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This paper focuses on the relationship between agency and knowledge within the context of rising nationalism and populism. The case is the Czech debate over the reintroduction of civil defence education (CDE). It was abandoned in 1989 but recently, many new and contradictory calls for its return have appeared. We aim to gain an understanding of what the nationalising of education does with actorship in educational governance and how agency is achieved in pushing or criticising nationalist claims in education. The dataset consists of media entries, strategic documents, and interviews. We argue that the populist repertoire intervened significantly in "defining" what is the problem that some groups wanted to solve by a renewal of CDE. This situation stabilised the position of security-military expertise as reasonable knowledge, which concealed the educational nature of the problem and thus denied educational actors a role in agency. The role of the state structures responsible for education was problematised and set the difference of the Czech case in the European context regarding educational governance. We conclude that contemporary nationalists' claims concerning education may be seen as a sign of the changing role of expert knowledge that camouflaged defence education as an educational problem.

Since Israel's founding, being a "Jewish state" has been central to its self-representation. However, Israel has struggled to identify what that means. This article examines the strength of Jewish nationalism in Jewish Israeli public opinion. It draws on a recent survey of 200 Jewish Israelis for a qualitative and quantitative investigation of public responses to religious nationalist statements. These findings offer a utilizable survey short scale for measuring Jewish nationalism and to understand how Jewish Israelis are interpreting these statements. This study is a necessary step to empirically evaluating religious nationalism in the "Jewish state". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current scholarship on Chinese public perceptions of international affairs tends to highlight the growing hawkishness and nationalistic tendencies in popular public opinion during the Xi Jinping era. Whereas these studies tend to deal with cases and contexts directly involving China, little is known about how the Chinese public responds to geopolitical crises in which China is not a direct participant. Our study attempts to address this gap by examining how Chinese social media commentators narrated and debated Russia's war in Ukraine—a major geopolitical event that has shaped China's interests but thus far has not directly implicated China in the conflict. Our analysis, drawing on online commentaries during the first six months of the Russia-Ukraine war, finds that the dominant narratives are still rooted in China-centric objectives and experiences. These nationalistic sentiments, however, diverge when it comes to advocating for China's positions on this war, ranging from direct support of Russia as part of China's battle against the West, to a cautionary position of learning from Russia's mistakes, to support for Ukraine as rooted in China's own experiences with foreign aggression. All these positions are distinct from the official stance of ambiguity in this conflict, highlighting the possibility of alternative, albeit still nationalistic, perspectives presenting themselves on social media despite strict censorship. This analysis contributes to our understanding of popular expressions on international affairs in the Xi era and, specifically, of the different manifestations of Chinese popular nationalism in contexts outside of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China's power grows, a widespread perception is that China is more willing to respond to nationalist demands and act assertively in international incidents. In reality, China has not supported and accommodated nationalism in all events but has cooled down nationalism in some cases. An important unanswered question is, why does the Chinese government demonstrate selectivity when responding to nationalism and take different foreign policies concerning nationalism in various incidents? This article provides a coherent and testable framework to answer this question and uses five cases to test the congruence and validity of the analytical framework. The core argument is that the primary concern of the Chinese government in dealing with nationalism is its legitimacy. When policymakers perceive severe threats to China's regime security and stability, they will open a 'safety valve' to embrace nationalism, allowing nationalism to unleash its anger under the government's monitor and escalating disputes to defend national interests and appease nationalism. When there are few threats to the regime, three factors will affect China's choice: the economic value of the diplomatic relationship, elements of China's core interests, and the viability of reaching an agreement that sets aside the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International sport has always been associated