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Comments on six papers, appearing in this issue of the Transactions, discussing rational inquiry, pragmatism, truth, cognitive progress, and value. The six papers were originally presented at 'The Idea of Pragmatism,' a conference held at the University of Sheffield on 18-19 May 2015 to honour the work of Christopher Hookway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his Pragmatism lectures, William James argued that philosophers' temperaments partially determine the theories that they find satisfying, and that their influence explains persistent disagreement within the history of philosophy. Crucially, James was not only making a descriptive claim, but also a normative one: temperaments, he thought, could play a legitimate epistemic role in our philosophical inquiries. This paper aims to evaluate and defend this normative claim. There are three problems for James's view: (1) that allowing temperaments to play a role within inquiry replaces philosophical disagreement with psychological difference; (2) that including temperaments would allow arbitrary elements to influence the outcome of inquiry; and (3) that such a view assumes an implausible metaphysical picture. Through clarifying the nature of temperaments, and what counts as a satisfactory philosophical theory on a pragmatist account, this paper presents an interpretation of James's metaphilosophical claims that can provide satisfactory responses to these problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Metafísica y Persona. Revista Sobre Filosofía, Conocimiento y Vida is the property of Universidad Popular Autonoma del Estado de Puebla A.C. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper presents a model of the continuous structure of Cognition based on several theses proposed by Charles S. Peirce in his youth and in his mature period. In this model, cognitions are discontinuous parts on a continuum and a cognitive process becomes "individually-synthetic," as a hypostatic abstraction from discontinuous transformations of informational fluxes in the continuous course of experience. That is, they are salient regions or neighborhoods on a continuum rather than points, and the relations of succession and precession among them are inferential, fluid, time sensitive, and goal-directed. First, this paper will outline the theses found in the young Peirce's work, which inspire a conception of continuous Cognition. Two questions will be raised regarding such a conception: (1) at what point does a particular act of cognition conclude? and (2) how should we characterize individual cognitions? To address these questions, the paper will later introduce the concept of continuity that Peirce developed in his mature years. The synthetic character of the continuum leads to the formulation of the concepts of neighborhood and synthetic individuality. These notions support the conception of a continuous model of Cognition in which the relations of succession and precession between individual finite cognitions are explained. The paper ends with a brief reflection regarding the possibility of developing this model of continuous Cognition as a theory of extended cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peirce's theory of assertions articulates the original commitment theory of assertions. Commitment theories of assertion have gained considerable recent interest not only in the Peirce scholarship but also in studies of history and philosophy of language, logic and communication. In this preface we point out some recent work on the topic and provide a brief introduction to the papers published in this Transactions symposium. These papers consist of a selection of those presented in the workshop "Peirce on Assertion" held in Lecce, Italy, on 13 September 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to clarify what Peirce meant by "correlate" in his early paper "On a New List of Categories." I take up the interpretation of Peirce's concept of the correlate put forward by André De Tienne in his book L'analytique de la représentation chez Peirce , and I offer my own interpretation by pointing out the problems with De Tienne's view. De Tienne detects a certain confusion in Peirce's notion of the correlate in the "New List." The problem is that Peirce seems to be using the term "correlate" in two incompatible senses, namely: (1) that which occasions the introduction of reference to a ground, and (2) the second term of a dyadic or triadic relation. I will argue, however, that these two senses of the term "correlate" are incompatible only on a narrow, psychological reading of Peirce's notion of comparison and that there is no incompatibility if we understand comparison in a broader way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Issues of Pragmaticism" (1905) contains the only published version of Peirce's doctrine of "critical common-sensism." One of the claims of that doctrine is that common sense beliefs are invariably vague. In this paper, we seek to explain this claim. We begin by providing a philological reconstruction of the drafts of "Issues of Pragmaticism" and a comparison of Peirce's several, successive expositions of critical common-sensism across those drafts. Then we examine Peirce's theory of vagueness; we show that there is both a "subjectal" and a "predicative" variety of vagueness, and that Peirce construes predicative vagueness according to three distinct models. Finally, we assess in what sense, i.e., according to which of the three models, common sense beliefs may be said to be invariably vague. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2019, a granite monument was erected at the Peirce gravesite in the Milford Cemetery in place of the small eroded tombstone which for many years had been thought to be inadequate as a sign of Peirce's enduring importance as a philosopher and man of science. A small symposium featuring six papers was held in conjunction with the dedication of the new monument. Those six papers, along with an account of the challenging campaign to replace the old tombstone, follow this introduction. Here the papers are encapsulated in an account of Peirce's life after the death of his father, his marriage to Juliette, and the loss of his position at Johns Hopkins. Peirce's move to Milford, Pennsylvania, in 1887, completed a transition from membership in the society of the scientific and intellectual elite to the ranks of the outsiders. From that time on, Peirce would be in perpetual conflict over the urgent need for income and his sense of duty to contribute to the advancement of knowledge. Many of the most troubled and distressing times of Peirce's life occurred during his Milford years and yet they also fostered much of his best and most creative thought. The following symposium papers provide illuminating accounts of important facets of Peirce's life and thought during these times providing new information and insights about the man whose ashes lie under the new monument but whose ideas continue to grow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses some of the possible connections between the principles of modeling in the new mechanical philosophy and the modeling used by Charles S. Peirce in his work on categories and evolutionary theory. The main goal is to show that the theoretical approaches used in the new mechanism can be beneficial for disciplines that are not clearly labelled as either humanities or natural science – for example, biosemiotics – and that this philosophical movement can help close the gap between natural science and the humanities. In individual chapters, this text deals with: the difference between the doctrine of the universal mechanism and the doctrine of the new mechanism, exploring the concept of the category of Thirdness and evolutionary theory in the work of Charles S. Peirce and finally focusing on the similarities between Peirce's work and the approach of the new mechanical philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim. The foundation of symbolisation is a substitution: a mediation between a Representamen and Object. The paper leverages this core mechanic to examine the substitutions within the conscious and unconscious parts of the mind, which compose every act of thinking. Recognising it is a single instance: the Ego, which regulates this parallel mediation, the paper focuses on the exploration of dichotomies that result from the necessity to perform two symbolisations simultaneously. Concepts. The study's theoretical framework is determined by Charles S. Peirce's (1998) concept of sign and Melanie Klein's (1948) psychoanalytic theory. From semiotic and psychoanalytic angles, this paper explores possible comprehensions of the object in the quasi-mind (Interpretant in infinite semiosis) and actual realisation of code in the act of individual thinking (Ego mediating between conscious and unconscious symbolisation). Results and conclusion. The main result of the study is the exposure of dichotomies that structure the shared ground for the conscious and the unconscious symbolisation. This, in turn, highlights tangible constraints that the mind is subjected to in the act of thinking. Cognitive value. The study's main contribution is the high-level scheme of dynamics that hold the Ego in reality through the means of unconscious and conscious symbolisation. The study also incorporates into coherent model unexamined aspects of individual sign usage: it deploys psychic continuity into the conscious symbolisation process (by basing the model on the instance of Ego), which allows addressing the issues arising at the border of conscious and unconscious symbolisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brief introduction to four papers on the economy of research published in this issue of the Transactions. The papers were originally presented in a workshop on the economy of research at Bocconi University, October 5–6, 2017. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I outline a pragmatist epistemology of logic inspired by later work of Charles S. Peirce that shares many features with an anti-exceptionalism about logic but, I argue, can better respond to a key problem that plagues the anti-exceptionalist. I first lay out what I take to be the tenets of anti-exceptionalism, discussing some difficulties in formulating the position that make it difficult to definitively label the position discussed here. I then analyze a key problem for the anti-exceptionalist, the background logic problem, and suggest that when framed as a problem for certain types of inquiry, it shares a presupposition about the priority of logic with other problems in the epistemology of logic. Turning to a discussion of Peirce from the 1903 Lowell Lectures, I then outline a pragmatism about logic that rejects the priority claims underlying the problems for inquiry in logic and, I argue, can resolve the background logic problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how adaptive creativity is continuously generated and sustained in living systems. The philosophical frame and motivations for this investigation will be introduced by juxtaposing an actual creative process with current cybernetic efforts to automate creativity. Past and present process philosophers that have critiqued the implicit commitments of these contemporary techniques will set the stage for further investigations. The litmus test of progress in this investigation will be measured against the extension of two concepts: virtuality, as introduced by Gilbert Simondon (On the Mode of the Existence of Technical Objects), and relevant noise, as introduced by Bacigalupi ("Semiogenesis: A Dynamic System Approach to Agency and Structure"). To refine the concepts of virtuality and relevant noise for our purposes, a rigorous theoretical model will be proposed whose intent is to explain veritable unbounded creativity. This model will then serve as a heuristic lens to explore additional extant models, such as the Kuramoto model (Strogatz), that are used to explain empirical observations of adaptive and creative behaviors in a diversity of biological phenomena. Based on these models of biological creativity and the critique of the contemporary cybernetic project, this paper will conclude by outlining the ethical implications of our culture's current commitments to a cybernetic world view and how we might evolve beyond it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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To better understand Peirce's practical conservatism, this paper examines Peirce's views on a liberal arts education and the political potential of the university. Peirce's views on education raise a puzzle for