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The goal of the Meteorology Program is to provide all routine meteorology measurements for LANL operational requirements. This report discusses the program, its routine operations, and other services.

This report summarizes the findings of a two year effort to systematically assess neutron and gamma backgrounds relevant to operational modeling and detection technology implementation. The first year effort focused on reviewing the origins of background sources and their impact on measured rates in operational scenarios of interest. The second year has focused on the assessment of detector and algorithm performance as they pertain to operational requirements against the various background sources and background levels.

This report provides an overview of information, prior studies, and analyses relevant to the development of functional and operational requirements for electrochemical testing of batteries and energy storage devices carried out by Sandia Organization 2546, Advanced Power Sources R&D. Electrochemical operations for this group are scheduled to transition from Sandia Building 894 to a new Building located in Sandia TA-II referred to as Building 1012. This report also provides background on select design considerations and identifies the Safety Goals, Stakeholder Objectives, and Design Objectives required by the Sandia Design Team to develop the Performance Criteria necessary to the design of Building 1012. This document recognizes the Architecture-Engineering (A-E) Team as the primary design entity. Where safety considerations are identified, suggestions are provided to provide context for the corresponding operational requirement(s).

As part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Neutron Radiography Reactor (NRAD) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was converted from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. After the conversion, NRAD resumed operations and is meeting operational requirements. Radiography image quality and the number of images that can be produced in a given time frame match pre-conversion capabilities. However, following the conversion, NRAD’s excess reactivity with the LEU fuel was less than it had been with the HEU fuel. Although some differences between model predictions and actual performance are to be expected, the lack of flexibility in NRAD’s safety documentation prevented adjusting the reactivity by adding more fuel, until the safety documentation could be modified. To aid future reactor conversions, a reactivity-focused Lessons Learned meeting was held. This report summarizes the findings of the lessons learned meeting and addresses specific questions posed by DOE regarding NRAD’s conversion and reactivity.

This document specifies the functional and performance requirements to be used in the development of the conceptual design of a high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) based plant supplying energy to a typical industrial facility. These requirements were developed from collaboration with industry and HTGR suppliers over the preceding three years to identify the energy needs of industrial processes for which the HTGR technology is technically and economically viable. The functional and performance requirements specified herein are an effective representation of the industrial sector energy needs and an effective basis for developing a conceptual design of the plant that will serve the broadest range of industrial applications.

High-Level Functional & Operational Requirements for the AFCF -This document describes the principal functional and operational requirements for the proposed Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF). The AFCF is intended to be the world's foremost facility for nuclear fuel cycle research, technology development, and demonstration. The facility will also support the near-term mission to develop and demonstrate technology in support of fuel cycle needs identified by industry, and the long-term mission to retain and retain U.S. leadership in fuel cycle operations. The AFCF is essential to demonstrate a more proliferation-resistant fuel cycle and make long-term improvements in fuel cycle effectiveness, performance and economy.

The preclosure safety analysis for the monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain must consider the hazard that aircraft may pose to surface structures. Relevant surface structures are located beneath the restricted airspace of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) on the eastern slope of Yucca Mountain, near the North Portal of the Exploratory Studies Facility Tunnel (Figure 1). The North Portal is located several miles from the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), which is used extensively by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) for training and test flights (Figure 1). The NTS airspace, which is controlled by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for NTS activities, is not part of the NTTR. Agreements with the DOE allow USAF aircraft specific use of the airspace above the NTS (Reference 2.1.1 [DIRS 103472], Section 3.1.1 and Appendix A, Section 2.1; and Reference 2.1.2 [DIRS 157987], Sections 1.26 through 1.29). Commercial, military, and general aviation aircraft fly within several miles to the southwest of the repository site in the Beatty Corridor, which is a broad air corridor that runs approximately parallel to U.S. Highway 95 and the Nevada-California border (Figure 2). These aircraft and other aircraft operations are identified and described in ''Identification ofmore » Aircraft Hazards'' (Reference 2.1.3, Sections 6 and 8). The purpose of this analysis is to estimate crash frequencies for aircraft hazards identified for detailed analysis in ''Identification of Aircraft Hazards'' (Reference 2.1.3, Section 8). Reference 2.1.3, Section 8, also identifies a potential hazard associated with electronic jamming, which will be addressed in this analysis. This analysis will address only the repository and not the transportation routes to the site. The analysis is intended to provide the basis for: (1) Categorizing event sequences related to aircraft hazards; (2) Identifying design or operational requirements related to aircraft hazards.« less

In this document we discuss specific implementations for gamma-ray imaging instruments including the principle of operation and describe systems which have been built and demonstrated as well as systems currently under development. There are several fundamentally different technologies each with specific operational requirements and performance trade offs. We provide an overview of the different gamma-ray imaging techniques and briefly discuss challenges and limitations associated with each modality (in the appendix we give detailed descriptions of specific implementations for many of these technologies). In Section 3 we summarize the performance and operational aspects in tabular form as an aid for comparing technologies and mapping technologies to potential applications.

