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The relevant literature on missile defense is limited in that it primarily consists of policy-oriented prescriptive studies that support or oppose the deployment of missile defense in a host country. To address this deficiency, the current research compares two controversial cases of US missile defense deployment in Poland and the Republic of Korea. A theoretical framework is developed based on the alliance security dilemma to explain why certain allies accept US missile defense. The framework is used to evaluate two key aspects of missile defense deployment: whether a missile defense target is a shared adversary and the degree of reliance on the alliance. These variables are utilized as measures of entrapment and abandonment fears to explain why allies accept US missile defense systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent advances in radar seeker technologies have considerably improved missile precision and efficacy during target interception. This is especially concerning in the arenas of protection and safety, where appropriate countermeasures against enemy missiles are required to ensure the protection of naval facilities. In this study, we present a reinforcement-learning-based strategy for deploying decoys to enhance the survival probability of a target ship against a missile threat. Our approach involves the coordinated operation of three decoys, trained using the Multi-Agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (MADDPG) and Multi-Agent Twin Delayed Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (MATD3) algorithms. The decoys operate in a leader–follower dynamic with a circular formation to ensure effective coordination. We evaluate the strategy across various parameters, including decoy deployment regions, missile launch directions, maximum decoy speeds, and missile speeds. The results indicate that, decoys trained with the MATD3 algorithm demonstrate superior performance compared to those trained with the MADDPG algorithm. Insights suggest that our decoy deployment strategy, particularly when utilizing MATD3-trained decoys, significantly enhances defensive measures against missile threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decision by South Korean authorities to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile battery in 2016 unleashed a storm of protest, both domestically and internationally. Attempts to resolve these debates by showing the 'truth' of the THAAD system obscure the considerable investment of time and resources needed to stabilize technological meanings in the face of rival interpretations. This article synthesizes work in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) to present an integrated model of technopolitics explaining how doing politics through 'things' consists of interlinked rhetorical, performative, and material stabilization techniques each seeking to make the object simple, nonpolitical, and ultimately invisible or banal. In the case of THAAD, the single battery deployed to South Korea was the tip of a broader US technopolitical project to materially bind together its regional allies and contain North Korea and China. However, opponents inside and outside of the Korean peninsula tried to destabilize this project by employing their own rhetorical, performative, and de-materialization strategies. This resulted in a partial victory for both sides insofar as the broader US missile defense technopolitical project on the peninsula was paused but not defeated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates interception missiles’ trajectory tracking guidance problem under wind field and external disturbances in the boost phase. Indeed, the velocity control in such trajectory tracking guidance systems of missiles is challenging. As our contribution, the velocity control channel is designed to deal with the intractable velocity problem and improve tracking accuracy. The global prescribed performance function, which guarantees the tracking error within the set range and the global convergence of the tracking guidance system, is first proposed based on the traditional PPF. Then, a tracking guidance strategy is derived using the integral sliding mode control techniques to make the sliding manifold and tracking errors converge to zero and avoid singularities. Meanwhile, an improved switching control law is introduced into the designed tracking guidance algorithm to deal with the chattering problem. A back propagation neural network (BPNN) extended state observer (BPNNESO) is employed in the inner loop to identify disturbances. The obtained results indicate that the proposed tracking guidance approach achieves the trajectory tracking guidance objective without and with disturbances and outperforms the existing tracking guidance schemes with the lowest tracking errors, convergence times, and overshoots.

Recent advances in radar seeker technologies have considerably improved missile precision and efficacy during target interception. This is especially concerning in the arenas of protection and safety, where appropriate countermeasures against enemy missiles are required to ensure the protection of naval facilities. In this study, we present a reinforcement-learning-based strategy for deploying decoys to enhance the survival probability of a target ship against a missile threat. Our approach involves the coordinated operation of three decoys, trained using the Multi-Agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (MADDPG) and Multi-Agent Twin Delayed Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (MATD3) algorithms. The decoys operate in a leader–follower dynamic with a circular formation to ensure effective coordination. We evaluate the strategy across various parameters, including decoy deployment regions, missile launch directions, maximum decoy speeds, and missile speeds. The results indicate that, decoys trained with the MATD3 algorithm demonstrate superior performance compared to those trained with the MADDPG algorithm. Insights suggest that our decoy deployment strategy, particularly when utilizing MATD3-trained decoys, significantly enhances defensive measures against missile threats.

