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Populist nationalism is on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. Depending on the political orientation, it is both reinforced and confronted by social media and social movements. Nationalism also cements the longstanding rule of autocratic regimes in West Africa, particularly in Togo, Benin and Senegal. Supported by the commodification of the party system, autocrats set up a shadow state. They use populism to prop up their illegitimate rule and to destabilize the opposition. The internet and social media play a crucial role in the spread of fake news through the mostly state-controlled media. The Catholic Church also tried, with little success, to counteract the wave of nationalism. In Benin, for example, in 2019 the bishops of Cotonou called for a 'fast on the lies that inundate and poison interpersonal and social relationships'. In Lomé, the bishops' conference condemned the systematic persecution of the opposition and the arrest of its leader, presidential candidate and former prime minister Agbeyome Kodjo. Senegal, like Benin, has long been marketed as a 'showcase of democracy' in Africa, including peaceful political transition. But things changed radically with the 2019 Senegalese presidential election, which brought new configurations. One of the main problems was political transhumance, which was elevated to the rank of religion with disregard for political morality. It threatened political stability and peace. In response, social networks of mostly young activists established in 2011 after the Arab Spring focused on campaigning for grassroots voters for good governance and democracy. They proposed a break with a political system they saw as neo-colonialist. Activists such as 'Y'en a marre' (literally 'I'm fed up') and other dissident social movements benefited from the country's particular social conditions, which favoured collective action. Should President Macky Sall opt for a third term in 2024, it would again pose a serious challenge to Senegalese democracy., Le nationalisme populiste est en hausse en Afrique subsaharienne. Selon l'orientation politique, elle est à la fois renforcée et confrontée par les réseaux sociaux et les mouvements sociaux. Le nationalisme cimente également la domination de longue date des régimes autocratiques en Afrique de l'Ouest, en particulier au Togo, au Bénin et au Sénégal. Soutenus par la marchandisation du système des partis, les autocrates ont mis en place un État fantôme. Ils utilisent le populisme pour étayer leur pouvoir illégitime et déstabiliser l'opposition. Internet et les médias sociaux jouent un rôle crucial dans la diffusion de fausses nouvelles par le biais de médias principalement contrôlés par l'État. L'Église catholique tenta aussi, sans grand succès, de contrer la vague de nationalisme. Au Bénin, par exemple, en 2019, les évêques de Cotonou ont appelé à "un jeûne sur les mensonges qui inondent et empoisonnent les relations interpersonnelles et sociales". À Lomé, la conférence des évêques a condamné la persécution systématique de l'opposition et l'arrestation de son leader, candidat à la présidence et ancien Premier ministre Agbeyome Kodjo. Le Sénégal, comme le Bénin, a longtemps été présenté comme une "vitrine de la démocratie" en Afrique, y compris la transition politique pacifique. Mais les choses ont radicalement changé avec l'élection présidentielle sénégalaise de 2019, qui a apporté de nouvelles configurations. L'un des principaux problèmes était la transhumance politique, élevée au rang de religion au mépris de la morale politique. Il menaçait la stabilité politique et la paix. En réponse, les réseaux sociaux de jeunes militants pour la plupart créés en 2011 après le printemps arabe se sont concentrés sur la campagne des électeurs de base pour la bonne gouvernance et la démocratie. Ils ont proposé de rompre avec un système politique qu'ils considéraient comme néo-colonialiste. Des militants comme "Y'en a marre" (littéralement "j'en ai marre") et d'autres mouvements so

Die Richtlinienkompetenz ist im Zuge der Auseinandersetzungen um die Asylpolitik die Diskussion geraten. Es zeigt sich, dass ihre Inanspruchnahme zur Konfliktlösung nicht nur ungeeignet war, sondern sich kontraproduktiv, nämlich krisenverschärfend wirkte.

