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The discovery of a dozen ‘new’ documents in Marvell’s hand from the Carlisle embassy discloses much about his role in Sweden and Denmark late in 1664. The forms and contents of the letters themselves, and the further diplomatic correspondence with which they are bound, confirm how the demands first of language (owing to a preference for diplomacy in native tongues in Muscovy and Sweden) and then of secrecy (owing to extremes of caution in Denmark) worked against Marvell having more of a part in the negotiations in those countries. Even so, the documents show him in service as diplomatic secretary on matters great and small. They also shed new light on Marvell’s ventriloquial function, whether it is Carlisle speaking in Marvell’s writing or whether the secretary more nearly writes in his own person. When we find Carlisle, ship-bound with his secretary for a week off Elsinore, writing his friends for the sake of writing, and curveting rhetorically as never before, we sense something nearer minds melding at the end of their 18 months abroad together. Marvell learned a lot from hearing Carlisle speak and from speaking for Carlisle.

Students of European integration have produced an enormous amount of literature on the intergovernmental negotiations that led to the establishment of such organizations as the OEEC, the EEC and EFTA. However, only a few have devoted substantial attention to the international contacts between companies that attempted to undermine the integration process by building private trade barriers that would replace those that governments had agreed to remove. The paper producers began to build such barriers soon after EFTA and the EEC had been set up. Although these attempts were not always successful, the industrialists did manage to create arrangements that were substantially more extensive in their geographical and product scope than those that had existed before. The British government and the EEC were reluctant to challenge these arrangements, and in some cases even actively promoted them. The interwar decades are widely considered to be the ‘golden era’ for international cartels; but for the paper cartels, the ‘golden era’ began in the 1960s, when previous bilateral links were replaced with multilateral ones.

Grigorii N. Trubetskoi was a unique and contradictory figure in the first three decades of the twentieth century He was a leading liberal -- often scathing -- critic of autocracy, yet was perhaps most influential in pushing the regime toward an aggressive annexationist stand in the Balkans. Personally deeply religious and idealistic about his faith, he became the proponent of deep reforms of Orthodoxy and pragmatic solutions to the divisions between the church that remained in the Soviet Unio...

Review, Aethiopica, Vol 16 (2013)

The twelve essays in this volume underscore the similarities between Chinese and American approaches to bilateral diplomacy and between their perceptions of each other's policy-making motivations. Much of the literature on U.S.-China relations posits that each side was motivated either by ideologically informed interests or by ideological assumptions about its counterpart. But as these contributors emphasise, newly accessible archives suggest rather that both Beijing and Washington developed a responsive and tactically adaptable foreign policy. Each then adjusted this policy in response to changing international circumstances and changing assessments of its counterpart's policies. Motivated less by ideology than by pragmatic national security concerns, each assumed that the other faced similar considerations.

In 1643, ten crew members of the Dutch yacht "Breskens" were lured ashore at Nambu in northern Japan. Once out of view of their ship, the men were bound and taken to the shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu, in Edo, where they remained imprisoned for four months. Later the Japanese government forced the Dutch East India Company representative in Nagasaki to acknowledge that the sailors had in fact been saved from shipwreck and that official recognition of the rescue was in order. "Prisoners from Nambu" provides a narrative of this relatively obscure incident, while casting light on the history of the period as a whole. Constructing his tale from primary sources, the author examines relations between the Dutch East India Company and the shogunal government immediately following the promulgation of the "seclusion laws" (sakokurei) and anti-Christian campaigns.

Part 1 Sino-Russian Competition Over Outer Mongolia: China's "New Administration" in Mongolia, Lan Meihua Russian Merchants in Mongolia - the 1910 Moscow Trade Expedition, Elizabeth Endicott Russian Diplomats and Mongol Independence, 1911-1915, Nakami Tatsuo The Buriat Alphabet of Agvan Dorzhiev, Yeshen-Khorlo Dugarova-Montgomery and Robert Montgomery. Part 2 International Diplomacy Concerning Outer Mongolia: Aspects of Soviet-Mongolian Relations, 1929-1939, Elena Boikova The Final Consolidation of the USSR's Sphere of Interest in Outer Mongolia, Bruce A. Elleman Sino-Soviet Diplomacy and the Second Partition of Mongolia, 1945-1946, Christopher P. Atwood Mongolia and Japan in 1945-1995 - a Half Century Reconsidered, Ts. Batbayar. Part 3 Mongolia Today: A Survey of the Mongols in Present-Day China - Perspectives on Demography and Culture Change, A. Hurelbaatar Mobility, Technology and Decollectivization of Pastoralism in Mongolia, David Sneath The 800th Anniversary of Chingis Khan - the Revival and Suppression of Mongolian National Consciousness, J. Boldbaatar Nationalism, Elites and Mongolia's Rapid Transformation, Tom Ginsburg Epilogue - Mongolia's Foreign Policy Revisited - Relations with Russia and the PRC into the 1990s, G. Tunurchulunn.