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During the Cold War, the Soviet Union invested heavily in its air defense systems, so its rightful successor, Russia, has now some of the most advanced air and missile defense systems in the world. Among them, the S-400 “Triumf” surface-to-air missile system is perhaps the most criticized, shrouded in mystery, and feared system in Russia’s arsenal. Developed and then presented as capable of engaging a variety of aerial threats, the system gained a reputation, at least declaratively, of being able to counter US and NATO ambitions to win a conflict through airspace dominance.

Robert Latiff is a retired US Air Force major general and a private consultant who provides advice on advanced technology matters to corporate and government clients and to universities. His current work includes research on the ethical implications of emerging and dual-use technologies. He has served on the staffs of Headquarters US Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force. A member of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' Science and Security Board, Latiff spoke recently with Bulletin editor-in-chief John Mecklin about the worsening international security situation as countries jockey for both military and private-sector advantage in space. This conversation occurred before Russia acknowledged testing an anti-satellite weapon in space, creating a debris field that could threaten the International Space Station and highlighting international tensions over use of space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides a comparative analysis study of the dynamics and mechanisms of the strategic stability transformation both during the Cold War and at present. Drawing on the analysis of the factors affecting strategic stability in different time periods, the author outlines the priorities of this transformation. Its basic principles are confined to the stability of nuclear deterrence in any realistic scenarios and do not provide for practical action. Hence, one should distinguish them from applied solutions for calculating military-strategic balances and elaboration of arms control agreements. The latter depend on the current strategic landscape subject to constant, sometimes drastic change, as both the Cold War history and the recent developments testify. The choice of particular type of representation of strategic stability is determined by the nature of the most dangerous ongoing trends, and relies on a set of three basic groups of factors (political-military, military-technical, and military-strategic) existing at a given time. This necessitates constant revaluation of these factors and development of new practical measures to build up nuclear deterrence.The paper assesses the current set of relevant factors affecting stability of nuclear deterrence, and then compares it with the commonly used model of strategic stability based on the logic of arms control negotiations of the late 1980s. The author highlights the limitations of the latter model applicability to the present strategic landscape, and outlines the key factors that erode the current understanding of strategic stability (as it was stipulated in the 1990 U.S.–Soviet Joint Statement). In particular the author emphasizes the increasing complexity of international landscape as compared to the Cold War period: new and unanticipated challenges have affected all three above-mentioned groups of factors. The paper ends up with the analysis of the possible developments in the field of arms control that could alleviate tensions and increase strategic stability.

This paper discusses specific types of missile attacks the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) might launch in a conflict and identifies the key sources of uncertainty that US and allied political and military leaders must take into account in assessing how effective defense systems might be in stopping these attacks. A key finding is that while missile defenses might be able to blunt some kinds of attacks, the DPRK will have options for retaliatory missile attacks that can reach their targets despite the presence of defenses, and Pyongyang will know which options those are. The existence of this second set of cases is crucial for US and allied leaders to recognize if they are considering taking actions under the assumption that defenses will be effective in protecting US and allied populations.