Populist nationalism is on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. Depending on the political orientation, it is both reinforced and confronted by social media and social movements. Nationalism also cements the longstanding rule of autocratic regimes in West Africa, particularly in Togo, Benin and Senegal. Supported by the commodification of the party system, autocrats set up a shadow state. They use populism to prop up their illegitimate rule and to destabilize the opposition. The internet and social media play a crucial role in the spread of fake news through the mostly state-controlled media. The Catholic Church also tried, with little success, to counteract the wave of nationalism. In Benin, for example, in 2019 the bishops of Cotonou called for a ‘fast on the lies that inundate and poison interpersonal and social relationships’. In Lomé, the bishops' conference condemned the systematic persecution of the opposition and the arrest of its leader, presidential candidate and former prime minister Agbeyome Kodjo. Senegal, like Benin, has long been marketed as a 'showcase of democracy' in Africa, including peaceful political transition. But things changed radically with the 2019 Senegalese presidential election, which brought new configurations. One of the main problems was political transhumance, which was elevated to the rank of religion with disregard for political morality. It threatened political stability and peace. In response, social networks of mostly young activists established in 2011 after the Arab Spring focused on campaigning for grassroots voters for good governance and democracy. They proposed a break with a political system they saw as neo-colonialist. Activists such as 'Y'en a marre' (literally 'I'm fed up') and other dissident social movements benefited from the country's particular social conditions, which favoured collective action. Should President Macky Sall opt for a third term in 2024, it would again pose a serious challenge to Senegalese democracy., Populistischer Nationalismus ist in Subsahara-Afrika auf dem Vormarsch. Er wird je nach politischer Ausrichtung durch soziale Medien und soziale Bewegungen sowohl verstärkt als auch konfrontiert. Der Nationalismus zementiert auch die langjährige Herrschaft autokratischer Regime in Westafrika, insbesondere in Togo, Benin und Senegal. Unterstützt durch die Kommodifizierung des Parteiensystems errichten Autokraten einen Schattenstaat. Sie nutzen den Populismus, um ihre illegitime Herrschaft zu stützen und die Opposition zu destabilisieren. Das Internet und soziale Medien spielen eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Verbreitung von Fake News durch die meist staatlich kontrollierten Medien. Auch die katholische Kirche versuchte mit wenig Erfolg, der Welle des Nationalismus entgegenzuwirken. In Benin beispielsweise riefen die Bischöfe von Cotonou 2019 zu einem "Fasten der Lügen auf, die zwischenmenschliche und soziale Beziehungen überschwemmen und vergiften". In Lomé verurteilte die Bischofskonferenz die systematische Verfolgung der Opposition und die Verhaftung ihres Anführers, Präsidentschaftskandidaten und ehemaligen Ministerpräsidenten Agbeyome Kodjo. Senegal wurde, ebenso wie Benin, lange Zeit als 'Schaufenster der Demokratie' in Afrika verkauft, einschließlich eines friedlichen politischen Wandels. Doch die Dinge änderten sich radikal mit der senegalesischen Präsidentschaftswahl von 2019, die neue Konfigurationen mit sich brachte. Eines der Hauptprobleme war die politische Transhumanz, die unter Missachtung der politischen Moral in den Rang einer Religion erhoben wurde. Sie bedrohte die politische Stabilität und den Frieden. Als Reaktion darauf konzentrierten sich soziale Netzwerke von meist jungen Aktivisten, die 2011 nach dem Arabischen Frühling gegründet wurden, darauf, Wähler an der Basis für gute Regierungsführung und Demokratie zu werben. Sie schlugen einen Bruch mit einem politischen System vor, das sie als neokolonialistisch ansahen. Aktivisten wie 'Y'en a marre

Ergebnisse der wöchentlichen Umfragen, welches Thema aus Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft die Bundesbürger persönlich am meisten beschäftigt.

Colombia elected a new progressive government on 19 June. While the COVID-19 pandemic did not play a direct role in the campaign, it has deepened both structural problems as well as pre-pandemic trends such as high levels of social inequality, citizen distrust regarding state institutions, and increasing violence in certain regions of the country. While these social disparities led to a call for change by different groups, reducing violence will be a key policy test for the new government. COVID-19 hit Colombia at a delicate time. A comprehensive peace agreement had been signed in 2016, but the elections of 2018 brought the forces that had run on an anti-agreement platform into government. A half-hearted implementation of the accord resulted, which together with increasing citizen dissatisfaction led to mass protests at the end of 2019. In the wake of the pandemic's onset, around six million Colombians fell into poverty. Despite some social policies such as the solidarity income (ingreso solidario), in many fields the state retreated from the provision of public services - in contrast with an increase in repressive measures, as for instance in the pursuit of coca eradication. After a short decrease in collective forms of violence due to lockdown policies, pre-pandemic patterns resumed. In peripheral and border zones, armed actors strategically leveraged the pandemic to increase their control over illicit enterprises and local populations. The entanglement of deteriorating socio-economic conditions, increasing violence, and an extremely unpopular government opened the door to the election of the first left-leaning president in Colombia's history, Gustavo Petro. The new government offers the historic opportunity to save the peace agreement and initiate the profound changes Colombia desperately needs. External actors need to support the reform agenda. Particularly, the implementation of the structural changes established in the peace agreement as well as reform of the

