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The twenty-first century is facing multiple global challenges and terrorism is now the weapon of the "weak against the strong." Despite the end of the cold war, conflicts still continue and new threats lurk on the horizon. Terrorism and crimes are burning political issues the world over. People's lives are threatened by violence in several forms that include political oppression, religious and ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, easier access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear know-how, together with the circulation of small arms (assault rifles) have contributed to violence. The scenario has provided fundamentalists and insurgents from governments with democratic deficit to create an atmosphere of vulnerability, fear, and paranoia worldwide. The key objective of this study is to show that no nation is exempt from terrorism and crimes. Hence, the curtailing of such acts will require the coalitions and alliances from countries around the world. How terrorism impacts diplomacy and foreign policies among nations would be analyzed. Also, the undercurrents and inter-links issues that lead to such inhumane acts will be examined together with the prospects and challenges of the multilateral organizations (e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and United Nations Security Council among others). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of IAEA documented violations of international fissile materials safeguards and responding to warnings that Iran was attempting to develop a surreptitious nuclear weapons program, the UN Security Council has passed a series of resolutions directing Iran to cease uranium enrichment. The resolutions are designed to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on Iran in order to bring Iran's nuclear activities into full compliance with the fundamental convention on nuclear science and nuclear armaments, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The constraint the UN Security Council is seeking to impose upon Iranian policy is not directed at restraining Iranian scientific and economic development but rather it is directed at enforcing one of the fundamental pillars of the NPT, the international control over the proliferation of fissile materials and fissile material production technology. The effectiveness of diplomatic efforts to curtail Iran's enrichment program depends at least in part on the willingness of Iran's regional neighbors to exert moral influence over Iran's calculations of its long-term interest in challenging international efforts to stem nuclear proliferation. The adoption of the Central Asian Nuclear Free Zone (CANFZ) in 2009 is an example of regional efforts to promote nuclear science while curbing nuclear armaments. This paper describes the impact of the CANFZ on regional security in the context of the Iranian uranium enrichment program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The absence of global governance has resulted in vertical and horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The mechanisms like Non proliferation treaty and the Comprehensive test ban treaty have failed to transform themselves as nuclear weapons control regimes. Result is that in the post cold-war period, three developing countries, India, Pakistan and North Korea have gone overtly nuclear. Incidentally all of these belong to Asia. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by these Asian countries and others continued desire to get them, inter alia, reopened the debate on the factors that motivate countries to go nuclear. It must be noted here that out of the eight nuclear weapons states who have gone overtly nuclear at least four out of them are modern liberal democracies. So what international theory did they follow while deciding their nuclear programme?. This study intends to understand the external factors that motivate countries to go nuclear, along with suggesting new mechanisms to stop further proliferation of these weapons. Also can a global regime be formed now to safeguard these weapons of mass destruction from reaching in the hands of non state actors who are desperate for them??. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should the United States and its allies deal with regimes that abuse their own people and threaten world order? Are some regimes so evil that it is wrong and unwise to engage with them on matters of shared concern? The answer depends not only on the "facts of the case" but also on priorities and frames of reference. Thus, Soviet citizens, each a Nobel Prize winner, disagreed on whether Western governments should treat the Kremlin as a viable partner in negotiations to control the arms race.. Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn said "no," because a regime that oppressed its own people could not be trusted. But Andrei D. Sakharov answered "yes," because the stakes for humanity were so high. Solzhenitsyn put human rights first; Sakharov, the survival of humanity. Today a similar choice confronts Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as they confront leaders in Pyongyang moving to expand their nuclear-missile capabilities. President George W. Bush placed North Korea on an "axis of evil." He loathed a leader who permitted more than a million of his subject to starve. But even if this repugnance was justified, did it serve U.S. interests to end the dialogues that, in the Clinton years, offered hope of limiting and perhaps terminating the North's nuclear weapons and missile programs?. "We are good and they are bad" is dangerous as an approach to foreign affairs. But it is also wrong and reckless to assume that all actors are equally flawed. This paper sides with Sakharov. If a cruel dictatorship is willing to negotiate security arrangements likely to limit arms competition and make war less likely, democratic governments should engage and seek verifiable arrangements. If a deal materializes, however, it will probably rest far more on calculations of material power than on sentiment