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Russia's war against Ukraine has accelerated international competition for influence in Africa. Structural weaknesses and post-pandemic instabilities continue to threaten achievements in the fields of democratic governance, peace and security, as well as development. We present a select list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2023. Politics: Democratic quality will depend on the nature of polls, as the electoral calendar is heavily packed. Important general elections that could trigger social unrest are scheduled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. Peace and security: Against the backdrop of continued structural-conflict risks, Jihadism and related ethno-regional tensions pose a major security challenge that may spill over to neighbouring states, especially from the Sahel to West African coastal countries. The recent ceasefire in Ethiopia's Tigray Region could be a first positive step towards peace. International arena: Amid Russia's war against Ukraine, many African governments were reluctant to join the international coalition condemning the Putin regime. Continued Western pressure on African countries to isolate Russia fosters African agency. At the same time, we expect to see an intensifying "new scramble for Africa" that includes both China and Middle Eastern countries. Socio-economic development: African countries will slowly rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic's socio-economic effects, but high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth. Progress on joint efforts to counter the climate crisis remains slow. Western support for African countries in their struggle for democracy, peace and security, as well as development requires a "new start" that focuses on prevention rather than ad hoc responses to current crises. The European Union and United States should avoid lapsing into Cold War habits of only assisting African governments if they "break away" from Russia. Germany needs to formulate a sound

This working paper is based on empirical research on the Translocal Figurations of Displacement in Greece and Italy. The authors aim to compare protracted displacement in Greece and Italy, looking at the structural forces shaping it and their interactions with migrants' mobility and connectivity. This comparison is based on the analysis of the relations between two contextual variables (governance regimes and host population) and three key variables (mobility, connectivity and marginalisation). In this paper, they present findings from three study sites in Greece and four research locations in Italy. Findings show that protracted legal and socio-economic marginalisation is a key feature characterising the lives of displaced people in southern European countries. It confirms the hypothesis that protracted displacement does not end when forced migrants reach Greece or Italy. Restrictive governance regimes at the national and EU level severely limit mobility opportunities within Greece and Italy and across the European Union (EU). To cope with and resist marginalising and immobilising policies, displaced migrants in Italy and Greece put in place several strategies, ranging from adapting to governance regimes and taking the most out of them to resisting them and finding ways to avoid, bypass or overcome such regimes. In this framework, mobility and connectivity emerge as a resource and a trap for displaced migrants in southern Europe. On the one hand, migrants' strategies of intra-national and intra-EU mobility may help them out of protracted displacement, while on the other, certain types of mobility (hyper-, circular, paradoxical) can entrap, rather than free them. Similarly, local, translocal and transnational networks emerge as a crucial resource for displaced people in Greece and Italy. At the same time, family and co-ethnic networks may also be experienced as disabling, hampering one's aspirations to get out of protracted displacement. Fieldwork in both countries

The sum of an ideal view of society, with an abstract action model of social interaction, imbues money infrastructure that seeks to further a utopian view of society. This article analyses the cases of ordinary money as the euro and Sardex, a successful case of complementary currency born in Sardinia in 2009, with a specific focus on the different forms of solidarity and sustainability that these two types of money advance. The examples provide the basis for identifying two models of money infrastructure, namely the "indifferent" and the "situational." The former is based on the historical model of self-interested utilitarianism of the monetarist approach with a specific focus on the satisfaction of individual preferences, but scant consideration of their formation and externalities. The latter, by contrast, has the potential to enhance cooperation and solidarity among its users to promote collective aims on a situational basis. This type of money appears to be much closer to a local, tangible level that can shape new policies for sustainability.

Iran's conservative politicians, known to be loyal supporters of Ayatollah Khamenei, have been actively working to revitalise the regime's revolutionary values according to his vision. President Ebrahim Raisi's efforts to deliver on such aims are linked with his hopes of becoming the country's next supreme leader. As poverty and inflation increase in Iran, various rounds of protests demonstrate brewing socio-economic discontent among ordinary Iranians. While the regime's direct response consists of severe repression, President Raisi's administration has also reacted with a mixture of propaganda, populist economic policies, and attempts to strengthen relations with Eastern powers. Promoting a "modest lifestyle" as an Islamic and national virtue, condemning economic prosperity as part of materialistic, Westernised culture, and campaigning to change the nation's consumption habits are among the current regime's key responses to economic privation. Declaring a commitment to solve the nation's economic hardship through populist gestures and policies that are short of robust economic solutions has been emerging as an accompanying strategy. Doggedly pursuing the consolidation of ties with non-Western global powers has been continued as a strategy to cope with Western sanctions. These elements are embedded in the encouragement, promotion, and support of a new generation of political elite, frequently referred to as the "young jihadi managers," who in Khamenei's imagination, will be the vanguard of Iran's progress in the years to come. Iran on the path of re-revolutionising itself will be more resistant to demands for change domestically, less likely to abandon its regional security strategies, and harder for Europe to cooperate with. Therefore, it is important for EU and German policymakers to take Iran's longer-term strategies into consideration in order to develop lasting responses to them.

Over the past two decades, Africa has become increasingly connected as more and more Africans gained access to the internet and mobile phones. Building on this enhanced connectivity, a new wave of African startups has emerged, tackling some of the continent's biggest challenges with "homemade" digital technologies. There are growing signs that these new technologies could provide a leapfrogging opportunity for Africa. Africa has seen massive improvements in internet access and mobile phone adoption, due to investments in the continent's digital infrastructure, particularly mobile broadband networks. At the same time, there are significant connectivity gaps between Africa and the rest of the world as well as between and within African countries. These may widen as Africa's digital infrastructure faces capacity pressures from a rapidly expanding internet user base. Tech giants, primarily from the United States, have recognised a business opportunity in Africa's existing connectivity gaps and have begun investing heavily in subsea data cables, data centres, and technology hubs. It is critical that these investments bridge Africa's connectivity gaps - a growing body of evidence shows the wide-ranging positive socio-economic impacts of improved internet and mobile phone access. Africa's enhanced connectivity has led to the emergence of a new wave of growth-oriented technology startups, building innovative and "homemade" digital technologies for widespread use. Digital platforms in particular are increasingly disrupting Africa's major, mostly informal service, retail, and agricultural sectors. Anecdotal reports suggest that digital technologies from African startups can be transformative for individuals, businesses, and farms, but there is very little systematic empirical evidence on their local impacts. Such evidence is urgently needed to harness their full potential for inclusive economic development in Africa. As Africa's digitalisation accelerates, African governments

