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The document provides information on three keynote papers and presenters. The first paper, presented by Prof. Dr. Agnieszka St¿pi¿ska, discusses the concept of media populism and its three perspectives: populism by the media, populism through the media, and populist citizen journalism. The second paper, presented by Prof. Dr. Ewa Mazierska, explores the meanders of populism in Polish cinema, particularly focusing on the oppositional cinema of the state socialism period and its depiction of the people against the corrupt government. The third paper, presented by Prof. Dr. Susana Salgado, examines the interconnections and processes between populism and denialism, using examples of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis and climate change. [Extracted from the article]

Debates over the difference between populism and nationalism have been at the forefront of political research on the far right in recent years. This paper aims to provide an empirical support for the claim that nationalism and populism are two distinct phenomena by analysing the articulations of both discourses in Vlaams Belang gender politics. In this perspective, this paper starts by presenting Benjamin De Cleen and Yannis Stavrakakis's discursive-theoretical distinction of populism and nationalism (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 2020), before to introduce the literature on far right gender politics. The contribution then analyses Vlaams Belang's gender discourses by mobilizing this theoretical framework in order to show how this distinction can help us identifying the different dimensions underlying contemporary far right gender discourses. The article concludes by suggesting new avenues for a better understanding of the various discursive strands composing far right politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on varying degrees a process of deindustrialization which, combining relocations, development of international subcontracting and financialization has led to a reclassification of territories. It mentions decline of the working class, appearance of industrial wastelands, rise of populism. It also mentions management sciences is also due to the fact that sub-disciplines have captured part of the deindustrialization by relating to categories.

In the last decade, there have been numerous studies on the rise, characteristics, and consequences of the emergence of populist parties in Western liberal democracies. However, most analyses of European populist parties have focused on the right-wing populist parties. Although some scholars have made valuable efforts to understand left-wing populism in Europe, these studies have paid attention to their ideological-organizational idiosyncrasies or the characteristics of their electoral bases. This paper aims to fill the gap in the economic and political contexts in which Radical Left Populist Parties have achieved significant electoral results putting into practice a fsQCA analysis and examining their uneven electoral performance in Europe. Following some previous work applying QCA techniques, this paper tests the theory on the importance of economic and political factors. Findings indicate that the electoral performance of radical left populism cannot be explained in a univocal way, highlighting the crucial role of equifinality in understanding this political phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an introduction to the special issue of the Athens Journal of Social Sciences on Politics. It includes six papers, which relate to various aspects of politics in today's democracies. The first paper examines populism in selecting political parties of the European Union (EU); the second explains a political experiment performed in USA; the third discusses the prospects of the 2022 elections in Brazil; the fourth states that democracies need leaders as this is the case with Israel; the fifth looks at a real threat to democracy which is radicalism and violence using the case of the Slovakian youth; and the last paper examines a case of primary elections of a Greek political party (PASOK). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws lessons from security and populism studies to theorize how radical right-wing populism (RRWP) utilizes borders as a symbolic resource in crisis narratives to clearly frame an "Us" and a threatening "Them". By analyzing the Hungarian Orbán regime's evolving rhetoric on borders, the paper illustrates how populists employ crisis narratives not to mitigate, but exacerbate ontological insecurities, and thereby facilitate de-democratization by (re)shaping voter attitudes (cf. Homolar & Scholz 2019; Steele & Homolar 2019). The paper suggests that populists-in-power rely on crisis and bordering narratives beyond voter mobilization: such narratives are in fact designed to legitimize and affirm illiberal practices that undermine liberal democracy itself, and contribute to regime building. Border crises, and crisis politics, hence become a template for the manipulation of individuals' security-of-being, and thereby a tool in the politics of reassurance and control at the broader, societal level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to identify the patterns of populists' tactics in foreign policy and to propose actionable recommendations to minimize the impacts of populism in Pakistan's foreign policy. International politics witnessed a surge in the rise of populist leaders all across the globe. The rise of populism is a new phenomenon with profound implications for state relations, and Pakistan is not an exception. This is non-experimental exploratory research employing qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. In line with Michael Zurn's