or spirituality, and on reliable verification procedures more than on trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the prospect of global nuclear disarmament is debated in policy circles, scholarly inquiry can offer insights into possible future nuclear scenarios. Why might states give up their nuclear weapons? Might the major nuclear powers denuclearize? This article presents a novel sociological explanation of nuclear choices to shed light on the potential for nuclear disarmament. It explores how South Africa's elimination of its nuclear arsenal two decades ago resulted chiefly from its new vision of international standing as achievable by cooperative diplomacy and upholding global rules. However, the nuclear powers show few signs of following suit. Indeed, nuclear reversal would require the major powers to abandon the nuclear arms they hold as essential to their global power stature. Overall, the research shows that major power aversion to deficient power status will make global nuclear zero difficult to achieve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional analyses of Switzerland's nuclear weapons program often explain both the beginning of the program as well as its end by merely subsuming it under the broad logic of security calculations. Accordingly, the country originally developed an interest in nuclear weapons due to its precarious security environment after the end of World War II; it ended its nuclear ambitions roughly two decades later when it felt less threatened by external powers. Yet, such a depiction of the Swiss case brushes aside the historical political context in which the country's nuclear decision-making was embedded. Moreover, it overstates the significance of (seemingly given) external security threats in the decision-making process while underestimating the ideational underpinnings that constituted the debate in the first place. Hence, it will be argued that understanding the Swiss debate on nuclear weapons is only possible if we manage to grasp the changing historical narratives that are attached to both the country's identity and to nuclear weapons as an object. Based on a discursive analysis of key documents it is claimed that Switzerland's decision to forego nuclear weapons can only partially be explained by recourse to the security paradigm. Instead, within less than ten years the historical narratives underlying nuclear weapons changed from modern, prestigious, legitimate, clean and ethically justified means of warfare towards depicting them as militarily, politically, economically and environmentally dangerous. At the same time the country's self-perception, its envisioned political role and its presumed identity underwent a profound change, too, thereby rendering the possession of nuclear weapons less and less ?appropriate?. On a more general, abstract level the paper aims at illustrating the benefits of a Pragmatist-inspired theoretical framework for the study of international security issues: Not only can a Pragmatist-framework shed light on the social processes of interpretation and meaningmaking; it can also help us overcome IR's ?potted history?-problem (Jervis) by reminding us of the social constructedness of history and historical knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the more than six decades since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a norm of non-use of nuclear weapons has developed, as shown by Nina Tannenwald in her book The Nuclear Taboo (2007). But non-use is not the same as non-possession, and the interest among states in possession of nuclear weapons remains strong. Nuclear weapons are desired to deter aggression, to add coercive weight to ordinary diplomatic interactions, and to provide status. Despite their inability to frame a realistic scenario in which nuclear weapons would be usable, the U.S. military regularly designs war games in which the weapons are available for use. What would it take to delegitimize the possession of nuclear weapons? My paper will explore different strategies and evaluate their potential for success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the impact that North Korean nuclear arms tests have on the financial markets in East Asia. Earlier research has shown that terrorist and military attacks influence capital markets considerably, but that these markets adapt to such events. The analysis will explore how large the losses are and how resilient these markets are to nuclear brinkmanship games that the leadership of the communist country occasionally plays. The article demonstrates with the help of event studies that the costs of the North Korean nuclear policy are considerable, but mainly restricted to South Korea. The authors discuss the extent to which financial markets can be used to predict the credibility of North Korean threats to use nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do conventional arms exports punish or reward nuclear weapons development? The UN often issues arms embargoes to deny conventional arms to would-be nuclear states. However, conventional arms may also decrease the appeal of nuclear weapons by bolstering states' conventional security. In the 1970s, experts agonized over this ?dove's dilemma,? asking whether the risks of instability from conventional arms proliferation had to be accepted in order to prevent the proliferation of unconventional arms. Similar questions are also appropriate today, as policy-makers struggle to find effective means to address nuclear proliferation. This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the relationship between conventional arms and nuclear weapons development. It examines conventional arms transfers by the top nine major conventional exporters from 1960 to 2001 in order to explore the conditions under which nuclear weapons states use arms sales to deter states from pursuing nuclear weapons. Results show that the pursuit of nuclear weapons increases recipients' likelihood of receiving conventional weapons only during the Cold War. The prominence of arms embargoes in the post-Cold War era, as well