South Africa finds itself in a severe internal crisis that has serious implications for its neighbours. As the regional hegemon is turning inwards, it has largely been unable to engage in regional crises in a constructive and meaningful way. As a result, we see a worrying downward trend in Southern Africa, traditionally a haven of stability in Africa. The COVID-19 pandemic has amplified South Africa's social and economic woes. Unemployment has reached an all-time high; more than half of the youth cannot find a job and live in poverty. This has bred public discontent and protest. The governing African National Congress (ANC) is ravaged by internal power struggles between "traditionalists" and the "reformers" around current president Cyril Ramaphosa. While official investigations have exposed deeply ingrained corruption in state-owned companies, the ANC suffered a serious blow in the November 2021 local elections. Being preoccupied with its domestic challenges, the government has largely remained inactive in responding to gross human rights violations in neighbouring Zimbabwe and eSwatini. Additionally, authoritarian Rwanda, not South Africa, has led the regional response to jihadist violence, deploying elite troops to quell the Islamist insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado region. The European Union and Germany both have a strong interest in further supporting South Africa and thereby also the broader Southern Africa region: South Africa is one of the world's few democratic regional powers: it can be a core partner in fighting the global climate crisis, and its progressive constitution closely aligns with the new German government's focus on promoting human rights and women's empowerment. Finally, with more than 600 German companies present in South Africa, German business interests would profit from fostering stability in the country and the Southern African region.

Two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, there are signs that sub-Saharan Africa will experience a modest recovery in 2022. Yet at least in the first half of the year, the region will continue to suffer from inadequate provision and administration of vaccines. In addition, violent conflicts and structural weaknesses constitute considerable challenges. We present a selective list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2022. Politics: Last year saw a number of military coups, which may foreshadow future takeovers by armies in Africa. Pivotal elections lie ahead that could trigger the outbreak of violence, for instance in Kenya. Political heavyweight South Africa is in a severe socio-economic crisis that is engendering growing public anger, and the governing African National Congress is experiencing increasingly deepening internal rifts. Violent conflicts: The civil war in Ethiopia puts the state’s integrity at risk and could further undermine stability in the whole Horn of Africa. Jihadism represents a major security threat on the continent that needs to be tackled by African and international actors. A focus should lie on addressing root causes and on preventing crises. Development: It will take years for African countries to rebound from the pandemic’s socio-economic repercussions. Structural problems such as high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth and the effects of climate change are strongly felt in many African countries already. The year 2022 will be crucial for devising the next steps for continental economic integration. International arena: Africa is a sought-after international partner. Several actors including China, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union and its member countries are vying for political and economic influence. This competition will further intensify. African countries getting their full share of COVID-19 vaccines will be important. African and international partners need to expand support fo

Mit 55,9 Prozent der Stimmen und einem Abstand von 11,8 Prozentpunkten gegenüber José Antonio Kast gewann Gabriel Boric am 19. Dezember 2021 die Stichwahl um die chilenische Präsidentschaft. An jenem Tag erreichte die Wahlbeteiligung in Chile mit 55,6 Prozent ein historisches Hoch seit der Abschaffung der Wahlpflicht. Die starke Mobilisierung verhalf Boric, der im ersten Wahlgang noch auf dem zwei­ten Platz gelandet war, zum Sieg. Damit steht der neue Präsident auf solidem demokratischem Fundament, aber auch vor großen Erwartungen in der Bevölkerung. Zudem wird der Regierungschef im Spannungsfeld zweier Institutionen agieren müssen: einer Verfassunggebenden Versammlung und einem parteipolitisch geteilten Kongress. Seine vierjährige Amtszeit, die am 11. März beginnt, könnte die letzte unter der "Pino­chet-Verfassung" und die Anfangs­phase einer demokratischen Transformation sein. (Autorenreferat)

The positive impact of socio-cultural diversity on innovation and economic prosperity has been widely discussed. Yet, there is a lack of a clear quantitative indicator of sociocultural diversity. Most empirical works are limited to small case studies that follow various methods. This gap in the literature calls for a comprehensive measure whereby researchers could assess and compare diversity across cities and regions at the national level. Building on a unique database of registered associations (in German: eingetragene Vereine), this study provides a hierarchical categorization of associations based on their field of activities. Applying the Shannon entropy index, the sociocultural diversity of German regions is measured. The findings indicate a disparity between East and West Germany, reflecting the path-dependent nature of historical events. This article sets an agenda for future research.

Political and social relations in South Africa are eroding. This is the result of structural changes and concurrent developments that mutually reinforce each other. Any hopes of generating tourism revenue in the months of November 2021 to February 2022 have been dashed by the international travel restrictions put in place since the discovery of the Covid variant Omicron. Moreover, tensions within the governing African National Congress (ANC) limit President Cyril Ramaphosa’s ability to act. Nevertheless, progress is slowly being made on reforms. The party system has also become increasingly differentiated since the local elections in early November. Germany and the EU can support positive developments through well-designed and appropriate assistance, but they should always keep a number of (especially socio­economic) factors in mind. (author's abstract)

Jordan and Pakistan are among the countries that host the most refugees worldwide - refugees who come from countries facing protracted conflicts with no end in sight. TRAFIG research at multiple sites in Jordan and urban Pakistan (con ducted before the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021) found that, despite myriad challenges, many refugees are mobile - and they are using this mobility to unlock a range of opportunities. However, the potential benefits of mobility are far from being fully leveraged. This policy brief examines how and why refugees are moving after their initial displacement and suggests how policymakers in the region and elsewhere, in collaboration with humanitarian, development and integration stakeholders, can help Afghans and Syrians tap into outward mobility to improve their upward mobility.