with nationalism. The purpose of the study was to explore how Chinese media and the general public perceived the doping scandal of their national sports hero, Sun Yang. Through analyzing 11 Chinese media outlets' coverage on Chinese social media Weibo, the results revealed that Chinese media covered Sun and his team's reaction and perspectives on this issue more when compared with other news. The general public's perceptions toward this scandal tended to be favorable toward Sun, with 55.5% of selected Weibo comments defending Sun after his 8-year ban for doping was handed down. The analysis of these social media comments posted by sports fans showed that the general public's perceptions might have been impacted by their nationalism, international relations, and media coverage. In addition, the study revealed the Chinese public's perceptions toward current antidoping regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The immediate task of the Mexican post-revolutionary governments in the twenties was the creation and consolidation of institutions that would build the ideological program of the new state. In this task, intellectuals played a prominent role, particularly in the debate on the definitions of culture and national identity, which fostered an atmosphere of exchange of ideas, as well as tensions between different artistic and intellectual groups. This article analyzes two specific groups: the first headed by José Vasconcelos and the second by Pedro Henríquez Ureña. Both characters shared an intellectual bond and common purposes, but different ways of fulfilling those goals: on the one hand, as a maker of institutions, directly linked to the governmental structure and government actions and on the other, as a social critic. Thus, through the comparative analysis of two publications in particular: La falange. Revista de cultura latina, as organ of the group linked to José Vasconcelos, and Vida Mexicana. Revista mensual de ideas de interés, by those who followed Pedro Henríquez Ureña, analyzes the trajectory of two ways of understanding the social role attributed to intellectuals, the points in common of these groups, as well as the differences in the projects and trajectories that followed later. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2022, the Welsh Government announced plans to increase the size of the Welsh Parliament/Senedd Cymru, a culmination of two decades of elite-level argument over whether more members should parallel the institution's growing suite of legislative and fiscal powers. While an expanded legislature may improve the Senedd's capacity to scrutinise the executive, opposition has focused on increased costs that detract from core public spending. Using a novel survey experiment conducted in the 2021 Welsh Election Study, we assess public attitudes and find that support for expanding the Senedd is limited to those with a strong Welsh-only identity and pro-autonomy preferences. Although appeals to holding the executive to account do not broaden this base of support, a framing that the Senedd should be comparable in size to legislatures in Scotland and Northern Ireland does have a positive effect on voters with more median constitutional preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Representing the nation in sports mega events has become a highly contested issue with the acceleration of the transnational movement of athletes. This research has examined Chinese people's attitudes to the naturalization of football players. The article discusses the findings in the context of the qualifying stages for the 2022 FIFA Men's World Cup by presenting and analysing data collected from semi-structured interviews and social media extracts. Two main issues were debated by Chinese people concerning the identity of naturalized athletes. One was the ethnicity of the naturalized footballers in relation to nationality, with some people questioning whether they belong to China and can represent China. The other issue concerned the players' skills and ability which influenced considerations of how much they could help China to qualify for the World Cup Finals. In relation to Chinese nationalism, national identity and Chinese sports, this study reveals, through the window provided by the presence of these naturalized footballers, how football, instrumentalism, nationalism and naturalization have been inextricably linked and have interacted with one another within the current context. The article analyses how pragmatic values have negotiated with ethno-cultural nationalism and impacted on the Chinese public's attitudes towards naturalized athletes, their image being presented in variable and dynamic ways by football fan netizens after each qualifying game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The COVID-19 pandemic reveals an obvious ideological influence on people’s health decisions worldwide. However, little research has examined such an effect on China’s public attitude to health issues. This article tries to fill the gap by examining how conventional factors linked to health behaviours – e.g. perceived threats, scientific knowledge, and trust in