as expectations for more restrictive conventional arms export practices may diffuse the dove's dilemma and limit how policy-makers can use conventional arms supplies as a tool of foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the coercive effects of nuclear weapons? Sixty-five years into the nuclear age, we still lack a complete answer to this question. This article employs a new dataset of nearly 200 militarized compellent threats from 1918 to 2001 to evaluate whether states with nuclear weapons are better able to make successful compellent threats than non-nuclear states. Using a bivariate probit model designed to jointly model the initiation and outcomes of threats, we find that states possessing nuclear weapons are not more likely to make successful compellent threats. If anything, possessing the bomb reduces the likelihood that targets will accept challengers' demands without a fight. While nuclear weapons may carry coercive weight as instruments of deterrence, it appears that these effects do not extend to compellent threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on nuclear proliferation has identified several correlates of the propensity to pursue these weapons of mass destruction: the nature of the security environment, alliances with great powers, technological resources, and regional status aspirations are all repeatedly found to matter. Yet regime type has repeatedly been found not to matter. To take one example, Gartzke and Jo conclude that "there is no difference between democracy and autocracy in terms of a tendency to pursue nuclear weapons production programs." However, the simple democracy/non-democracy classification of regime type obscures as much as it reveals, and previous studies have been hindered in their ability to detect regime type effects by their use of a 'causes of effects' instead of an "effects of causes" research design. We argue that regimes with highly centralized leadership are much more likely to risk the international condemnation that developing nuclear weapons typically entails, particularly after the creation of the NPT. Unlike previous research, which distinguishes only between democracies and autocracies, we therefore identify personalistic leaders in which one ruler has amassed substantial personal power. Using this more nuanced classification of regime types, we find that regime type does matter: personalistic regimes have a much higher conditional probability of pursuing nuclear weapons than other regimes. Previous studies have missed a substantively and statistically significant effect because they have rested on an under-conceptualized classification of regime type. Our finding that personalistic regimes have a much higher propensity to proliferation holds using different codings of proliferation dates and is robust to a range of specifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that the balance of material costs and benefits of nuclear armament for Japan is sensitive to small changes in the scope and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence supports the current role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. This paper scrutinizes this assumption in terms of a constraint that is especially difficult to change: what kind of deterrent strategy can Japan implement against nuclear weapon states? I start with pessimistic assumptions about the need for an independent nuclear deterrent, and optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, both of which are crucial for prediction and advocacy of nuclear armament. The first set of assumptions, in which the United States no longer extends deterrence, and China values victory in nuclear war against Japan, rules out a small force de frappe for Japan. Instead, Japan will need a large retaliatory force, even with an asymmetric counter-recovery strategy against energy resources, transportation, and sea power. This deterrent is not likely to become operational without a decade of investment. In short, a claim that a small nuclear deterrent is necessary and sufficient for Japan contradicts itself. Japan needs either a large nuclear deterrent, or none of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes Russia's recent efforts to provide Venezuela with a nuclear reactor and its implications for U.S. security policy. The Russo-Venezuelan nuclear program's intent was declared and signed into effect in November 2008, the first working group session took place in 2009, and it all culminated in the most recent agreement on October 15, 2010 to officially go ahead and start building a nuclear reactor in Venezuela. This is significant since it will be the first Russian nuclear reactor built in Latin America. It, most likely, is a harbinger and many more Russian nuclear reactors will be coming to not only Venezuela but to all of Latin America. This paper argues that future Latin American purchases of Russian nuclear reactors may seriously undermine the principle of the Monroe Doctrine, particularly since the customers will most likely have to rely on Russia for future enriched-uranium, expertise, and maintenance (usually, all are incorporated into a nuclear energy contract). Moreover, with the nuclear energy deal Russia has made recently many economic and military agreements with Venezuela worth billions of dollars. The benefits of a nuclear energy agreement can go well beyond the contract itself, particularly given the great value of nuclear energy and the very select number of suppliers. Nuclear energy deals, thus, can improve a country's chances at the very least of winning in many other competitive economic situations. In the end, with Latin America's ongoing rapid economic development and growing need for energy resources, a heavy reliance on Russian nuclear reactors could represent a major change in Latin American politics and, likely, a serious decline in American power in the region. It also may lead to the possibility that the enriched uranium may go from nuclear energy to nuclear weapons at anytime in the future and, thereby, fundamentally altering the balance of power in the hemisphere. Overall, this paper contends that the U.S. must do much better in defining the Monroe Doctrine and, then, competing more effectively with other countries seeking to penetrate the region through nuclear energy deals and other major agreements. The paper concludes with recommendations on how the U.S. can respond to this recent nuclear reactor deal and the potential effects on the Monroe Doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When should negotiations be held with adversaries? When should they be refused? American decision makers have frequently grappled with these questions during international crises with adversarial states. Yet there is widespread disagreement on whether or not the US should engage with adversaries. 