Our current economic systems are transgressing planetary boundaries globally and yet societal needs are not sufficiently and equally fulfilled. Fostering the bioeconomy as an economy based on renewable resources can be a transformation towards a sustainable future, to fulfill societal needs within planetary boundaries. However, sustainability is not intrinsic to the bioeconomy and consequently advanced and comprehensive monitoring systems on a national scale are needed. In the systemic modeling and monitoring of the German bioeconomy (SYMOBIO) a comprehensive national monitoring framework in the context of global dynamics was developed, and a first pilot report of monitoring results was published and presented to the public in June 2020. Stakeholder participation plays a role in informing monitoring from the beginning. Consequently, in this study we aim at evaluating the pilot report and monitoring as well as the general perception of the bioeconomy by an open survey. We collected approximately 100 responses, mainly from the stakeholder group "science". Most stakeholders are moderately satisfied with the monitoring and reporting. However, social aspects of the bioeconomy like hunger, poverty and inequalities are considered to be underrepresented, and the socio-economic perspective is viewed as too narrow. Future monitoring efforts should be oriented more on international agreed frameworks like the SDGs and be comparable to other monitoring systems and levels. Regarding general perceptions of the bioeconomy, a majority of stakeholders have a vision of a socio-ecological transformation, in contrast to German and European strategies which are seen as business-as-usual capitalism using additional renewable resources. Even though most stakeholders see the current development of bioeconomy critically, they consider the future development as open and encourage a sustainable bioeconomy that creates sustainable consumption and production patterns, global responsibility and c

In den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen Südafrikas finden derzeit Erosionsprozesse statt. Sie sind das Resultat struktureller Veränderungen und paral­lel ablaufender Entwicklungen, die sich gegenseitig verstärken. Die Hoffnungen auf Einnahmen aus dem Tourismus in den Monaten November 2021 bis Februar 2022 haben sich zerschlagen, seitdem nach Entdeckung der Corona-Variante Omikron internationale Reisebeschränkungen erlassen worden sind. Hinzu kommt, dass die Spannungen innerhalb der Regierungspartei African National Congress (ANC) den Präsidenten Cyril Ramaphosa in seiner Handlungsfähigkeit einschränken. Aller­dings sind langsame Fortschritte bei Reformen und positive Tendenzen einer Weiter­entwicklung jenseits des dominierenden ANC erkennbar. So hat sich das Parteien­system nach den Kommunalwahlen im Anfang November zusehends ausdifferenziert. Deutschland und die EU können positive Entwicklungen durch gut ausgerichtete und sensible Hilfe unterstützen, müssen dabei aber stets insbesondere sozioökonomische Faktoren im Blick behalten. (Autorenreferat)

Pastoral counties in northern Kenya are expected to undergo massive social-ecological change in the coming years as a result of the government's 'Vision 2030' with its large-scale investments and infrastructure projects. The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor project is an ambitious infrastructure development project that links with other continental transport corridors traversing the country. The 500m-wide corridor is to consist of a railway, a highway, a fibre-optic cable and a crude oil pipeline, linking oil fields in Turkana county in the far north-west to a 32-berth port at Lamu on the Kenyan coast. A 50-km wide "special economic zone" straddling the corridor will attract investors, and the development will be accompanied by several associated projects, including three planned resort cities, oil processing facilities and airports. Proponents of the corridor point to its potential to "open up the north" and to reverse previous marginalisation. However, a growing body of work on frontiers and economies of anticipation surrounding development projects points to the potentials for dispossession of local populations and disregard of local dynamics. Further, such projects stimulate future-oriented activities and a variety of visions of the future among the different actors, which may converge or diverge, leading to contestations. This Working Paper is part of a larger project called "Future Rural Africa: Future-making and socialecological transformation" by the Universities of Bonn and Cologne and BICC in collaboration with USIU-Africa and other Kenyan universities, which is interested in the kinds of claims being made on land and its resources and how these may change existing dynamics of organised violence. In this Working Paper, the author seeks to understand the dynamics of participation and anticipation and how these relate to conflict and contestation along the LAPSSET Corridor area (in the following referred to as 'LAPSSET'). He takes

On 19 December 2021, Gabriel Boric won the run-off of the Chilean presidential elec­tion with 55.9 percent of votes, 11.8 percentage points ahead of José Antonio Kast. That day voter participation in Chile reached a historic high (55.6 percent) since the abolition of mandatory voting. This great mobilisation helped Boric - who had finished second in the first round - to victory. The newly elected president therefore has a solid democratic foundation, but Chileans have also invested great hopes in him. Fur­thermore, the new head of government will have to contend with the tensions between two institutions: a Constitutional Convention and a Congress that is divided along party lines. His four-year mandate, starting on 11 March, could be both the last under the “Pinochet Constitution” and the start of a democratic transformation. (author's abstract)

Der ägyptische Präsident Abdel Fatah al-Sisi hat seine autoritäre Herrschaft in den vergangenen Jahren konsolidiert. Dies ging einher mit einem deutlichen Anstieg von Kairos Auslandsverschuldung, die sich - gemessen am Bruttoinlandsprodukt - zwischen 2013 und 2021 nahezu verdreifacht hat. Die Schuldenpolitik des Landes war direkt an das präsidiale Macht­zentrum angebunden. Der Regierung gelang ein gut choreographierter Mix aus Anreizen, Drohungen und Täuschung, der es ermöglichte, immer neue Kredite aufzunehmen und für machtpolitische Zwecke einzusetzen. Profitiert hat von der Schuldenpolitik zuvorderst das ägyptische Militär, auf dessen Unterstützung Präsident Sisi angewiesen ist, um seinen Herrschaftsanspruch durchsetzen zu können. Die Streitkräfte haben das staat­liche Gewaltmonopol inne und kontrollieren damit auch den Repres­sionsapparat. Durch die machtpolitische Instrumentalisierung der Schuldenpolitik steigt das Risiko, dass Ägypten seine Verbindlichkeiten zukünftig nicht mehr bedienen kann. Vor allem aber unterminiert die Fehlallokation knapper Finanzmittel die sozioökonomische Entwicklung des Landes und befördert polizeistaat­liche Repression. Letztere begünstigt ihrerseits die machtpolitische Instru­mentalisierung der Schuldenpolitik, da sie jegliche Kontrolle des Regierungshandelns verhindert. Die Bundesregierung sollte daher künftig die bilaterale Kreditvergabe und die Unterstützung Ägyptens bei dessen Verhandlungen mit inter­nationalen Finanzinstitutionen an zwei Bedingungen knüpfen: erstens den Rückbau der militärischen Wirtschaftsaktivitäten - wobei auch die Ver­mögenswerte der Streitkräfte offenzulegen sind - und zweitens konkrete Schritte zur Beendigung der polizeistaatlichen Repression. (Autorenreferat)

