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در این مقاله، تحلیلی از مسئلة اصلی نظریه و رویة قضایی حقوق بشر را بسط می‌دهیم. مشکل به برخورد با هویت دینی در دولت‌هایی مربوط می‌شود که مدعی دفاع از معیارهای حقوق بشر در اروپا هستند. این مشکل - به عنوان مثال - خود را در قالب ممنوعیت اعمال مذهبی خاصی نشان داده است که تصور می‌شود اصول مطابق با مبانی دولت در برخی از حکومت‌های اروپایی را نقض می‌کند. از جملة این اعمال مذهبی می‌توان به پوشیدن روسری و سایر موارد مذهبی توسط کسانی که وظایفی دولتی برعهده دارند (مانند کارمندان دولت و معلمین) یا کسانی که به اماکن عمومی وارد می‌شوند (مانند محصّلان مدارس و دانشگاه‌های دولتی)، اشاره کرد.

What are the main conditions that any theory of human rights should satisfy to guide action? If agents must take action for a fairer world as human rights discourse suggests, this is a crucial question to reflect upon. In this paper, I make a proposal. I argue that any theory of (moral) human rights that guides action on the basis of correlative duties must satisfy three key conditions. The first condition is focused on the specification of act-types, the second concerns the distribution of correlative duties, and the third is focused on the resolution of (resolvable) conflicts of human rights. I show that this proposal has substantive implications because it implies to reject, challenge and, in some cases, resist ideas that are commonly accepted in the literature on human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on international legal mobilization often analyze the mobilization efforts of activists at a single international court. Yet we know little about how activists choose among multiple international institutions to advance social justice claims. Drawing on comparative case studies of Turkish and British trade union activists' legal mobilization efforts and case law analysis, I show that activists, guided by their lawyers, probe multiple avenues to identify the legal institution with the highest judicial authority and is most responsive to activists' claims. Once they identify their target institution, the iterative process between a responsive court and activists' strategic litigation can build a court's jurisprudence in a new issue area, even if the court provides limited de jure rights protections. Activists primarily use international litigation strategy to leverage structural reforms at the domestic level and to set new international norms through precedents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely accepted among political philosophers that distributive justice should be promoted by the state. This essay challenges this presumption by making two key claims. First, the state is not the only possible mechanism for attaining distributive justice. We could rely alternatively on the voluntary efforts and interactions of individuals and associations in civil society. The question of what mechanism we should rely on is a comparative and empirical one. What matters is which mechanism better promotes distributive justice. We cannot settle the question a priori in favor of the state. Second, several considerations suggest a presumption in favor of relying on civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States cannot legitimately enforce their borders against migrants if dominant conceptions of sovereignty inform enforcement because these conceptions undermine sufficient respect for migrants' basic human rights. Instead, such conceptions lead states to assert total control over outsiders' potential cross-border movements to support their in-group's self-rule. Thus, although legitimacy requires states to prioritize universal respect for basic human rights, sovereign states today generally fail to do so when it comes to border enforcement. I contend that this enforcement could only be rendered legitimate if it was predicated on more desirable conceptions of sovereignty that supported the universal prioritization of basic human rights. Specifically, desirable conceptions would not establish and require absolute state sovereignty over borders as a necessary precondition for true popular self-governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This matters because, if we are interested in understanding the phenomenon of public shaming in a way that is potentially actionable, rather than simply lamenting yet another unjust feature of the world, we need a deeper insight into public shaming beyond the claim that it is wrong because it violates a proportionality constraint. The point of this brief dip into the history of public shaming is to suggest that perhaps the right response is the radical one endorsed the last time public shaming was a subject of public concern: a call for a strong presumption against public shaming in mass contexts such as the internet. In the case of public shaming, Bloom and Jordan suggest, it is through collective behavior that troubling consequences arise. The moderate approach has its virtues: it addresses the social context of public shaming; it focuses on whether or not people act on their representative authority legitimately or not; and, similarly, it creates a space for public shaming to play a role in the enforcement of social norms. 3 For a thorough discussion of the different ways online shaming implicates concerns of proportionality, see Billingham and Parr [9], pp. 378-83. 4 Darwall [14], pp. 23-4. 5 I say "almost always" to preserve the possibility that perhaps there are situations where mass public shaming is called for and does not run into the sorts of problems noted below. [Extracted from the article]

