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We study how Apple and independent repair service providers used different physical, regulatory, and digital instruments to influence each other's abilities to control the repair aftermarket of the Apple iPhone between 2007 and 2020. We show how the emergence of digital instruments for enacting control, made possible through emerging functionality for tethering, encryption, and temporary binding implemented in the iPhone itself, was shaped by and shaped the actions of Apple and the independent repair service providers, and led to a dominant tension between encrypted authorization and inscription of control through Apple and collective legal action by independent repair service providers. Our analysis provides a more nuanced understanding of control enactment by highlighting the implications of using different mediums for exercising control, and we provide a new way to understand the dialectics involved in enacting control in digital product aftermarkets. Our study provides insights that can inform the regulation of digital product aftermarkets--in particular, the ongoing debate about rights-to-repair legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade mark owners have increasingly been acting similarly to those they accuse of infringement or dilution of their marks. They are acting as "ownfringers". They have been engaging in previously unheard-of competitor collaborations, collaborations with businesses in distant spaces, and self-parody. These trends typify how trade mark owners are increasingly behaving like the third parties they pursue for infringement. How should trade mark law think about these new, prevalent behaviours by mark owners? Perhaps it is just par for the course because mark owners have the right to use their marks in commerce in ways that would constitute infringement if done by third parties. Even so, by engaging in ownfringement, trade mark owners are potentially altering the balance or calculus of a number of fundamental aspects of trade mark doctrine. I explore three important doctrinal impacts of ownfringement: on likelihood of consumer confusion, trade mark distinctiveness and self-dilution, and the parody defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the technology and design industries, one product builds on another: A smart television enhances a smart phone. However, due to complementary features, the utility that is gained by owning both products from the same firm is greater than the sum of the two products' utility if purchased from separate firms. Aftermarkets suggest that the margins of the second product would increase. Instead, we show that the firms' complementary utility offset each other, which results in reduced prices. Further, consumer purchase behavior is a function of the product release order; given a different release schedule, some consumers would purchase from a different company. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics of the technology industry are facing unique analytical obstacles to bringing successful antitrust claims against digital platforms, particularly with regard to their multi-layered structure and often free features. Recent congressional investigations into digital platforms have not deterred these companies' efforts to profit from this structure through potentially anticompetitive methods. This Note argues that the theory of antitrust aftermarkets as defined in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. is an under-utilized doctrine that could be successfully applied to digital platforms. I consider two industries--mobile app stores and their payment systems, and cloud computing--as case studies for the complex economic questions plaintiffs must prove to successfully argue that these digital platforms possess market power in their respective aftermarkets. While the structure of the particular industry and the controlling law both affect the viability of such a theory, I argue that the aftermarket theory can be applied to digital platforms and should be one arrow in the quiver of enforcement agencies and plaintiffs alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research study aimed to examine the objective which is the relationship between sales promotional expenses and sales performance in Automobile companies of Pakistan. The data collected from 3 different sources was analyzed using mean analysis to determine the impact of sales promotional expenses on sales performance. The research results showed that there happens to be a positive relationship between sales promotional expenses and sales performance. However, it should be noted that the study only considered sales promotional expenses as a factor affecting sales performance and did not take into account other factors such as marketing strategies, consumer behavior, and economic conditions. This study highlights the importance of considering sales promotional expenses in the overall marketing budget, but it is recommended that future studies take a more comprehensive approach in evaluating the impact of various factors on sales performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two‐sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one‐to‐one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents are allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static markets: an agent's payoff from remaining unmatched cannot be defined independently of other contemporaneous agents' outcomes. Dynamically stable matchings always exist. Dynamic stability is a necessary condition to ensure timely participation in the economy by ensuring that agents do not strategically delay the time at which they are available to match. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

App stores have become the subject of controversy and criticism within antitrust. For instance, app developers such as Spotify and Epic Games (creator of Fortnite) allege that Apple's 30% cut of all sales in the App Store violates the antitrust laws and is indicative of monopoly power. The claim is that iPhone users are locked into Apple's walled garden iOS platform, which frees Apple to engage in misconduct in the App Store "aftermarket" to the detriment of users and app developers. This Article challenges the recent economic and legal characterizations of app stores and the nature of the alleged harm. First, this Article builds an accessible, economic framework to illustrate how app stores do not represent the same type of aftermarkets that were condemned in the Supreme Court's landmark Kodak case. Importantly, the differences between Kodak-like aftermarkets and app store aftermarkets raise serious questions whether the digital revival of the aftermarket doctrine conforms with the economic realities of these markets. Second, the complexity of the commercial relationships found in app stores has raised questions regarding who has standing to seek antitrust damages in this type of market setting. This Article provides an overview of the development of the current doctrine of antitrust standing--focusing on Illinois Brick and Pepper. Further, this Article contends that Justice Kavanaugh's opinion in Pepper, which gave iPhone users the right to sue Apple over the 30% commission, was right for the wrong reason. Instead, Justice Gorsuch's dissent offers a much more economically sound approach to antitrust standing--as his "proximate cause" standard does not artificially focus on identifying the "direct purchaser," which is unnecessarily limiting for more complex commercial relationships. As the number of antitrust claims against various app stores proliferate, the consequences of faulty characterizations of app stores will only grow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]