analysis, this article assesses Pakistan's Foreign Policy in populist leaders' tenures. This paper delves into exploring the populism of Bhutto and Khan, and its impacts on Pakistan's foreign policy. The paper finds that Bhutto and Khan follow centralized foreign policy decision-making, employ populist Islamic and anti-west rhetoric, and poised foreign policy with their notorious political agendas. The paper recommends increasing public awareness and strengthening foreign policy-making institutions to minimize populist elements in foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many citizens feel excluded from political decision-making, which, in their eyes, is dominated by an unresponsive political elite. Citizens with high populist attitudes perceive the world through a populist 'lens' and therefore yearn for more popular control and for 'the people' to be included in the political process. Participatory budgeting should be particularly suited to address populist demands due to the fact that it is focused on giving citizens actual influence on policy-making. However, so far, no study has examined the effect of participation in a democratic innovation on populist attitudes. This paper empirically assesses if and to what extent participation in a participatory budget affects populist attitudes, and whether citizens with high populist attitudes are affected differently than citizens with low populist attitudes. We analyze panel data on participants of four local participatory budgeting events in the Netherlands before and after participation and find that citizens with high populist attitudes decrease these attitudes significantly after participating in a participatory budget, whereas citizens with low populist attitudes are not significantly affected. Moreover, the significant difference in change between these two groups suggests that citizens with high populist attitudes go 'through the looking glass' and become less populist after participating in a participatory budget. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leading to Australia's 2019 Federal election, then-Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, drew attention for posting images of him making family dinners on Facebook. These 'curry night' posts became the subject of media banter as he publicly cultivated his 'daggy-dad' persona. Assuming this behaviour was strategic, questions arise as to why. This paper considers theories of irrational appeals in political communication to interpret this behaviour. In doing so, it clarifies and operationalises 'politics of the gut', a nexus between populist politics and mediated authenticity. This paper tracks authenticity and populist appeals from Australian politicians on Facebook and gauges their efficacy by contrasting randomised and high-engagement samples. Results show these appeals were widespread but differed in configuration between candidates. Furthermore, during the sampled period, authenticity demonstrated increased engagement from users while populist appeals received decreased engagement, offering new perspectives on the efficacy of these communication styles on Facebook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of policy entrepreneurs has gained increasing attention in studies of policy change, including climate policy and governance. It foregrounds the role of agency in understanding policy change. However, agency of policy entrepreneurs in the policy process is political and conceals the power that shapes how public problems and policies are framed and defined. Thus, policy entrepreneurs should be confronted with the challenge of generating legitimacy, accountability, and justice in their actions and the implementation of their targeted policy change. Drawing on political–philosophical theories of liberal and deliberative democracy as well as environmental and ecological democracy this paper outlines a conceptual framework for critical analytical as well as normative research on strategies and impacts of policy entrepreneurs on democratic governance, primarily in climate policy but also more generally. Empirical research on the strategies and impacts of policy entrepreneurs in recent policymaking on climate change mitigation in the EU and Sweden identifies several deficits related to the democratic principles of legitimacy, accountability, and justice. It is found that policy entrepreneurs from different social spheres use cultural–institutional entrepreneurship to influence beliefs and perceptions on problems and policies. In addition, it is found that public sector policy entrepreneurs use structural entrepreneurship on ideological grounds to change existing power relations in climate governance. In all, the paper brings ideology and politics into research on policy entrepreneurs. It is suggested that not only the strategies used, but also the ideologies of the actors that use them, are decisive for the impacts of policy entrepreneurs, and thus, whether their advocacy will adhere to democratic norms and facilitate or hamper a just transition to climate neutrality and sustainability. The paper ends with proposals on how policy entrepreneurs can act more democratically, how to deal with populist policy entrepreneurs wanting to erode democracy, and conditions for climate justice movements to take responsibility and act in a more entrepreneurial way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests how lessons from Germany's national-level, comprehensively focused place-based regeneration (or levelling up) efforts could be applied in the UK. It draws the direct linkage between spatial inequality and the decline of large-scale heavy manufacturing industry at the end of the 20th century in Germany and the UK. It also posits that rapid deindustrialisation, poor-quality