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Here, we review the literature on autonoetic consciousness in episodic memory, our memory for personally experienced events, in order to understand its relationship to visual perspective. Autonoeti...

The capacity to adapt to resource distributions by modulating the frequency of exploratory and exploitative behaviors is common across metazoans and is arguably a principal selective force in the evolution of cognition. Here we (1) review recent work investigating behavioral and biological commonalities between external foraging in space and internal foraging over envi- ronments specified by cognitive representations, and (2) explore the implications of these commonalities for understanding the origins of the self. Behavioural commonalities include the capacity for what is known as area-restricted search in the ecological literature: this is search focussed around locations where resources have been found in the past, but moving away from locations where few resources are found, and capable of producing movement patterns mimicking Levy flights. Area-restricted search shares a neural basis across metazoans, and these biological commonalities in vertebrates suggest an evolutionary homology be- tween external and internal foraging. Internal foraging, and in particular a form we call embodied prospective foraging, makes available additional capacities for prediction based on search through a cognitive representation of the external environment, and allows predictions about outcomes of possible future actions. We demonstrate that cognitive systems that use embodied prospec- tive foraging require a primitive sense of self, needed to distinguish actual from simulated action. This relationship has implica- tions for understanding the evolution of autonoetic consciousness and self-awareness (Current Zoology 61 (2): 368-381, 2015). Keywords Self-projection, Mental time travel, Episodic future thinking, Foraging, Consciousness

Following the seminal work of Ingvar (1985. “Memory for the future”: An essay on the temporal organization of conscious awareness. Human Neurobiology, 4, 127–136), Suddendorf (1994. The discovery of the fourth dimension: Mental time travel and human evolution. Master's thesis. University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand), and Tulving (1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/PsychologieCanadienne, 26, 1–12), exploration of the ability to anticipate and prepare for future contingencies that cannot be known with certainty has grown into a thriving research enterprise. A fundamental tenet of this line of inquiry is that future-oriented mental time travel, in most of its presentations, is underwritten by a property or an extension of episodic recollection. However, a careful conceptual analysis of exactly how episodic memory functions in this capacity has yet to be undertaken. In this paper I conduct such an analysis. Based on conceptual, phenomenological, and empirical considerations, I conclude that the autonoetic component of episodic memory, not episodic memory per se, is the causally determinative factor enabling an individual to project him or herself into a personal future.

The recollection of sensory information and subjective experience related to a personal past event depends on our episodic memory (EM). At the neural level, EM retrieval is linked with the reinstatement of hippocampal activity thought to recollect the sensory information experienced and stored in the cortex. At encoding, the sensory information also includes many bodily cues (i.e., touch, proprioception). Such integrated bodily signals are the basis of a sensorimotor form of self-consciousness called bodily self-consciousness (BSC). BSC consists of subjective experiences like the sense of ownership, first-person perspective, and the sense of agency, recruiting a distributed neural system consisting of premotor (PMC), supplementary motor (SMA), and posterior parietal regions. However, although both BSC and EM rely on the integration of sensory stimuli, the neural mechanism associating BSC and EM are still not known. In my thesis, I designed a new experimental procedure using virtual reality (VR) and motion tracking to investigate the behavioral and neural correlates of BSC, EM, and their interactions. I fully adapted the procedures to fMRI in order to test the impact of BSC manipulation at encoding on EM retrieval and its subjective components. The first part of my thesis investigated how different levels of BSC (visuomotor and perspectival congruency) during encoding impacted EM (Study 1) and the subjective re-experience of the memory called autonoetic consciousness (ANC; Study 2). In Study 1, I found that hippocampal reinstatement was enhanced and coupled with key BSC areas (PMC, SMA) only for preserved BSC characterized by visuomotor and perspectival congruency. Study 2 showed that the strength of recollection correlated with the strength of the subjective experience at encoding only under visuomotor and perspectival congruency. This relationship between ANC and BSC was mediated by the insula, a structure related to BSC and also linked with emotions in the EM field. In the second part of my thesis, I investigated the paradigm used in Studies 1 and 2 in clinical populations presenting damage to the medial temporal lobe (Study 3) or cortical areas (Study 4). In Study 3, I tested a rare case of amnestic patient with bilateral damage to the hippocampal complex. Despite preserved BSC, the patient showed a decreased EM when encoded under a BSC characterized by visuomotor and perspectival congruency. In Study 4, I tested whether damage to frontal cortex, including PMC, in motor stroke patients alters the impact of BSC state in EM. Preliminary results indicated that memory performance for scene encoded under visuomotor and perspectival congruency was not enhanced in stroke patients with impaired BSC. Finally, in the last part of my thesis (Study 5), I discuss the importance of VR technology in the study of BSC and what to improve in VR aesthetics to boost BSC effects in future studies. In summary, I designed a new experimental protocol using VR and motion tracking to investigate the impacts of BSC and its related subjective experience on EM. I adapted the design to fMRI to investigate the neural correlates of the association of these two processes. I linked these results in light of a rare case of an amnestic patient with a specific EM deficit and a group of motor stroke patients with lesions involved in BSC processes. My thesis contributes to linking sensory information processing, self-consciousness, and EM within a common framework: BSC.