This working paper is based on the empirical research on translocal figurations of displacement of Syrians in Jordan. It contains methodological discussions, central findings and reflections on these findings. Drawing on the conceptual framework of the TRAFIG project, this paper explores the central research question of TRAFIG, namely "how are protractedness, dependency, and vulnerability related to the factors of local and translocal connectivity and mobility, and in turn, how can connectivity and mobility be utilized to enhance the self-reliance and strengthen the resilience of displaced people?" The paper presents findings from Jordan, where Syrian refugees have sought refuge in host communities. Syrian refugees' stay in Jordan has become increasingly protracted, with the durable solutions of return in safety and dignity, local integration and resettlement remaining out of reach for most. In this paper, we argue that Syrians are de facto integrated in Jordanian host communities due to shared language, religion and socio-cultural ties as a pragmatic strategy for dealing with uncertainty and protracted displacement. We found that family- and kin networks have proven vital in facilitating and protecting mobility out of Syria and within Jordan, even as these networks are strained due to physical and geographic distance, reliant upon aid and financial support and socio-economic stress in the local labour market. We see that Syrians experience uncertain futures in which their mobility aspirations are unrealised, economic prospects are reliant upon and highly competitive with others, and connectivity with the host community is strained and can be improved.

Die neue Bundesregierung hat nicht nur Umfang und Ursache des Debakels in Afghanistan aufzuarbeiten. Ebenso dringend sind Weichenstellungen, die eine weitere Destabilisierung des Landes verhindern.

In addition to addressing the extent and cause of the debacle in Afghanistan, the new German Government must urgently consider how to set a new course to prevent further destabilisation of the country.

Der Beitrag reflektiert bedarfsgerechte Stadtplanung und aktivierende Stadtentwicklung von Kleinstädten aus der Praxisperspektive einer Bürgermeisterin. Es werden die Voraussetzungen, die Akteure sowie das (finanzielle) Anreizsystem der Stadtplanung ebenso diskutiert wie aktivierende Stadtentwicklung und deren Instrumente. Dabei wird auf bauliche, sozioökonomische und soziokulturelle Entwicklungen eingegangen, und aus praktischen Erfahrungen werden Schlüsse zu finanziellen und personellen Ressourcen sowie zu Innen- und Außenkommunikation gezogen., The article reflects on needs-based urban planning and activating urban development in small towns from the practice perspective of a mayor. Preconditions, stakeholders and the (financial) incentive system of urban planning are addressed, as is activating urban development and its instruments. This involves discussion of socio-economic and socio-cultural trends and the development of built form. The consideration of practical experience allows conclusions to be drawn for financial and human resources and for internal and external communications.

The global pandemic crisis has highlighted the inherent weaknesses of governance in countries of the Maghreb. It has underscored Morocco’s lagging human development and infrastructure amid growing authoritarianism. In Algeria, where the government is struggling with an ongoing legitimacy crisis, the pandemic has exposed the state's weak public services. In Tunisia, the pandemic has emphasised the disarray of the coun­try's political elites and the effects of the protracted transition on state output. Yet, the pandemic crisis has pushed some of these governments to seize opportunities, in­cluding speeding up digitalisation, allowing for citizen engagement, and even seeking some self-sufficiency in terms of medical production. As these countries pursue eco­nomic relief and support to overcome the growing economic impacts from the crisis, European partners have the opportunity to use their leverage to promote policies that reduce inequality, prioritise investment in critical infrastructure, and encourage transparent and responsive citizen-government relations. (author's abstract)

Mit der Präsidentschaft Joseph Bidens sind in Deutschland und anderen EU-Staaten hohe Erwartungen an einen "Neustart" der transatlantischen Beziehungen verbunden. Die Handlungsspielräume auch dieses Präsidenten werden allerdings wesentlich mitbestimmt von langfristigen Trends in der US-amerikanischen Innen- und Außenpolitik. Sieben Trends wirken auf die Innen- und Außenpolitik der USA besonders stark ein: die politische Polarisierung; die Verschärfung der sozioökonomischen Ungleichheit; die Transformation der amerikanischen Medienlandschaft; die steigenden Kosten des Klimawandels; der Niedergang des verarbeitenden Gewerbes; die sich zuspitzende Rivalität mit China und die Zunahme der sicherheitspolitischen Anforderungen an die US-Bünd­nissysteme. Diese Entwicklungen verstärken sich ganz überwiegend gegenseitig. Es gibt kaum Einflüsse, die bewirken würden, dass ein Trend den anderen signifikant abschwächt. Das "System USA" bewegt sich daher stabil in eine Richtung - der Handlungsspielraum des amerikanischen Präsi­denten wird sich verengen. Die Revitalisierung der transatlantischen Partnerschaft unter dem Vor­zeichen einer konfrontativen Chinapolitik birgt das Risiko, die EU und die europäischen Nato-Partner der USA zu spalten, statt sie zu einen. Impulse für Veränderungen und gesellschaftliches Umdenken in den USA könnten vor allem aus dem wachsenden Problemdruck entstehen. Das gilt beispielsweise mit Blick auf die Kosten des Klimawandels und auf die Gefahren für die amerikanische Demokratie, die mit Desinformation einhergehen. Die deutsche und die europäische Amerikapolitik sollten vor diesem Hintergrund realistische Ambitionen formulieren. Chancen für mehr transatlantische Zusammenarbeit eröffnen sich unter anderem bei der Entwicklung gemeinsamer Normen, Regularien und technischer Standards für den ökonomischen Austausch, nicht zuletzt im Bereich der Digitalwirtschaft, sowie bei gemeinsamen Investitionen. (Autorenreferat)