science—and ideological beliefs jointly influence the Chinese public’s attitude to the zero-COVID policies. Utilizing a national quota sample (n = 1,021) collected in April 2022 when Shanghai’s lockdown resulted in numerous online protests, this study found that perceived severity of COVID-19 infection, trust in science, left-leaning ideologies, and nationalism scores were associated with supporting the zero-COVID policies. Objective scientific judgments did not influence their views. Moreover, people whose ideological stances were closer to the official lines (political left and nationalism) were less likely to associate a zero-COVID attitude with perceived threats but more likely to link their trust in science to their support for the zero-COVID policy. The findings here provided empirical proof from China to the booming research agenda on the politicization of science and health communication while expanding our understanding of how ideological beliefs may have distorted scientific cognitions and health decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A military conflict over the Taiwan Strait seems increasingly likely today against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition between China and the United States. While much has been discussed and debated about the prospects for and consequences of war, we know little about how ordinary Chinese evaluate the full set of policy tools that Beijing could potentially leverage against Taipei in the near term. Drawing from a unique public opinion survey in China, we find that armed unification, or 'wutong', garners only a slim majority (55%) of support, no more than for a range of less aggressive policy options, from using small-scale warfare, to coercing Taipei into negotiating, to simply maintaining the status quo. Only one out of one hundred rejected all but the most extreme option of 'wutong'. Analyses of respondent attributes further reveal that aggressive policy preferences are primarily driven by nationalism and peer pressure, but dampened by concerns about the economic, human, and reputational costs of non-peaceful unification and the likelihood of US intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Procesos Historicos is the property of Universidad de Los Andes (Venezuela) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Two phenomena have been present in multiethnic/multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina since its independence from SFR Yugoslavia: massive depopulation and strong nationalism(s). Although nationalism influences which nation/ethnic group should produce and how, the links connecting these nationalistic ideologies and pronatalist population policies in the country/entity have been, almost paradoxically, left on the margins of the previous studies. This paper asks to what extent nationalist ideologies are present in the pronatalist population policy discourse in the Serb-dominated entity Republic of Srpska and what nationalism it is. After developing Spectrum of Nationalism(s), a framework underlined by Siniša Malešević's views on nationalism and ethnicity as ideologies, the paper provides an overview of Bosnia's demographic processes and brief insights into Republic of Srpska pronatalist policies through a semi-structured literature review. Keeping in mind that media profoundly influences public opinion, discursively moulding policy debates, two most recent cases of pronatalist campaigns and programs in the Republic of Srpska: Let Our Children Be Born and National Programme of Demographic Revival, are analysed via critical discourse analysis (CDA). Selected media articles predominantly cover the period from 2018 onwards, concentrating on the commentaries of the ruling SNSD political nomenklatura. The analysis displays the powerful influence of nationalism on the discourse on population policies. However, on the spectrum of nationalism(s), civic nationalism seems only to be pro forma defined, while in RS's reality, the abovementioned path has continued toward an ethnonationalism direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops the concept of 'patriotic consumer mobilization' to explain how China uses informal boycotts as economic coercion. Patriotic consumer mobilization employs citizens as the unit of action, facilitating manipulability, uncertainty, and plausible deniability. It manages public sentiment for domestic legitimacy and foreign policy goals. Citizens are mobilized via propaganda that underscores national humiliation, frames boycotts as grassroots patriotism, and signals resolve to foreign countries. After outlining conditions for use and a case comparison with Taiwan, we draw on Chinese-language sources to examine Beijing's coercion of South Korea over a missile defense system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the non-juridical aspects of sovereignty, delving into the cultural productions in Pakistan and Oman. It mentions how mediatized state and Taliban productions in Pakistan, as well as Oman's heritage regime, influence citizens' perceptions of the state, shape historical understanding, and impact the construction of national identity.

