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Alliances and ballistic-missile defense (BMD) are both significant elements of U.S. security policy, but the emphasis on each may be changing. Since the end of World War II, the global [...]

THE JAPANESE 'INVASION' OF TEXAS APPEARS TO BE IN FULL SWING,' reported a correspondent from the lower Rio Grande Valley (hereinafter, the Valley) on January 7, 1921. The writer drew [...]

The article takes a critical look at the current state of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute in light of the recent escalation between China and Japan. The article's central thesis is that the practical significance of the dispute has diminished considerably due to developments in the security and economic spheres. Rather, the dispute continues to exist and escalate because of the domestic political interests of the respective governments. This recognition is important to manage the dispute effectively, to avoid hyperbolic arguments about the dispute's conflict potential, and similarly to avoid undue comparisons with the South China Sea. This article adopts a realist, rational-choice based approach to demonstrate the diminishing nature of the security and economic significance of the islands, which underpins a decreasing rationale for actively seeking an alteration of the status quo. The question of why the dispute continues to escalate is highlighted in the article's examination of how the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and the Chinese Communist Party use the islands as a political symbol to pursue their own domestic and regional political agenda, in a way only tangentially connected to the actual dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the policy response of the Abe government (2012–present) to UNESCO's inscription of the 'Documents of Nanjing Massacre' to argue that the historical revisionists' perspective is central to the thinking of Japan's UNESCO diplomacy. The UNESCO's inscription heightened a sense of shame from the viewpoint of Japanese historical revisionists, leading the Japanese government to the unprecedented step of using its economic power to reform UNESCO's Memory of the World programme and to prevent further inscription of historical documents that go against the view of the government. Because UNESCO constitutes the existing biographical narrative of Japan as a peace-loving, law-abiding country, the Japanese government remains careful to maintain a good-will posture to UNESCO. This article highlights the case of Japan to illustrate the importance of memory and identity change, as well as of the distinction between ontological security and the removal of threat to a historical narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is necessary to conduct an analysis of relations between Japan and Russia to determine the main trends and prospects for joint development. The purpose of the article is to study and disclose the stages of development of cultural relations between Russia and Japan and determine its features, highlight the most pressing problems of relations and identify possible ways to build strong interstate relations. The methodological basis of the study is the analytical method, for a comprehensive analysis of the changes that occurred during the development of cultural relations between Japan and Russia. Also a prerequisite is compliance with the principles of historicism and objectivity. In the course of studying used the method of study and systematization of literature. As a result of studying the problem, we can evaluate the historical development of cultural relations between Russia and Japan. Assess the state of relations between Russia and Japan and uncover limitations and growth points to strengthen relations between Japan and Russia. The results of this study can be useful as Japanologists and to specialists dealing with the problems of Asia-Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the early nineteenth century Italy became the second biggest world exporter of silk thread. To improve productivity in silk cultivation a number of Chinese and Japanese silk production techniques were tried and when Europe was struck by a ruinous and incurable silkworm disease (1845-1880) to keep domestic silk production running Italian experts went to Inner and East Asia to purchase large quantities of healthy silkworm eggs. Eventually Japanese silkworm eggs were seen as the best choice and exported consecutively to Italy for some twenty years in a row. As well as trade connections, cultural ties between Italy and Japan were developed as well while from the late nineteenth century Italy showed much interest in Chinese silk production too. Two expeditions were sent there, the first 1914 lasted for about one year while the second was from 1932 to 1937 and was headed by an Italian expert who was recruited by the League of Nations to revive and modernize Chinese silk production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that by creating a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy' (FOIPS) in 2016, Japan has engaged in 'tactical hedging' to cope with the strategic uncertainty engendered by China's growing economic power and political influence in Asia and the Trump administration's uncertain foreign policy towards the region. Tactical hedging refers to a declaratory policy doctrine that aims to utilize temporal strategic ambiguity to understand and determine whether any long-term strategy shift is necessary or possible. In doing so, Japan has bided its time in order to understand strategic trends and coordinate policies and principles with allies and partners--especially the United States and ASEAN--and shaped the concept of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIPJ in accordance with those consultations since 2016. Nevertheless, the emerging trend--especially the clear division between America's more hardline stance towards China and ASEAN's own conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific which aims to facilitate cooperation with China--indicates that the benefits of tactical hedging are diminishing, and that Japan needs to clarify its political stance if it wants to maintain its own FOIP concept as a viable strategic vision. Keywords: FOIPS/FOIP, tactical hedging, strategic ambiguity, Indo-Pacific, Japan, the United States, ASEAN, Southeast Asia., Japan's relations with Southeast Asia are at a crossroads. Faced with rapid changes in US-China relations, Japan has begun to reevaluate the utility of the existing political and security frameworks [...]