In order for telemedicine to realize the vision of anywhere, anytime access to care, it must address the question of how to create a fully interoperable infrastructure. This paper describes the reasons for pursuing interoperability, outlines operational requirements that any interoperability approach needs to consider, proposes an abstract architecture for meeting these needs, identifies candidate technologies that might be used for rendering this architecture, and suggests a path forward that the telemedicine community might follow.

A design methodology for the waste packages and ancillary components, viz., the emplacement pallets and drip shields, has been developed to provide designs that satisfy the safety and operational requirements of the Yucca Mountain Project. This methodology is described in the ''Waste Package Design Methodology Report'' Mecham 2004 [DIRS 166168]. To demonstrate the practicability of this design methodology, four waste package design configurations have been selected to illustrate the application of the methodology. These four design configurations are the 21-pressurized water reactor (PWR) Absorber Plate waste package, the 44-boiling water reactor (BWR) waste package, the 5-defense high-level waste (DHLW)/United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) Co-disposal Short waste package, and the Naval Canistered SNF Long waste package. Also included in this demonstration is the emplacement pallet and continuous drip shield. The purpose of this report is to document how that design methodology has been applied to the waste package design configurations intended to accommodate naval canistered SNF. This demonstrates that the design methodology can be applied successfully to this waste package design configuration and support the License Application for construction of the repository.

Video inspections in the annulus of Hanford double-shell waste storage tank 241-AY-101 in 2001 and earlier showed rust over large areas of the primary and secondary tank walls. These observations led to extensive on-destructive inspections and analyses to determine the extent and severity of the corrosion and correction of several operational deficiencies that contributed to the problem. PNNL has performed an independent review of the accumulated evidence from these efforts to determine whether unacceptable conditions were corrected and the current condition of the tank meets or exceeds technical and operational requirements. The findings of this review are the subject of this report. The conclusion is that AY-101 is fit for service without restriction subject to several recommendations for further inspections and analyses.

This document describes the hazards and operability (HAZOP) analysis performed for the activities associated with the storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) sludge at the T Plant. The safety authorization basis for the T Plant for SNF sludge storage is defined as those aspects of facility design and operational requirements relied upon by DOE to authorize operations. The safety authorization basis for the current T Plant activities is described in HNF-SD-WM-ISB-006, Rev 2, ''Interim Safety Basis for Solid Waste Facilities (T Plant) (ISB)'' and associated amendments and engineering change notices. In addition the authorization basis includes other document as summarized in Section 1.3.

This Operational Requirements Document (ORD) describes the capabilities that need to be incorporated in the NCC interactive simulation system being developed under the auspices of the NCC development program. The ORD addresses the necessary capabilities (i.e. what the system needs to be able to do); it defines the envelope of situations and circumstances that the NCC system must be able to represent and operate within. The NCC system will be developed in modules over a period of several years. This ORD, Version 2, supersedes the previous version. Future updates of this ORD are anticipated to be issued as needed to guide the development of later versions of the NCC system.

This Project Design Concept represents operational requirements established for use in design the tank farm Monitoring and Control System. These upgrades are included within the scope of Project W-314, Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operations.

On-Site Inspection (OSI) Workshop-6 met 26-30 June 2000 in Vienna, hosted by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBT Organization. The purpose of the workshop was to provide guidance on OSI Operational Manual (OM) development for Working Group B (WGB) of the CTBT preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in the general areas of equipment and logistics. The two main sessions of this workshop, titled ''OSI Equipment: Development of Functional and Operational Requirements, Specifications and Application Procedures'' and ''OSI Logistics: Continued Work on Standing Arrangements, Status of Inspectors and Support Equipment Issues'' reflected this focus. For this workshop, the schedule of work was divided into two parts: The first half of the week were sessions with formal paper presentations and discussion; the latter half of the week used two smaller subgroups to focus on and discuss separately equipment and logistics issues. Drawing heavily on the results of the five previous workshops, these subgroups produced material to be considered by Working Group B. This provisional material is intended to advance the process of equipment definition and procurement and establish procedures for logistics that can be incorporated into the OSI Operational Manual. The participants agreed that using subgroups in this workshop was an especiallymore » effective mechanism for discussion of different expert opinion on technical issues, and that having access to material presented at the previous five OSI workshops was particularly valuable.« less

The purpose of this Test and Evaluation Plan (TEP) is to identify the Test and Evaluation (T&E) activities required to confirm that design and installation of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) provided by Project W-521 will satisfy Level 2 and operational requirements, and to describe the T&E program to be implemented during the various project phases. This TEP establishes a sequence of test and evaluation activities to provide confidence that all required T&E activities will be accomplished successfully to support a smooth and timely turnover of completed SSCs to the River Protection Project (RPP) operations organization. In addition, organizational responsibilities for managing and performing the T&E activities are outlined. This TEP was prepared in accordance with the guidance and requirements of the RPP Test and Evaluation Management Plan. The Project W-521 TEP documents the process that will show that the SSCs are (1) compliant with the requirements of the Level 2 Specifications, (2) constructed in accordance with approved design drawings and procurement/construction specifications, (3) installed properly and appropriately integrated into the existing systems, and (4) will operate adequately on turnover to the customer.