Oxford COVID-19 Database (OxCOVID19 Database) is a comprehensive source of information related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This relational database contains time-series data on epidemiology, government responses, mobility, weather and more across time and space for all countries at the national level, and for more than 50 countries at the regional level. It is curated from a variety of (wherever available) official sources. Its purpose is to facilitate the analysis of the spread of SARS-CoV-2 virus and to assess the effects of non-pharmaceutical interventions to reduce the impact of the pandemic. Our database is a freely available, daily updated tool that provides unified and granular information across geographical regions.

Technocratic governments and similar systems that give more voice to experts in the decision-making process are one of the potential alternatives to traditional representative party government. These alternatives have become increasingly popular, especially in countries where strong political disaffection and previous favourable pro-expert attitudes exist simultaneously. The Spanish case is one of these settings, with the emergence of a political party, Ciudadanos (Citizens), that represents these ideas. This article contributes to the understanding of public opinion support for an expert government, its main motives, and social supports. We claim that experts are not so much a decision-making alternative as they are a desired piece of the decision-making process. Support for a more significant role for experts comes especially from those that credit them with ample technical capacities, but most citizens want them to work as a piece of representative government, not as an alternative to it. The article combines two types of evidence: A survey of a representative sample of the population, including innovative questions about support to expert governments, and 10 focus groups that allow a more in-depth comprehension of the support (and criticism) of an increased role for experts. The results provide a nuanced picture of the types of expert involvement sought and their respective social support.

Researchers on inequalities in representation debate about whether governments represent the preferences of the rich better than those of less affluent citizens. We argue that problems of high- and low-status citizens are treated differently already at the agenda-setting stage. If affluent and less affluent citizens have different priorities about which issues should be tackled by government, then these divergent group priorities explain why government favours high- over low-status citizens. Due to different levels of visibility, resources and social ties, governments pay more attention to what high-status citizens consider important in their legislative agenda and pay less attention to the issues of low-status citizens. We combined three types of data for our research design. First, we extracted the policy priorities (most important issues) for all status groups from Eurobarometer data between 2002 and 2016 for 10 European countries and matched this information with data on policy outcomes from the Comparative Agendas Project. We then strengthen our results using a focused comparison of three single country studies over longer time series. We show that a priority gap exists and has representational consequences. Our analysis has important implications for the understanding of the unequal representation of status groups as it sheds light on an important, yet so far unexplored, aspect of the political process. Since the misrepresentation of political agendas occurs at the very beginning of the policy-making process, the consequences are potentially even more severe than for the unequal treatment of preferences.

Dieser Bericht enthält zwölf mögliche Szenarien für die Welt im Jahr 2030. Er bietet Einblicke darin, wie die EU angesichts der großen disruptiven Veränderungen, die in diesem Jahrzehnt voraussichtlich aufkommen werden, ihre Handlungsfähigkeit erhalten und ausbauen kann. Die Publikation erschien im Vorfeld der Bundestagswahl im September 2021, die als Referendum über ein zehn Jahre andauerndes Krisenmanagement der Regierung gewertet werden kann.

Containing twelve scenarios for the world in 2030, this report offers insights into how the EU can maintain and build up its capacity to act in the face of the major disruptive changes that are likely to come over this decade. It is being released in the run-up to German elections in September 2021 that will serve as a kind of referendum on ten years of government-heavy crisis management.

