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Do private entrepreneurs in China support democracy? This paper finds that in general private entrepreneurs find democracy desirable, but their concerns with the feasibility of democracy predispose them toward maintaining the status quo. This research employs a mixed method. On one hand, it draws on a national survey to show that Chinese private entrepreneurs are more likely to have democratic values than the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class, controlling the effects of relevant political, regional and demographic factors. In-depth interviews, on the other hand, suggest that capitalists who demonstrate democratic values tend to argue that democracy is infeasible in China, at least in the near future. As a result, they adopt a pro-government stance in their economic, social and political activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, China has been under frequent attacks by nature. Due to high population, low economic development, wide climate range and vulnerable environment, China would adopt appropriate adaptive and reduction actions according to the basic situation of the country and under the framework of sustainable development. the PRC government released its first policy report on climate change in June 2007, China's National Plan for Climate Change. In 2008 and 2009, China followed up with the release of a white paper titled China's Policies and Actions on Climate Change, which points out that "as a responsible developing country, China is fully aware of the importance and urgency of addressing climate change and has adopted a series of policies and measures in this regard." This essay addresses China's policy responses towards climate change. This paper discusses China's policy response to climate change. The discussion begins with the influences of climate change on China's environment and then moves on to discuss China's concern, guiding principle, goal and policy action in reaction to the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to systemic theories, war or peace is determined by the system which is the distribution of states. A war happens due to the structure regardless of decision makers. On the other hand, theories at the individual level argue that individuals matter. Prospect theory argues that risk propensity of decision makers has impacts on the estimation of both values and probabilities of triggering a war. This paper demonstrates how different risk attitudes influence decision-makers and how the decision-makers choose between war and peace. Using interaction games, the paper successfully links the factors of wars at the systemic level and that of the individual level. A case study on the relations between China and Japan in 1894-1945 is conducted to show how to dissect the reasons of war and peace based on the combination of prospect theory and power transition theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do economic relations among states become infused with questions of national identity? Is economic nationalism emerging as a reaction to the deepening of global trade and capital flows? By analyzing foreign investment disputes between the United States and China since 2001, this paper identifies conditions under which states place curbs on foreign investment in response to popular demands. The paper compares cases of popular mobilization in China and the United States to oppose foreign investment with cases in which public reaction was relatively muted. The results shed light on the conceptual question of whether the term "economic nationalism" is simply a new label for the old-fashioned politics of protectionism or mercantilism, or if it reflects a broader sentiment in which politicians and the public frame global economic relationships as threats to national identity. The results of this study can also signal the extent to which economic relations between the United States and China might be vulnerable to emerging economic nationalism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares images of the Korean War enemy, in particular the communist Chinese, in landmark films and television since 1962. The first set of works evaluated by this paper, including The Manchurian Candidate (1962) Star Trek: Savage Curtain (1969) M*A*S*H*: Bug Out (1976) MacArthur (1977) M*A*S*H*: Guerilla My Dreams (1979) Seven Years in Tibet (1997) Die Another Day (2002) Team America: World Police (2004) and Taegukgi hwinalrimyeo-The Brotherhood of War (2004) establishes or exploits a nightmarish view of the Korean War enemy. A second group of films and television episodes, including Star Trek: Omega Glory (1968), Red Dawn (1984) Star Trek: First Contact (1996) South Park: The China Probrem (2008) and Gran Torino (2009), has twisted and turned the hard-line images of the early Cold War into many different shapes. The primary conclusion of the paper is that the Korean War narrative of the Chinese and Koreans as an alien and inscrutable horde, devoid of individualism and rationality, remains prominent but does not completely monopolize popular wartime images. The expected release of a new Red Dawn in 2010, in which Chinese forces invade the United States, should further develop the enemy images explored by this paper. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of regional international relations by looking at bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. It focuses on the two major East Asian states, Japan and China. Mostly limited to questions of traditional security, Japan-China relations are often characterized as the result of a power shift, contentions about history or conflicting identities. However, since the 1990s, dynamics of globalization are dramatically changing and complicating the socio-economic and political environment in East Asia. It is thus necessary to analyze regional and bilateral security cooperation comprehensively. This paper therefore seeks to explain the nexus between questions of traditional and non-traditional security in Japan-China relations. It evaluates policy coordination through bilateral and multilateral channels in the areas of environmental security against the background of their overall security-political relationship since the mid-1990s. In this regard, the study analyzes the development of cooperation within the frameworks of the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM) and the Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP). Subsequently, it assesses the proposition that cooperation in areas of non-traditional security is politically easier to realize than