The United States is facing a significant strategic challenge to its interests, allies, and leadership of the liberal world order from an increasingly wealthy, well-armed, and assertively nationalistic China. Whether [...]

On May 15, 1972, the United States returned Okinawa and the other islands in the Ryukyu chain to Japan, culminating years of negotiations that some have hailed as 'an example [...]

This study uses the lens of Critical Whiteness Studies to examine how students and faculty at a Japanese university viewed 'global education' and 'internationalization'--two concepts that have been ardently promoted and pursued in Japan. This investigation and analysis focus on the critical juncture of the modern Japanese higher education system and Whiteness. It sheds light on the under-addressed issue of the racial power dynamics that affect one's perception towards race and race relations and, the impact of Whiteness on Japanese students' self-esteem and identity. By selecting and adopting privileged standpoints, higher education in Japan has reinforced 'the White vistas that centuries of racism have carved in our society' (Ross, 2002, p. 255). The findings of this study suggest that views and attitudes toward English education are influenced by Japan's Westernization movement during the Meiji era (i.e., the second half of the 19th century) that privileged and pursued the cultural assets and linguistic capital of Western/White states. Keywords: global education; Whiteness; linguistic capital, Global Education and Whiteness The concept of 'globalization' is embraced across sectors and disciplines including higher education. The term 'globalization' is associated with the process of economic integration and interaction [...]

This article covers the controversy that followed the March 16, 1893 escape of prisoner Yosaku Imada to the Japanese warship, the Naniwa, which was docked in Honolulu. Imada's act of seeking refuge onboard the ship occurred at a time when the provisional government of Hawai'i had no extradition treaty with Japan. This created a diplomatic event that entangled leaders from Japan, the provisional government, and the United States. To further complicate matters, Issei and Meiji government officials were also pressing for franchise in the Islands, a right that a majority of the community did not have access to at home. By placing Imada's escape and the Issei fight for voting rights in the context of the uncertainty that followed the January 17, 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, this article emphasizes Hawai'i's relevance as a site where inter-imperial dynamics aligned with competing settler colonialisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using Samuels' [(2007). Securing Japan: The current discourse. The Journal of Japanese Studies, 33(1), 125–152] political categories of Japanese perspectives on strategic policy, this article argues that the nation's foreign and security policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has undergone three distinct phases: a first phase of neoconservatism during his first tenure as Prime Minister from 2006 to 2007; a second period when he returned to the office of Prime Minister five years later in 2012 that can be described as neoautonomous; and a third phase of pragmatic realism from 2015 to 2016. In addition, this article analyses the factors driving change from one phase to another. By adopting an eclectic approach to theory, it claims that each traditional theory in the field of International Relations (IR) offers different but complementary causal effects to shifts in security and foreign policies. Each IR theory emphasizes or downplays these four factors: actors, structures, material forces and ideas. This article will employ all three IR traditional theories as they relate to these factors to discern the change factors of Abe's foreign policy. Finally, it concludes by siding with those scholars who assert that Japan's foreign policy has made a consequential break from its past and has embarked on a new path towards a remilitarization of its foreign and security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1980s, Japan's war memory has strained its relations with South Korea and China, to a less degree, the USA. Two of the thorniest issues are the comfort women and the US atomic bombing of Japan. Before the Obama administration announced its policy pivot to Asia in 2011, both Japanese and American leaders were reluctant to make amends for the past acts of their countries. However, in 2015, the Japanese conservative Prime Minister Abe reached an agreement with South Korea that 'finally and irreversibly' resolved the comfort women issue, thus achieving a historic reconciliation between the two countries. In 2016, then President Obama visited Hiroshima to commemorate the atomic bomb victims. Then, in December 2016, the comfort women issue resurfaced in Japan and South Korea relations, indicating a failure of the reconciliation. Why did the USA change its policy on historical issues involving Japan? Why did Abe and the South Korean President Park Geun-hye settle the comfort women issue? Why did Obama visit Hiroshima? Why did the reconciliation fail? In this article, I propose a rational choice theory to answer these questions. Applying the proposed theory and relying on available evidence, I argue that the settlement of the comfort women issue and Obama's visit to Hiroshima are important components of Obama's pivot to Asia to balance China's rise. The reconciliation failed mainly because it did not resolve the historical justice issue promoted by the human rights norms. I discuss some implications for reconciliation in Northeast Asia., Author(s): Chien Liu [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (Aff1) 0000 0001 0493 7966, grid.422476.1, Department of Sociology, Wagner College, , One Campus Road, 10301, Staten Island, NY, USA Introduction Japan's war memory [...]

