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With German forces on the run following the Allied success at Normandy and the breakout and pursuit across France, Allied forces were staged to enter Germany in late summer 1944. Both Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley clamored to be given the priority of effort. General Eisenhower chose Montgomery's Operation MARKET GARDEN as the plan for action. It called for airborne forces to open the route for a ground force to move more than sixty miles up a single road, ending up north of the Rhine River near Arnhem, Netherlands. By accomplishing this task, the German Ruhr industrial heartland would be within easy grasp. But the operation failed. The ground force did not make it to the last bridge; it was six more months before Allied forces crossed the Lower Rhine River near Arnhem. Between 17 and 26 September 1944, there were 17,000 Allied casualties including eighty percent of the 1st Airborne Division (UK). Did senior Allied leaders do enough to resolve issues raised before the operation began? Should it even have been conducted at all? This paper uses primary sources, including diaries, memoirs, and autobiographies, and unit reports, to examine what role senior leaders played in the failure of the operation.

This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to 1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The requirements of the coalition air campaign in the Mediterranean theater provided significant challenges to the leadership of the US Army Air Forces (AAF). Prewar Army Air Corps doctrine focused on strategic bombing and aerial interdiction. Air- men lacked a well thought-out tactical support doctrine and had no doctrine for supporting amphibious operations. The mission of the AAF in the North African and Italian campaigns was the winning of air superiority. The Twelfth Air Force had to adopt new tactics and operational techniques to support the Allied landings at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy, against the formidable German Luftwaffe.The Mediterranean theater was the first theater to encounter the use of precision-guided munitions in the form of radio-controlled glide bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was designated a secondary theater of war, resulting in the Twelfth Air Force operating with inadequate resources, as aircraft and crews were periodically reassigned to units supporting the Combined Bomber Offensive in the European theater of operations. While supporting the Mediterranean theater, the Twelfth Air Force operated alongside the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and was routinely tasked with supporting operations of both the US Fifth and British Eighth Armies. This provided significant command, control, and communication (C3) problems that had to be addressed to optimize the effectiveness of Allied airpower.

Analyses changing patterns of international military cooperation and assistance and shows that Western defence diplomacy is increasingly being directed towards new goals. The new defence diplomacy runs alongside the old and there are tensions between the two, in particular between the new goal of promoting democracy and the old imperative of supporting authoritarian allies.

First Published in 2005. Since the breaching of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War, there has been a marked increase in attention paid to multinational military forces. Adelphi Paper 294 looks at the problems facing multinational forces and operations and the prospects for the future.

'United States involvement in wars and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria since 1990 have all involved coalitions. In 2010-11, U.S. Army colonel James L. Creighton commanded a multinational North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) brigade consisting of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and civilians from nine different countries integrated into tactical formations down to the platoon level. This NATO brigade -Combined Team Uruzgan (CTU)- was responsible for defeating the Taliban insurgency in the provinces of Uruzgan and Daykundi, Afghanistan, and enabling the government of Afghanistan to build a stable society. In this book, leadership lessons resonate from the experiences and stories that the men and women of CTU shared during a year of counterinsurgency operations'--

This book presents a detailed assessment of the role of navies in the Korean War. It highlights that, despite being predominantly a land war, navies played a vital part. Moreover, the naval war was not solely a U.S. operation. Smaller navies from many countries made important contributions both in supporting the United States and carrying out independent and combined naval operations. This subject holds special importance since current Western strategic thinking and capabilities emphasise the necessity of combined naval operations involving multiple navies in any potential future naval conflict. The example set by the Korean War therefore offers valuable insights into the operational and strategic problems, and benefits and opportunities of contemporary and future combined coalition naval operations.