cooperation in the area of traditional security, and that such functional cooperation is conducive to the improvement of international relations through the building of political trust. Finally, the study aims to contribute to the understanding of how dynamics of globalization transform the nature of international relations and influence the course of future regional cooperation in East Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, under the influence of the "Harmonious World," China has worked vigorously to develop friendly relationships with its neighboring countries, adopting the "Good Neighbor Diplomacy" to build up a peaceful environment not only in accordance with the common interest of the Chinese and people in surrounding countries, but also to facilitate peace and development in Asia. Due to the strategic importance and rich natural resources of Southeast Asia, the region is important for Chinese national interest, prompting China to actively seek cooperation with countries in the region and make headways into developing China-ASEAN FTA. Moreover, under the condition that traditional security issues have been temporarily settled, both sides have moved to cooperate in the realm of non-traditional security and construct many bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. This paper will analyze Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia. First, this paper discusses the definition of the "Harmonious Worldview," and "Good Neighboring Diplomacy." This paper moves on to address the changes of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia in order to gain a basic understanding of Chinese policy in the region. This paper will further elaborate on China's strategic goals and policy acts in Southeast Asia. Finally, this author wishes to clarify expectations of China's future policy options in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the emerging 'triangle' in commercial relations between the EU, China and the United States, using the concepts of 'complex interdependence' and 'bi-multilateralism' as organising and evaluative devices. The paper argues that in the 'triangle' there are important areas of unevenness and variation reflecting differences of power, institutional factors and norms, but that nonetheless there can be discerned important elements of 'complex interdependence' as defined by Keohane and Nye. This can be observed in the bilateral relationships between the three parties; at the same time, however, the EU-China-US relationship is central to power, institutions and norms in the changing multilateral commercial system, centred on the World Trade Organisation. This means that many of the commercial policy negotiations between the three parties are essentially 'bi-multilateral': on the one hand, the management of bilateral relations creates externalities for the multilateral system, and on the other hand the evolution of the multilateral system creates new forces shaping the management of bilateral relationships. The paper explores two cases, China's entry into the WTO and the management of trade disputes over textiles, to illuminate the ways in which 'bi-multilateral' elements enter into the EU-China-US 'triangle'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines global and national responses to the challenge of HIV/AIDS for young people. With reference to Thailand and China, the paper also introduces an on-going study into HIV/AIDS at community level in Chiang Mai and Kunming. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that IR has tended to mischaracterise the 'social' basis of international society. States and other actors orient their behaviour towards shared understandings of cooperation not because of a prior common identity but because the provision of public goods provides a high value pay-off in terms of status. In the early part of the paper, we draw on Wittgenstein's ideas on rule indeterminacy to critique the idea of the causal power of norms, a view which animates a great deal of mainstream constructivism. Working with an alternative sociology of norms, it becomes possible to view the international social system as being produced through 'recognition games' played on many different boards. The goal of international social action is recognition of rightful membership of institutions and alliances, an argument familiar to English school writings in IR. China's struggle for status in contemporary international society provides an illustrative case study, one which avoids the stark choice between managing China's imminent threat (realism) or liberal socialization (constructivism). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite discussions about China's rise as a global manufacturing titan and the world's third largest trading economy, few notice the unevenness of China's integration into the world economy. While some Chinese export producers have shown signs of climbing up the global value chain, most others are still trapped in a downward spiral of "race to the bottom" competition based on cheap prices. What accounts for this local variation despite the availability of cheap labor throughout coastal areas? Based on comparative case studies, the paper finds that contrary to the expectation of both neoclassical economics and state-led development theory, export upgrading was neither a natural product of market competition nor a sheer outcome of deliberate government promotion of capital-intensive investment. Rather it resulted from the complex interaction between foreign capital on the one hand and local export institutions that took root before the entrance of FDI on the other hand. While local institutions heavily influenced the direction and the magnitude of FDI's impact on local export activities, the influx of FDI at a particular period also revised the institutional arrangements governing the behavior of local governments and export businesses. This produced intended and unintended effects on the likelihood of ruinous competition or export upgrading. The paper concludes that in a transformed eraâ??one in which outsourcing and offshore production has increasingly segregated the source of proprietary knowledge from manufacturing, one should go beyond the pure focus on the amount of capital-intensive exports and high-tech investment, and should devote more attention to the important role of social coordination in overcoming ruinous competition and in nurturing the indigenous capacity for innovation and upgrading. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractSince 2000, China has a major economic player in Africa. China's role in Africa has manifested not only in trade but in investments in different sectors of the African economy, and in the provision of aid. There has been a significant increase in the flow and stock of China's FDI in Africa since 2000. The increase is largely driven by expansion in China-Africa trade, the search for new energy sources and the need to elevate China's international stature in the world. This paper examines the major policy changes in China which acted as fillip to Chinese firms; the characteristics and patterns of China's FDI; and the salience of Africa. The paper also assesses whether China's FDI is a catalyst to generate industrial development or a Trojan horse that will create a dependent linkage between the African economy and China ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some leaders choose foreign policies that flout the constraints posed by international structures? This paper argues that leaders possess varying beliefs about their state's proficiency in different areas of foreign policy, or "national efficacy beliefs." When sufficiently strong, these beliefs inspire leaders to act boldly, even when international structures offer incentives for restraint. Strong martial efficacy beliefs inspire leaders to challenge more powerful opponents on the battlefield, while strong moral efficacy beliefs prompt leaders to engage in costly forms of cooperation even when the relevant international institutions are weak. In constrast, weaker senses of martial and moral efficacy produce policies that are much more sensitive to structural constraints. The paper outlines how this framework can explain why the foreign policies of both China and India have become more conservative over the past six decades. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Foucault (1980; 2003) started to work on bio-power - which might be summarized as the maximization of state/national resources, including human resources -- he was clearly linking the state to the rounding out of the population as a whole. The focus on the intimate linkage of sovereign power and bio-power was made even more important since 9/11, when the exercise of sovereign power is used to justify the protection of population at home.The importance of state sovereign power in China is certainly unquestioned, even amidst economic reform. What is new in the governmental reasoning in China is that the full development of the individual now constitutes the source of the strength of the state, and that the full development of the individual involves, among other things, self-steering of the individual. The rationality behind this shifting is that the state realizes the knowledge economy is about competing globally for talents. This might be interpreted in terms of Foucault’s security (sécurité), “the future-oriented management of risk” (Valverde 2007, 172). "Knowledge economy", as a new concept, started to circulate in newspapers, magazines, media and Chinese leaders' speeches in 1998 since it first appeared in the 15th Communist Party Congress report. According to the rationalities of the state, the individual has to improve his/her physical, mental, psychological quality to prepare for and act as integral part of the new knowledge economy. This is fully in line with an emerging global elite consensus that is also evident in popularizers here in the West. Thomas Friedman's latest book The World is Flat (2005), popularizes the stakes in what he describes as a race to the top, one in which human capital/resources are identified as the deciding factor. Although Friedman does not say this, it is thus a global biopolitical race. Friedman pointedly identifies China, together with India and Brazil, as three most important players in the global race to the top.The proposed paper thus argues that China, although not a liberal society, is increasingly using governance techniques that remarkably resemble those used in the liberal society. In Foucault’s notion of governmentality, freedom is necessary to government. Individual's freedom is not a pre-given entity, but is a product of governmental steering through the desires, needs, interests, rights, and choices of individuals (Dean 1999, 149-175). Empirical materials for this paper derive from personal interviews I conducted in China and document analyses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a heuristic model for the international development of nonproliferation education programs. The paper draws on the examples of five nonproliferation education programs at U.S. universities, plus a program currently being developed at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. Three phases of the developmental process are studied for both international and domestic programs: program development, curriculum development, and sustainability. Lessons learned from each of the three phases are combined into a developmental model, intended to serve as a guide to the further development of these programs by practitioners. The factors that contribute to program development, where the focus is on creating a viable institution of learning, are much the same for domestic and international programs alike. The factors that contribute to curriculum development are different for domestic and international programs. For domestic programs, the locus of development is the organization. For international programs, the center of gravity is a collaborative network. In the latter, the central challenge is maintaining the commitment of multiple participants, all in the pursuit of a shared intellectual enterprise. As a curriculum matures and comes to be recognized as the hallmark of a program, the need for a robust international collaborative network diminishes. Domestic and international programs eventually converge in their developmental paths, with each facing similar sustainability issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do private entrepreneurs in China support democracy? This paper finds that in general private entrepreneurs find democracy desirable, but their concerns with the feasibility of democracy predispose them toward maintaining the status quo. This research employs a mixed method. On one hand, it draws on a national survey to show that Chinese private entrepreneurs are more likely to have democratic values than the non-entrepreneurial middle class and working class, controlling the effects of relevant political, regional and demographic factors. In-depth interviews, on the other hand, suggest that capitalists who demonstrate democratic values tend to argue that democracy is infeasible in China, at least in the near future. As a result, they adopt a pro-government