The article considers possible options for conducting a hybrid war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The analysis of the existing basic concepts of dysfunction of the state system is carried out. Possible options for the influence of the Russian Federation to achieve a political goal in various areas (domains) are identified based on the concepts of strategic paralysis and operation based on effects The article analyses the main factors determining the operating environment conditions in which the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will operate. There are analysed modern forces of air attack, means of air defence, tendencies of their development, application, and influence on the present and future operating environment. The threat of conducting combined information and strategic air operation as an effective tool for achieving the political goals of the Russian Federation in Ukraine is substantiated

Given the increasing tensions between world powers, missile defense is a topic that is more relevant than ever. However, information on the subject is often fragmented, confusing and untrustworthy. On the other hand, we believe that an informed overview of the current status is important for decision makers and citizens alike. A missile is essentially a guided rocket and therefore the term can be used to describe a very wide range of weapon systems. In this paper, we focus on long-range and intercontinental threats, which we believe are more important and problematic to defend against. We provide an overview of the two most common types of sensors, space-based infrared sensors and radars, and highlight their peculiarities and, most importantly, their drawbacks that severely limit their effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Canada began to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine in February 2022 and sent heavy weapons two months later. In 2022 the Trudeau government agreed to increase the Canadian military contingent in Latvia as part of a plan to strengthen NATO's military presence in Eastern Europe. However, Canada did not comply with the NATO requirement for its members to spend 2% of GDP on defense. The aggravation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022 did not lead to an increase in Canada's military commitments in Europe, but to an increase in the North American dimension in Canada's military policy. The Trudeau government used the aggravation of the Ukrainian crisis and hostilities in Europe to launch an expensive project with the United States to modernize their joint North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Canada's main contribution to the modernization of NORAD will be to provide territory for the new NORAD surveillance system, which will include over-the-horizon radars, a network of other radar systems in the Canadian North, and space-based surveillance. Providing its territory for the new NORAD surveillance system and the purchase of F-35 fighters means Canada's participation in the defense of North America from cruise and hypersonic missiles. There remains the possibility of Canadian support for US missile defense against ballistic missiles. Canada supports the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO not just as new military allies in the Arctic, but also as countries like-minded with Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between US missile defense and the US-China security dilemma dynamics by developing the concept of diffuse signaling involving the Korean peninsula. We argue that the US' efforts to bolster deterrence against North Korea's growing threats through missile defense have resulted in China's countermeasures of enhancing survivability and penetrability of its second-strike capability, leading to downward spirals of tensions between Beijing and Washington. We explain how three structural factors – geography, the US alliance system, and nuclear asymmetry – have made diffuse signaling salient, thus making it very challenging for the United States to reassure China even when its actions targeted North Korea. The article empirically shows the action-reaction process through which China and the US have come to experience the aggravation of the security dilemma over the Korean peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nukleare Fragen haben von jeher eine wichtige Rolle bei der Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen Moskau und Peking gespielt; sie waren und sind eine Quelle sowohl potentieller Konflikte als auch einer sich heute abzeichnenden Kooperation. Von 1964, als China seinen ersten Atomwaffentest durchführte, bis zur Ära Gorbatschow in den 1980er-Jahren waren die nuklearen Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und China erklärtermaßen von Gegnerschaft geprägt. Die Normalisierung der Beziehungen leitete eine Ära stillschweigend gegnerischer Beziehungen ein, die bis zur Ukraine-Krise dauerte. Während dieser Phase war es offensichtlich, dass Chinas wachsende militärische Macht Russland Sorgen bereitete und dass es daher entschlossen war, die nukleare Abschreckung gegenüber China aufrechtzuerhalten. Seit Beginn der Ukraine-Krise haben Russland und China eine immer engere Beziehung aufgebaut, die zu einer neuen Phase einer stillschweigenden nuklearen Kooperation mit koordinierten Bemühungen führte, die nukleare Abschreckung gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten aufrechtzuerhalten. Beide Länder treten gemeinsam US-amerikanischen Anstrengungen entgegen, Raketenabwehrsysteme und hochpräzise konventionelle Waffen zu entwickeln. Sie stimmen ihre Positionen zu Fragen wie multilaterale Rüstungskontrolle und strategische Landschaft nach dem Ende des INF-Vertrags ab. Russland hilft China beim Bau eines Raketenfrühwarnsystems. Eine verstärkte Verteidigungskooperation eröffnet die Möglichkeit, Bestrebungen zur Aufrechterhaltung der nuklearen Abschreckung gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten in einer Krise zu koordinieren. Nuclear issues have historically played an important role in the development of relations between Moscow and Beijing, acting as a source of both potential discord and emergent cooperation. From 1964, when China conducted its first nuclear test, until Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure in the 1980s, nuclear relations between the Soviet Union and China were explicitly adversarial. The normalization of relations introduced an era of implicitly adversarial relations that lasted until the Ukraine crisis. During this phase, Russia's concerns about China's growing military power and its resulting determination to maintain nuclear deterrence of China remained apparent. Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis, Russia and China have built an increasingly close relationship, leading to a new phase of implicitly cooperative nuclear relations featuring coordinated efforts to maintain nuclear deterrence of the United States. The two countries jointly oppose US efforts to build missile defense systems and high-precision conventional weapons. They coordinate their positions on such issues as multilateral arms control and the post-INF strategic landscape. Russia is helping China to build a missile attack early warning system. Growing levels of defense cooperation raise the possibility of coordinated efforts to maintain nuclear deterrence of the United States in a crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the increasing tensions between world powers, missile defense is a topic that is more relevant than ever. However, information on the subject is often fragmented, confusing and untrustworthy. On the other hand, we believe that an informed overview of the current status is important for decision makers and citizens alike. A missile is essentially a guided rocket and therefore the term can be used to describe a very wide range of weapon systems. In this paper, we focus on long-range and intercontinental threats, which we believe are more important and problematic to defend against. We provide an overview of the two most common types of sensors, space-based infrared sensors and radars, and highlight their peculiarities and, most importantly, their drawbacks that severely limit their effectiveness.