education and other indices of poverty and economic inequality have fuelled political fragmentation — including loss of public trust in government, national and civic institutions — in both countries. The paper explores and compares two sets of German redevelopment efforts over time, in the industrial heartland of the former West German Ruhr region and across the former East Germany, to assess their impacts on reducing political polarisation as well as bolstering redevelopment. It highlights which elements of these efforts have been most successful and why. The German experience, as described in the paper, clearly demonstrates that it takes decades to achieve measurable positive economic outcomes from redevelopment programmes. Political outcomes can also be mixed, even negative, if grassroots sentiment and public well-being are ignored or discounted in the process. In the former East Germany, despite huge transfers of development funds, grievances rooted in the economic and political dislocation of German unification in the 1990s have fuelled anti-establishment politics. The paper also examines how grassroots, philanthropic and private sector actors work alongside regional and federal governments in Germany in shaping positive political as well as socio-economic outcomes and how this might be most effectively adapted for the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concept of data sovereignty as a discursive practice in light of the populist idea of popular sovereignty and analyzes the digital policies of Western European right-wing populist parties (WEPs). It argues that WEPs use popular sovereignty and data sovereignty in a similar way: as discursive tools to legitimize drawing power back to the national level (with divergent and often contradictory interpretations), rather than workable foundations for policy plans. The paper also discusses how international cooperation, which populists often reject, is a useful tool to achieve data sovereignty. With this contradiction in mind, the paper develops an agent-based typology of data sovereignty as a discursive practice. It then analyzes the most recent official electoral programs of several WEPs: AfD in Germany, PVV and FvD in the Netherlands, UKIP in the UK, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, and Rassemblement National in France. It uses a comparative policy analysis to compare the cases along several data points such as the proposed roles of governments, private companies, and cyber diplomacy. Most of the WEPs under discussion see data sovereignty as synonymous with individual privacy, do not acknowledge the role of international cooperation, and use digital policy as a means of reinforcing their image as challenger parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper employs Michel Foucault's History of Sexuaity: Confessions of the Flesh to shed light on the perplexing phenomenon of vaccine (mandate) resistance. It argues that vaccine (mandate) resistance, while seemingly irresponsible and selfish, is entangled with the same modes of 'truth-telling' that have been part of the basic structure of modern Western governance for centuries. The paper begins by introducing the problem of vaccinate (mandate) resistance as a pedagogical problem for educators who want to teach social responsibility as informed by sound scientific knowledge and research. It then outlines the triad of knowledge/science, power/governance, and subjectivity/being at the heart of Foucault's research as a necessary frame for understanding the sociopolitical and historical entanglements of science in modern Western governance. Lastly, the paper traces Foucault's study of early Christian writers such as St. Augustine in terms of how they help establish basic practices of truth-telling that still impact how subjects relate to power today. The ultimate goal of the paper is to show how exploration of the social, historical, and political realities of science related issues are vital for understanding issues of collective existence today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the contemporary problematic of populism and associated reactionary right-wing politics, this paper argues for a greater analytic focus on the role of schools and teacher expertise in understanding the social relations of populism. This conceptual paper builds a conjunctural conceptualisation of populism that understands it as an invariable political modality of modern democracies, mobilised to different political ends. Extending this analysis, I explore the ways in which schools and teacher expertise lie at the heart of the populist tension between the 'expert' and the 'layperson'. The social relationships to knowledge and knowledge-making institutions are fundamental to populism as well as the hierarchies of being understood (or not) as a 'knower' capable of truth-claims in modern liberal democracies. I conclude by arguing the need to engage in the social relations of 'popular' and 'expert' knowledge claims and the politics that underlie them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to address the wider questions of populism and its seeming contemporary rise within the specific context of the Philippines, regarding education. Starting from the assumption that neither politics nor education sits above cultures or spaces autonomously acting upon them but instead emerges with/because/against particularities; after a brief overview of populism, I explore the conceptual characteristics in context. This is informed from my own experiences of living and researching in the Philippines, including experience of the Mindanao conflict but also the failure of liberalism in the Philippines more generally, the failure of western education to 'develop' the nation and the reactions