Copyright of Filosofija, Sociologija is the property of Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How does identifying with the Prosperity Gospel or as a Christian Nationalist affect political attitudes? Religion has long been a key factor in explaining public opinion, partisanship, and political ideology, though recently scholars have turned to these two theological worldviews to explain support for Donald Trump, conservative political activism, and political extremism. But these theological identities have varying effects based on race, often cutting against the direct effects of race and religion on politics. Further, while scholars have analyzed these identities on attitudes such as immigration, social/moral policies, and foreign policy, less attention has been paid to the relationship with attitudes toward spending, debt, and the economy. This paper uses two national surveys to connect the Prosperity Gospel and Christian Nationalism with race in predicting economic values and beliefs. In general, both are found to predict economic conservatism, though mostly among whites, while Prosperity Gospel adherence decreases personal economic conservatism. Both theological identities also help to explain agreement with nationalist and populist policies, helping to make sense of the relationship between (white) Christianity and support for Donald Trump. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Historia i Polityka is the property of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Historia i Polityka is the property of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study aimed to reveal the relationships between a Chinese influencer’s “kimchi” video content on YouTube, news reports about it in portals, and online nationalism, which will help explore how the issues of history and traditional culture in portal news reports are conveyed and understood. The results demonstrated that the correlation of nationalism and the Chinese Northeast Project, and responsibility frames was the largest in the Naver portal. The more the origin and pride of kimchi are emphasized, the more the kimchi issue is attributable to the Chinese Northeast Project, which is one of China’s policies. This is the responsibility of China and affects anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea. As Chinese government officials accelerate this issue, it is ultimately amplified to develop into public opinion. On the other hand, the correlation between the anti-Korean sentiment and conflict frames in the Baidu portal was the largest, which means that shifting the responsibility for conflict between Korea and China tends to enhance anti-Korean sentiment inside China, resulting in enhanced cohesion of the Chinese people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on public opinion and foreign policy in China has focused on nationalism as the driver behind public support for the use of force. However, nationalism is just one of many potentially significant factors that can increase support for military deployments. In this article we build a mediation model to test the relative effects of psychological predispositions, foreign policy attitudes, perceptions of the opposing state and calculations about the likely outcome of the conflict on support for China sending naval forces to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. We find that dislike of the Japanese government and a belief that China would be victorious in a conflict with Japan are both powerful predictors of support for the use of force. Nationalism and militarism directly increase support but also indirectly increase it via different pathways. Nationalists are more confident in a Chinese victory while militarists have a stronger dislike of the Japanese government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how stereotypical perceptions contribute to the construction of Muslim identity narratives in the context of Indian nationalism and the history of the Indo-Pak Partition. The main focus of this study is on how mainstream cinema portrayed the historical and nationalistic struggles of Partition through which the Muslim identity was shaped and shared through a range of communicative mediums. The verbal, physical, ritualistic and virtual modes of communication play significant roles in the construction and performance of identity. Analyzing films of mainstream Indian cinema, this article explores how expressions of the Indian Muslim are associated with the concept of Indian nationalism and its violent history of Partition and border politics where the stereotypical perceptions of Islam and Muslim identity contribute to the shaping of public opinion. It argues that whenever the corporeality of Indian Muslims is expressed through such forms, they get incorporated into the existing historic-geographical narratives, fictionalized as ideal stereotypes, normalized to fit into a particular political or ideological view, and finally get solidified into a set of polarized collective identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article brings, for the first time, two of the most pivotal distinctions in nationalism studies into extended dialogue: the civic–ethnic distinction (CED) and the nationalism–patriotism distinction (NPD). By reviewing both the evolution of those distinctions over the previous decades and the ways in which they have been used in quantitative empirical research, we argue that the CED's evolution has been a partial success story, whereas discourse around the NPD has not seen substantial development. Despite lingering inconsistencies, researchers drawing on the CED have been successful in addressing different lines of critique and in using the CED as a heuristic for investigating notions of nationhood