Die Bioökonomie zielt auf eine Abkehr vom fossilen Energie- und Produktionsregime. Dies wird mit der Notwendigkeit der Ressourcenschonung und des Klimaschutzes begründet. Argentinien und Malaysia haben diese Vision übernommen. Dem Agrarsektor in beiden semi-peripheren Ökonomie gelang es seine Interessen in den Bioökonomieagenden beider Länder zu verankern, wodurch Bioökonomie zu einer Entwicklungs- bzw. Industrialisierungsstrategie geworden ist, in dessen Kern das Versprechen eines industrial, social und environmental upgradings steht. Mit der Förderung der Weiterverarbeitung von Agrarprodukten (v.a. Soja und Palmöl) und dem Aufbau von Industrieanlagen im ländlichen Raum forcieren Argentinien und Malaysia eine höhere Wertschöpfung und die Schaffung neuer Arbeitsplätze. Dies stellt im Vergleich zu älteren Entwicklungsstrategien eine Verschiebung dar, mit der die Position semi-peripherer Länder als Exporteure un- bzw. wenig verarbeiteter Agrargüter überwunden werden soll. Allerdings konnte die kritische industriesoziologische Debatte bereits zeigen, dass die Annahme, mit einem industrial upgrading ginge automatisch ein social upgrading einher, sich häufig als falsch erwiesen hat. Ausgehend von der Weltsystemdebatte und des globalen Güterkettenansatzes zeigt der Beitrag, dass ein social upgrading durch die Bioökonomie in Argentinien und Malaysia kaum zu erwarten ist. Wird der eingeschlagene Weg fortgeführt, sind voraussichtlich weder die von den Bioökonomiebefürworter*innen proklamierten Nachhaltigkeits- noch die sozialen Ziele realisierbar., Justified by the need for resource conservation and climate protection, the bioeconomy model aims to turn away from fossil energy and production regimes. Argentina and Malaysia have both adopted this approach. In both these semi-peripheral countries, the agricultural sector has succeeded in anchoring its interests in national bioeconomy agendas, which aim to transform the bioeconomy into a development strategy promising industrial, social, and environmental upgrading. By encouraging the processing of agricultural products (especially of soybeans and palm oil) and the development of industrial plants in rural areas, Argentina and Malaysia are promoting the adding of value and the creation of jobs. Compared to previous development strategies, this represents a shift that aims to overcome position of semi-peripheral countries as exporters of raw materials or partially processed agricultural goods. However, the critical debate in industrial sociology has shown that the assumption industrial upgrading would automatically lead to social upgrading has been proven wrong in the past. Based on the world systems and global commodity chain approach, this article shows that social upgrading through bioeconomy can hardly be expected in Argentina and Malaysia. If the chosen path is continued, neither the sustainability nor the social goals proclaimed by bioeconomy proponents are likely to be achieved.

Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May 2019 in parliament opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term because the law does not apply retroactively. In February 2020, the President won again the disputed presidential elections and thus consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in March and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved, but remains poor. Yet, the international community followed a 'laissez faire' approach in the interests of regional stability. The economy dropped into recession due to the worldwide economic negative effects of the corona-crisis. The democracy index of the Economic Intelligence Unit, London, still rated Togo as an 'authoritarian regime'.

The migration of healthcare professionals has detrimental impacts on socio-economic development in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Germany’s active recruitment of healthcare professionals contributes to this trend and thus adversely affects the goals of bilateral development cooperation. The Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development should engage with the Ministries of Health and of Labour and Social Affairs to bolster the sustainability of the government’s inter-agency strategy on the recruitment of qualified workers (2019). A detailed whole-of-government approach needs to be put in place that further assesses and prevents adverse long-term demographic and socio-economic effects of emigration of care personnel in origin countries. The German Ministry of Health must ensure that legal and ethical standards for the recruitment of international personnel are observed. It should support the governments of Albania and BiH in monitoring the private mediation companies’ training and recruitment practices of nurses and medical technicians to avoid exploitative practices and adhesion contracts. The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development should support programmes that provide equipment and know-how. Options for career advancement and training, safety measures and legal protection are the most urgent issues to prevent a care drain and need for medical tourism. The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development should support such reforms through bilateral cooperation (technical advice) with Albania and BiH to counteract distortions of the labour market due to out-migration and to aid structural economic recovery. The attractiveness of alternative apprenticeships and job profiles needs to be increased, not least because the long-term attachment and increase of skilled workforce will positively affect the investment climate.

The Gnassingbé clan has ruled the country since 1967. The demand for political alternance, constituted the major contentious issue between the government and the challengers of the Gnassingbé regime throughout the survey period. The first local elections since more than 30 years took finally place on 30 June 2019 and resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Shortly afterwards, in February 2020, the President won also the disputed presidential elections and thus consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in April 2020 and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved but remains poor. Despite undeniable improvements to the framework and appearance of the regime's key institutions during the review period, democracy remains far from complete. However, the international community, notably Togo’s African peers, the AU and ECOWAS, followed a ‘laissez-faire’ approach in the interests of regional stability and their national interests in dealing with Togo. Economic growth remained stable at about 5% per annum (before Corona). Public investment in infrastructure and increases in agricultural productivity, notably of export crops, had been the key drivers of economic growth. However, growth remains vulnerable to external shocks and the climate and has not been inclusive. Moreover, it was overshadowed by increasing inter-personal and regional inequality as well as an increase in extreme poverty. Money-laundering, illegal money transfers and trafficking grew alarmingly. Nevertheless, the business climate improved considerably., Le clan Gnassingbé dirige le pays depuis 1967. La revendication d'alternance politique a constitué le principal litige entre le gouvernement et les challengers du régime Gnassingbé tout au long de la période d'enquête. Les premières élections locales depuis plus de 30 ans ont finalement eu lieu le 30 juin 2019 et ont abouti à la victoire du parti au pouvoir. Peu de temps après, en février 2020, le président a remporté également les élections présidentielles contestées. Par cela il a consolidé son pouvoir, aidé par l'armée et les services de sécurité fidèle. Le déclenchement de l'épidémie de Corona au Togo en avril 2020 et la récession économique qui a suivi, ont peut-être contribué à limiter les protestations populaires contre le régime de Gnassingbé. Le bilan du gouvernement en matière de droits humains s'est amélioré, mais reste médiocre. Malgré des améliorations indéniables du cadre et de l'apparence des principales institutions du régime pendant la période à l'examen, la démocratie reste loin d'être achevée. Cependant, la communauté internationale, notamment les pairs africains du Togo, l’UA et la CEDEAO, ont suivi une approche de « laissez-faire» dans l’intérêt de la stabilité régionale et de leurs intérêts nationaux face au Togo. La croissance économique est restée stable à environ 5 % par an (avant Corona). Les investissements publics dans les infrastructures et les augmentations de la productivité agricole, notamment des cultures d'exportation, ont été les principaux moteurs de la croissance économique. Cependant, la croissance reste vulnérable aux chocs externes et au climat, et le développement n'a pas été inclusive. La croissance positive a été éclipsée par l'augmentation des inégalités interpersonnelles et régionales ainsi que par une augmentation de l'extrême pauvreté. En outre, le blanchiment d’argent, les transferts d’argent illégaux et le trafic ont augmenté de façon alarmante. Le climat des affaires s'est néanmoins considérablement amélioré., Der Gnassingbé-Clan regiert das Land seit 1967. Die Forderung nach politischer Abwechslung war Hauptstreitpunkt zwischen der Regierung und den Herausforderern des Gnassingbé-Regimes während des gesamten Untersuchungszeitraums. Die ersten Kommunalwahlen seit mehr als 30 Jahren fanden am 30. Juni 2019 statt und führten zum Sieg der Regierungspartei. Kurz darauf, im Februar 2020, gewann der Präsident auch die umstrittenen Präsidentschaftswahlen. Somit festigte er seine Macht, unterstützt von der loyalen Armee und den Sicherheitsdiensten. Der Ausbruch der Corona-Epidemie in Togo im April 2020 und die anschließende wirtschaftliche Rezession haben möglicherweise dazu beigetragen, den Protest der Bevölkerung gegen das Gnassingbé-Regime zu begrenzen. Die Menschenrechtsbilanz der Regierung hat sich verbessert, ist aber weiterhin schlecht. Trotz unbestreitbarer Verbesserungen des Rahmens und des Erscheinungsbilds der wichtigsten Institutionen des Regimes im Berichtszeitraum war die Demokratie bei weitem nicht umfassend. Die internationale Gemeinschaft, insbesondere die afrikanischen Kollegen Faure Gnassingbés in der AU und ECOWAS, verfolgten jedoch im Interesse der regionalen Stabilität und in ihrem nationalen Interesse im Umgang mit Togo einen "Laissez-Faire" Ansatz. Das Wirtschaftswachstum blieb stabil bei etwa 5% pro Jahr (vor Corona). Öffentliche Investitionen in die Infrastruktur und die Steigerung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktivität, insbesondere von Exportkulturen, waren die Haupttreiber des Wirtschaftswachstums. Das Wachstum bleibt jedoch anfällig für externe Schocks und das Klima und war nicht inklusiv. Das Wirtschaftswachstum wurde durch die zunehmende zwischenmenschliche und regionale Ungleichheit sowie die Zunahme der extremen Armut überschattet. Darüber hinaus nahmen Geldwäsche, illegale Geldtransfers und Menschenhandel alarmierend zu. Dennoch verbesserte sich das Geschäftsklima erheblich.