stance in their economic, social and political activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on the seminal work of Keck and Sikkink, recent years have witnessed an explosion of scholarly research on transnational advocacy networks-- globalized groups of activists bound and driven by a common commitment to principled ideas or values and working to promote, monitor, and enforce compliance with them at the state level. Most of the time, fidelity to core values within these networks is assumed to be unwavering and non-negotiable. Indeed, fixity in the moral commitments of advocacy networks is implicit in their very definition. This paper, however, argues that the principles motivating advocacy networks are not always stable or constant, and suggests conditions under which some networks may alter or retreat from the original stance taken. The argument is probed empirically through an examination of the transnational campaign for Tibetan independence, whose central objective has evolved from sovereign statehood for Tibet toward its greater inclusion within a multinational or quasi-federal Chinese state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a critical evaluation of the UNFCCC process and other key climate change mitigation initiatives and concludes that both the UNFCCC and other polycentric approaches to climate change mitigation are of continued value in supporting global GHG emissions reductions but the notable lack of concrete commitment to performance on behalf of China and the United States renders these efforts impotent in terms of abating the worst consequences attributed to climate change. The article puts forward the notion that a bilateral agreement between the US and China represents a desirable supplemental initiative in the battle to expedite GHG emission reduction. After examining the perspectives on climate change mitigation that dominate the respective nations, the paper outlines areas of prospective collaboration, introduces some of the elements that are critical to collaborative success and considers some of the prevalent threats to such a collaborative initiative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The largely neglected authoritarian regimes I define as neo-communist are far from representing an endangered species. Past and present neo-communist constructs include the authoritarian regimes of Bulgaria, Romania, Belarus, Moldova, Vietnam, and Laos. Nepal and Venezuela seem to evolve in the same direction. Frequently, these regimes try to create anti-Western alliances that seriously hamper any democratization attempt at home as well as in their 'near neighborhood.' This is due mainly to the fact that, depending on domestic and international conditions, 'soft' neo-communist regimes can suppress democratic trends in their society and become stable 'hard' regimes; or they can fail and disappear. It is this fundamental incompatibility with the Western promotion of democracy that forces them to adopt a hostile attitude toward the West. A key element for the future of the West's relations with Eastern Asia is the nature of the present Chinese regime that certain authors see as an intermediate phase in the transition from totalitarian communism to a possibly democratic political system. This paper uses the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Belarus case studies in order to show that the Chinese regime falls into the same neo-communist category. This Lukashenka-type, 'hard' authoritarian regime is the very final stage of China's post-communist transition. As such, it should not be expected to 'soften' and democratize. Rather, it will preserve its present characteristics and the implicit incompatibility with Western democratic norms and values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's emergence as a powerful and confident international actor presents both a challenge and an opportunity for states worldwide. Assessments of how international actors have responded to China's rise have typically focused on rival great powers or on China's Asian neighbours. In these cases, relative power, geographic proximity, and regional institutions have conditioned elements of actors' relationships with China. China's relationship with the developing world has largely been defined by power asymmetry and the appeal of the Chinese governance model to authoritarian regimes. Absent from this discussion is an understanding of how Western middle power democracies are responding to the rise of China. This paper compares how Canada and Australia are responding to the rise of China. The two case studies are similar in many respects. Both are Western democratic states with prominent middle power foreign policy traditions. Both are resource based economies that have a track record of bilateral and institutional engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, both states are key US allies. These similarities allow the authors to isolate differences in the Canadian and Australian response to China's rise in the fields of political, economic and military engagement. China's rise challenges Ottawa and Canberra to adopt policies that balance often conflicting international and domestic priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the efforts made by the international community on climate change, since the 1990s, the world has not yet reached an acceptable solution to tackle the problem. Disputes existed not only between the advanced economies and the emerging powers, such as the BRICS states, but also between the emerging developing nations and the least developed nations. The key issue was not about "whether" the climate change should be tackled, but rather on "how" to tackle it, namely, "what" should be done and "who" should make the decisions. As one of the greatest carbon emitters, China has often been blamed being responsible for the failure of reaching a binding international treaty at the Copenhagen Conference, yet China insists that it has the legitimated rights to develop its economy and that the Western nations should take more responsibilities. This paper aims to examine the current international architecture on climate change, and to explore the obstacles that prevented reaching a "fair" solution to tackle the issue, taking China's position as an example. It argues that although the approaches taken by the relevant parties are legitimate under their own circumstances, they are not beneficial to help reach a global solution to save the earth. To ensure more effective governance on climate change, some reform may be required to strengthen the global institutions and rules; but the