We reviewed studies that have specifically explored the memory deficit hypothesis of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) checking, highlighting the methodological differences between these studies that may explain inconsistencies regarding memory deficits in OCD checkers. Based on Conway's proposition that one function of episodic memories is to keep an adaptive record of recent goal processing in order to check that actions have actually been accomplished, we suggest that impaired autonoetic consciousness -one of the main features of episodic memory- may be at the heart of the issue of checking compulsion. Autonoetic consciousness, that can be experimentally assessed by the Remember/Know/Guess paradigm,could be impaired in OCD checkers leading them to be unable to mentally relive their actions in order to be assured that they have been accomplished (e.g., having locked the door). We make methodological suggestions to improve the assessment of autonoetic consciousness deficit in OCD checkers and understand its role in the etiology and maintenance of compulsive checking.

Background: This study aimed to investigate whether people with borderline personality disorder (BPD) can benefit from reliving positive autobiographical memories in terms of mood and state self-esteem and elucidate the neural processes supporting optimal memory reliving. Particularly the role of vividness and brain areas involved in autonoetic consciousness were studied, as key factors involved in improving mood and state self-esteem by positive memory reliving. Methods: Women with BPD (N = 25), Healthy Controls (HC, N = 33) and controls with Low Self-Esteem (LSE, N = 22) relived four neutral and four positive autobiographical memories in an MRI scanner. After reliving each memory mood and vividness was rated. State self-esteem was assessed before and after the Reliving Autobio-graphical Memories (RAM) task. Results: Overall, mood and state self-esteem were lower in participants with BPD compared to HC and LSE, but both the BPD and LSE group improved significantly after positive memory reliving. Moreover, participants with BPD indicated that they relived their memories with less vividness than HC but not LSE, regardless of valence. When reliving (vs reading) memories, participants with BPD showed increased precuneus and lingual gyrus activation compared to HC but not LSE, which was inversely related to vividness. Discussion: Women with BPD seem to experience more challenges in reliving neutral and positive autobio-graphical memories with lower vividness and less deactivated precuneus potentially indicating altered autono-etic consciousness. Nevertheless, participants with BPD do benefit in mood and self-esteem from reliving positive memories. These findings underline the potential of positive autobiographical memory reliving and suggest that interventions may be further shaped to improve mood and strengthen self-views in people with BPD.