Fears that the COVID-19 pandemic will lead to massive deaths in sub-Saharan Africa have not materialised. However, the region will not be spared from its effects in 2021 regardless. Many challenges unrelated to the pandemic persist and are likely to be aggravated by the coronavirus outbreak, putting at risk previous progress made. We present a selective list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2021. Fighting the Pandemic: As the world watches the race over vaccines and the start of mass vaccination, it remains doubtful that vaccinations will be available on the African continent anytime soon. Rising infection rates give reason to worry, and 2021 has already seen new lockdown measures that again hit the already poor and vulnerable. Conflicts: Jihadism will fuel further conflict while additional conflict potentials in Central Africa and elsewhere need to be watched closely too, especially in Ethiopia given it is on the verge of civil war and state disintegration. Politics: COVID-19-related restrictions may increase authoritarian tendencies. In several countries - including Ethiopia, The Gambia, Uganda, and Zambia - crucial elections will be held in 2021 that pose the risk of further democratic backsliding. Africa's giant Nigeria may see a continuation of the EndSARS protests. Development: The current crisis entails important risks for Africa's economic outlook, including the delay of regional integration, increasing government debt, and the drying-up of foreign investment flows. Poverty will remain on the rise, while the food crisis is likely to be exacerbated. Regarding the pandemic, it will be key that Africa gets its share of vaccines. European Union-Africa relations deserve a reset at the upcoming Africa-EU summit that is likely to be mainly concerned with the economic fallout of the pandemic. After Donald Trump’s demise, it remains to be seen whether the new United States Africa policy will overcome “Africa apathy” or will instead turn the continen

On reaching the Horn of Africa, the corona virus will have encountered countries already facing a multitude of challenges. Prolonged armed conflict, drought and insecurity have turned more than eight million people into refugees in their own countries, and a further 3.5 million have fled to neighbouring countries where they live in overcrowded refugee camps. All the countries in this region are in a fragile state of political transformation or have been severely weakened by war and govern­ment failures. They possess neither the capacity to contain the Covid pandemic nor to mitigate the resulting unemployment, poverty and hunger. In order to guard against jeopardising the process of democratisation in Sudan and Ethiopia, special emphasis should be placed on social security systems and gaining the trust of the popu­lation. This requires an emergency aid package from abroad that will ensure the economic survival of all countries in the region. However, long-term support should be con­ditional on guaranteeing that most of the investment goes into developing state capacities for critical infrastructure and social security. (Autorenreferat)

The Gnassingbé clan has ruled the country since 1967. The demand for political alternance, constituted the major contentious issue between the government and the challengers of the Gnassingbé regime throughout the survey period. The first local elections since more than 30 years took finally place on 30 June 2019 and resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Shortly afterwards, in February 2020, the President won also the disputed presidential elections and thus consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in April 2020 and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved but remains poor. Despite undeniable improvements to the framework and appearance of the regime's key institutions during the review period, democracy remains far from complete. However, the international community, notably Togo’s African peers, the AU and ECOWAS, followed a 'laissez-faire' approach in the interests of regional stability and their national interests in dealing with Togo. Economic growth remained stable at about 5% per annum (before Corona). Public investment in infrastructure and increases in agricultural productivity, notably of export crops, had been the key drivers of economic growth. However, growth remains vulnerable to external shocks and the climate and has not been inclusive. Moreover, it was overshadowed by increasing inter-personal and regional inequality as well as an increase in extreme poverty. Money-laundering, illegal money transfers and trafficking grew alarmingly. Nevertheless, the business climate improved considerably.