emerging powers, including China, should also be prepared to bear more responsibilities at the international stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thus far, the literature on energy security has largely been a descriptive endeavour designed to assess how states are pursuing energy security and what implications these efforts have on bilateral, regional, and global international relations. A more useful policy debate is that which has emerged over how to interpret success in energy security policy. This paper adds to this debate by evaluating the success of oil import diversification strategies of China and Japan, the two largest oil-importers in Asia-Pacific. To ascertain which party has been more successful, and advance arguments on why this may be the case, this article employs a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. Chinese and Japanese strategies are also compared to the United States, the most successful state at oil import diversification. The findings indicate that China's import diversification strategy has been more successful than Japan's. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the construction of early Soviet identity in relation to China and Japan ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For all the interest that the decades-long standoff across the Taiwan Strait has generated in the academic and policy literature, relatively little attention has been devoted to tracing the origins of the deadlock between Taipei and Beijing. Standard accounts of this deadlock in the West tend to accept as given and historically grounded the strong nationalist feelings on both sides of the Strait about competing visions for Taiwan's future. This paper challenges this view and argues that the hegemonic perception of Taiwan in the PRC as part of the "sacred territory" of China, as the Preamble to its 1982 Constitution puts it, is a strategic social construction which coincided with Taiwan's exacerbated geostrategic value following the intensification of the Cold War in East Asia after the Korean War. Seeking to prevent the establishment of a separate state on Taiwan promoted by Washington as part of the American containment strategy in East Asia, the PRC government, through repeated propaganda campaigns, sought to mobilize the nationalist masses and imprint in the collective conscience of the Chinese nation the idea that "Taiwan is China's sacred and inviolable territory" as a way to enhance the credibility of its deterrent threat against Taiwanese independence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As evidenced by its participation in a series of recent negotiations in the UN Security Council, China's decision-making in international organizations faces a contradiction. On one hand, it seeks consensus and desires to be perceived as a cooperative actor. On the other hand, it assiduously works to protect its particularistic interests in the problem under review. How is this contradiction resolved? What factors determine the way in which China balances its obligations to act as a "responsible stakeholder" vis-a-vis its pursuit of its own narrow security interests? This paper develops a typology of three processes which can help to explain China's positions in the Security Council, covering negotiations on North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Myanmar and Zimbabwe. These consist of, first, a concessional type, in which China's veto power is emphasized, and decisions are reached primarily through scaled back Western demands; second, a preferential type, in which China moves towards the Western position via converging preferences about the means and ends of intervention; and third, a political type, in which China's consent is based on successful Western efforts at political pressure against the PRC. The conclusion is that each type can help account for a piece of the outcome in the five cases, although the value of pressure alone appears to be particularly constrained and problematic. Hence, we should expect that affirmative Chinese votes on contentious issues in the Security Council will be based mainly on Western concessions and on processes of preference convergence. Yet the results are tentative, and more research is clearly required to establish how China navigates conflicting objectives in negotiation processes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in the global or systemic contexts, as well as regional or bilateral contexts, thin scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of the other great power - India, and how these two Asian great powers - India and China - perceive the ascendancy of the other state. Yet how these two very different Asian giants with a complex relationship view each other and consequently negotiate their paths in substantially changed international milieus will be important for scholarly interest and policy making. This paper examines how Indian elites - in political, security, and economic arenas - perceive the rise of China and their assessment of the feasibility of Indo-Chinese partnership ("Chindia") or rivalry by employing a mixed-method research strategy, combining secondary literature research, elite interviewing, and direct observation conducted over the summer of 2008. It analyzes the Indo-Chinese relationship through three paradigms - geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocivilizational. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up on the commanding heights, at the pinnacle of the state, China's top leaders agree that law should serve the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Down in the trenches, at the frontlines of decision-making, Chinese judges in civil environmental cases decipher this directive and attempt to diffuse local discontent. Faced with ambiguous legal standards, they enjoy limited discretion to decide cases as they see fit. But why do judges make the decisions they do? This paper looks at legal decisions (panjueshu) as a window onto judges as strategic actors as well as the everyday practice of law. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates crises in which the Chinese government requested an apology from the United States, and the official and popular reactions to these incidents. Two contentious episodes are studied: the 2001 EP-3E airplane collision near Hainan Isl ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 30 years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has transformed itself into a major actor in the international economy. This paper considers the extent to which China's growing economic power translates into political influence over the foreign policy priorities, behavior, and perceptions of its economic partners. I test quantitatively whether different types of economic exchange with China are correlated with a particular country's leadership travel to China, that country's willingness to recognize China as a market economy, and its public perceptions of China. Findings are mixed, but suggest on balance that bilateral economic ties are more closely correlated with behavior (recognition of China as a market economy) and public perceptions than they are with priorities (leadership travel to China). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by the debate about the rising power of Southern countries, most notably the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), we critically examine whether it inhibits the potential for the transformation of North-South relations within the global political economy. We argue that these new North-South-relations are much more characterized by similarity and complementarity rather than challenge.This paper analyzes both the regulation of money and production for Brazil, China and India, as well as the ideologies by which they legitimize their orders in international arenas such as the IMFC and the IMF Board of Governors. Such a combined examination of both material and ideational structures reveals that, beyond the rhetoric of contestation, these countries share much of the politico-economic common sense within the G7. In effect, these countries align to the Post-Washington Consensus on how to regulate order in the political economy. This "tolerant liberalism" is able to incorporate any substantial different order stemming from emerging powers. The "challenge" of Southern economies thus does not bring about any substantial change which would not have been on its way within the G7 anyway. Furthermore, it does not enhance the potential for developing countries to pursue independent development strategies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an increasingly globalized world, international cooperation is fundamental to controlling communicable diseases. Nevertheless, recent trans-national public health crises have shown that states continue to use national sovereignty to justify non-compliance with rapidly emerging international health norms pertaining to the timely sharing of information, transparency of process, and the need to address social and environmental determinants of health. There is for example, compelling albeit limited epidemiological evidence that despite its' political isolation, Burma's incidence and prevalence rates of HIV, multi-drug resistant tuberculosis and malaria are among the highest in Asia, and stronger evidence that the governing regime lacks both the capacity and political will to address determinants of disease spread as its response to Cyclone Nargis dramatically shows. Other key cases of this dynamic in Asia are China's initial failing to alert the international community to the SARS outbreak and Indonesia's temporary refusal to continue to provide samples of avian influenza virus to the WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance Network. Using these cases, this paper examines to what degree communicable disease control is impeded by state sovereignty, and how states, international organizations and other non-state actors are interacting and/or partnering to overcome this impediment and better address global public health threats created by the fluid movement of pathogens across borders. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By the end of 2008, after 30 years of opening to the outside world, China will have accumulated close to 1.5 million students and scholars who have studied overseas. In the past decade, many of them have decided to return to China; and many of those who have not returned play an active role in technology transfer, trade and investment in China. These Chinese returnees, and those who have remained as Diasporas, play an increasingly significant role in China's globalization. There is a great shift from focus in China on what China wants. China has become the number two export country in the world and it has become the endpoint of an enormous amount of foreign investment, now second only to the United States in the yearly FDI fare. China now has the largest foreign reserve in China and China now is not that hungry for money anymore, instead China needs more international talents, especially the returnees and diaspora, as they are emerging as the new important changing forces in China. This paper is the first of its kind to comprehensively examine the roles and contributions made by returnees in the Chinese economic and business front and their impact on the China globalization process and going out strategy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unprecedented economic growth and development in China over the past two decades has been as impressive as it has been daunting. Surpassing all expectations, China's GDP continues to grow at an average of 6 to 8 percent annually since 1999. However such growth has not been without consequences including: 1) increased migration; 2) the increased gap between rural and urban development; 3) and the changing place of women in the economy and society as they are among the number of those migrating. The changing political economy of China has increased the costal-interior, urban-rural as well as gendered economic inequalities while exposing the inadequacies of social and labour policies to accommodate the changing needs of Chinese citizens. As a result, the rural and migrant women who have traditionally been marginalized continue to be vulnerable to the forces of market reform and globalization. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to show that while the changing political economy in China has afforded rural women an opportunity to enter the off-farm labour market with the hope of improved economic security, policy deficiencies continue to marginalize migrant rural women by categorically framing them as second-class citizens within the cities they move into. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The old debate of whether regional trade agreements are a stepping stone or a stumbling block for global trade liberalisation has become particularly pertinent today with East Asia's largest economies joining the rush to preferential trade. China is currently studying, negotiating or implementing FTAs with over 20 countries or regions. This notable development in China's economic diplomacy has caused other countries, especially those in the Asia Pacific, to embark on preferential trade agreements as well, causing concern from the WTO over the proliferation of discriminatory FTAs. This paper analyzes China's bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) and discusses their implications for the WTO. The focus will be on Chinese perspectives on the relationship between FTAs and the WTO, Beijing's motivations behind its activism in FTAs, China's approach to FTA negotiations, and the domestic roots of China's FTA policies. The implications of China's FTAs for the WTO include whether China has abandoned multilateralism for bilateralism for its international trade cooperation, whether Beijing hopes to facilitate trade liberalization under the WTO through the FTAs, and whether Beijing has tried to keep its FTAs compliant with WTO rules. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The necessity of using the law to address unrest has pushed "lawful environmental rights and interests"—the government-preferred formulation of environmental rights—towards an uncontroversial entitlement. Indeed, environmental rights look benign when even human rights are written into the Chinese constitution. But what exactly is a "lawful environmental right" and where did rights language come from? This paper explores both how elites talk about environmental rights and how these rights are translated into action. China's upwardly mobile classes have begun using environmental rights language to justify opposition to nearby high voltage towers, highways and railroad lines. I look at one NIMBY dispute, opposition to the Shanghai-Hangzhou magnetic levitation (maglev) train in 2006-2007, to explore how rights fit into a kaleidoscope of frames designed to elicit response from an opaque state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese penetration in the trade and investments field in South America in the XXI century has changed national actors's expectations in the region during a transition period, after economic crises of the neo liberal development model. Based on the Chinese economy's own dynamics in today's global economic context, we believe that China's penetration in South America tends to consolidate, in short to medium term at the least, as part of a world strategy from that superpower seeking energy resources and other commodities, aiming food and energy security. Therefore this paper has as goal to evaluate political implications of Chinese economic penetration in South America in the global economic context of the XXI century, indicating the regional outspreads of the new world geopolitics of energy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) has become a major institutional linkage within the ASEAN Plus Three framework. This paper will employ an historical institutional approach to examine the development of the ASEAN-China linkage. The origins of the ACFTA and the sequence of events that has promoted the linkage will be analysed. The extent to which the positive economic and political feedback process as well as the timing and sequence of events have helped to reinforce the relationship will be assessed. It is argued that the resulting trajectory of the ACFTA underscores the political nature of the emerging association and makes it difficult, although not impossible, for other relationships to supersede the ASEAN-China linkage at the centre of the APT framework. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarship in foreign policy (FP) often examines the decision-making process or outcomes of states at a single level of analysis, and frequently the study is of a single case over a short period of time. By incorporating multiple levels of analysis within a comparative framework, more robust findings may be gleaned, yielding greater insight into the FP decisions that states make and which decisions can be anticipated under certain conditions.I attempt such a comparative analysis in FP by performing case studies of several countries over time, unpacking to how the domestic, state, and international levels of analysis combine causally to influence FP decisions. My paper will confine its scope to the issue area of international environmental commitments and the ways in which perceived national role in the international system and concomitant state priorities interact with domestic-level support, giving rise to predictable outcomes.I expect that those states that perceive their international roles as increasing will look to carve out a niche in the international system in a given issue area (such as environmental protection) while promoting domestic support for this area, which serves to signal a strong level of commitment to international audiences. States in decline will likely look to make any number of international commitments in an effort to “save face,” yet will fail to promote or allow domestic support for these commitments to grow. Finally, status-quo states will focus on issue areas directly related to security and power, sidelining issues that do not have direct bearing on the state’s ability to maintain its present level of power in the international system; domestic support for non-security-related issues will be minimal and stagnant over time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have paid attention to China's increasing political and economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper, I explore whether and how this increased interaction effects the health care sector. Is there a positive spillover effect that comes with China's commercial interests in Africa? Has the Chinese government's stated commitment to non-interference and support for infrastructure resulted in greater support for the health care sector in sub-Saharan Africa ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IFew items being monitored by the international development assistance community have caused as much consternation as the emergence of China as a significant source of official development assistance (ODA). 40 years ago, similar criticisms were being made about Japan's ODA, which was considered a mere offshoot of its mercantilist trade policies. Yet today Japan is arguably a strong adherent to the prevailing international norms that guide (though perhaps do not govern) official giving, especially on positions with respect to tied aid, non-military aid, economic development, environmental impact, and monitoring and evaluation standards. This paper looks at international aid norms and how they came to be accepted in Japan despite domestic political opposition. It also places Japanese and Chinese aid in global perspective. There is a lesson to be learned from the Japanese experience: China will also one day converge towards international norms on aid. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's transition is drawing world-wide attention. China started market economic reform since 1978 and rapidly closes up the gap economically with world industrialized nations. The 1990s witnessed the downfall of Communist political system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, yet the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule continued. However, the Chinese public and leaders have started to debate and explore where China should go politically and how to get there. Through examining the merits and weaknesses of four prevailing democratization theories: modernization theory, social mobilization model, cultural argument, and negotiation-pact transition theory, this paper intends to design an appropriate model for China's political future. It argues that (1) the conflict between the reform and conservative groups inside the communist regime will shape the process of China's democratization; and (2) the hope of China's political future may lie in continued economic development, a mature civil society, and the building of democratic political culture in society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can commerce contribute to the formation of an East Asia Community? What can the ICT (Information and Communications Technology) trade in Northeast Asia tell us of precedent and prospect for regional cooperation in innovation? This paper tracks emerging knowledge networks in China, Japan, and South Korea through the prism of the ICT trade. The regional competition for knowledge resources is my subject, the harnessing of innovation to national interest my focus, and local insulation or regional integration my question. I argue that commerce in ICT can contribute to regional community only with new complementarities in legal systems and foreign direct investment regimes. A theoretical section on regionalism and networks provides a frame for analysis of three knowledge societies, their ICT trade networks, and their continuities in legal systems and investment regimes. I conclude with alternatives of convergence, divergence, or complementarity. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysts have made efforts to explore the motivations behind China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific. Some are concerned that China is strategically motivated and China's growing influence poses a major threat to the West. This paper assesses the strategic value of the South Pacific in China's grand strategy, China's soft power in the region and some constraints to China's hegemonic rise. It concludes that China's policy toward the South Pacific is not mainly driven by its security strategy and that China's soft power in the region is limited. It also casts doubt on China's hegemonic rise in the region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Africa has embarked on a new phase of capitalist development, powered in large part by Chinese investment. After three decades of stagnation, the continent as a whole is witnessing growth rates of five percent per year and becoming once again a focal point of geopolitical dispute. This paper will focus on the Sino-African relationship and ask two questions in particular: what is China's strategy in Africa? And what is its likely developmental impact? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the current dilemma that Taiwanese leaders face as my inspiration, I propose a new theory that defines local and international politics as a result of the relations between contending identities. I capitalize on the work of Samuel Huntington, Antonio Gramsci, and the semiotic approach to studying political culture to develop my own causal theory. My global theory of culture is reliant on, and applicable to, comparative analysis and international relations theories. I aim to show the fruitful ways that these two sub-disciplines can be combined, as well as show how deeply they rely on each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the strategic outlook of the world's largest yet understudied armed force ? China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). With its sheer size, rapidly increasing capabilities, and uncertain intentions, the PLA's assessment of the country's external security environment entails profound implications for international relations. China has the world's largest military (with a manpower of over 2.3 million), second highest defense spending ($90 billion in 2004, by Pentagon's estimates; or $25.6 billion, by China's Defense White Paper), and one of the fastest-growing economies serving as the resource base for double-digit increases in defense spending for each of the past 15 years and for rapidly expanding its military capabilities. Yet, studying China's strategic intentions faces methodological challenges. China's decision-making process is opaque; its top leadership is not accountable to the electorate. A peculiar "civilian control of the military" ensures that the military will protect the party's interests. Access is guarded. Top generals rarely give interviews and their public statements echo top party leaders' statements. Discussions with "think tanks" affiliated with PLA tend to be formalistic. Moreover, a "strategic culture" of realism and a "cult of defense" combine to give Chinese an edge in deception and asymmetry. For a question crucial to U.S. national security, these problems have confounded scholars and policy-makers.The PLA's stated raison d'être is to "safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and preventing Taiwan's formal independence for now (or, in the future, incorporating Taiwan through force) has provided the impetus for the modernization of this armed force. But will China's aspirations increase with growing capabilities? The "Taiwan issue" thus provides a good angle to understand and evaluate China's perception and assessment of its security environment in the first decade of the 21st century.This paper tackles four questions: (1) How to disentangle the PLA's worldviews from those of China's civilian party leaders? (2) Compared to civilian leaders, is the military more hardline on issues perceived to pertain to sovereignty and territorial integrity but also more cautious on the use of force? (3) Are there subtle differences within the PLA -- by services, cohorts, doctrines -- on key strategic issues? (4) How does China's military development coalesce with the current leadership's stated strategy of "peaceful rise"? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]