Starting his second term as Japanese prime minister in late 2012, Shinzo Abe regarded Japan's participation in TPP negotiations as one of the top priority foreign policy issues. Abe successfully acquired a concession from President Barack Obama in order to enter the TPP negotiations without prior commitment to the total elimination of tariffs. After entry into the negotiations, Japan found a way to offer a tariff elimination on the politically sensitive agricultural products. Although the Japanese negotiation team was a latecomer in the TPP negotiation, its members played an instrumental role in reaching an agreement by helping other negotiating partners in the process. In addition, other factors including Japan-Australia FTA, the break-up of the Japan-US cabinet level meeting, and the Chinese initiative in AIIB motivated the American negotiators to reach an agreement. Japan's role became even more important with the US withdrawal from the agreement, eventually contributing to a successful conclusion of the TPP agreement among 11 countries. Employing a two-level game framework, this study examines how Japan reached an important agreement with the United States in the original TPP negotiations, and then, after the American withdrawal, with other countries in the TPP 11 negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article discusses whether Japanese military and political elites perceived the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) as threats during the Cold War. Realist scholars have argued that Japan's security alliance with the United States and the global balance of power were such that most Japanese officials did not perceive either of the Communist giants as a serious military threat. Reaching a similar conclusion but for starkly different reasons, constructivist scholars have argued that cultural, normative, and identity factors explain why Japanese elites did not perceive the Soviet Union or China as militarily threatening. Neither of these arguments holds up. Archival data and oral history collections from Japan's Self-Defense Force and National Diet Library reveal that Japan's defense establishment and political leaders perceived both the Soviet Union and the PRC as extremely threatening and that these perceptions fluctuated in intensity over time, across sectors, and among actors. Psychological factors, including affect, behavioral tendencies, and cognitive beliefs (the ABC model), may better explain why Japanese judged the intensity and source of perceived threats in the manner that they did. These findings underscore why threat perception in the international system is best evaluated by aggregating individual judgments and their distribution among larger groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the tactical intelligence activities of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) prior to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii during World War II. Topics discussed include the human intelligence and communications intelligence capabilities of the Third Intelligence Department of the IJN General Staff, the espionage activities of the IJN which involved the monitoring of U.S. Navy (USN) activities in Hawaii, and the relations between Japan and the U.S. in 1941.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has shown a keen interest in his country's relationship with India with an intention to protect Japan's stake in maritime affairs under the 'Indo-Pacific' concept. In evaluating Japan's India strategy, a particularly important factor is China's regional presence. This article, through an analysis of Japan's India policy during 2013–18, seeks to address the following two questions. First, how has Japan's India diplomacy under Prime Minister Abe in politics, security, and economics been influenced by its strategies towards China? Second, how can Japan's diplomatic policies towards India be evaluated in terms of key concepts in relation to a state's foreign policy responses? The exploration of the development of Japan's India diplomacy, the geopolitical and geo-economic factors behind it, and the strategic nature of the diplomatic policies enables us to understand the prospect of increasingly important Japan–India relations and their strategic implications for rapidly evolving regional politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea–Japan relations are at their lowest point in decades, as colonial era disputes flare once again. Most pundits argue that the South Korean public is strongly united against Japan. We argue that South Korean elites are sharply divided over how to manage the crisis; this division is starting to impact