Viele politische Entscheidungsträger in Deutschland und anderen EU-Staaten dürften darauf hoffen, dass die transatlantischen Beziehungen nach den bevorstehenden US-Präsidentschaftswahlen am 3.November wieder in ruhigere Fahrwasser gelangen, falls der Demokrat Joe Biden gewinnt. Allerdings wird der innen-und außenpolitische Handlungsspielraum des amerikanischen Präsidenten auch von langfristigen und strukturellen Entwicklungen bestimmt, die über die nächsten (und übernächsten) US-Wahlen hinauswirken. Sieben Trends sind in dieser Hinsicht besonders relevant. Zusammen betrachtet verdeutlichen sie, dass außenpolitische Anforderungen und innenpolitische Ressourcen in den USA zunehmend auseinanderklaffen. (Autorenreferat)

Local and global dependencies and interactions between individuals, groups and institutions are becoming increasingly opaque and risky. This is due to increased importance of highly complex abstract systems created and supported in order to maintain of transport, communications, finance, energy, media, security infrastructure, as well as social and cultural institutions. These systems require the knowledge and skills of experts. Professionals that not only satisfy identified needs, but also create new thereby contribute the development of cultural narcissism phenomenon. The aim of the book is to discuss relations of experts and mass narcissism, on the background of shaping the knowledge societies and knowledge-based economies, and moreover their transformations towards the societies and economies based on creativity and wisdom. Undertaken analysis is contribute to sociology of expertise and intervention by indicating four selected contemporary issues: dilemmas of the knowledge society development; selection between trust substitutes and its reconstruction methods; transformations of social stratification; and the choice of pathways to socio-economic development.

Aside from the health challenge, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought an unprecedented social crisis to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). To avoid a humanitarian disaster, governments across the region have responded with a marked expansion of social protection measures. These, however, vary greatly with regard to speed, breadth, and sufficiency. People cannot stay at home if they cannot feed their families. Governments recognised at varying speeds that income assistance measures are central to an effective epidemiological strategy. Both the lockdown measures and the associated economic crises have highlighted the gaps in existing social protections in Latin America, as half of the region's employed population works in the informal sector. Many of these workers lost their income virtually overnight. To cover the needs of informal workers, the most effective governments established relatively inclusive eligibility criteria for cash assistance that allowed low-income households to self-identify and apply. The result is an extended registry that has expanded state capacity, on which further social protection policies can build. The region's two largest economies, Mexico and Brazil, have both suffered high pandemic-related infection and mortality rates, but sharply differ in their social policy approach. The left-wing Mexican government stands out for not establishing any nationwide cash assistance programme in the wake of COVID-19. By contrast, Brazil underwent a massive, opposition-driven expansion of social protection coverage, which eventually boosted the right-wing government's approval ratings among the poor. This year's Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the World Food Programme on 9 October recognizes the fundamental human need for sustenance. The social protection floors that were established ad hoc in the course of the COVID-19 crisis in Latin America need to now be extended to ensure that families can continue to feed themselves. The policy expansion efforts of t

Wie alle anderen europäischen Länder wurden auch die Visegrád-Staaten von der Covid-19-Pandemie erfasst. Anders als in Süd- und Teilen Westeuropas ließ sich hier aber eine explosionsartige Verbreitung des Virus verhindern. Mit diesem Erfolg im Rücken und den sozialökonomischen Konsequenzen der Pandemie vor Augen haben sich Polen, Tschechische Republik, Slowakei und Ungarn nun in der EU positioniert. Obwohl sie Differenzen hinsichtlich der Brüsseler Finanzpakete haben, werden sie durch die Kri­senbewältigung nicht strategisch auseinanderdividiert. Für Deutschland wird es weiter von Bedeutung sein, die vier Länder europapolitisch einzubinden und überdies gemein­sam Wege zu finden, um das wirtschaftliche Fundament der Beziehungen zu sichern. (Autorenreferat)

Trotz der Auswirkungen der Corona-Krise und der anhaltend hohen Migrations­dynamik zeichnet sich in Venezuela kein Ende der politischen Konfrontation ab. Das politisch-militärische Regime unter der Führung von Präsident Nicolás Maduro erweist sich als sehr resilient. Um sich finanziell am Leben zu halten, stützt es sich immer mehr auf illegale und kriminelle Öl- und Goldgeschäfte. Die internationale Sanktionspolitik hat bislang nicht die erwünschten Brüche im Machtapparat herbei­geführt, auf die viele internationale Akteure und Oppositionsmitglieder gesetzt hatten. Mit Blick auf die für den 6. Dezember 2020 vorgesehenen Parlamentswahlen hat das politische Ränkespiel Maduros erneut begonnen. Mithilfe legalistischer Tricks versucht das Regime die politische Opposition zu schwächen, indem ihre gewählten Repräsentanten abgesetzt und dadurch ihre Wahlchancen reduziert werden. Das politische Spektakel drängt die humanitäre Krise des Landes und den Kollaps des Gesundheitssystems in den Hintergrund - obwohl hierauf die Hauptaufmerksamkeit der internationalen Gemeinschaft liegen sollte. (Autorenreferat)

Die Corona-Krise überschattet politische und sozialökonomische Entwicklungen im Kaukasus. Im Südkaukasus, der zum Raum der Östlichen Partnerschaft der Euro­päischen Union (EU) gehört, verläuft die Infektionsdynamik höchst unterschiedlich. Während Armenien zu einem Epizentrum der Pandemie im Kaukasus geworden ist, zählt Georgien weltweit zu den Ländern mit den geringsten Covid‑19-Infektions- und ‑Todes­raten. Selbst wenn es für frühzeitige und konsequente Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Infektionsausbreitung gelobt wird, sind die wirtschaftlichen Folgen auch für Georgien erheblich. Die Pandemie trifft im Südkaukasus auf Länder mit schwachen Sozial- und Wirtschaftssystemen, hoher Armut und Arbeits­losigkeit sowie einer großen "informellen Wirtschaft". Sie zwingt die Regierungen zu anspruchs­vollen Anti-Krisen-Plänen. In der Nachbarschaft des Süd­kaukasus liegt ein weiteres Epi­zentrum der Infektion: Russland. Dessen kaukasische Peripherie, der Nord­kaukasus, stellt dabei eine besondere Problemregion dar. (Autorenreferat)

Within the European Union (EU), Italy is one of the main countries of transit and destination for migrants coming from Africa and Asia, including a significant component of forced migrants and protection seekers. In particular, Italy is the first European country of arrival for many migrants and asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean from North Africa (mainly but not exclusively from Libya and Tunisia). Along with maritime migration flows, Italy has been receiving growing numbers of (forced) migrants entering the country through its Eastern land borders, mainly coming from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and transiting through Greece and the Balkans. These persons often find themselves in situations of protracted precariousness, vulnerability and marginalisation, both in terms of their legal status, attached rights and socio-economic conditions. Such situations of protracted displacement are largely (although not exclusively) determined by the legal and policy structures governing migration, asylum and mobility. This internal report analyses the regulatory framework which applies in Italy, and which impacts on the daily lives and future aspirations of protractedly displaced people. This report contributed to the formulation of TRAFIG Working Paper no. 3 “Governing Protracted Displacement: An analysis across global, regional and domestic contexts”.