as expressed in public perceptions. In contrast, there has been only limited dialogue between theoretical and empirical approaches to the NPD. The article illustrates how research drawing on the NPD could profit from the CED's evolution. We close by providing a conceptual roadmap to guide the path towards more terminological clarity and to construct more theoretically robust measures for nationalism and patriotism. We specifically suggest that nationalism and patriotism should be consistently understood as ideal types that citizens can simultaneously hold to varying degrees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well documented that individuals' conceptions of national identity influence their opinions about immigration. The most well‐known ideal types to capture conceptions of national identity are the civic and ethnic conceptions. Yet, this dichotomy does not reflect contemporary debates about immigration, which are framed in cultural terms. Scholars have thus proposed a cultural conception of national identity. The relationship between this conception and immigration, however, remains contested. Using an innovative approach to studying public opinion, this research analyses qualitative interviews conducted with individuals from the general public to investigate how each conception of national identity influences opinions about immigration in the context of Quebec, Canada. It shows that the cultural conception of national identity is related to both positive and negative opinions about immigration. This is explained by an evaluation mechanism whereby individuals evaluate if immigrants are included or excluded from the national group based on their (non)conformity to specific markers of identity. This evaluation is subjective and is often informed and substantiated by mediatised information about immigration‐related issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines evolution of the opinions of the Slovenian public regarding cohabitation in socialist Yugoslavia before its breakup. Data from regular Slovenian sociological surveys from 1970s and 1980s and the design of these surveys are analysed. A sudden increase of ethnic issues is observed in the questionnaire in 1987 which illustrates growth of importance of the topic even among those intellectuals who had focused on other political issues up to then. The results of the surveys show, at the same time, continually increasing ethnical sensibility and fading identification with Yugoslavia among the Slovenian public during the entire decade with an acceleration in 1987. Since the second half of that year, growing nationalism in Slovenia was extensively discussed also by the local communist elites. They, however, mostly gave in to the nationalist radicalisation and quickly absorbed it into their own attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of political polarization, nationalism, demographic threat, and social group equality on democratic backsliding from 2013 to 2021, testing the implications of theories proposed by scholars of democratic quality and national and ethnic politics. A linear regression analysis finds that political polarization correlates with greater levels of backsliding, while social group equality correlates with lesser backsliding. Importantly, it also finds that countries with higher initial levels of democracy have greater levels of backsliding, suggesting that democracies are inherently unstable instead of consolidating. Then, through a case study on the Trump presidency in the United States, this paper argues that public priorities for partisan platforms, national order, and dominant ethnic status can undermine democratic quality as voters favor other interests over democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the effect of a victimization narrative on national identity and public opinion in China experimentally. Previous research has suggested that governments can shape public opinion by guiding citizens' collective memories of historical events, but few studies have established a clear causal link. By conducting an online survey experiment among 1890 urban Chinese citizens, we examine the causal impact of historical narratives on political attitudes. We find that, compared to control conditions, a narrative focusing on China's humiliating past in the late Qing significantly reinforces respondents' attachment to the victim side of the Chinese national identity, raises suspicion of the intention of foreign governments in international disputes, stimulates preference for more hawkish foreign policies, and strengthens support for China's current political system. These effects are particularly strong among respondents without a college degree. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New information technologies increasingly allow autocrats to shape public opinion outside their borders. Regimes like Russia and China spend millions on such efforts, raising concerns that they may be swaying foreign publics through their illiberal nationalist appeals. We know little, though, about the actual impact of such endeavors. We ask here: Where such regimes can find foreign audiences who support them and the values they represent, does this translate into an ability to sway public opinion on important foreign policy issues through their endorsements? We focus on the Putin regime's ability to shape orientations toward US President Donald Trump's foreign policy through an experiment-bearing survey in two countries that share EU aspirations but have different baseline orientations to the USA and Russia: Serbia and Albania. We first establish that Putin has a considerable number of sympathizers in both countries and that this sympathy is indeed linked to illiberal nationalist ideas. We