Background: This study aimed to investigate whether people with borderline personality disorder (BPD) can benefit from reliving positive autobiographical memories in terms of mood and state self-esteem and elucidate the neural processes supporting optimal memory reliving. Particularly the role of vividness and brain areas involved in autonoetic consciousness were studied, as key factors involved in improving mood and state self-esteem by positive memory reliving. Methods: Women with BPD (N = 25), Healthy Controls (HC, N = 33) and controls with Low Self-Esteem (LSE, N = 22) relived four neutral and four positive autobiographical memories in an MRI scanner. After reliving each memory mood and vividness was rated. State self-esteem was assessed before and after the Reliving Autobio-graphical Memories (RAM) task. Results: Overall, mood and state self-esteem were lower in participants with BPD compared to HC and LSE, but both the BPD and LSE group improved significantly after positive memory reliving. Moreover, participants with BPD indicated that they relived their memories with less vividness than HC but not LSE, regardless of valence. When reliving (vs reading) memories, participants with BPD showed increased precuneus and lingual gyrus activation compared to HC but not LSE, which was inversely related to vividness. Discussion: Women with BPD seem to experience more challenges in reliving neutral and positive autobio-graphical memories with lower vividness and less deactivated precuneus potentially indicating altered autono-etic consciousness. Nevertheless, participants with BPD do benefit in mood and self-esteem from reliving positive memories. These findings underline the potential of positive autobiographical memory reliving and suggest that interventions may be further shaped to improve mood and strengthen self-views in people with BPD.

Time is usually conceived of in terms of space: many natural languages refer to time according to a back-to-front axis. Indeed, whereas the past is usually conceived to be “behind us”, the future is considered to be “in front of us.” Despite temporal coding is pivotal for the development of autonoetic consciousness, little is known about the organization of autobiographical memories along this axis. Here we developed a spatial compatibility task (SCT) to test the organization of autobiographical memories along the sagittal plane, using spatiotemporal interference. Twenty-one participants were asked to recall both episodic and semantic autobiographical memories (EAM and SAM, respectively) to be used in the SCT. Then, during the SCT, they were asked to decide whether each event occurred before or after the event presented right before, using a response code that could be compatible with the back-to-front axis (future in front) or not (future at back). We found that performance was significantly worse during the non-compatible condition, especially for EAM. The results are discussed in light of the evidence for spatiotemporal encoding of episodic autobiographical memories, taking into account possible mechanisms explaining compatibility effects. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.3758/s13423-021-01906-z.

The qualities of remembered experiences are often used to inform “reality monitoring” judgments, our ability to distinguish real and imagined events. Previous experiments have tended to investigate only whether reality monitoring decisions are accurate or not, providing little insight into the extent to which reality monitoring may be affected by qualities of the underlying mnemonic representations. We used a continuous-response memory precision task to measure the quality of remembered experiences that underlie two different types of reality monitoring decisions: self/experimenter decisions that distinguish actions performed by participants and the experimenter and imagined/perceived decisions that distinguish imagined and perceived experiences. The data revealed memory precision to be associated with higher accuracy in both self/experimenter and imagined/perceived reality monitoring decisions, with lower precision linked with a tendency to misattribute self-generated experiences to external sources. We then sought to investigate the possible neurocognitive basis of these observed associations by applying brain stimulation to a region that has been implicated in precise recollection of personal events, the left angular gyrus. Stimulation of angular gyrus selectively reduced the association between memory precision and self-referential reality monitoring decisions, relative to control site stimulation. The angular gyrus may, therefore, be important for the mnemonic processes involved in representing remembered experiences that give rise to a sense of self-agency, a key component of “autonoetic consciousness” that characterizes episodic memory.