how South Koreans understand colonial era narratives; and, long‐term, bilateral relations depend on how these growing divisions play out. Despite state censorship, a rising counter‐narrative in South Korea challenges the dominant, Manichaean, anti‐Japanese one. For the first time, Korea and Japan have a realistic chance of reconciling based on liberal public discourse and a nuanced, empirically based understanding of history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Japanese unity of Overseas Despatch Operation (ODO) actors, laws, and operational aspects, interaction with state and institutional actors, '4C' functional regional engagement and concepts of partnership, and Japan's United Nations Peace Operations-Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief Operations (UNPO-HADRO) nexus. Japanese cooperation for dual liberal-international peace and realist security goals within increasing regional strategic competition and nationalist antipathy is examined, particularly in Japan's 'poor neighbourhood'. The paper questions why, despite undoubted expertise, Japan has not emerged as a regional UNPO-HADRO development leader, and whether Japanese UNPO-HADRO and 'pro-active pacifism' approaches are utilising UNPO-HADRO for Asia-regional strategic competition purposes? Japanese ODO have played important functional engagement, value sharing, and institutional socialisation roles, with integrated legal-civil–military holistic approaches providing models for others and foundations for partnerships. However, despite specialist capacity-building knowledge transfer efforts Asian disquiet remains concerning cooperation and partnership. Japan remains highly risk-averse, raising questions regarding its dependability, and 'HADRO-CIMIC superpower-aspirations', or bridging-actor role between Indo-Pacific and 'Northern-Developed' practitioners, can be evaluated by Japan's modest present UNPO actor status. Japanese leadership and initiative is limited by its neighborhood and attendant institutions, but also by its self-perceived identity shaped by historical, alliance, and leadership challenges to manage relative decline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's primary objective of the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called 'tactical hedging'. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shimoi Harukichi (1884-1954) Italianist and professor of Japanese Language and Literature at the "Orientale" University of Naples, has recently regained popularity because of the ongoing centenary of the Impresa di Fiume where he took part for a few months during 1920. This is why recent research has focused on his political activism - rather than his literary production: this article aims to define the extent his experiences proved to be sufficient ground to be involved in the development of Italy-Japan alliance in the Thirties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The annexation treaties between Korea and Japan remain controversial, as does the question of their legality. In contrast to the Koreans, who indicated the treaties were concluded under duress, the Japanese focused on seeking international approval. By analysing the German news reports on the Japanese annexation of Korea published between 1905 and 1945, this article examines whether Germans believed the Japanese colonisation of Korea conformed to international law and custom. This article demonstrates two main findings. First, the Japanese government attempted to produce international approval by directly intervening in the production of news articles. The Japanese government made particular newspapers and journalists act as their agents and almost completely suppressed reports on events such as the signing of the annexation treaty of 1910. Despite these efforts, the flourishing world of German journalism was too diverse to accept Japanese intervention passively. This article also shows that the international community did not perceive the annexation treaties as of legal. The annexation treaties were interpreted simply as the continued process of colonisation and only pro-Japanese newspapers showed interest in the legality of the annexation treaties. Considering these realities of the German media landscape, we should be careful in discussing the international approval of the annexation treaties as a fact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 1945 Japanese navy circles in Berlin tried to begin peace negotiations with the United States. Using their contacts with the arms trader Friedrich Wilhelm Hack, they sent Commander Fujimura Yoshikazu to Switzerland, where he opened talks with Allen W. Dulles of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services. Though the Japanese navy and Foreign Ministry showed some interest, the peace attempts finally failed since neither side took the initiative to an official level. Fujimura confused his government by claiming that the Americans had made the first step, while the U.S. side waited for proof that the administration in Tokyo was backing the navy officer's initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Many scholars have suggested that Japan aligned its foreign policy with the US War on Terror. Part of Japan's alignment is said to have involved disbursement of foreign aid [...]