'Hawks' argue that negotiations themselves can be a form of appeasement. Adversaries gain legitimacy from US engagement, they claim, and can use talks as a way to stall for time while continuing with bad behavior. They also argue that talks are a show of weakness that can encourage other states to behave badly, believing that the United States will reward them similarly. Advocates of diplomacy, on the other hand, argue that negotiations are essential to defuse crises, and provide a necessary forum in which to reach compromise. Withholding talks, they claim, does nothing to enhance America's bargaining position, or to pressure adversaries to change their behavior. This paper seeks to shed light on this issue by examining US diplomacy with three adversaries pursuing nuclear weapons: Libya, North Korea, and Iran. It concludes that negotiations, contrary to the hawks, do not carry significant reputation costs or encourage greater demands. Withholding talks until preconditions are met, conversely, typically fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The six-party process aimed at North Korea's denuclearization has long been stalled since the Six-Party Talks (SPT) failed to agree on a verification protocol in early December 2008. North Korea now wants to be recognized as a nuclear state, and is unlikely to abandon its nuclear weapons without security guarantees provided by the U.S. Some scholars argue that the Six- Party Talks have outlived their usefulness, while others maintain that the SPT are still useful. The author has argued over the years that the six-party process remains alive and useful as the best means of resolving North Korea's nuclear issue to achieve North Korea's denuclearization, which is a pre-requisite for building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and regional peace in Northeast Asia. The author discusses the current status of the Six-Party Talks, which have been stalled for over two years, analyzing the major events on the Korean peninsula as key obstacles to the restoration of the six-party process. He makes policy recommendations for an early resumption of the longstalled SPT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction has long been one of the largest fears of states. In this respect, one would expect states to take extraordinary action to prevent their adversaries from developing such potentially devastating technologies. Anticipatory military activities (preemptive strikes or preventive military actions) have long been in the toolbox of actions available for states when faced by potential (or imminent) threats. Reiter (1995) and Bzostek (2008) find that states rarely engage in these activities. Additionally, there have been a few times that this type of action has been used specifically as a counterproliferation tool. This paper seeks to explore the reasons why states do (or do not) choose to use anticipatory military activities for the purposes of counterproliferation and the implications of these choices. In other words, when would a state decide to take anticipatory action for the sake of counterproliferation and what would the consequences be of that action?. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When does nuclear counterproliferation succeed? When does it lead to preventive war? We argue that the answers to these questions hinge on the effect of nuclearization on the balance of power relative to the cost of preventive war. When it is low, threats of preventive war are not credible; proliferation continues apace and peace prevails. Such was the case during the Cold War. When it is high, threats of preventive war are credible, slowing down the rate of proliferation. At the same time, since the decision to proliferate is not perfectly observable, there is a higher likelihood of mistaken preventive wars. This characterizes the post Cold War. We trace the logic of our argument by looking at the cases of Soviet nuclear acquisition in 1949 and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan's nuclear weapons program generates intense concern in Washington and among its allies for a variety of reasons. To name only a few, there are concerns about the potential of nuclear war with India, about proliferation, about Pakistan's impact on the global arms control regime (most recently illustrated by its stance on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty), about an arms race in SW Asia, about state failure, about military control over its nuclear weapons, and about acquisition of the weapons (or fissile material) by Islamist militants. These concerns are legitimate to be sure. But a closer examination of the program itself and the environment in which that program nests raises a larger concern: the likelihood of synergistic interactions among these variables leading to even greater danger to US security. This manifestation of unintended outcomes cannot be predicted, but the way in which these dangers arise can be better understood. To this end, this paper examines the environment in which Pakistan's program nests, what sorts of dangers may arise in this environment, and how these dangers might interact synergistically, leading to even greater peril. The resulting hazards are more difficult to understand, less predictable, and thus pose an even greater threat to US security than generally