Episodic memory enables us to form a bank of autobiographical memories across our lifespan. The relationship between autobiographical memory and laboratory-measures of episodic memory is complicated and these processes might be differentially affected by ageing (e.g. Diamond et al., [2020]. Different patterns of recollection for matched real-world and laboratory-based episodes in younger and older adults. Cognition, 202, 104309.). Here, we examine whether the ability to recall one’s own visual perspective relates to richness of autobiographical recall, and how this relationship is affected by age. Memory of perspective at encoding, was assessed in younger (18–35 years) and older adults (65–85 years). Participants, wearing head cameras, viewed arrays of objects. Later they were asked which images represented earlier scenes, and if the image was taken from their perspective (i.e. from their camera). Performance was compared with autobiographical memory. Accuracy in identifying their own perspective correlated with autobiographical scores. Age-group was a moderating factor in this relationship. Subsequently, new participants encoded photographs of objects and were later asked whether they recognised the images. Visual perspective was manipulated in these photographs. In this task there was no relationship between performance and autobiographical memory. In younger adults only 3-D encoding of scenes relates directly to autobiographical memory but ability to complete these two tasks appears to operate independently in the older group.

Autobiographical memory is vital for our well‐being and therefore used in therapeutic interventions. However, not much is known about the (neural) processes by which reliving memories can have beneficial effects. This study investigates what brain activation patterns and memory characteristics facilitate the effectiveness of reliving positive autobiographical memories for mood and sense of self. Particularly, the role of vividness and autonoetic consciousness is studied. Participants (N = 47) with a wide range of trait self‐esteem relived neutral and positive memories while their bold responses, experienced vividness of the memory, mood, and state self‐esteem were recorded. More vivid memories related to better mood and activation in amygdala, hippocampus and insula, indicative of increased awareness of oneself (i.e., prereflective aspect of autonoetic consciousness). Lower vividness was associated with increased activation in the occipital lobe, PCC, and precuneus, indicative of a more distant mode of reliving. While individuals with lower trait self‐esteem increased in state self‐esteem, they showed less deactivation of the lateral occipital cortex during positive memories. In sum, the vividness of the memory seemingly distinguished a more immersed and more distant manner of memory reliving. In particular, when reliving positive memories higher vividness facilitated increased prereflective autonoetic consciousness, which likely is instrumental in boosting mood.

The ability to remember, recognize and reconstruct places is a key component of episodic autobiographical memory. In this respect, place forms an essential basis for the unfolding of experiences in memory and imagination. The autobiographical memory is seen to contribute to a sense of self and place identity. The aim of this study was to concertedly analyze paintings, autobiographical narrations and places of birth and life of clients under treatment at a psychiatric clinic in Switzerland who were manifesting psychiatric disorders, e.g. depression, anxiety disorders, bipolar disorder, personality disorder, substance dependence, and dementia. Each client exhibited distinctive attitudes and approaches towards life characterized by unique personal mental constructs for living in given places of time episodes that worked towards shaping the development of their identities as well as the development of their health. For these clients, place and time function together to leave a mark, a trajectory, that can hinder or help the resolution of a psychiatric condition. Based on six representative cases, we illustrate how each painting, each biographical narration and each interview reveals deeper structures of individual perception, emotions, feelings, coping strategies, and capacities to reflect and identify with place-time trajectories. Based on this analysis, a place-time-identity model has been developed, which emphasizes the importance of narration, the structure of personality, and emotional experiences in the development of the 'relay station' of episodic autobiographical memory, self and autonoetic consciousness: these three elements are not only connected through their embeddedness in time, but also through their embeddedness in place. In this context, place provides an external fundus of memory, capable of supporting humans in healthy recollection and remembering. The process of placing appears to contribute to the creation of self-esteem and identity. This psycho-geographical place-life-time approach is contrasted to phenomenological place-space-time theories of Husserl, Heidegger, Bachelard, and Sloterdijk.

When having travelled one returns to, or revisits, a place. Unaware of the personal transformation that has occurred, one realizes the change when confronted with familiar things. In a desire to understand what objects and places mean to people, the project An actual house looks at three objects from a childhood home: a staircase, a window and a curtain and their relation to memory and autonomic consciousness. It reflects upon the importance of memory and imagination in art, architecture, and design - memory as well as imagination as a tool to create a different future. This art-practice-based work uses a hybrid form method. Exploring phenomenology trough writing, creating objects from memory and conveying the work to a perceptible form in a curated exhibition. It wants to contribute to a discussion on the relation between humans, objects and places in time.