Sue James recommends an‘enforcement account’ of rights, where a right is to be understood simply as an enforceable claim. I show that adopting this analysis of rights implies giving up non-rhetorical, important, uses of the word‘right’ which are possible on the best alternative theory of rights to James's position: the ability to deny a moral right's existence, even where claims are effectively enforced; the notion of a right's violation; and the idea that rights imply entitlement to make a demand, and not just enforcement of demands. Thus, adopting James's position implies giving up much more than mere rhetoric about rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues that online public shaming can be productively understood as a problem of technology. In particular, the technology of public shaming is ambiguous between two senses. On the one hand, public shaming depends on various technologies, such as social media posts or, more historically, pillories. These are the artifacts of shame. On the other hand, public shaming itself is a social technology. In particular, public shaming is a way for communities to promote cooperation. Ultimately, I claim there is a mismatch between the artifacts of shame and this important social technology of shame. Social media drifts toward disintegrative shame, which tends to corrode cooperation. This suggests that we must either realign the technology of public shame or reject shame as a legitimate option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues that online public shaming can be productively understood as a problem of technology. In particular, the technology of public shaming is ambiguous between two senses. On the one hand, public shaming depends on various technologies, such as social media posts or, more historically, pillories. These are the artifacts of shame. On the other hand, public shaming itself is a social technology. In particular, public shaming is a way for communities to promote cooperation. Ultimately, I claim there is a mismatch between the artifacts of shame and this important social technology of shame. Social media drifts toward disintegrative shame, which tends to corrode cooperation. This suggests that we must either realign the technology of public shame or reject shame as a legitimate option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The case study presented in this article analyses the social construction of India's Right to Food Act of 2013 in light of the extant literature on the social construction of human rights. It argues that Lockwood's novel hypothesis – that human rights are created by elite actors using the enhanced 'moral and material resources' that they have at their disposal, not in their own self-interests, but in the interests of the less advantaged – is borne up by the present case study, (although less advantaged social actors were involved in the campaign for the Act). The article also seeks to extend Lockwood's theory by examining which moral and material resources contributed the most to the creation of the Act and why. Finally, drawing on Waters, the article proposes that political elites' need to consolidate political support was an important factor in securing the Act. In conclusion, this paper argues that further research on the perceived needs of the less advantaged in respect of the Right to Food Act's content must be undertaken if we are to be sure it genuinely reflects their interests. The article is based on in depth socio-historical research including a review of hundreds of documents and 37 interviews. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The much-discussed "claimability objection" holds that it is unjustified to believe that all individuals have a human right to subsistence because the bearers of the correlative duties are not sufficiently determined. This argument is based on the so-called "claimability-condition": S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined. Practice-based theorists defend the human right to subsistence by arguing that if we take the existing human rights practice seriously, there is no indeterminacy about the allocation of duties. In this paper, I challenge this (apparently compelling) defense of the human right to subsistence with a dilemma. If the claimability condition is true, the practice-based defense fails to undermine the claimability objection because the duty-bearer is determined in some, but not all, cases. If practice-based theorists reject the claimability condition, they generate an account of human rights that is problematic from the practical perspective because it may contain duties that are unable to guide action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article discusses Online Public Shaming (OPS) has a form of norm enforcement that involves collectively imposing reputational costs on a person for having a certain kind of moral character. Topics include OPS functions as a form of ostracism that fails to show equal basic respect to targets; and a Twitter campaign builds up around claims by conservative activists for penal reform.

This article shows the importance in human rights law of the right to leave any country, in light of increasing efforts by European countries of destination to prevent departures and to contain movement by enlisting countries of origin and transit to act as gatekeepers. The article highlights the autonomous nature of the right and challenges in triggering its application. It assesses whether this right is opposable to destination countries, and finds two key challenges – first, meeting the requisite jurisdictional threshold, and secondly, as this is a qualified right, applying the proportionality test. The article examines the interplay between these difficulties. It argues that the jurisdictional threshold expresses a political and legal relationship between the duty bearer (the State) and the right holders (the individuals). This relationship enables us to operationalize the proportionality test – namely whether measures limiting rights are in accordance with the law and are proportionate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her own words, the point is that "any right must be matched by some corresponding obligation, which is so assigned to others that right-holders can in principle claim ... the right" against an agent who is sufficiently determined (O'Neill [32], 129). Rights involve correlative obligations - as O'Neill correctly says, obligations and rights "are two perspectives on a single normative pattern: without obligations there are no rights" (O'Neill [34], 431). To guide the action of the agent, the correlative obligation must be "so assigned to others that right-holders can in principle claim ... the right" against specific duty-bearers (O'Neill [32], 129). Call this the I ex post i conception of rights.[20] In brief, according to this possible objection, the problem is that my argument makes sense, for example, to someone who adopts the I ex ante i conception of action-guiding rights, but not to someone who adopts the I ex post i conception of action-guiding rights. 17 The rights O'Neill targets (human rights to goods and services) should be understood as claim rights, not liberty rights. [Extracted from the article]

