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In the field of international relations, it has long been believed that nationalism generates adverse foreign policy preferences. This article revisits this long-standing assumption by investigating how stimulating nationalistic sentiments shapes mass foreign policy preferences in two contexts, namely when celebrating national achievements and greatness with a focus on the national Self and when invoking negative historical memories in relation to a salient Other. Using a survey experiment conducted in China, which capitalized on visual stimuli drawn from real-world sources to stoke respondents' nationalistic sentiments, this article shows that not all rises of nationalism are the same. Adverse foreign policy preferences, such as a preference for a hawkish approach, an uncompromising attitude, and a dislike for the status quo, emerge when nationalistic sentiments are stoked by invoking negative historical memories but not by celebrating general national achievements and greatness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese government is fond of invoking the 'hurt feelings of 1.4 billion Chinese citizens' to protest foreign actions and policies. However, this rhetoric might be nothing more than propaganda and attempts to leverage nationalist sentiment. How much do citizens in China actually care about issues completely unrelated to their daily livelihoods? To answer this, the study employs a representative survey to investigate the extent to which rhetoric about 'hurt feelings' is consistent with public opinion on four contemporary socio-political disputes involving the NBA, Marriott International, Mercedes-Benz and the city of Prague. Across the scenarios, we found that the Chinese government did not exaggerate the displeasure of audiences—citizens are aware of the cases, were indeed upset by them and advocated for retaliatory measures that were surprisingly more forceful than those adopted in reality. These emotions were largely driven by nationalistic sentiment rather than personal experiences or encounters, suggesting the success of state propaganda in steering the public opinion toward outcomes favourable to the state. These findings support recent studies highlighting the peculiar case of rising nationalism in China, and have important implications for the impact of public opinion on Chinese policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's new assertiveness and the sudden inward turn of United States are a function of causes located in both the second and third images. The key second-image variable is nationalism, which combines with the power trajectories (a third-image variable) of both China and the United States to define how their relationship will unfold in the coming years. The interaction between nationalism and power trajectory produces entirely different foreign policy orientations in rising and declining powers–the former embraces an outward-looking, extroverted foreign policy of expansion, while the latter adopts an inward-looking, introverted foreign policy of restraint and retrenchment. The resurgent nationalisms of the rising challenger and the declining hegemon are entirely compatible with a future relationship characterized by peace and harmony. Obviously, the two nationalisms pose no inherent conflict of interests: China currently wants more global influence; the Unites States wants less. Hence, there is good reason to expect a soft landing as the world moves from unipolarity to bipolarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'International Responsibility' has become one of the most significant topics in Chinese International Relations studies over the last decade. Although growing numbers of scholars have focused on this issue, there remains a low awareness of the need to explore its roots in China's academia, and to investigate the internal debates that display the different Chinese perceptions of international responsibility. This article provides a discourse-activation framework to explain why Robert B. Zoellick's speech polarized China's attention on international responsibility. It moreover constructs a typological framework based on dimensions that include the nationalism-internationalism orientation and degree of fulfilling international responsibility. It singles out three camps of scholars and their respective viewpoints on international responsibility and China's relevant policies in this regard, and demonstrates the 'divergent convergence' feature that characterizes the debate on the topic. In addition to this structural analysis, the article also summarizes the overall trend from 1950 to 2015 of the preventative to projecting preferences apparent in China's academic studies and political discourses on international responsibility. Subsequently, the article briefly investigates the possible factors affecting convergence and divergence of perceptions of international responsibility, which imply that fulfilling international responsibility is crucial to China's growing presence on the global stage, and that Chinese academics' attention to international responsibility should focus on collaboration towards improving the effectiveness of China's assertive behaviour in international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has China's foreign policy become more assertive since 2009, and what is driving Beijing's foreign policy orientations? Given the significance of China's rise over the past few decades, it is surprising that this question has not been subjected to systematic analysis as well as general investigation within scholarly research. This article serves to examine the sources of China's assertiveness using a system-level, unit-level and individual-level analysis. This article first looks at system-level explanations such as state power, external threats and national interests, and then considers unit-level factors including bureaucratic competition, struggles of the elite and the surge of nationalism. However, both system-level and unit-level explanations alone fail to account for China's more assertive foreign policy. This suggests that individual factors play a major role in explaining the country's more assertive external behaviour. This is especially the case when the perceptions of the political elite are deeply embedded in the state leader's preferences. This finding can enhance our understanding of why traditional explanations, that do not incorporate the role of the state leader, may fail to predict Chinese foreign policy behaviour. To understand better the implications of China's rise, therefore, we must take into account the role of the state leadership and its impact on China's growing influence in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role of Taiwan in the national identity of China. Taiwan is governed by a Chinese power structure and has its own military capabilities. It has an ocean buffer sufficient to provide options not available to Hong Kong, China and Macao. According to China, by competing with it for the diplomatic recognition of small nations in the Third World and desiring entry into organizations from the United Nations to the World Health Organization, Taiwan has subjected it to repeated embarrassment.