In July, 2000, the Controlled Materials Accountability and Tracking System (COMATS) Team, with the assistance of a representative of the Local Area Network Materials Accountability System (LANMAS) development team from Savannah River, performed an evaluation to enumerate and qualify differences between the current LANMAS functionality and LLNL requirements as implemented by COMATS. The differences found range from minor to serious deficiencies of LANMAS in relation to current LLNL MC&A practice. Therefore, we recommend a gradual integration of LANMAS into a hybrid system which uses LANMAS to satisfy DOE/NNSA MC&A and reporting requirements and uses COMATS to satisfy LLNL-specific MC&A and operational requirements.

NSTX is one of the largest of a new class of magnetic plasma research devices known as spherical toroids (STs). The plasma in a ST is characterized by its almost spherical shape with a slender cylindrical region through its vertical axis. The so-called ''center stack'' is located in this region. It contains magnetic windings for confining the plasma, induce the plasma current, and shape the plasma. This paper will describe the engineering challenges of designing the center stack magnets to meet their operational requirements within this constrained space.

This Project Design Concept represents operational requirements for design of transfer piping system for Phase I of Project W-314, Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operation Upgrades.

The purpose of this Procedure is to assist construction in the pre-operational fabrication and testing of the pit leak detection system and the low point drain assembly by: (1) Control system testing of the pit leak detection system will be accomplished by actuating control switches and verifying that the control signal is initiated, liquid testing and overall operational requirements stated in HNF-SD-W314-PDS-003, ''Project Development Specification for Pit Leak Detection''. (2) Testing of the low point floor drain assembly by opening and closing the drain to and from the ''retracted'' and ''sealed'' positions. Successful operation of this drain will be to verify that the seal does not leak on the ''sealed'' position, the assembly holds liquid until the leak detector actuates and the assembly will operate from on top of the mock-up cover block.

This sampling and analysis plan (SAP) identifies characterization objectives pertaining to sample collection, laboratory analytical evaluation, and reporting requirements for grab samples obtained to address waste compatibility. Analytical requirements are taken from two revisions of the Compatibility data quality objectives (DQOs). Revision 1 of the DQO (Fowler 1995) listed analyses to be performed to meet both safety and operational data needs for the Compatibility program. Revision 2A of the DQO (Mulkey and Miller 1998) addresses only the safety-related requirements; the operational requirements of Fowler (1995) have not been superseded by Mulkey and Miller (1998). Therefore, safety-related data needs are taken from Mulkey and Miller (1998) and operational-related data needs are taken from Fowler (1995). Ammonia and total alpha analyses are also performed in accordance with Fowler (1998a, 1998b).

This Configuration Management Implementation Plan was developed to assist in the management of systems, structures, and components, to facilitate the effective control and statusing of changes to systems, structures, and components; and to ensure technical consistency between design, performance, and operational requirements. Its purpose is to describe the approach Project W-464 will take in implementing a configuration management control, to determine the rigor of control, and to identify the mechanisms for imposing that control.This Configuration Management Implementation Plan was developed to assist in the management of systems, structures, and components, to facilitate the effective control and statusing of changes to systems, structures, and components; and to ensure technical consistency between design, performance, and operational requirements. Its purpose is to describe the approach Project W-464 will take in implementing a configuration management control, to determine the rigor of control, and to identify the mechanisms for imposing that control.

This document presents a definition of tank turnover. Also, DOE and PC responsibilities; TWRS DST permitting requirements; TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) requirements; TWRS AP Tank Farm operational requirements; unreviewed safety question (USQ) requirements are presented for two cases (i.e., tank modifications occurring before tank turnover and tank modification occurring after tank turnover). Finally, records and reporting requirements, and documentation which will require revision in support of transferring a DST in AP Tank Farm to a privatization contractor are presented.

A Technical Basis Document (TBD) should provide the background information for establishment of an instrument`s operational requirements. Due to the amount and location of DOE facilities, no one set of requirements is possible. Operational requirements will vary based on the local environments and missions at each facility. Environmental conditions that can affect an instrument`s operations are ambient temperature, humidity, and radio frequency, and to a lesser extent, magnetic fields, and interfering ionizing radiations. Consideration should also be made regarding how an instrument is to be used. If an instrument will be transported around the facility, vibration and shock can cause problems if they are not addressed in the TBD. This document provides guidance for the development of a TBD. This document applies to radiation instruments used for personnel and equipment contamination monitoring, dose rate monitoring, and air monitoring.