Hätte man einen Kenner der spanischen Politik bei der nationalen Parlamentswahl von 2008 nach den Veränderungen in den kommenden zwölf Jahren gefragt, hätte er wohl kaum vorhergesagt, dass bald über 30 Prozent der Stimmen auf Parteien entfallen würden, die es zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch gar nicht gab. Die rechtsradikale Partei Vox ("Stimme"), die bei der Parlamentswahl im November 2019 einen Stimmenanteil von etwa 15 Prozent erhielt, existiert erst seit Ende 2013. Unidos Podemos ("Gemeinsam schaffen wir das"), eine sich selbst als linkspopulistisch präsentierende Partei, die auf dem Höhepunkt ihres Erfolges 2016 etwas mehr als 21 Prozent der nationalen Stimmen erhielt, wurde erst wenige Wochen zuvor gegründet. Die Partei Ciudadanos ("Bürger"), auf die bei der Wahl im April 2019 fast 16 Prozent der abgegebenen Stimmen entfielen, war ursprünglich eine 2006 gegründete katalanische Regionalpartei, die erst seit 2015 an nationalen Wahlen teilnimmt. Demgegenüber sank der Stimmenanteil der zwei einstmals führenden sozialistischen und konservativen Altparteien - Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, "Spanische Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei") und Partido Popular (PP, "Volkspartei") - von gemeinsam fast 84 Prozent im Jahr 2008 auf knapp 49 Prozent bei der Wahl im November 2019.

COVID-19, arguably the new millennium's most trying test of state capacity, caught the world off guard. In order to contain the spread of the virus, governments had to respond quickly and comprehensively: strict lockdowns, movement restrictions, masks, and social distancing - measures that draw not only on public resources but also on the buy-in and cooperation of civil society. Citizen compliance and cooperation are founded on trust in government institutions. As such, the pandemic has also been a stress test for trust in government. Trust in government is a crucial determinant of effective crisis management, and governments lacking such trust suffer a profound disadvantage. In many instances, strict lockdown measures were accompanied by an expansion of executive powers. This creates power imbalances, or aggravates existing ones, and poses a threat to trust in government. High levels of vaccine hesitancy, a looming recession, and expectations of government support require ongoing efforts to build and ensure trust in government. Even though many African countries seem to have gotten through the coronavirus crisis relatively well until now, vaccine hesitancy and looming recessions pose ongoing challenges for trust in government. Hence, governments must actively engage in building trust as they prepare for future crises. The Ebola epidemic has shown that a bottom-up approach entailing collaboration with pre-existing networks and institutions at the local level can facilitate this process. In contexts where executive powers have been expanded, the evolution of this process needs to be carefully monitored.

During his election campaign, Jair Bolsonaro promised economic recovery, the fight against corruption, and an iron hand against violent crime - today, these tasks rep­resent the weak spots of the President: Brazil has become an epicentre of the Covid‑19 pandemic. Even though Bolsonaro downplays the situation and opposes containment measures, the virus and the chaotic crisis management are bringing about serious nega­tive health, social, and economic consequences for the citizens. Investigations, in­cluding those on corruption, and revelations about the Justice Minister who resigned are targeting the President and his family. While the homicide rate is on the rise again in 2020, Bolsonaro pleaded in a cabinet meeting for armed resistance from the population against the health protection policies in the federal states. Threatened by impeachment, the President is struggling for his political survival, challenging the rule of law and democratic principles. (author's abstract)

Wirtschaftsaufschwung, Korruptionsbekämpfung und eine eiserne Hand gegen Gewaltkriminalität hat Jair Bolsonaro im Wahlkampf versprochen - heute bilden sie die schwachen Flanken des Präsidenten: Brasilien ist ein Epizentrum der Covid‑19-Pandemie geworden. Auch wenn Bolsonaro diese kleinredet und sich gegen die Eindämmungsmaßnahmen stellt, zeitigen das Virus und das chaotische Krisen­manage­ment gravie­rende sanitäre, soziale und ökonomische Folgen für Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Ermittlungen, unter anderem wegen Korruption, sowie die Enthüllungen des zurückgetretenen Justiz­ministers nehmen den Präsidenten und seine Familie ins Visier. Während die Mord­rate im Jahr 2020 wieder ansteigt, plädierte Bolsonaro in einer Kabinett­sitzung für den bewaffneten Widerstand der Bevölkerung gegen die Politik des Ge­sundheits­schutzes in den Bundesstaaten. Der vom Impeachment bedrohte Präsident ringt um sein politisches Überleben und fordert dabei rechtsstaatliche und demokratische Prinzipien heraus. (Autorenreferat)

