The Strategic Logic of Sectarian Killing in Iraq.

Since the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, one of the chief sectarian problems facing U.S. and allied forces has tit for tat killings between sectarian communities in Iraq. This violence, however, does not represent merely senseless killing, or even a concerted attempt to raise the costs of occupation and force a withdrawal of Coalition forces. To the contrary, this paper argues that there is a distinct strategic logic for the violence in Iraq, as the armed groups representing sectarian communities conduct both inter-sectarian and intra-sectarian bargaining. Using the data available on sectarian killing, it argues that Sunni insurgent groups are conducting an escalatory strategy designed to start a civil war with Shi’a insurgents, while attempting to counter al-Qaeda’s strategy of mass-scale civilian killings for demonstration effects. This has led to a process of outbidding where Sunni leaders are gradually becoming more radicalized and less inclined to participate in the political process. It further argues that Shi’a violence can be explained as a form of hedging, as Shi’a leaders participate in the political process while turning a blind eye to freelancing Shi’a militias. This allows them to be in a stronger position vis a vis their Shi’a rivals and Sunni factions if the Iraq government collapses. Thus this paper concludes that only by shifting the incentives for Sunnis (to stop the process of sectarian outbidding) and for Shi’as (to reduce the attractiveness of hedging strategies) can sectarian killings in Iraq be brought to an end. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]