The conflict between secrecy and publicity is one of the most delicate issues in foreign policy. Not long ago, absolute monarchs were able to conduct diplomacy that was really secret and could make war and peace - not to mention less cardinal decisions-without explanation. However, in the age of mass armies and of total wars, public opinion has to be mobilized and the issues of foreign policy need to be elaborated, justified and defended, even by non-democratic governments. On the other hand, professional diplomats continue to claim that secrecy is often a crucial prerequisite for successful foreign policy. Modern international relations have thus posed a seemingly insoluble dilemma that will probably haunt governments in the future: negotiations can be flexible and successful only if they are kept secret, but they will be barren without popular consent.

In the first half of 2019 Australian foreign policy was tumultuous, marked by the federal election on 18 May 2019. The election was won, somewhat unexpectedly, by the Coalition and returned Scott Morrison as Prime Minister. The initial moves of the Prime Minister, new Foreign Minister Marise Payne and new Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds in the diplomatic sphere were conducted against the backdrop of intense debates about “strategic competition” between China and the United States of America in our region.1 As 2019 began, many volatile events lay on the immediate horizon for Australian foreign policy, but due focus on these events was interrupted by the election. This chronicle considers how nimble Australian diplomacy was able to be during the first half of 2019, with some broader implications for the transitional nature of Australian foreign policy. When the then foreign minister, Julie Bishop, commissioned the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, she noted it was designed to help Australian diplomacy be more proactive. She said: “[…] it's about looking at the kind of framework that needs to be in place so that we're not reacting to events, we're strategically positioned to manage, maybe even shape, events”.

The Crimean War and the diplomacy surrounding it have fascinated historians for the past one hundred twenty-five years. Even in the last decade, a period when diplomatic studies have fallen from fashion, several compelling examinations of what A. J. P. Taylor has felicitously termed "the war that would not boil" have appeared. These studies have been largely national in approach-Paul Schroeder for Austria and England, John Curtiss for Russia, Winfried Baumgart for Austria, and A. P. Saab for the Ottoman Empire. They have been supplemented by the publication of three volumes of Austrian documents, the first phase of a massive undertaking entitled Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs, and most recently by Norman Rich's attempt at synthesis.1 Missing in this resurgence of Crimean scholarship, as it had been in the period before 1970, is a comprehensive treatment of French foreign policy. We do have the brief but perceptive work of Luc Monnier, which draws its documentation from important pri

This article traces the emergence of the General Motors Corporation as a multinational enterprise under the leadership of James D. Mooney from 1922 to the outbreak of World War II. Mooney's unpublished paper “The Science of Industrial Organization” (1929) portrays GM's multidivisional organization's use of the line-staff concept in organizing overseas assembly plants. Here I compare General Motors with Ford Motor Company, which had first-mover advantages overseas, and examine how each company organized and managed their international operations. “Linking pins,” a social-science concept, illustrates how GM's organizational hierarchy achieved vertical coordination of effort. Economic depression and the prelude to World War II followed the expansionary 1920s, requiring GM and Ford to adjust to a changing environment. The article also covers Mooney's naïve attempts to use business for diplomacy in the years leading up to the war.

International audience; The question of WWI aims of the Kingdom of Hungary, constituting a distinct State within the Habsburg Monarchy, remains almost unexplored. This paper tries to reduce this gap. First, it synthesizes the main features of Hungarian expansionist projects in 1914–1918. Second, it emphasizes the importance of war-time separatist scenarios, intending to ensure the territorial integrity of Hungary. This way, the Hungarian strategic thought during the war appears to have constantly balanced between perspectives of territorial enlargement (in case of a victory of Central Powers) and independence (in case of the Entente’s success). Both alternatives had a common goal – to maximally secure the political freedom and territories of Hungary. The paper is based on the analysis and synthesis of available sources in Hungarian, Slovak, English, French and Russian (relevant historiography, published and archives documentation and memoirs).