Der Druck auf die indigenen Völker Lateinamerikas steigt bis hin zur Existenzbedrohung. Die linkspopulistische Regierung Mexikos setzt sich ebenso wenig für die Interessen der Indigenen ein wie die konservative Übergangsregierung in Bolivien. Brasiliens rechtsradikaler Präsident betreibt gar eine offene Assimilierungspolitik. Als neue Bedrohung kommt nun das Coronavirus hinzu, auf das die isoliert lebenden Völker immunologisch nicht vorbereitet sind. Der eingeschränkte Zugang zu Gesundheitsdiensten und fehlende Intensivbetreuungskapazitäten erweisen sich während der Coronakrise in schwer zugänglichen Indigenengebieten als verhängnisvoll. Indigenenverbände befürchten, dass COVID-19 zur Ausrottung einiger indigener Völker führen kann. Lateinamerikas indigene Völker sind eine bevorzugte Zielscheibe schwerer Menschenrechtsverletzungen. In Brasilien wurden allein in den letzten zwei Jahren mindestens 163 Indigene im Kontext von Landkonflikten getötet. In Bolivien erschoss das Militär bei Antiregierungsprotesten 36 überwiegend indigene Unterstützer des Ex-Präsidenten Evo Morales. Und im mexikanischen Chiapas leben derzeit etwa 5.000 überwiegend indigene Vertriebene in improvisierten Camps. Zwar bezeichnen sich Mexiko und Bolivien in ihren Verfassungen als plurikulturelle Nation bzw. als plurinationaler Staat. Doch in der Realität werden indigene Rechte zunehmend ausgehöhlt, um den Ausbau von Infrastruktur, Landwirtschaft und Rohstoffabbau in indigenen Gebieten voranzutreiben. Besonders perfide zeigt sich dabei Brasiliens Präsident Bolsonaro, indem er die Indigenenschutzbehörde unter die Leitung eines Agrarlobbyisten stellt. Die Bundesregierung und die Europäische Union sollten es trotz der Fokussierung auf das eigene Coronavirus-Management nicht versäumen, auf die besorgniserregende Lage der indigenen Völker zu reagieren. Um ein Massensterben durch COVID-19 abzuwenden, müsste die WHO umgehend den Transport medizinischen Personals und Behandlungsinfrastruktur in die teils

Thanks to economic growth, Poland’s ruling PiS party has introduced social programs that have further bolstered its popularity. Unlike in recent European elections, the opposition is not running as a unified bloc in parliamentary elections on October 13, 2019. If PiS again wins a majority, it will take steps to cement its system of illiberal democracy. As long as he maintains good relations with Donald Trump, PiS’s leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski does not seem wary of reactions from Brussels and Berlin.

Boris Johnson geht auf Konfrontationskurs: Seit seiner Ernennung zum Premier­minister des Vereinigten Königreichs ordnet er die Agenda seiner Regierung dem Ziel unter, die EU um jeden Preis zum 31. Oktober 2019 zu verlassen - mit zunehmender Wahrscheinlichkeit ohne Abkommen. An seinen ersten Amtshandlungen wird deut­lich, dass der Wechsel mehr ist als eine Stabsübergabe, wie sie bei einem Führungswechsel inner­halb einer Partei üblich ist. Die Konservative Partei wandelt sich unter seiner Führung endgültig zur Partei des harten No-Deal Brexits, während die Opposition zerstritten bleibt. Ein Machtkampf mit dem Parlament ist in vollem Gange. Ange­sichts einer nur noch theoretisch denkbaren Parlamentsmehrheit sind vorgezogene Neu­wahlen unausweichlich. Entscheidend ist dabei ihr Zeitpunkt: ob vor oder nach dem EU-Austritt. In Anbetracht dessen muss auch die EU ihre Brexit-Strategie überdenken. (Autorenreferat)

The article mainly seeks to explain the legislature's preferences in social welfare before and after democratization using South Korea as a case study. Based on an original dataset that consists of all executive and of legislative branch-submitted bills between 1948 and 2016 - roughly 60,000- legislative priority on social welfare is compared over time, and tested using logistic regressions. The key focus of analysis is whether and how the level of democracy affected the degree and universality of social welfare priority. The findings show that the promotion of social welfare is positively related to higher levels of democracy in a continuous fashion, which clearly points to the need to avoid applying a simple regime dichotomy - authoritarian or democratic - when seeking to understand social welfare development. Going further, the article examines the legislature's priority in welfare issues within a presidential structure and under majoritarian electoral rule, at different levels of democracy. The result shows that the higher levels of democracy are, the more the legislative branch contributes to the overall salience of social welfare legislative initiatives as compared to the executive branch. Moreover, the legislative branch itself prioritizes a social welfare agenda - alongside democratic deepening - over other issues.