that led to the populists rise of Duterte. The paper offers an understanding of the complexities of populism and offers some hope to how education can meet the challenge through a specific example of critical participatory community education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the subject of populism receives increasing scholarly attention from both political scientists and criminologists, so far these two bodies of literature have existed mostly in isolation of each other. This paper aims to connect them by investigating whether parties that political scientists describe as populist are likely to evince positions on criminal justice that criminologists describe as populist. Relying on a secondary data analysis comparing mainstream right-wing and populist right-wing parties for 131 elections in 24 countries since 1973, this paper concludes that the populist right on average expresses slightly more support for penal populism than the mainstream right, but that its positioning is crucially shaped by considerations relating to issues of immigration and multiculturalism. These findings suggest that most contemporary populist parties on the right primarily pursue a nativist agenda and will only invoke penal populism when it fits this overall strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has witnessed an escalating, well-financed, and well-organized international mobilization against any study, policy, or discussion related to gender or LGBTQI+ issues in many parts of the world. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been disproportionately affected by this backlash, resulting in public threats and violence against scholars and representatives of the nongovernmental sector who work on gender and LGBTQI+ issues. The anti-gender mobilization has been extremely successful in Bulgaria, where there have been numerous threats against scholars, nongovernmental organizations, and public figures dealing with gender and sexuality issues. The Bulgarian Constitutional Court was the first court on a global level to pronounce the term "gender" anti-constitutional in response to a request submitted by the government regarding ratification of the so-called Istanbul Convention. Dealing with gender and LGBTQI+ studies in Bulgaria is believed to be "illegal" by many, based on the court's decision. As a result, any approaches to gender and sexuality that do not fit essentialist and religious beliefs have become dangerous and have endangered knowledge in many contexts. In this paper, I discuss the rapid development of the anti-gender mobilization within certain neoliberal discourses and values, and using the concept of a "neoliberal utopian gaze," I outline the challenges gender and sexuality studies have faced. Based on case studies, personal experiences, and public discourses, the paper explores how gender and sexuality studies have been affected by (1) institutional decisions, (2) manipulation of scientific information, (3) radical political populism, (4) transnational religious movements, and (5) the advancement of social media. Finally, the paper discusses possible solutions to this alarming trend, paying particular attention to academic solidarity, knowledge production, and institutionally coordinated policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The North-South divide forms the central axis along which scholars study the contemporary global order. Yet many countries fall in-between the cracks of a world divided into core and periphery. This paper develops a structural account to understand the position of countries in this space of in-betweenness. The focus is on Central and Eastern Europe. I draw on already existing scholarship on liminalities, the varieties of capitalism and transition studies to argue that a liminal identity of in-betweenness goes hand-in-glove with a domestic logic of transitioning, as the state seeks to move somewhere else. Furthermore transitioning dynamics position the state in the semi-periphery, as the transition to the civilizational core requires capital and know-how from abroad. The resulting semi-peripheral position further underlines the liminal identity. The paper uses this apparatus to understand why CEE countries are typically climate change laggards within the EU. Their continuing liminal identity results in frustration over and resistance against the schooling tendencies of Brussels and Western European capitals. The dynamics of a sense of imposition of climate change mitigation policies stem from CEE's liminal positioning as apprentices, but the reasons for the perceived alienness of such policies are located in domestic societal dynamics, and CEE countries' economic structure. The specific political structures of communism and the communist transition have strengthened particularistic personal ties of friendship and family between individuals and the localities they live in, while simultaneously weakening general and abstract conceptions of the public good. Accordingly initiatives for preserving specific localities can be strong, but conceptions of protecting an abstract, global climate, are not well developed. Additionally, the material costs of protecting the climate are higher in post-communist economies due to their comparative advantage in resource and labour intensive industries, their reliance on foreign capital, and a lack of domestic innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Donald Trump's capture of the Republican Party enabled a radical questioning of received wisdom within the broader conservative intellectual movement. In particular, it enabled the emergence of a post-Trump, distinctly American New Right. This policy paper examines the American New Right and its visions for United States foreign policy. In the context