The corona pandemic and its economic and social consequences are testing EU cohe­sion as well as the balance of power in the Union. The belated -or lack of - reaction by the EU during the crisis has reinforced the national sovereignty of the member states and the dominance of the intergovernmental method in moments of crisis. One of the palpable consequences has been an alteration in the "North-South divide" resulting from a European policy offensive by Spain and Italy, a stronger "southern orientation" by France, and a simultaneous crumbling of the "New Hanseatic League". During the corona crisis, institutionalised groups of member states have acted pri­marily as interest groups that exacerbate differences rather than overcome them. Germany, which will assume a special mediating role as the Presidency of the Council from 1 July 2020, has to act as a bridge builder. (Autorenreferat)

Die Corona-Pandemie und ihre wirtschaftlichen wie sozialen Folgen stellen den Zu­sammenhalt der EU, aber auch die Machtbalance in der Union vor eine neue Bewährungsprobe. Die (Nicht-)Reaktion der EU zementiert die nationale Souveränität der Mitgliedstaaten und die Dominanz des Intergouvernementalen in der Krise. Zwischen den Staaten verschiebt sich der Spalt zwischen Nord und Süd: Folge einer europa­politischen Offensive Spaniens und Italiens, einer stärkeren "Südorientierung" Frank­reichs und eines gleichzeitigen Zerbröckelns der "Neuen Hanse". Konjunktur haben vor allem Gruppen als Interessenverbände, die Differenzen in der EU verschärfen statt sie zu überwinden. Deutschland, ab dem 1. Juli 2020 als Ratsvorsitz in beson­derer Vermittlungsrolle, ist als Brückenbauer gefragt. (Autorenreferat)

The community-based conservation model is an increasing phenomenon in Kenya, especially in northern pastoralist counties. This Working Paper, the result of empirical research over several years, considers dimensions of inclusion and exclusion and subsequent conflicts around communitybased conservancies in Isiolo County. It finds that conservancies are sometimes established to protect a community’s interests in and access to community land, including formal claim-making over ancestral community land which may spatially exclude other groups. These dimensions are reinforced by the presence of rangers, of whom many are armed National Police Reservists. Spatial and political dimensions of exclusion also exist to some extent within conservancies due to the need to balance wildlife and grazing needs. Armed security forces in conservancies have important implications for state sovereignty and control over the use of force. Importantly, a powerful donor-funded umbrella organisation (the Northern Rangelands Trust) is significantly involved in training, equipping and deploying rangers. The presence of well-equipped armed ranger teams may then inadvertently play into resource-based conflict and alter power balances between ethnic groups as is most clearly highlighted on the Samburu–Isiolo border. Sustainability is another concern where donor funding is an important source. Another concern for the future is Isiolo’s position at the centre of the country’s infrastructural and economic development plans which threaten to dispossess pastoralists of community land. Land claims and conflicts are set to increase, and arms in civilian hands could plausibly be used in various types of conflict, from ethno-political to community-investor and community-state conflicts.

In a world with over 70 million people registered as forcibly displaced, governing migration has long been high on the European Union's agenda. However, rather than emerging from evidence-based perspectives, policy responses have often been built on simplistic premises regarding how refugees' mobility and decision-making work. Findings from the research project SYRMAGINE can contribute to the revising of these views: While many Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Turkey strongly long for a return to their native country should the conflict end, returning under current conditions is perceived as unsafe - with individuals fearing military conscription or political persecution upon return, especially those opposed to al-Assad's regime. Often moderate aspirations to stay in the host country exist, even should the war end. Among refugees in Turkey, strong resistance to the idea of migrating to Europe is also prevalent. The consideration to settle down is based on a preference to remain geographically close to Syria, to live in a culturally familiar context, feelings of relative safety compared to Syria, family ties, and the notion that building a life worth living might be possible where one currently lives. Factors which influence refugees' decisions to move on to another third country are a combination of insufficient legal safety, financial vulnerability, and inadequate access to health and education services within the host country; views within families about onwards migration; and, refugees' current life satisfaction and future imaginations. With ongoing violence in Syria alongside the legal and economic vulnerabilities faced by refugees in the Middle East, safe pathways to reaching third countries need to be expanded. In the Middle East itself, policies should focus on improving legal and educational conditions for refugees and supporting anti-discrimination measures. Return campaigns and refoulement have to stop immediately.

Im Zuge von Massenprotesten kam 2018 der Oppositionspolitiker Nikol Paschinyan in Armenien an die Macht. Angetreten war er mit einer ambitionierten Reformagenda, die bei der Bevölkerung hohe Erwartungen geweckt hat. Zwei Jahre später lautet die Bilanz "Work-in-Progress". Covid-19 durchkreuzt aber nun die (wirtschafts-)politischen Vorhaben der Regierung. Die Krise lässt sowohl negative als auch positive Rahmen­bedingungen für die Umsetzung zentraler Reformen erkennen. (Autorenreferat)

Am Horn von Afrika trifft das Corona-Virus auf Staaten, die ohnehin mit einer Viel­zahl von Problemen konfrontiert sind: Anhaltende bewaffnete Konflikte, Dürre und Unsicherheit haben mehr als acht Millionen Menschen zu Flüchtlingen im eigenen Land gemacht, weitere 3,5 Millionen sind in die Nachbarländer geflohen, wo sie in überfüllten Flüchtlingslagern leben. Alle Staaten der Region befinden sich in einem fragilen Zustand politischer Transformation oder sind durch Krieg und Regierungs­versagen enorm geschwächt. Ihre Kapazitäten reichen weder für die Eindämmung der Covid-Pandemie aus noch für die Abfederung der Folgen, wie Arbeitslosigkeit, Armut und Hunger. Um die Demokratisierung im Sudan und in Äthiopien nicht zu gefährden, ist es notwendig, den Fokus auf soziale Sicherungssysteme zu richten und das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung zu gewinnen. Dazu ist ein Soforthilfepaket aus dem Aus­land erforderlich, das den Staaten das wirtschaftliche Überleben sichert. Langfristige Unterstützung jedoch sollte an die Bedingung geknüpft werden, dass ein Großteil der Investitionen in den Aufbau staatlicher Kapazitäten fließt. (Autorenreferat)