This Configuration Management Implementation Plan (CMIP) was developed to assist in managing systems, structures, and components (SSCS), to facilitate the effective control and statusing of changes to SSCS, and to ensure technical consistency between design, performance, and operational requirements. Its purpose is to describe the approach Privatization Infrastructure will take in implementing a configuration management program, to identify the Program`s products that need configuration management control, to determine the rigor of control, and to identify the mechanisms for that control.

The identification and definition of the authorization basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) facility and operations are essential for compliance to DOE Order 5480.21, Unreviewed Safety Questions. The authorization basis, as defined in the Order, consists of those aspects of the facility design basis, i.e., the structures, systems and components (SSCS) and the operational requirements that are considered to be important to the safety of operations and are relied upon by DOE to authorize operation of the facility. These facility design features and their function in various accident scenarios are described in WHC-SD-CP-SAR-021, Plutonium Finishing Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 9, `Accident Analysis.` Figure 1 depicts the relationship of the Authorization Basis to its components and other information contained in safety documentation supporting the Authorization Basis. The PFP SSCs that are important to safety, collectively referred to as the `Safety Envelope` are discussed in various chapters of the FSAR and in WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010, Plutonium Finishing Plant Operational Safety Requirements. Other documents such as Criticality Safety Evaluation Reports (CSERS) address and support some portions of the Authorization Basis and Safety Envelope.

This OTP shall verify and document that the monitor and control system comprised of PICS SALW-6001B PLC, 242S PLC, Operator Control Station, and communication network is functioning per operational requirements.

This Document describes the operational requirements, procedures, and options for execution of the retrieval of the waste containers placed in buried storage in Burial Ground 218W-4C, Trench 04 as TRU waste or suspect TRU waste under the activity levels defining this waste in effect at the time of placement. Trench 04 in Burial Ground 218W-4C is totally dedicated to storage of retrievable TRU waste containers or retrievable suspect TRU waste containers and has not been used for any other purpose.

This report summarizes the findings of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory`s decontamination study in support of the Tank Waste Retrieval System (TWRS) development program. Problems associated with waste stored in existing single shell tanks are discussed as well as the justification for the TWRS program. The TWRS requires a decontamination system. The subsystems of the TWRS are discussed, and a list of assumptions pertinent to the TWRS decontamination system were developed. This information was used to develop the functional and operational requirements of the TWRS decontamination system. The requirements were combined with a comprehensive review of currently available decontamination techniques to produced a set of evaluation criteria. The cleaning technologies and techniques were evaluated, and the CO{sub 2} blasting decontamination technique was chosen as the best technology for the TWRS.

The US Bureau of Mines` research program is focused on developing procedures and guidelines for acceptable underground oil shale blasting that fulfill the operational requirements for efficiency while maintaining a high level of safety when operating under gassy mine conditions. This work is aimed at providing new information, alternate methods, and innovation in underground blasting procedures. The results from this research will have direct impact on regulatory standards for blasting under gassy mine conditions. Based on the low incendivity data from the Cannon Gallery and several months of recent testing in their mine, Kennecott`s Greens Creek base metal mine in Alaska had decided to exclusively use a low incendive bulk emulsion product in place of the low incendive water gel prod ct for all blasting operations. As was the case with the low incendive water gel product, the use of this bulk product resulted in: no dust ignitions and related injuries and/or production/equipment losses; the elimination if preblasting measures of using stemming and water sprays, and the improvement of roadways due to the reduction of water.

The Stored Waste System Design Study (SWSDS), commissioned by the Waste Technology Development Department at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), examines relative life-cycle costs associated with three system concepts for processing the alpha low-level waste (alpha-LLW) stored at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex's Transuranic Storage Area at the INEL. The three system concepts are incineration/melting; thermal treatment/solidification; and sort, treat, and repackage. The SWSDS identifies system functional and operational requirements and assesses implementability; effectiveness; cost; and demonstration, testing, and evaluation (DT E) requirements for each of the three concepts.

Within the next few years a hole will be drilled into a shallow magma body in the western US for the purpose of evaluating the engineering feasibility of magma energy. This paper examines potential drilling sites for these engineering feasibility experiments. Target sites high on the list are ones that currently exhibit good geophysical and geological data for shallow magma and also have reasonable operational requirements. Top ranked sites for the first magma energy well are Long Valley, CA, and Coso/Indian Wells, CA. Kilauea, HI, also in the top group, is an attractive site for some limited field experiments. A number of additional sites offer promise as eventual magma energy sites, but sparsity of geophysical data presently prevents these sites from being considered for the first magma energy well.