of contemporary American politics, the New Right is best understood as a rejection of the 'fusionism' that has characterized US conservatism since the early decades after the Second World War. The paper argues that there are three major identifiable parts of the New Right: the Claremonters, the post-liberals and the national conservatives. In part because of their 'big-tent' character, as well as deft intellectual leadership by Yoram Hazony, the national conservatives have become the most influential group within the contemporary New Right. The article also examines how the New Right has attempted to create an alternative ideational infrastructure, with a clear focus on entrenching itself through large-scale credentialing of personnel deemed to be loyal to the New Right's agenda. There is reason to speak of a 'natcon takeover' of traditional conservative institutions. This is particularly the case with the Heritage Foundation, the largest and most influential conservative think tank. While all segments of the New Right ostensibly embrace some notion of grand strategic restraint, the policy paper argues that the rise of national conservatism is likely to accelerate the US pivot from Europe to Asia rather than lead to neo-isolationism, as is sometimes suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Marmara University Journal of Political Science / Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of Marmara University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

On June 29, 2019, Carola Rackete docked the rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 on the Sicilian island of Lampedusa, in defiance of a ban imposed by Italy's Interior Minister Matteo Salvini. The migrants rescued by the Sea-Watch 3 had been blocked at sea for the previous two weeks, making it to international headlines and sparking a heated debate around sovereignty and humanitarianism in the face of the European migration crisis. On her arrival, Rackete was arrested for refusing to obey a military vessel and aiding illegal immigration. This paper investigates social media and international news discourses around the Sea-Watch 3 docking, to be regarded as a critical incident capable of catalysing attention and generating a significant media resonance. Results show how both social and traditional media contributed to the proliferation of misogynous attacks against Captain Rackete, at the intersection between right-wing populist discourses of Italian 'sovranism' and European anti-immigrationism. By triangulating the role of the media, intersectional hostility and populist ideology, this paper sheds light on how these three factors feed into each other in the discursive construction of the 'Fortress Europe' of present times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism has become a widely used concept in both academia and the media. The term's popularity has encouraged scholars to question how it is applied and to theorize on the consequences of its use. However, there is little empirical research on the temporal and cross-country changes in the use of the term in the public sphere. This article analyses the significations given to the terms 'populism' and 'populist' in six countries' daily newspapers over a period of nearly two decades. It presents the results of a quantitative content analysis of texts (N = 3252) published in legacy daily papers in Finland, Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Turkey in the years 2000–2018. The article shows how the salience, meanings and perceived repercussions of 'populism' change over time and vary between the countries. The study reveals how, towards the end of the 2010s, the term is increasingly used in the context of right-wing populism and as a reference to political ideas that are detrimental to democracy. The results are examined in the context of developing academic discussions regarding the effects of 'populism' becoming a ubiquitous signifier in the media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emerging debate on transnational populism has thus far mainly focused on cases, which have remained relatively inconsequential due to the weak institutionalisation of the political transnationalism arena. By bringing in a better-structured arena of migrant transnationalism, this paper introduces populist political parties mobilising transnational migrants to the debate and explores the resulting phenomenon of homeland populism. The paper investigates three populist parties that operate transnationally – Ecuadorian APAIS in Spain, Turkish AKP in Germany and Estonian EKRE in Finland. The analysis demonstrates that the phenomenon of homeland populism shares several distinct features despite the ideological, geographic, cultural and migratory differences between the three cases. The cases also sport differences: while the construction of 'the people' depends on migratory context, the construction of 'the antagonist' is more related to the ideational variations of populism. The study also suggests that the key target group of homeland populism are economic migrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Indonesia's political strategic environment, Islamic narratives have been among the main narratives, but have not always been dominant. The 2014 presidential election displayed the beginning of a rising trend of Islamic narratives within the political context in Indonesia. Since then Islamic narratives influenced the strategy of Indonesia's populist leaders, as particularly seen during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election and 2019 presidential election. This paper analyzes how populism as a strategy was used in recent Indonesian elections. For this purpose, it uses the conception of populism as a political strategy proposed by