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We document that regulatory enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation cluster in industry-specific waves and that wave-related enforcement has information spillovers on industry peer firms. Waves and spillovers have significant effects on share prices. Early-wave target firms have the largest short-run losses in share values and the largest information spillovers on industry peer firms. Late-wave targets’ short-run losses are smaller, but not because they involve less costly instances of misconduct. Rather, late-wave targets are subject to more information spillovers from earlier in the wave. These results indicate that prices incorporate changes in the likelihood that a firm will face wave-related enforcement action for financial misconduct. Short-window share-price losses understate the total share-price impact, particularly for firms whose financial misrepresentation is revealed late in an enforcement wave. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance. Supplemental Material: The internet appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4711 .

SUMMARY This article summarizes “How Do Auditors Respond to FCPA Risk?” (Lawson, Martin, Muriel, and Wilkins 2019), which investigates the pricing of audits for clients that violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). FCPA compliance has become a top priority for regulators who rely heavily on accountants as they combat illegal activity. We find that auditors charge higher fees for violators both before and during formal FCPA investigations. We also find that fees are more sensitive to accounts that are more susceptible to FCPA risk. Our findings are stronger (weaker) for clients with high (low) foreign sales. While this may seem intuitive from an audit materiality perspective, regulators are not required to prove materiality as they pursue FCPA violations (Ebright 2016). Our study should be of interest to practitioners and auditors, as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is considering whether updates should be made to PCAOB AS 2405

Regulators claim to reward firm cooperation in the enforcement process. However, critics question which actions constitute firm cooperation and contend that cooperation leads to “harsh” and “unfair” outcomes. Examining 1,162 enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Justice, we find that regulator-cited cooperation credit is best explained by remedial actions and self-reported law violations. Cooperation credit is negatively associated with firm monetary penalties assessed by regulators. Our estimates suggest that firms with cooperation credit realize an average penalty reduction of $23.8 million (49 percent). We also estimate that average reputation-related losses are $756 million (70 percent) lower for firms with cooperation credit. We find no association between cooperation credit and related private action outcomes. Our results provide important insight into what constitutes meaningful cooperation with regulators, and suggest that the benefits can be substantial for firms deemed to be cooperative. JEL Classifications: G38; K22; K42; M41.

Whistleblowers are ostensibly a valuable resource to regulators investigating securities violations, but whether there is a link between whistleblower involvement and the outcomes of enforcement actions is unclear. Using a dataset of employee whistleblowing allegations obtained from the U.S. government and the universe of enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation, we find that whistleblower involvement is associated with higher monetary penalties for targeted firms and employees and with longer prison sentences for culpable executives. We also find that regulators more quickly begin enforcement proceedings when whistleblowers are involved. Our findings suggest whistleblowers are a valuable source of information for regulators who investigate and prosecute financial misrepresentation. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

An extensive literature examines the causes and effects of financial misconduct based on samples drawn from four popular databases that identify restatements, securities class action lawsuits, and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). We show that the results from empirical tests can depend on which database is accessed. To examine the causes of such discrepancies, we compare the information in each database to a detailed sample of 1,243 case histories in which regulators brought enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation. These comparisons allow us to identify, measure, and estimate the economic importance of four features of each database that affect inferences from empirical tests. We show the extent to which each database is subject to these concerns and offer suggestions for researchers using these databases. JEL Classifications: G38; K22; K42; M41.

We use a comprehensive database of regulatory enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation and apply Receiver Operating Characteristics theory to construct a misrepresentation prediction model. The model performs well both in and out of sample, with an average area under the curve (AUC) of 0.78 in out-of-sample tests. The model’s base case implies that 22.3% of Compustat-listed firms are engaged in financial misrepresentation that is potentially sanctionable by regulators in an average year. The average violation period is 3.1 years, implying that 7.2% of firms initiate new programs of financial misrepresentation each year. Of these, 3.5% eventually are caught and sanctioned. These findings yield numerical estimates of the size of the price distortions imposed by misrepresentation on the shares of both misrepresenting and non-misrepresenting firms, and the size of firms’ ex ante expected costs – incorporating both the probability of getting caught and the penalties if caught – of engaging in financial misrepresentation.

Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, excluding misconduct firms, creating a short-term spillover that averages $92.7 billion losses per year. We examine an expansive set of channels under which this spillover to nontarget firms can occur, and find that it reflects the loss of the embedded value of monitoring by a common institutional owner, enforcement wave activity, and industry peer and business relationships. Institutional investors also experience a significant abnormal outflow of funds in the year following the misconduct event.

This paper examines whether managers attempt to mitigate the negative outcomes of financial misconduct by altering the tone of required disclosures. Using a series of difference-in-differences analyses, we show that following fraudulent activity, managers use more negative and litigious words in disclosures, as compared to a matched sample of control firms. We find managers that have a larger set of negative outcomes, such as those with foreknowledge of the fraud committed, are more aggressive in altering disclosure when compared to peer firms. Our results also suggest that negative outcomes due to financial misconduct, such as monetary fines and reputation loss, are mitigated by altering the tone in financial disclosures. Altogether, we conclude that managers alter disclosures to reduce the set of negative outcomes they face following securities law violations.