• This paper explores a three-dimensional tracking guidance strategy against high-maneuvering hypersonic vehicles. • The proposed guidance method utilizes a velocity control channel to increase tracking precision. • The wind field is accurately modeled to simulate the actual environment in the near-space to prevent impractical scenarios. • The backpropagation neural network extended state observer is proposed to estimate the uncertainty disturbance and design an adaptive control law to compensate for the tracking errors. • The proposed strategy combines fast nonsingular terminal sliding mode control and adaptive techniques to improve non-singularity, tracking accuracy, and estimation precision. This paper presents a three-dimensional disturbance observer-based adaptive tracking guidance scheme for the trajectory tracking problem of a missile intercepting a hypersonic vehicle with the wind field, autopilot lag dynamics, and input saturation. Unlike most of the existing missile trajectory tracking guidance systems without velocity controllability and external wind field model, the wind field model is added to the dynamic model, and the velocity control channel is introduced into the three-dimensional trajectory tracking guidance problem to prevent impractical scenarios and increase tracking precision. The proposed tracking guidance methodology incorporates the sliding mode and adaptive control techniques, in which the sliding mode motion is finite time stable independently of the tracking guidance system's initial conditions. Also, the super twisting switch control law is added to cope with the chattering problem. In this context, external uncertainty disturbances and unmeasured states are lumped into lump disturbance and estimated using the backpropagation neural network extended state observer. To this end, numerical simulations demonstrate the tracking to reach zero between 3 s and 5 s against various uncertainties in engineering practical, and position tracking errors are within 0.15 m, superior to the existing tracking guidance methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a noniterative feedback midcourse guidance algorithm for intercepting a ballistic target. The virtual impact point (VIP) concept, which is the intersection point between the defense missile trajectory and the sphere defined by the hit altitude, is introduced. Then the motion of the virtual impact point caused by the external acceleration applied to the missile is derived. The proposed guidance algorithm generates the acceleration command that moves the VIP to the PIP along the shortest path without any iterative procedure and has high potential as an onboard midcourse guidance algorithm. The validity of the proposed guidance algorithm has been demonstrated through the case study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]