Alterations within consciousness in schizophrenia can be evidenced by impediments in self-awareness and loss of agency. Ned Block’s definition of access consciousness is applied in order to further delineate cognitive deficits involving reflective thought and autonoetic thinking in persons with schizophrenia. Current theories on the nature and functioning of consciousness are discussed, which include Global Workspace Theory and metarepresentational characterizations. These describe a recursive, integrative quality to consciousness, contributed to by the functions of access consciousness, that is relevant in examining cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. The integrative deficit that is described as operating in conscious process involves a failure to incorporate prior outputs from a separate cognitive task and integrate these into a novel working schema. The alterations in access consciousness in persons with schizophrenia appear to be a consequence of disrupted integrative cognitive functions. An anteceding problem with cortical circuits involving integrative functions related to access consciousness is therefore hypothesized to manifest as subsequent cognitive dysfunction that leads to symptoms of schizophrenia. Constitutive failures to integrate information in schizophrenia could lead to an inability to create experiential unity and manage content in autonoetic consciousness. Some of the aberrant reasoning manifested by persons with schizophrenia, including problems with hierarchical relational reasoning, model-based-learning, J-con, ipseity, and source monitoring, could also reflect alterations in access consciousness, and their investigation offers additional approaches for scientific inquiry.

Although the concept of mental time travel refers to autonoetic consciousness (that is, consciousness of one's own past), I argue that it should prove worthwhile to analyse the apparent similaritie...

Understanding consciousness is one of the most fascinating challenges of our time. From ancient civilizations to modern philosophers, questions have been asked on how one is conscious of his/her own existence and about the world that surrounds him/her. Although there is no precise definition for consciousness, there is an agreement that it is strongly related to human cognitive processes such as attention, a process capable of promoting a selection of a few stimuli from a huge amount of information that reaches us constantly. In order to bring the consciousness discussion to a computational scenario, this paper presents conscious attention-based integrated model (CONAIM), a formal model for machine consciousness based on an attentional schema for human-like agent cognition that integrates: short- and long-term memories, reasoning, planning, emotion, decision-making, learning, motivation, and volition. Experimental results in a mobile robotics domain show that the agent can attentively use motivation, volition, and memories to set its goals and learn new concepts and procedures based on exogenous and endogenous stimuli. By performing computation over an attentional space, the model also allowed the agent to learn over a much reduced state space. Further implementation under this model could potentially allow the agent to express sentience, self-awareness, self-consciousness, autonoetic consciousness, mineness, and perspectivalness.

Endel Tulving's proposal that episodic memory is distinct from other memory systems like semantic memory remains an extremely influential idea in cognitive neuroscience research. As originally suggested by Tulving, episodic memory involves three key components that differentiate it from all other memory systems: spatiotemporal binding, mental time travel, and autonoetic consciousness. Here, we focus on the idea of spatiotemporal binding in episodic memory and, in particular, how consideration of the precision of spatiotemporal context helps expand our understanding of episodic memory. Precision also helps shed light on another key issue in cognitive neuroscience, the role of the hippocampus outside of episodic memory in perception, attention, and working memory. By considering precision alongside item-context bindings, we attempt to shed new light on both the nature of how we represent context and what roles the hippocampus plays in episodic memory and beyond.

Current theories of identity in organizations assume and valorize stability of identity over time. In this chapter the authors challenge this assumption by introducing contemporary understandings of the fluidity of time in the construction of autobiographical memory. They argue that, both in individual and organizational memory, narrative constructions of the self fluidly incorporate episodes from the past, present, and future in an ongoing effort to create a coherent autobiography. They elaborate the construct of autobiographical memory as constituted by autonoetic consciousness, life narrative, and collective memory and discuss the implications for identities in organizations.