International economic agreements increasingly touch on fundamental principles of corporate governance. The trend contrasts with existing scholarship, which assumes corporate law evolves via domestic mechanisms. This Article introduces the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, with its dedicated chapter on corporate governance, as a case study. At the normative level, the emergence of corporate governance in international agreements represents a positive development by enabling countries to signal and put into action commitments for better governance. Given these recent developments, the field of comparative corporate governance should incorporate international agreements as an emerging source of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the Sino-Japanese strategic foreign aid competition in the Philippine infrastructure sector. It argues that the practice of geoeconomics in East Asian affairs has intensified as a result of China's rise as a great-power competitor and the growing nexus of security and economics in the region. In order to make their foreign aids attractive, Japan has adopted a set of normative principles that are encapsulated in its "Quality Infrastructure" as a strategy, while China continues to emphasize the principles of Chinese aid and the adoption of the BRI. The article found, among other outcomes, that the existing maritime dispute between the Philippines and China affects the legitimacy and attractiveness of Chinese assistance. On the other hand, due to their deepening bilateral relation, Japan remains the Philippines's most important bilateral development partner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whaling has been a consistent theme in Australia's relations with Japan since the 1930s, Australia having endeavoured to regulate, restrict, or bring to a complete halt Japan's Antarctic whaling virtually since it began. Australia's motivations have been mixed, involving at various points, some combination of protection of Australia's coastal whaling industry, concern for Australia's security, for safeguarding Australia's Antarctic territorial claim, and more recently, concern for Australia's whale-watching industry and/or for the whales. Since environmental consciousness became a primary factor in the 1970s, Australian policy has been aligned with that of anti-whaling non-governmental organizations (NGOs), albeit that certain actions of NGOs have caused difficulties for the Australian Government. Law – inclusive of legal argument in the course of diplomacy, domestic laws, and international litigation – has been a mechanism of influence used by the Australian Government and NGOs. This paper traces Australia's legal opposition from its beginnings until Japan's announcement in December 2018 that it would end Antarctic whaling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, Sir David Warren, who was British Ambassador to Japan from 2008 to 2012, lays out the historical background to modern Japan, its political and economic structures (and international relationships); explores why we tend not to think of Japan as affected by the populism that we see in other Western democracies; and asks why Japan still presents itself as such a 'different' country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia is currently in a transitional period. Recognizing the challenges presented by China's rise to the current regional order, existing literature analyses the security situation in Asia by focusing on the material aspects of power distribution between the US and China. Few works substantively discuss the roles played by middle powers such as Japan in shaping the regional order and how they can deal with the challenges of great power competition and threats to the global rules‐based order. By employing Japan's involvement in the South China Sea issues as a case study, this article examines how a middle power attempts to shape or underpin the regional security order and if such attempts are effective. The investigation of Japan's engagement illustrates that a middle power's practical support can indirectly and gradually contribute to sustaining and defending the regional "rules‐based order". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses trends in regional security order in Asia. Topics covered include the maritime security policy of Japan with Vietnam and the Philippines, peace-building efforts of China at Burma, South Korea's cybersecurity contributions in the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries, the evolution of the regional economic order in East Asia and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