acknowledged. Because the threats generated are more likely to have unintended consequences, it is more important than ever to plan for coherent, interconnected responses. This paper examines the environment in which Pakistan's nuclear weapons program exists, key elements of the program itself, and then discusses several forecasting tools that are available to help understand the interaction of the various variables, synergistic outcomes, and the implications of these outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The realist "security dilemma" has long shaped our understanding of why states arm and spurn disarmament even when conditions appear ripe for an international agreement that would limit the growth or reduce the size of national arsenals. A limitation of accepting this pessimistic vision is to put too little stake in the ideational influences upon policymakers - here, the net benefits to the United States under the proposed terms of a treaty. Whereas realists do not put much stake in the ideational context in which states act and signals are sent - what policymakers think of their counterparts and the terms of an agreement - this paper maintains that assumptions about adversary intentions and relative advantages in arms control are essential for understanding why parties seek to forgo or negotiate a treaty, then to propose or react to its terms, and then to accept or reject them. It establishes the relevance of these ideas by examining a number of "hard cases" - US-Soviet arms-control proposals in the Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations. These stand as hard cases because, with intense Cold War rivalry, they were likely to produce the failure at arms control that is envisioned under a security dilemma. But, even in failure, this paper establishes that US arms-control proposals stemmed from inchoate and incoherent beliefs about relative advantage and somewhat benign views of Soviet intent. These beliefs shaped the specifics of the proposals and fueled some optimism that the Soviets would agree to the terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has become common to equate the attainment of a "significant quantity" (SQ) of fissile material with the achievement of de facto nuclear weapons capability and therefore view the possible creation of an Iranian highly enriched uranium stockpile as crossing the line to nuclear weapons. We argue that application of the SQ/no-SQ indicator of nuclear weapons stateness is generally not preferable to the traditional test/no test indicator, and that the Iranian case is no exception to the general rule. First, Iran's domestic, regional and international position is considerably different than that of Israel, so far the only persistent case of nuclear opacity. Second, Iran's record of openly testing strategic weapons, specifically ballistic missiles, offers empirical evidence that the political actors guiding Iran's strategic weapons programs see numerous advantages to testing their equipment. In short, Iran would be highly likely to test a nuclear device as soon as it had one. This conclusion means that the Iranian nuclear crisis is less acute than many have claimed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the interesting behavioral patterns of the post-Cold War era is the relative lack of interstate warfare, particularly attempts at conquest. This is markedly different from the pre-Cold War era, where wars of conquest and imperialist expansion were quite common, culminating in the two World Wars. Contrary to pessimistic projections made in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War of an imminent return to the pre-Cold War pattern of great power competition and wars for resource, the interstate system has remained largely stable and peaceful. Dominant theoretical paradigms based on dyadic dynamics such as the presence of nuclear weapons, interdependence, and the �democratic peace� are of limited explanatory value because the phenomenon is so extensive. I argue that the current era of relative interstate peace is the culmination of several trends that have together drastically increased the costs and reduced the likely benefits of war. These include the development of the modern, globalized world economy, the spread of ideas of nationalism in an environment where there is ready access to light weapons, and the development of international norms against aggression and imperialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Could an Iranian regime which had developed the capacity to build a nuclear weapon be "deterred?" What might be the requirements of such deterrence? What would both Iran and its foes have to do to promote stability? This paper will explore these questions beginning with an exploration of the internal political landscape of Iran, and how that influences critical choices made by the regime. The paper then examines Iran's nuclear programme, within the context of domestic decision-making as the key driver. Third, the paper discusses Iranian culture and negotiating behaviour and how these might affect the question of deterrence. Finally, the paper asks what it all means for attempts to deter Iran should it ever become a nuclear weapons state - either a latent or an overt one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to improve international governance are based on increased acceptance of shared norms within the international community. By creating and reinforcing sets of normative rules, conditions for more effective cooperation are created between countries. Such a system can be easily undermined by states, which do not comply with the norms, as enforcement by force is often problematic due to political constraints. Drawing on Giorgio Agamben's State of Exception, the paper argues that Israel is currently existing as a "state of exception" within international law, which jeopardizes attempts at establishing more effective regimes of global governance as well as regional cooperation. Israel's refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is just one of the examples where Israel's