ensures privacy but at the cost of not guaranteeing integrity. This is useful in a number of e-voting schemes such as STAR-Vote and Selene. However, the proposed marked mix-net construction comes with no proof of security and, as we show in this paper, does not provide privacy even in the presence of a single corrupt authority. Fortunately, the attack that we present is easy to prevent and we show several possible ways to address it. Finally while the original marked mix-net paper worked with ElGamal, we identify conditions that the adopted encryption scheme should satisfy in order to be appropriate for a marked mix-net. This opens the possibility of building marked mix-nets based on intractability assumptions which are believed to hold in the presence of a quantum computer.
- Published
- 2020