Weyland. Building on this approach, the paper explains the strategic adjustments made in the use of populism from 2014, 2017, and 2019 in Indonesian political events. It argues that the strategic environment faced by populist actors in Indonesia's 2019 election affected their decision to choose Islamic narratives as an instrument for mass mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background and research aims. Considering the high prevalence of conspiracy theories and misinformation, there is an urgent need to explain the tendency to adopt a conspiracy mentality and identify behavioural (including voting) outcomes of a high conspiracy mentality. The aims of the present paper are 1) the examination of populist attitudes dimensions, relative deprivation and mistrust of expertise as predictors of conspiracy mentality and 2) proposal of comprehensive models, that combine predictors of conspiracy mentality and its voting consequences. Methodology. Studies utilised OSL regression and structural equation modelling. Results. The overall regression was statistically significant. It was found that dimensions of populist attitudes (anti-elitism, sovereignty), relative deprivation and mistrust of expertise were significant predictors of conspiracy mentality. In line with the second research aim, the fitness of models was confirmed and results suggest mistrust of expertise is also a significant predictor of far-right voting. Discussion. The contribution of the paper lies in connecting conspiracy mentality with not only attitudes but also with important behaviour outcome - voting behaviour. We propose future research should experimentally examine whether the reduction of some of the identified predictors could possibly lower levels of conspiracy mentality and whether this reduction translates into voting behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that understanding populism as a communicative process and contextualising its modern forms in relation to our current political communication environment improves our understanding of how it grips citizens. The paper identifies the disruptive communicative practices of modern populist politicians as characteristic of a digital media-dominated fourth age of political communication in extension of Blumler's account. It explores the reaction of the current wave of populism against institutional norms of political communication and its recognition and construction of a perceived disconnect between public representatives and citizens. The paper identifies three aspects of modern populist communication that, through this oppositional positioning, erode institutional communication in the fourth age: a populist pragmatics of disruptive symbolic action, an ontology that sees directness as the only means of breaching the divide between appearance and reality in politics, and an epistemological stance that replaces expertise with authenticity. These constitute an injection of grassroots communicative forms into institutional politics. The result is the exposition but also deepening of the lopsided efficacy of the fourth age whereby citizens feel inefficacious in relation to institutional politics but increasingly able to participate at a grassroots level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an in-depth investigation into the intricate dynamics between socio-political crises, Black and Muslim social groups, and the escalating support for Populism and populist movements within the context of contemporary France. Our study seeks to unveil the direct and distinct correlations that exist between these minority communities and the surge of Populism while empirically scrutinising the underlying relationships between socioeconomic, cultural, and political integration and the rise of populist sentiments. The research delves into the complex landscape of Populism, encompassing its various manifestations and identifying how socio-political crises provide fertile ground for populist appeals. By exploring the intricate interplay between these elements, our study contributes to an enhanced understanding of the multifaceted nature of Populism within diverse social contexts. The paper's theoretical framework is rooted in the theory of Populism, the principles of intersectionality and the analysis of the relationship between world-feelings and populist support. Methodologically, we take a comprehensive approach based on quantitative and data collection methods. Thus, we empirically examine the relationship between socioeconomic, cultural, and political integration and whether the link between these factors is related to Populism and political radicalisation. The results reveal intricate correlations between integration and the prevalence of populist sentiments, highlighting the role of socioeconomic and cultural factors and political engagement in shaping these dynamics. This article not only contributes to the academic understanding of populism and minority politics but also offers practical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although attention to populism is ever-increasing, the concept remains contested. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of populism research and identifies tendencies to a conflation of host ideologies and populism in political science through a two-step analysis. First, we conduct a quantitative review of 884 abstracts from 2004 to 2018 using text-as-data methods. We show that scholars sit at "separate tables," divided by geographical foci, methods, and host ideologies. Next, our qualitative analysis of 50 articles finds a common conflation of populism with other ideologies, resulting in the analytical neglect of the former. We, therefore, urge researchers to properly distinguish populism from "what it travels with" and engage more strongly with the dynamic interlinkages between thin and thick ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing from the National Role Conceptions (NRCs) framework, this paper seeks to assess whether, beneath the ideological, structural or discursive differences exposed in the literature, a pattern of convergence among the foreign policies of populist parties in Europe can be identified in how these conceive the orientation and tasks that their countries should follow in the international system. Comparing the NRCs which emerge from the foreign policy discourse of three populist parties of diverse persuasions—Front National/Rassemblement National in France, Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, Podemos in Spain—the paper argues that these parties share the underlying conception of a decisively pro-active, transformative and value-based role for their countries in both European and global perspectives, which the different articulations of the people/other dichotomy in their foreign policy discourse affect and differentiate in terms of goals and preferences.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite increasing attention to citizenship education since the turn of the 21st century, the recent spread of authoritarian populism worldwide has raised relatively little attention in educational policy and research. As a result, the possibilities and limitations that national curricula offer to educators to deal with this phenomenon are still rather uncertain. In this article, we develop an analytical framework based on the key features of authoritarian populism and critical citizenship education to compare the elements and scope for addressing populism in the national curricula of Brazil and Spain, two countries where national populism is particularly widespread. This paper examines the extent to which national curricula in these countries include goals and content that enable teachers to address the complexities of this phenomenon ranging from political polarisation through to the exaltation of national identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While conspiracy theories have traditionally received attention from the Turkish public and political elite, recently, however, they have proliferated when explaining complex situations. This paper examines conspiracy theories in Turkey and the role of entertainment media, specifically the popular period drama, Payitaht: Abdülhamid, in mainstreaming conspiracy theories. Payitaht: Abdülhamid, as an ideological state apparatus, repurposes anti-Semitism as salient conspiracy theories by creating scapegoats and existential others. This paper argues that the state uses entertainment media to disseminate conspiracy theories and, in effect, endorses anti-Semitism. As a result, anti-Semitism has transformed from a marginal movement to a mainstream movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Journal of Political Philosophy / Las Torres de Lucca is the property of Revista Las Torres de Lucca. Facultad de Filosofia, Ciudad Universitaria and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper critically examines the recent presidential memorandum that replaced the Anglicized exonymic version "Turkey" with the endonym "Türkiye" as a conscious, performative and public relations campaign at both national and international levels. On the surface, this change addresses populist sociolinguistic hypersensitivities surrounding the connotations of the term "turkey" while simultaneously harnessing the commodification and marketization of the Turkey brand through selective references culled from collective memory (i.e., past) and branding aimed at economic gains (i.e., future). However, at the deeper level, this transformation serves as a discursive political instrument and a top-down nation branding effort powered by substantial resources from the state and its institutions with an ultimate motivation to consolidate President Erdoğan's political power and authority, elevate his status to that of a national leader and institutionalize his populist/nationalist yerli ve millî rhetoric from a de facto to de jure within Yeni Türkiye as a competitive authoritarian regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to understand the factors that shape populist radical right parties’ economic policies. While there is a good understanding of how these parties’ core ideology of nativism and authoritarianism shapes social policies, we know less about economic policies. With few exceptions, the insights of this literature have also not travelled to East-Central Europe, despite the strength of the populist right in this region. Instead, authors writing on the region focus on the social coalitions forged by populist parties as an explanation for policies. These authors however do not focus on the role of populism in policymaking. Our paper therefore asks whether the ideological literature can travel to economic policies as well, and specifically to the cases of Hungary and Poland. Drawing on the evidence of financial market reforms under the Fidesz and PiS rule in Hungary and Poland, and a congruence analysis testing the predictive power of existing approaches, we show that a combination of ideological and material factors is needed to explain observed economic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the consequences of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro's strategy of appointing military officials to high‐level positions within the federal executive branch and its effect on public opinion about the Armed Forces. The main argument is that the outsized role of the Armed Forces in the Bolsonaro administration harmed public perceptions of the Brazilian military. Despite the robust recruitment process in the