position impedes international efforts - other states point at Israel's position when refusing to abide by international norms. Israel is indeed in many ways an exceptional state, and its officials keep reinforcing such discourse. By analyzing the consequences of the claims to exceptional status effectively out of bounds of international law, the paper argues that it would be beneficial in the long run for Israel to normalize its conduct as well as official positions (including the admission that it indeed has nuclear weapons), as only improved international governance can lead towards improved security in the region in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) failed to prevent some of its own members from pursuing nuclear weapons? With a series of game theoretic models, I demonstrate that the structure of the NPT fails to provide disincentives for proliferation, and that the Additional Protocol fails to correct the treaty's major weaknesses. I suggest a revision of the current NPT treaty: by forcing states to choose between signing an Additional Protocol and exiting the NPT, the nuclear nonproliferation regime will be better able to block the spread of nuclear weapons. Yet even this improved structure would suffer from the same problems of monitoring and enforcement that currently plague the NPT and many other international treaties. The international community must recognize the shortcomings of this supply-side approach to nuclear proliferation, and confront the demands motivating states to acquire nuclear weapons, if it hopes to contain the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Supporters and opponents of nuclear deterrence are clearly engaged in a renewed "contest" about the status of a long-standing normative idea in international relations. While the reality and logic of nuclear deterrence is often taken-for-granted, recurrent debates about the meaning and effectiveness of the norm arguably reflect an ongoing legitimacy crisis. Academic critics of nuclear strategy have for the most part simply revealed and explained the many contradictions in deterrence theorizing and practice. Most of these critics seek to correct, perfect, and reinforce the fundamental logic of deterrence. In contrast, the primary concern here is whether the growing recognition of the contradictions, irrationalities, and even absurdities of nuclear deterrence might usher in the strategy's demise—and potentially create the conditions for, and/or provide the impetus to, a world free of nuclear weapons. Empirically, much attention is directed at the anti-nuclear activism of numerous prominent former and current public officials and military leaders who have condemned nuclear weapons and called for a world without them. Alternatively, the paper explores whether the death of deterrence might merely assure the long life of preventive war strategies (like the "Bush Doctrine")? In terms of international relations theory, this paper serves as an immanent critique of nuclear deterrence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoclassical realism, which explores how domestic institutions filter and mediate international signals, is a particularly valuable theoretical tool for students of intelligence. Indeed, intelligence agencies reside at the sweet spot for neoclassical realist analysis becuase they are explicitly designed to gather and interpret information about relative power, looming security threats, and the balance of capabilities. This paper defines neoclassical realism; describes a model of intelligence based on neoclassical realist insights; and uses the model to explain the changing US view of Soviet strategic capabilties in the 1960s and 1970s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does international economic liberalization reduce states' likelihood of exploring, pursuing, or acquiring nuclear weapons? The argument that it does has attracted considerable attention and praise, but to date has only been assessed using a small number of qualitative case studies. Since it is uniquely well suited to quantitative testing against the full universe of states that did and did not engage in proliferation behavior over the sixty-odd years of the nuclear age, the argument is tested here using hazard analysis and a new dataset of proliferation behavior. The analysis, drawing on 228 separate models, yields three core findings, which shed significant new light on how economic liberalization impacts proliferation. First, states in the process of liberalizing, independent of their regional contexts, appear to be less likely to acquire nuclear weapons, but are no less likely to explore or pursue them, perhaps because the economic integration they are pursuing makes them more susceptible to external pressure to halt nuclear weapons programs once they are revealed. Second, states located in liberalizing regions, independent of their individual contexts, appear to be more likely to pursue nuclear weapons. This counterintuitive finding is explained by the third major finding, related to the interaction between individual and regional characteristics. Liberalizing states located in liberalizing regions are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons, while non-liberalizing states in liberalizing regions are much more likely to do so, perhaps because they have chosen isolation due to perceived external threats and/or because their isolation magnifies their threat perceptions. International economic liberalization does affect proliferation proclivity, albeit in nuanced rather than more straightforward ways. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We often imagine that countries with nuclear energy programs are nuclear weapons states waiting to happen. Yet there are multiple ways that states can enhance their nuclear security, even when they possess the requisite technology for a weapons program. They may undertake diplomatic efforts to reduce the level of threat, they may seek shelter under an ally's nuclear umbrella, and they may adopt unilateral military measures, up to and including the development of a nuclear arsenal. Over the past five decades, India has engaged in all three of these approaches. Since India's pursuit of nuclear weapons is already well-documented, this article focuses on its efforts to elicit nuclear restraint from other states through diplomacy and to seek the protection of nuclear-armed allies. Drawing on archival documents and interviews in New Delhi and Mumbai, it documents how Indian leaders eventually became disillusioned with these two alternatives to nuclear armament. In doing so, it depicts India's emergence as a nuclear power not simply as a response to regional threats, but also as the result of dissatisfaction with alternative paths to nuclear security. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of this finding for possible U.S.-Indian cooperation in nuclear energy in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We construct a sequential signaling game combined with the prospect theory and mean-variance analysis in order to capture interactions between two hostile players. Our formal deduction shows when confronting uncertainty about future outcome physical factors and psychological factors affect decision makers' calculation on whether to wage war. We deduce that if the challenger attaches negative values to the status quo, he will choose and initiate a large-scale war. High levels of uncertainty can drive a dissatisfied country into a relatively disadvantageous conflict. The implication is profound, nuclear challengers will escalate conflict to the limit of their capabilities once a confrontation is initiated. Rogue dissatisfied states find nuclear weapons very alluring because they might bring an 'ultimate victory' through the total destruction of the opponents despite the knowledge that the challenger may also suffer 'total destruction'. Thus, it is a quite reasonable option for rogue countries to struggle for WMD in spite of heavy external pressures. In sum, as nuclear club members become dissatisfied, deterrence ultimately becomes fragile. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will argue that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR, also sometimes called the Nunn-Lugar program) represents an important new method for states to protect their security. The program has used carefully targeted spending rather than ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes a critical look at the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons control regimes and forwards the notion that by comparison the nature of biological weapons is fundamentally different from both nuclear and chemical weapons. If biological ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the most recent U.S. and international public opinion surveys regarding perceptions of Iran's foreign relations and nuclear program and support for specific measures, including the use of force, to deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability. While these various publics' preferences on how to deal with Iran's nuclear programdo not necessarily reflect their respective leaders' views, they can constrain and otherwise influence their governments' policies. Multi-country surveys taken during the past several years have shown predominantly negative views of Iran, particularly among non-Muslim publics, as well as widespread concern about Iran's acquisition of nuclear arms. Despite this broad concern, only about a third of foreign publics on average support tough countermeasures against Iran, including economic sanctions and military action, if it continues to defy U.N. strictures against its enriching nuclear fuel. The most popular measure is to employ "only diplomatic efforts," supported by about two-fifths on average. The U.S.public, in contrast, is relatively hawkish on Iran. Three-fifths of Americans support tough countermeasures (45% economic sanctions and 15% military action), if Iran continues to enrich nuclear fuel in defiance of the U.N. The U.S. public's support for military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons roughly doubles (from nearly one-fifth to about two-fifths) when military force is stipulated as a last resort -- the only available option that could prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Surveys taken last year in Iran found no more than one-fourth of Iranians supported their country pursuing development of nuclear weapons in lieu of normal relations and economic assistance from the U.S. and other countries. The economic incentives part of a package to be offered Iran should be publicized to enhance the position of moderate Iranian leaders proposing reduced tension with other countries and a better life for Iranians. However, negotiations at the highest level should be approached cautiously, so as not to legitimize the present Iranian government's objectives, until there a signs that these have been modified and become acceptable to the U.S. and its friends in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a strong argument that human being cannot coexist with nuclear weapons. This insistence, however, tends to be limited within a circle of so-called idealist. But the latest trend seems to be different. The voices of necessity of nuclear weapons’ a ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been considerable debate in recent years about the role of deterrence in U.S. national security strategy. Underpinning many of these debates are basic beliefs about the utility of Cold War concepts of deterrence, and the applicability of deterrence lessons gained from Cold War experiences. Few argue that we should completely ignore the foundations of deterrence theory developed in the 1950s and early 1960s, or that we should discard our history books because the lessons of history are irrelevant to understanding modern challenges. Instead, the fundamental questions are just how much we should rely on concepts developed in a bipolar nuclear world, and which lessons from the Cold War might be used as a guide for current and future decision-makers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]