The standard view of academic freedom and free speech is that they play complementary roles in universities. Academic freedom protects academic discourse, while other public discourse in universities is protected by free speech. Here I challenge this view, broadly, on the grounds that free speech in universities sometimes undermines academic practices. One defense of the standard view, in the face of this worry, says that campus free speech actually furthers the university's academic aims. Another says that universities have a secondary democratic function, which cannot be fulfilled without free speech on campus. I identify shortcomings in both types of arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses issues on contractual liability and the theory of contract law. Other topics include the theory of contract as a promise, the concept of Oliver Wendell Holmes on the strict standard of liability for contractual breach called Holmesian account, the instrumental theory of strict liability, as well as the basic efficient breach theory.

This article is an intervention in recent debates about conceptual and normative theorisations of human rights, which have been increasingly characterised by a divide between 'moral' and 'practice-based'/'political' understandings. My aim is to articulate an alternative, pragmatist understanding of human rights, one that is importantly distinct from the practice-based account with which it might be thought affiliated. In the first part of the article, I reveal the fundamental flaw in the practice-based account of human rights: I argue that it is undermined by the ontological thesis at its heart, which naturalises and reifies political arrangements and institutions that are radically contingent. In the second part, I identify, and outline the attractiveness of, a pragmatist normative account of human rights. In contrast to the practice-based approach, this pragmatist account construes human rights in ideational terms. The pragmatist understanding accepts both the contingency of our practices and the cultural limits to moral justification, while nevertheless retaining a commitment to the enterprise of normative philosophical conversation. I argue, in contrast to prevailing interpretations, that the international theory advanced by John Rawls exemplifies a pragmatist account of human rights and points a way forward for theoretically fruitful but appropriately circumscribed analysis of the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ensuring open minds and open options education has recently been suggested by the UK House of Lords as a State role that can and should override parents' decisions in relation to their children's religious upbringing and education. Yet the language used in their Lordship's debates risks failing to respect the nature and purpose of legally enshrined parental rights in this area and of being perceived as potential bias that rests on a set of assumptions difficult to adequately determine. Through reference to various writings and case law on the interplay between parents' rights relating to religious upbringing and the State's obligations to education, along with an in-depth analysis of the notion of indoctrination, this article critiques their Lordships' discussions over this complex and highly charged issue by highlighting some of the problems confronting their discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of authors in recent liberal political theory have advanced an 'argument from integrity' in favour of legal accommodations. This holds that people are entitled to forms of legal accommodations every time they can plausibly claim that complying with a certain norm compromises their ability to act in accordance with some fundamental personal values. I advance two points against this argument. Valuing integrity unconditionally is implausible because a life devoid of integrity is one that does not prevent anyone from developing crucial liberal virtues. If integrity is valued conditionally, on the other hand, its normative role becomes redundant. In fact, I argue, the key liberal values of fairness and toleration can give a more plausible guidance with regard to the problem of how to treat (and sometimes accommodate) moral commitments that are incompatible with public norms. I conclude that the notion of personal integrity is, by itself, unnecessary and possibly detrimental in a theory of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the moral right to free speech most obviously concerns the right to I speak i , it is widely believed that the interests of listeners are relevant to the justification of the right.[38] One way to think about this idea, following Joseph Raz, is that while the moral right to speak one's mind is necessarily justified first and foremost by the interests of the speaker herself, the fact that listeners have interests in her having that right increases the stringency, or weight, of the right.[39] A moment ago I appealed to the claim, defended influentially by Raz, that the justification of a right to must derive in the first instance from the interests of the putative right-bearer in -ing (or in being free to ) though it can be bolstered by the interests of other parties.[44] One implication of this view is that if the putative right-bearer lacks an interest in -ing (or in being free to ), then even if others have an interest in her having the moral right, this would not suffice to justify it. I have argued that we have an enforceable moral duty to refrain from speech that incites the incontrovertible violation of others' rights, a duty that shapes our understanding of the moral right to free speech itself.[82] In the next two sections, I will turn to the matter of whether such a duty should be enforced, all-things-considered. The popular temptation to think that these concerns - counterproductivity, risks of abuse, chilling effects - are relevant to the moral right to free speech traces, I suspect, to the fact that they may be relevant to the proper specification of the I legal i right to free speech.[111] Because it is widely assumed that the legal right to free speech simply tracks the underlying moral right, it is natural to assume that what is relevant for one is relevant for the other.[112] But this need not be the case. [Extracted from the article]