This article focuses on the nature of Japan's foreign policy formulation and legitimization through a study of its interaction with Central Asian countries. The article examines foreign policy discourse that constructs Japan's "self" vis-à-vis Central Asian "other." It reveals the textual mechanism through which reality, objects, and subjects are constructed, and it interprets the official statements contained in several foreign policy initiatives, in particular, the "Eurasian (Silk Road) Diplomacy," the "Central Asia plus Japan," and the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," as an attempt to understand the intersubjective knowledge and analytical lens through which Japanese foreign policy makers conceive and interpret the constructed "reality," produce foreign policy choices, and choose among identified alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One striking feature of the Pacific War was the extent to which Wilsonian ideals informed the war aims of both sides. By 1943, the Atlantic Charter and Japan's Pacific Charter (Greater East Asia Joint Declaration) outlined remarkably similar visions for the postwar order. This comparative study of the histories surrounding both charters highlights parallels between the foreign policies of Great Britain and Imperial Japan. Both empires engaged with Wilsonianism in similar ways, to similar ends. Driven by geopolitical desperation, both reluctantly enshrined Wilsonian values into their war aims to survive a gruelling war with empire intact. But the endorsement of national self-determination, in particular, gave elites in dependent states a means to protest the realities of both British and Japanese rule and to demand that both empires practise what they preach. This comparative analysis of Britain and Japan thus sheds light on the part Wilsonian ideology played in the global crisis of empire during the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper's main aim is to contribute to the debate on the impact of China's rise on the established norms and practices in the field of international development. To do so, it zooms in on a single infrastructure project, the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail line, which involved intense competition between China and Japan. Specifically, it examines how competition between China, a non-Western emerging power, and Japan, an OECD member, led to a recalibration of both China and Japan's approaches to infrastructure financing in the region. The findings suggest that rather than straight convergence or competition between diverging models, there is an ongoing process of two-way adjustment between China, and representatives of the dominant global norms and practices. We also argue that to understand the implications of China's participation in the field of international development, and its impact on the 'rules of the game' of global governance, researchers should avoid positioning inquiries within the premises of China's one-directional impact on the development assistance regime. Rather, it is necessary to take into account a complex set of relationships including China, host countries and other 'socialised' actors, and the process of negotiation between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan-Southeast Asia relations have been largely positive over the past year and this trend will likely continue in a foreseeable future. Relations have gained new political traction since early 2018 from Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) concept, which has bolstered Japan's political, economic, and security engagement with Southeast Asia. There are three main positive trends: a synchronization of Indo-Pacific concepts, Japan's enhanced security commitment to Southeast Asia, and constructive development of bilateral relations between Japan and Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam. However, these trends have been focused on short-term goals and have not yet cemented a strategic relationship between Southeast Asia and Japan. Accomplishing that longer-term goal depends on whether Japan and Southeast Asian states can effectively manage three emerging challenges: reconciling differences with the US approach to the FOIP, expanding economic connectivity, and developing digital infrastructure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay first takes into consideration the shift in the balance of power in the Far East since the end of the Cold War. It focuses on the changes that have taken place in the Pacific from the Obama era to the Trump presidency, especially from the point of view of the so-called "Thucydides" and "Churchill" Traps. Within such a framework, it discusses the core reasons for the rivalry between the Popular Republic of China and the United States, as well as the theory of a clash between the two powers that is imminent and inevitable. In this connection, the essay also examines the role of Japan and the speculation that Japan is going to endeavour to achieve a true rearmament, by relinquishing the so-called Yoshida doctrine and the pacifism pursued after the Pacific War. The conclusion is that the above speculation is probably far-fetched, despite the fact that Japanese foreign policy is really set on a new course. We can probably expect to see a kind of entente or alliance between the United States and Tokyo, one roughly similar to that existing between Washington, Australia and New Zealand since the ANZUS treaty of 1951. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]