show, however, that these sympathies do not translate into an ability to move public opinion, and that where pro-American priors are strong, illiberal nationalist endorsement can actually backfire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent public opinion polls conducted in Europe and the United States show increasingly negative views of China. Does the Chinese public hold similar views of "the West"? Conducting a two-wave survey in China, we found great divergence and asymmetries in Chinese public perceptions. First, Chinese views of European countries and the US diverge sharply, despite these countries being typically grouped together as "the West" in mainstream English and Chinese discourses; the Chinese viewed the US much more negatively than Europe. Second, whereas the Chinese reciprocated American antipathy, there was an asymmetry in public perceptions between China and Europe, with the Chinese expressing much greater favourability towards European countries than the other way around, though the degree of favourability still varied by country. Analyses of respondent attributes also yielded insights that both confirm and challenge some of the conventional wisdom regarding age, education, and party membership in Chinese public opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims at exploring the discursive strategies used by the central press during the third Liberal Party government led by Gh. Tătărescu (29 August 1936 - 14 November 1937), so as to make naturalizations after 1918 a matter under debate and their revision a necessary solution. The revision of citizenship was already on the agenda of the far-right parties (the National-Christian Defense League, turned into the National-Christian Party, and the "Archangel Michael" Legion) since their foundation, but it was only during the tenure of this government that the topic made its way into the central press. That happened under certain specific conditions. First of all, there was the topic of foreigners and the revival of the National-Christian slogan "Romania for the Romanians" (in the original: „România a românilor"). Secondly, press reports referred to presumed cases of fraudulent reception of citizenship by foreigners (especially Jews) and, more precisely, there was a press scandal caused by the so-called Marton Hertz case. These discursive strategies were successful, because they were followed by three normative revision initiatives. As the analysis of these initiatives, in terms of their legal content and the parliamentary and press debates that ac - companied them, is complex and beyond the scope of this paper, we shall only sketch them. Starting from historical sources (the press articles of the time, the archives of the Legislative Council, the parliamentary debates), the study aims at exploring the previously unknown prehistory of Decree-Law No 169 of 21 January 1938 on the revision of citizenship in terms of the mechanisms that made it possible and prepared the public opinion, in 1938-1939, for the acceptance and effective implementation of the revision of citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scholarship on Chinese nationalism is rich, and readers would benefit from a more in-depth analysis of the changing substance of Chinese nationalism amid escalating tensions in the South China Sea. It is even arguable whether the South China Sea dispute, from the Chinese leadership's perspective, is a trade-off between sovereignty protection and stability maintenance when Peng admits himself that territorial sovereignty is non-negotiable. [Extracted from the article]

Under pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a hedging strategy: deepening economic relations with China while strengthening security cooperation with the U.S. How does the region's public view this strategy? With tensions rising in South China Sea territorial disputes, are more nationalistic individuals more likely to oppose hedging? Using an original public opinion survey conducted in the Philippines, we find that while an overwhelming majority of respondents were concerned about the territorial disputes, more nationalistic Filipinos were no more concerned than less nationalistic ones. Further, more nationalistic Filipinos were more likely to view economic relations with China as important for the Philippines and to approve of Duterte's China policy, which follows the logic of hedging. These surprising findings suggest that under the shadow of great-power competition, the link between domestic politics and foreign policy is nuanced in the Philippines, and Southeast Asia in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how online expressions about Dr Li Wenliang became a public opinion incident in China and how the regime adjusted its internet censorship and emotional governance. We find that public perception of Li changed from a rumormonger to a whistleblower, a victim of structural causes, and a martyr of the nation, with collective emotions shifting from feelings of uncertainty to outrage, panic, and grief. Reassured by the state's crisis management and by positive stories of solidarity and resilience, the public then moved to a xenophobic discourse of crisis nationalism with feelings of hope, vindication, and pride. Meanwhile, public trust in the state grew as the regime delegated responsibility to local governments and perpetuated itself as a paternalistic, responsive, and effective leader through an authoritarian participatory propaganda. We argue that the pandemic spawned an emerging crisis nationalism that fed into the regime's crisis management and propaganda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an ongoing academic debate about the question whether sub‐state nationalist parties should be considered as niche