On 5 August 2019, India's home minister Amit Shah made a shock announcement revoking India's constitutional guarantee of autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This article focuses on the wider ideological context of Hindu nationalism that has spurred this decision in order to assess the move's far-reaching implications for Indian democracy and peace in South Asia. In addition to the revocation of autonomy, a key condition of Kashmir's accession to India, India has further partitioned the state into two parts and downgraded its status to a centrally administered territory. This consolidation of the hard-line stance taken by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government in Kashmir since assuming power is bound to fuel further alienation and resentment. The unilateral decision calls into question India's other federal arrangements too - for instance, with states in India's north-east that also enjoy various degrees of autonomy, increasing the chance of disaffection and instability within the country. The decision also has the potential to spark tensions with Pakistan and China, both of which occupy portions of Kashmir's territory. Pakistan, which lays claim to the entire Muslim-majority province, has already downgraded its diplomatic relations with India. China, which claims rights to the north-eastern portion of Kashmir, has also issued a warning. Increased disaffection among the Kashmiri population is also likely to spur intervention by non-state Islamic groups, resulting in long-term strife. According to a Hindu Right dictum, only a display of might will get India its due in the world. This high-risk manoeuvre in Kashmir appears to be the Modi government's way of testing this axiom. The consolidation of Hindu nationalist politics in India suggests the government is likely to take a more belligerent stance in world politics, especially in issues concerning national security. EU decision-makers can expect to deal with a more uncompromising and hard-line India in the

Regarding Southeast Asia as a multi-ethnics region, this paper attempts to examine about why Buddhist Community turns into religious violence against Rohingyas in the State of Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan). Through understanding the triggers of conflicts, this paper applies historical perspective to analyze why ethnic-religious conflict occur nowadays between Buddhist and Rohingya in Myanmar. This paper also discusses how the influence of history has constructed the government’s policy under military regime to exclude Rohingya. However, the ethno-religious conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in managing diversity.

South Korea under President Park Chung Hee underwent rapid industrialization and experienced phenomenal economic growth making the country one of the Asian Tigers alongside Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Had suffered by the long-standing Japanese colonialization, South Korea's development strategies in its incipient economic venture, interestingly, postulate unforeseen similarities with those imposed by Japan primarily during the phenomenal industrial revolution of the Meiji government (1868-1912). Exponential modernization in South Korea was substantially forged by the implementation of "developmental state" model. The term was initially coined by Johnson (1982) to explain the pacification of government policies -rather than market- to achieve successful economic rejuvenation of post-war Japan. In light to this historical paradox between South Korea and Japan, this article attempts to revisit the embarking point of South Korea's rapid economic development beginning in the 1960s by drawing attention to the importance of leadership as one of the major components of the developmental state model. It concludes that Park Chung Hee's strong Japanese linkage combined with his pretext for imposing "hard authoritarianism" is particularly influential in determining South Korea’s pragmatic development trajectory.

This paper endeavors to review the inter-state relation in Southeast Asia countries. Especially in government policy. The most significant problem in regional relationship is about the absence of political awareness. As a consequence, ASEAN only provides limited positive achievement in political performance regionally. This article provides an alternative explanation for the limited achievement in political performance of ASEAN by assessing the implication of using non-interference principe to the incidence of ignorance and disconnection between ASEAN countries that leads to lack of political awareness. In this paper, we try to propose a combination between formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal diplomacy actions done by non-government actors. We also points out an alternative strategy to promote political awareness on the future of SEA community. First, open policy to connecting diplomatic based community. Second, optimalize the regional cooperation with more concern with democracy and human rights issue. Third, building and institutionalizing political awareness through people participation.

In the European Union, the institutional reform that risk regulation system has undergone in the last decade has emphasised the need for fostering public participation and stakeholder involvement in decision making processes. Citizen scrutiny, in theory, ought to bring about better governance, and greater participation in public policy decisions is usually regarded as a symptom of a healthy democracy. By presenting evidence from two case studies in the field of bio-technology regulation, this paper aims to prove that taking participation as a tout court advantage is a mistake.