This book is a tribute to the work of Professor Terry Gill, offered to him by friends and colleagues who are also academics and/or practitioners in the field of International Law of Military Operations (ILMO).ILMO is a distinct sub-discipline within public international law and domestic public law, covering all domains of military operations: land, sea, air and (cyber)space. As such, ILMO includes elements of other branches of public international law, such as international humanitarian law, human rights law, the law on the use of force, the law of the sea, the law of State responsibility, arms control law and the law of international organisations. Importantly, as a hybrid field of law, ILMO covers the legal basis for military deployment both nationally and internationally, as well as the subsequent international legal regimes applicable to the forces (once deployed) and the domestic administrative and constitutional issues related to the relevant forces.Control is a central notion of ILMO and is the leading theme of this book. The contributions in this book reflect the variety of legal frameworks applicable to military operations and offer an insightful view into the various legal and factual roles of control. The legal notion of control is considered, inter alia, in relation to restraints in the decision to deploy military forces and the legal basis for doing so. The impact of control is also discussed in relation to State and command responsibility and in different situations, including during peace operations, occupation and other situations of armed conflict. Additionally, control is considered over the armed forces themselves, over detainees migrants at sea and over the type or scale of force used in military operations, through targeting rules or rules of engagement. Furthermore, the book contains several discussions of control in the case law of international courts, within arms control law, weapons law and in the context of autonomous weapons systems.The editors of the book are all practitioners, academically affiliated to the Faculty of Military Sciences (War Studies) of the Netherlands Defence Academy and/or the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam.

Airpower in the War against ISIS chronicles the planning and conduct of Operation Inherent Resolve by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) from August 2014 to mid-2018, with a principal focus on the contributions of U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT). Benjamin S. Lambeth contends that the war's costly and excessive duration resulted from CENTCOM's inaccurate assessment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), determining it was simply a resurrected Iraqi insurgency rather than recognizing it as the emerging proto-state that it actually was. This erroneous decision, Lambeth argues, saw the application of an inappropriate counterinsurgency strategy and use of rules of engagement that imposed needless restrictions on the most effective use of the precision air assets at CENTCOM's disposal. The author, through expert analysis of recent history, forcefully argues that CENTCOM erred badly by not using its ample air assets at the outset not merely for supporting Iraq's initially noncombat-ready ground troops but also in an independent and uncompromising strategic interdiction campaign against ISIS's most vital center-of-gravity targets in Syria from the effort's first moments onward.

Airpower Over Gallipoli, 1915–1916, focuses on the men and machines in the skies over the Gallipoli Peninsula, their contributions to the campaign, and the ultimate outcomes of the role of airpower in the early stages of World War I. Based on extensive archival research, Sterling Michael Pavelec recounts the exploits of the handful of aviators during the Gallipoli campaign. As the contest for the Dardanelles Straits and the Gallipoli Peninsula raged, three Allied seaplane tenders and three land-based squadrons (two UK and one French) flew and fought against two mixed German and Ottoman squadrons (one land-based, one seaplane), the elements, and the fledgling technology. The contest was marked by experimentation, bravado, and airborne carnage as the men and machines plied the air to gain a strategic advantage in the new medium. As roles developed and missions expanded, the airmen on both sides tried to gain an advantage over their enemies. The nine-month aerial contest did not determine the outcome of the Gallipoli campaign, but the bravery of the pilots and new tactics employed foreshadowed the importance of airpower in battles to come. This book tells the lost story of the aviators and machines that opened a new domain for modern joint warfare. The dashing, adventurous, and frequently insouciant air commanders were misunderstood, misused, and neglected at the time, but they played an important role in the campaign and set the stage for joint military operations into the future. Their efforts and courage paved the way for modern joint operations at the birth of airpower.

The U.S. Marine Corps'Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam was an enlightened gesture of strategic dissent. Recognizing that search-and-destroy operations were immoral and self-defeating and that the best hope for victory was'winning hearts and minds,'the Corps stationed squads of Marines, augmented by Navy corpsmen, in the countryside to train and patrol alongside village self-defense units called Popular Forces. Corporal Edward F. Palm became a combined-action Marine in 1967. His memoir recounts his experiences fighting with the South Vietnamese, his readjustment to life after the war, and the circumstances that prompted him to join the Corps in the first place. A one-time aspiring photojournalist, Palm includes photographs he took while serving, along with an epilogue describing what he and his former sergeant found during their 2002 return to Vietnam.

Combined Arms Warfare in Ancient Greece examines the timelines of military developments that led from the hoplite-based armies of the ancient Greeks to the hugely successful and multi-faceted armies of Philip II, Alexander the Great, and his Successors. It concentrates on the introduction and development of individual units and their tactical coordination and use in battle in what is termed'combined arms': the effective integration of different unit types into one cohesive battle plan and army allowing each unit to focus on its strengths without having to worry about its weaknesses.This volume traces the development, and argues for the vital importance, of the use of combined arms in Greek warfare from the Archaic period onwards, especially concerning the Macedonian hegemony, through to its developmental completion in the form of fully'integrated warfare'at the battle of Ipsus in 301 BCE. It argues crucially that warfare should never be viewed in isolation in individual states, regions, conflicts or periods but taken as a collective whole tracing the mutual influence of other cultures and the successful innovations that always result.Wrightson analyses Greek and Macedonian warfare through the lens of modern military theoretical terminology, making this study accessible to those with a general interest in military history as well as those studying this specific period.