parties, focusing almost exclusively on their core issue of centre‐periphery relations, or whether their electoral appeal can be considered as multidimensional. In that case, these other dimensions can vary with regard to the specific ideological position, historical circumstances and strategic considerations. In this article, we address this theoretical question by relying on the case study of the sub‐state nationalist parties in the Flemish region of Belgium, where they jointly obtained 44% of the vote in the most recent elections. Comparing election surveys from 2009, 2014 and 2019 suggests that the electoral appeal of these parties rests on a mixture of nationalist issues, right‐wing economic policies and a restrictive attitude towards immigration. These results suggest that sub‐state nationalist parties are not purely niche parties, but should be seen as multiple issue parties, and this broader electoral appeal can explain the discrepancy between electoral results and public opinion on the core issues of these parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

December 1923 marked the first anniversary of the "student movement" in Romania. The student movement spectacularly seized this opportunity to capture public attention at any cost, even with violent means, on order to relentlessly promote its agenda and to severely censor those who dared to oppose its ideas and actions. Its intentions were clear, for instance, in regard to an important event the city was preparing to host: the General Congress of the Press. Gathering outside the universities, where they had been unable to obtain the "numerus clausus," the students diversified their arsenal and ways of fighting; they set themselves new institutional targets. Not only did the main political parties repeatedly miss the opportunity to show solidarity in the face of such violent outbursts and intolerable abuse, but the press--the independent one (not explicitly affiliated politically), which reflected and reinforced public opinion--also failed to put up a common front. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does experiencing a mass uprising during one's formative years shape attitudes toward post-uprising institutions? Existing research on cohorts has not examined settings of ongoing statelessness. We focus on Palestinians who witnessed the First Intifada and subsequent Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during their youth-to-adulthood transition. Analyzing a pooled sample of surveys conducted between 1996 and 2000, we observe that men from this cohort – using a youth-based definition of one's formative years – evaluated the Palestinian police more negatively than did other men, ceteris paribus. We test two, potential explanations. We find support for the proposition that men from this cohort held distinctive views about coercion and resistance that shaped their evaluations. We conclude that experiencing mass mobilization and transition during one's formative years can influence attitudes, but additional work is needed to test for their long-term endurance. Further, a younger operationalization of one's impressionable years may be salient in settings of insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of British Journal of Canadian Studies is the property of Liverpool University Press / Journals and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Scottish independence movement and its leadership have claimed ‘time is on our side’, citing the increased support for independence among younger citizens as evidence a future referendum would be more likely to deliver a ‘Yes’ result. Even amid protracted crises and tumultuous leadership changes within the Scottish National Party, observers still point to robust support for independence among younger voters as evidence of future change. Assessing this claim is important because it clarifies the role of different cleavages in Scottish and British politics and it helps us understand the motivations on both sides for trying to control the timing of any future independence referendum. In this research note, we assess the claim that time sides with the pro-independence movement, using data from the Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys and the Scottish Election Study from 1999 to 2021. Overall, we find limited support for the claim that generational replacement will help the pro-independence movement. Based on data from 1999 to 2021, the most appropriate interpretation is that time will neither help nor hurt the independence movement. Therefore, we need to treat claims on this topic from political actors with caution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critical media studies have long understood the role of the media in not just illuminating disputes between nations but in inflaming them. The media can be used to inform or distort the background and causes of conflict and arouse public opinion. This article surveys the potentially calamitous decline of public perceptions in China and Japan toward the other and asks if the media is a monitor of this decline or a party to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalism is generally seen as an issue owned by «traditional-authoritarian-nationalist», typically right-wing parties. However, data on electoral manifestos by the Manifesto Project shows that other formations too adopt nationalist positions. This includes a party family such as Western European social democracy, which traditionally opposed such stances and, as a result, has been largely neglected by the literature on nationalism, especially in terms of empirical investigations. This article investigates under which conditions social democratic parties in this region adopt nationalist positions in their electoral