Die Forschung zur digitalen Spaltung (Digital Divide) oder auch Beteiligungsspaltung (Participation Divide) hat diverse Voraussetzungen einer partizipativen Internetnutzung untersucht. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei eine immer größere Vielzahl förderlicher "Literacies" oder Kompetenzen. Um einer zunehmenden Unübersichtlichkeit dieses Forschungsfelds entgegenzutreten, haben erste konzeptionelle Studien das umfassendere Konzept der "digitalen Mündigkeit" vorgeschlagen. Basierend auf einer interdisziplinären Literaturanalyse erarbeitet der vorliegende Beitrag eine Definition der "digitalen Mündigkeit", und führt das Konzept durch eine entsprechende Operationalisierung erstmals einer empirischen Analyse zu. Basierend auf einer Befragung von 1.044 deutschen Internetnutzenden wird der Einfluss der digitalen Mündigkeit - neben soziodemographischen Faktoren, politischer Orientierung und Regierungsvertrauen - auf die politische Online-Beteiligung untersucht.

This article argues that communitarianism, as the prevalent citizenship paradigm in the Philippines, observable also in modest expectations towards government services among Filipinos and a high emphasis on individual and community action, can be used to explain the lack of political change in the Philippines. In its first part, the article presents data on the sense of citizenship and concepts of social rights and obligations among Filipinos by combining findings from a series of problem-centered interviews with young urban professionals and quantitative data collected within annual surveys by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on government, social inequality, and citizenship. The second part of the article attributes these findings to everyday concepts of citizenship as ideal-typical state responsibility theories and modern citizenship paradigms. By including ethnographic data, it discovers significant traits of communitarianism in Philippine everyday life. This section goes on to present how communitarianism (with its inherent character of exclusivity) impedes a democratic culture and moreover, how it is unable to serve as a guiding social philosophy in unifying a large-scale society mainly consisting of citizens who are strangers (ibang tao) to each other. Nevertheless, in conclusion, the article suggests the possibility of deepening and broadening the sense of citizenship in the Philippine society and its respect for the stranger by drawing on elements of Filipino culture.

This article examines the dynamics of executive decision-making in Germany and Spain during the global financial and economic crisis between 2008 and 2009. It applies the power-distributional approach and argues that distinct features of the institutional context affect the institutionalisation of decision-making arrangements during crises. In particular, it examines how the principles structuring cabinet and the nexus between the executive and the legislative influence the change or inertia of arrangements for executive decision-making. The comparative analysis reveals that both countries experienced a centralisation of executive decisionmaking, albeit less in Germany than in Spain. These differences are caused by the institutional setting of both countries constraining the Chancellor’s authority in Germany and permitting the dominance of the Spanish Prime Minister (PM) in cabinet. Furthermore, the relationships between the executive and the legislative obstruct a strong centralisation of executive decision-making in Germany, also because party-political actors are aligned to compromises in the executive, and facilitate a centralisation of executive decision-making in Spain, supported by extraordinary law-making procedures which have been applied in order to circumvent parliamentary and thus party-political debates., Der Beitrag analysiert Dynamiken exekutiver Entscheidungsprozesse während der globalen Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise in der deutschen und spanischen Regierungsorganisation in 2008 und 2009. Dem powerdistributional Ansatz folgend wird argumentiert, dass Merkmale des institutionellen Kontextes die Institutionalisierung der exekutiven Entscheidungsfindung während der Krise beeinflussen. In diesem Artikel werden insbesondere die Effekte der konstitutionellen Entscheidungsprinzipien im Kabinett sowie der Beziehungen zwischen Exekutive und Legislative auf exekutive Entscheidungsprozesse untersucht. Die vergleichende Analyse zeigt, dass in beiden Ländern die exekutive Entscheidungsfindung zentralisiert wurde, wenngleich in der deutschen Exekutive weniger intensiv als in der spanischen Regierungsorganisation. Diese Unterschiede lassen sich durch die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen beider Länder erklären, die die Autorität der deutschen Bundeskanzlerin beschränken und die Dominanz des spanischen Premierministers (PM) fördern. Darüber hinaus beschränken die Beziehungen zwischen Exekutive und Legislative in Deutschland eine starke Zentralisierung exekutiver Entscheidungsprozesse, auch da parteipolitische Akteure an Entscheidungskompromissen in der Ministerialverwaltung teilhaben, während diese Beziehungen in Spanien eine Zentralisierung der Entscheidungsfindung eröffnen, unterstützt durch außerordentliche Rechtsverfahren, die während der Krise angewendet werden und parlamentarische sowie parteipolitische Auseinandersetzungen einschränken.