What qualities make an ally useful in coalition warfare, and when is an ally more trouble than it's worth? Allies That Count analyzes the utility of junior partners in coalition warfare and reaches surprising conclusions. In this volume, Olivier Schmitt presents detailed case-study analysis of several US allies in the Gulf War, the Kosovo campaign, the Iraq War, and the war in Afghanistan. He also includes a broader comparative analysis of 204 junior partners in various interventions since the end of the Cold War. This analysis bridges a gap in previous studies about coalition warfare, while also contributing to policy debates about a recurring defense dilemma. Previous works about coalition warfare have focused on explaining how coalitions are formed, but little attention has been given to the issue of their effectiveness. Simultaneously, policy debates, have framed the issue of junior partners in multinational military operations in terms of a trade-off between the legitimacy that is allegedly gained from a large number of coalition states vs. the decrease in military effectiveness associated with the inherent difficulties of coalition warfare. Schmitt determines which political and military variables are more likely to create utility, and he challenges the conventional wisdom about the supposed benefit of having as many states as possible in a coalition. Allies That Count will be of interest to students and scholars of security studies and international relations as well as military practitioners and policymakers.

In contemporary missions, soldiers often face unconventional opponents rather than enemy armies. How do Western soldiers deal with war criminals, rioters, or insurgents? What explains differences in behavior across military organizations in multinational missions? How does military conduct impact local populations? Comparing troops from the United States, Britain, Germany, and Italy at three sites of intervention (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan), this book shows that militaries in the field apply idiosyncratic organizational routines. Friesendorf uses the concept of routines to explain, for example, why US soldiers are trigger-happy, why British soldiers patrol on foot, and why German soldiers avoid risk. Despite convergence in military structures and practices, militaries continue to fight differently, often with much autonomy. This bottom-up perspective focuses on different routines at the level of operations and tactics, thus contributing to a better understanding of the implementation of military missions, and highlighting failures of Western militaries to protect civilians.

A historian explores “with forensic precision” the dramatic turning point that changed the course of the Great War (The Scotsman). On March 21, 1918, Germany initiated one of the most ferocious offensives of the First World War. During the so-called Kaiserschlacht, German troops advanced on Allied positions in a series of attacks that caused massive casualties, separated British and French forces, and drove the British back toward the Channel ports. Five days later, as the German advance continued, one of the most dramatic summits of the war took place in Doullens. The outcome was to have extraordinary consequences. For the first time, an Allied supreme commander—the French General Foch—was appointed to command all the Allied armies, while the statesmen realized that unity of purpose rather than national interest was ultimately the key to success. Within a few months, a policy of defense became one of offense, paving the way for British success at Amiens and the series of unbroken British victories that led Germany to plead for armistice. Victory in November 1918 was a matter for celebration; excised from history was how close Britain came to ignominious defeat just eight months earlier.

On 21 March 1918 Germany initiated one of the most ferocious and offensives of the First World War. During the so-called Kaiserschlacht, German troops advanced on allied positions in a series of ferocious attacks which caused massive casualties, separated British and French forces and drove the British back towards the Channel ports. Five days later, as the German advance continued, one of the most dramatic summits of the war took place in Doullens. The outcome was to have extraordinary consequences. For the first time an allied supreme commander – the French General Foch – was appointed to command all the allied armies, while the statesmen realized that unity of purpose rather than national interest was ultimately the key to success. Within a few months a policy of defence became one of offence, and paved the way for British success at Amiens and the series of unbroken British victories that led Germany to plea for armistice.

This report examines the 14-year experience of U.S. special operations forces in the Philippines from 2001 through 2014 and the activities and effects of special operations capabilities employed to address terrorist threats in Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines through training and equipping Philippine security forces, providing operational advice and assistance, and conducting civil–military and information operations.