manifestos during the ten-year period following the outbreak of the late-2000s global financial crisis (2008-2018). It does so by performing a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis, which is able to handle and account for causal complexity in the form of conjunctural causation and equifinality. Such a configurational analysis builds on a theoretical framework positing that high levels of immigration, high ethnic fragmentation, a struggling national economy, and a supportive national public opinion are conducive to nationalist position-taking by parties. The results of the analysis indicate that whilst, as expected, no single condition is alone necessary or sufficient for the outcome of interest, two conjunctural and equifinal paths are sufficient for social democratic parties to endorse nationalist stances: a «fence-building» and a «preservation» scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese government is fond of invoking the 'hurt feelings of 1.4 billion Chinese citizens' to protest foreign actions and policies. However, this rhetoric might be nothing more than propaganda and attempts to leverage nationalist sentiment. How much do citizens in China actually care about issues completely unrelated to their daily livelihoods? To answer this, the study employs a representative survey to investigate the extent to which rhetoric about 'hurt feelings' is consistent with public opinion on four contemporary socio-political disputes involving the NBA, Marriott International, Mercedes-Benz and the city of Prague. Across the scenarios, we found that the Chinese government did not exaggerate the displeasure of audiences—citizens are aware of the cases, were indeed upset by them and advocated for retaliatory measures that were surprisingly more forceful than those adopted in reality. These emotions were largely driven by nationalistic sentiment rather than personal experiences or encounters, suggesting the success of state propaganda in steering the public opinion toward outcomes favourable to the state. These findings support recent studies highlighting the peculiar case of rising nationalism in China, and have important implications for the impact of public opinion on Chinese policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the fate of liberal nationalism in the post-communist space and the rise of illiberal variants in recent years. It explores how liberalism has been decoupled from nationalism and is now closely associated with cosmopolitanism, which supports universal rights while downplaying notions of national citizenship. The result is that, as publics have grown sour on globalization and institutions such as the European Union, illiberal nationalism has become the "default" nationalist response. While recognizing that this reaction holds across much of Europe, it investigates the rise of illiberal nationalism in Hungary and Poland. In addition to analyzing actions and statements of political elites, it presents public opinion data to argue that there remains a pronounced East-West gap on several fundamental issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the determinants of individual support for independence in Montenegro. We outline five theoretically distinct groups of factors covered by the literature and evaluate their impact on individual preference for independence. Using observational data obtained from a nationally representative survey conducted in Montenegro in 2003–2004, we find support for several hypotheses, showing that identity, income, and partisanship significantly impact individual opinion about independence. We also investigate and discuss the relative effect size of different factors associated with preference for independence. Additionally, we test variables with hitherto unexplored implications for opinions on independence, including the impact of support for EU membership, as well as support for democratic principles. Our logistic regression analyses reveal that attitudes towards EU integration and minority rights are strongly associated with support for independence. By systematically analyzing existing and new hypotheses with data from an understudied case, our findings contribute to the nascent literature on individual preferences for independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the 2013-2016 exhibitions in Moscow Manege which were later transformed into a network of entertainment centres ("historical parks") Russia-my (hi)story. The exhibitions are built on multimedia technologies and include no authentic artefacts/museum objects. There is a growing network of such centres all over Russia, all organized in a similar manner, appealing to the visitor's emotions and creating a relation of affect through the unravelling of a nationalistic historical narrative. Claimed to present "the objective picture of the Russian history" the exhibitions are following the recent developments in Russian cultural policies and history curricula. By analysing narratives presented at the "historical park" exhibitions, in policy documents and in media, this article follows the changes in public attitude towards history, which heritage is perceived as 'difficult' and 'contested' and how the digital representations influence these perceptions. Based on this analysis I argue that the reduction of the museum mechanism to only digital and multimedia form can bring along very serious issues in different political contexts. Russian historical parks enterprise, which combines the methods of fostering patriotism by the means of historical narrative templates both from the 19th and the 20th centuries, enhanced with the 21st-century technology in a form of "multimedia museums," is only one of such examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]