public bureaucracy, Bolsonaro found a way to surround himself with ideologically extreme bureaucrats at the highest level. The study explores the systematic approach of enhancing military personnel's presence in the government and hypothesises about declining levels of trust in the Armed Forces. The paper draws on data from three waves of the Brazilian survey 'A Cara da Democracia' (The Face of Democracy) to show that the population's level of trust in the Armed Forces decreased during Bolsonaro's tenure. Furthermore, the Brazilian survey data also suggest that lower trust in the Armed Forces is robustly associated with dissatisfaction with Brazilian democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various analyses show that right-wing populist parties (RWP) tend to be sceptical of climate science and policy. This points to a blank space in the dominant analyses of populism: their blindness towards society-nature relations. This paper aims to develop an approach grounded in Cultural Political Economy (CPE) that can be used to decipher the mediation of RWP within the context of economic, political, and cultural developments as well as society–nature relations. Against this background, the argument is developed that RWP is concerned not only with countering migration and processes of societal liberalisation, but also with defending an existing way of life that is firmly rooted in the destructive appropriation of nature. As a current of right-wing politics, RWP defends the imperial mode of living by expressing scepticism towards the existence of anthropogenic climate change. The paper contributes to a better understanding of the political economy of RWP by linking the dimensions of social domination with the appropriation of nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The wide circulation of conspiracy narratives and their frequent intertwining with populist rhetoric is both an element of concern and a topic of intense scientific and philosophical debate. The depth of the link between conspiracy theories and populism represents a crucial issue whose comprehension can facilitate understanding their specific nature and the factors behind their diffusion in public communication. To this end, it is necessary to cultivate an interdisciplinary approach and great critical attention, eschewing monocausal explanations. This paper addresses the question of the essentially political nature of conspiracism, confronting the recent epistemological debate that, by putting the positivist paradigm aside, has sought to explore and understand the socio-cultural roots of conspiracy rhetoric, with its sceptical, antagonistic and hermetic traits. By integrating the reflections of epistemologists such as Cassam or Harris with the considerations of political scientists such as Taggart and with Schmitt's radical reflections on politics, it is perhaps possible to reintegrate the different approaches to populist conspiracism into an overall social genealogical perspective, thanks also to recent demographic elaborations. Thus, we could ascribe the spread of conspiracism to the prevalence in societies of a hyperpolitical discursive regime, i.e., founded on the principle of opposition, without the possibility of compromise, between different groups and interests. At the basis of such Manichaeism, it is plausible to place in the first place the growing inequalities and related social disintegration, which hinder the circulation of trust and recognition between individuals and groups, thus ending up undermining democracy at its roots, as a political system that legitimises and thus peacefully regulates conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to conduct a literature review of the existing nexus between conspiracy theories and populist politics. Most of the literature considering the political nature of conspiracy theories has focused mainly on individual action and electoral choices, hence setting aside the agency of political leaders that deliberately resort to these tales to mobilise supporters. On the contrary, conspiracy theories are increasingly moving away from extremist politics to enter the institutional political arena and become part and parcel of the political narratives and strategies of institutional figures. Against this backdrop, the present work offers a new approach to investigate the connection between populist conspiracy theories and conspiracist populism and attempts to explain how conspiracist populism works and what its potential impact on contemporary democracies is. The analysis of the literature offers some theoretical insights to explore the specific case of the presidency of Kais Saied in Tunisia, which has been labelled as a form of constitutional populism integrating conspiracy theories. The inquiry on the Tunisian case demonstrates that conspiracy theories can represent both tactics and framings for populists in power, and, if democratic checks and balances are weak enough, they can lead to the erosion of democracy itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the literature on partisan politics in Portugal at the national and sub-national levels. Starting with a description of the institutional setting, main parties and electoral results, the paper then delves into how partisanship matters for the policies implemented by incumbent governments. The available evidence indicates clear differences in several policy areas, such as the labour market, welfare, health, education, and gender issues, with Portuguese left- and right-wing governments acting in line with their ideological agendas. Voter behaviour and the emergence of the populist far-right in the Portuguese parliament are also analysed. (JEL codes: D04, D7, H4, and H7) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]