Shih, Chih-yu. (2011) Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State Versus The Ego State. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00158.x This paper distinguishes and integrates national identity and national image through a deep role analysis. It argues that the meaning of China's rising rests upon the views of those who evaluate China's role playing. This role analysis mediates between international relations and Chinese foreign policy. It also mediates between China watchers and their China. The two dimensions of role-role taking and role making-generate four different discursive approaches to interpreting the rise of China, each in its own way associated with the affects of opportunity and threat. They are 'nation state,''civilization,''Tianxia,' and 'Asianism.' In response to the external view on the rise of China, Chinese narrators often take the Tianxia and nation state approaches as components of their conception of national role. These conceptions mediated by role-making and role-taking, evolve into four possible strategic focuses-national interests, imperialism, sovereignty and center-periphery. While this last strategic focus on role-taking has recently attracted enthusiastic response in China, it has been re-appropriated by social science concepts such as soft power and social capital that assume an egoistic role-making China is on the move. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This manuscript explores the state’s political use of the past and the function of history education in political transition and foreign relations. Modern historical consciousness in China is largely characterized by the “one hundred years of humiliation” from mid-1800s to mid-1900s when China was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists. This research focuses initially on how such historical memory has been reinforced by the current regime’s educational socialization through the national “Patriotic Education Campaign” after 1991. It then explores the impact of this institutionalized historical consciousness on the formation of national identity and foreign relations. This study suggests that, even though existing theories and literature illuminate certain aspects of China’s political transition and foreign affairs behavior, a full explanatory picture emerges only after these phenomena and actions are analyzed through the “lenses” of history and memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on ontological security concepts regarding international relations and nationalism in China. The author uses an instrumental rationale based on economist Milton Friedman's principles to explain the ontological security theories. He treats the state as a person, which increases theoretical productivity. It is mentioned that China's economic reforms brought about a crisis of communism in the world economy, but gradually China has shifted focus from communism to nationalism.

An essay is presented on the impacts of foreign threat on the formation of indian and chinese nationalism. It elaborates the different forms of nationalism which has influenced the two countries by presenting three independent variables. It mentions the potential triggers for mass nationalist movements and increased foreign threat for both China state nationalism and India's ethnic nationalism. It also notes on the divergent manifestations of nationalism for both countries.

The new wave of nationalistic fervor in China is believed to have further complicated cross-strait relations. Ordinary Chinese are not willing to see Taiwan moving towards independence. Yet such a nationalistic belief that the mainland has a rightful claim over Taiwan does not seem to accord with the feelings of a rising number of Taiwanese who tend to regard their separateness from the mainland as a unique feature that deserves safeguarding. While the potential for conflict is there, the situation is not all gloomy. The Beijing leadership has so far been able to keep the new nationalism in check by adopting a calibrated response to perceived independence moves by Taiwan. While more conciliatory in its gestures towards Taiwan, China can be firm if the need arises. Also, the United States appears to be tilting in favor of China in terms of maintaining cross-strait stability. Depending on the situation, the Chinese leadership retains the political initiative to break the deadlock at some point in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]