Although US foreign policy was largely unpopular in the early 2000s, many nation-states, especially those bordering Russia and China, expanded their security cooperation with the United States. In Alignment, Alliance, and American Grand Strategy, Zachary Selden notes that the regional power of these two illiberal states prompt threatened neighboring states to align with the United States. Gestures of alignment include participation in major joint military exercises, involvement in US-led operations, the negotiation of agreements for US military bases, and efforts to join a US-led alliance. By contrast, Brazil is also a rising regional power, but as it is a democratic state, its neighbors have not sought greater alliance with the United States. Amid calls for retrenchment or restraint, Selden makes the case that a policy focused on maintaining American military preeminence and the demonstrated willingness to use force may be what sustains the cooperation of second-tier states, which in turn help to maintain US hegemony at a manageable cost.

The study examines the demand for amphibious capabilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and explores the strategic and operational utility of various models for combined U.S. and Australian amphibious forces. The demand for amphibious capabilities reflects the operational and strategic challenges faced by the U.S. Marine Corps and Australian Defense Forces. Both nations have indicated the importance of deepening their strategic partnership, yet there has been a lack of clarity around the desired outcomes for and priority among the variety of cooperative activities.

General Robert L. Eichelberger was an extraordinary and brilliant leader. He was a selfless man who loyally and diligently served an egocentric task maker in General Douglas MacArthur. Eichelberger was the American version of the British Field Marshal William Slim of Burma fame. In a six-month period in World War II, Eichelberger's Eighth US Army made 52 amphibious landings in the Southwest Pacific Theater. In each of those operations, Eichelberger skillfully used US and Allied ground troops, naval forces, and aircraft. While his Army was normally assigned a supporting or mopping-up role, the Mindanao campaign was solely Eichelberger's. The purpose behind this study is to explore Eichelberger's leadership in the joint operations on, Mindanao Island in the Philippines.

Authors and historians have made the words Market-Garden and intelligence failure virtually synonymous. Is this really the case? Operation Market-Garden, the plan envisioned by Field Marshal Montgomery, would open the gate into Germany and simultaneously force General Eisenhower to abandon his broad-front strategy in favor of his narrow-front strategy. Executed on 17 September 1944, this operation became one of the greatest defeats suffered by the Allies during the Second World War. Until 1974, when the British Government declassified Ultra, no one beyond the producers and consumers of Ultra intelligence knew of its existence. With the program now declassified, it was learned that Ultra allowed Allied commanders an unprecedented capability to read high-level German messages that were thought to be unbreakable. The release of these documents now showed that senior Allied commanders knew that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were located on the corridor that the Allies planned to make their narrow-front thrust on. Despite this new information, numerous authors still continue to describe as an intelligence failure. While intelligence was not perfect in supporting this operation, it is not justifiable to say that Operation Market-Garden failed due to the intelligence system's failure to warn commanders of the threat to the operation.

The U.S. Navy's requirement to implement a longstanding rhetorical commitment to partnerships at sea was articulated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, confirmed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and was most recently reiterated in the new Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready. As a means to offset the risks inherent in divesting some maritime presence requirements and being challenged to ensure operational access, however, the Navy's current efforts fall short of the requirement. As an unclassified, service-specific look at an increasingly important defense policy area, Tailoring the Global Network for Real Burden-Sharing at Sea looks at what the Navy can do from the bottom up to provide for deeper, more structured partnerships as part of a federated approach to defense.

This monograph examines the considerations involved in maintaining a peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights. The examination is based on the assumption that Israel and Syria have reached an agreement concerning the Golan Heights and that the United States is going to establish a peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights.The monograph first examines the historical background of the area since the 1967 War. Based on this examination and on lessons learned from previous UN and other multinational peacekeeping operations, the monograph addresses national composition of the force, command of the peacekeeping force, and force structure. Next, based on the military and political aspects of the region, the monograph addresses the future peacekeeping force commander's concerns with military credibility, freedom of movement, and force protection.The study concludes with a summary evaluation of the necessary size and type of force for future peacekeeping in the Golan Heights. Based on the assumption and an analysis of the political and military considerations, future peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights would require a MFO type force under the command and control of the United States. Due to the essential requirement for force protection due to the potential of pre-emption by either Israel or Syria and of terrorist attacks, a heavy brigade would be the most effective force in maintaining the peace while protecting the force.