his political thought: Given his practical conservatism, why does Peirce think it is important to teach citizens and future leaders how to think, not what to think? If tradition, sentiment, and instinct are the best guides for the active life, why should those who lead active lives receive an education that focuses on strengthening and improving reasoning abilities? Why not simply teach them traditional wisdom and morality—as is often the case with conservative institutions and societies? This examination reveals an understanding of both the potential and limits of reason in the practical realm, resulting in a moderate practical conservatism. We also learn of the important moral lessons offered by institutions devoted to the noble pursuit of truth for its own sake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that contemporary consciousness studies can profit from Charles S. Peirce's philosophy of consciousness. It confronts mainstream tendencies in contemporary consciousness studies, including those which consider consciousness as an unsolvable mystery, with Peirce's phenomenological approach to consciousness. Peirce's answers to the following contemporary issues are presented: phenomenological consciousness and the qualia, consciousness as self-controlled agency of humans, self-control and self-reflection, consciousness and language, self-consciousness and introspection, consciousness and the other, consciousness of nonhuman animals, and the question of a quasi-consciousness of the physical universe. A detailed account of Peirce's three modes of consciousness is presented: (1) primisense, qualisense or feeling-consciousness, (2) altersense (consciousness of the other), and (3) medisense, the consciousness of cognition, thought, and reasoning. In contrast to consciousness studies that establish a rather sharp dividing line between conscious and unconscious states of mind, Peirce adopts the principle of synechism, the theory of continuity. For him, consciousness is a matter of degree. An important difference between Peirce's concept of qualia and current theories of qualia in human consciousness is discussed. The paper shows how consciousness, according to Peirce, emerges from unconscious qualia and vanishes into equally unconscious habits. It concludes with a study of the roles of qualia, habit, and self-control in Peirce's theory of signs, in particular in qualisigns and symbols, and the question of signs as quasi-conscious agents in semiosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Short introduction to a set of five papers on various aspects of several of Peirce's contributions to understanding religion. Papers range from Peirce's Neglected Argument, infant baptism, and the practice of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyze an apparent paradox that exists in the concept of the assertiveness of terms, an idea put forth by Peirce in the manuscript R 787, c. 1896. The scrutiny of this case sheds new light on Peirce's speculative grammar, especially on his account of subject and predicate. After briefly reviewing the current relevance of Peirce's thought for speech act theories, this paper investigates the role of rudimentary assertions in Peirce's thought, which lies at the crossroads of semiotics, logic and linguistics. In order to reach this goal, this paper (i) considers the place of assertions in Peirce's thought; (ii) analyzes the general conditions for assertion, especially its syntactical structure; (iii) redefines Peirce's original concepts of subject, predicate and copula, which differ from traditional logic and Indo-European grammars; and (iv) explores the structure of reasoning tacitly assumed in our linguistic habits, such that even a term might be understood as assertoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of the Ukrainian semiotic metalanguage still remains a subject of controversy for those who are interested in the scholarly heritage of the greatest and an extraordinarily prolifi c American philosopher, logician (mathematical and general) and semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 – 1914). In the course of his polymathic researches he created numerous terminological neologisms. The latter are most commonly rendered into Ukrainian applying transliteration. Peirce was extremely fond of placing things into groups of three, of trichotomies, and of triadic relations. His theory of signs is also based on his ʻtriadism’. The article discusses the interpretation of the fundamental categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as presented in Peirceʼs work “A Guess at the Riddle” and focuses on the challenges of rendering these and other important terminological units of Peircean semiotics into Ukrainian. The article contains excerpts from the above mentioned Peirce’s work translated into Ukrainian by the author of this paper and the issues of translating Peircean neologisms are approached with the aim of revealing logic in the management of semiotic realities and specifi cally the logic of constructing diff erent Ukrainian equivalents. The lack of the generally accepted tradition of translating semiotic terms brings to life many terminological variants used by diff erent Ukrainian scholars and translators. The present paper reviews some terminological variants used by Ukrainian semioticians and seeks to provide arguments to support the necessity of selecting Ukrainian equivalents using the native stock of morphemes instead of applying transliteration of the original English terms. Following this line of thought, the author suggests her options for rendering such key semiotic terms as Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, representation and determination, representamen and interpretant and some others and claims that the suggested approach is justifi ed and can ensure the adequacy of the translation and the unifi cation of the Ukrainian terminology of semiotics.

After considering why pragmatism should constructively treat issues of sexuality and erotic love and why it traditionally failed to, this paper examines the sexual views of classical pragmatism's leading figures. Focusing primarily on the canonical, heterosexual, white founding fathers—Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, it then examines sexuality in Jane Addams and Alain Locke, whose difference of gender or race is complemented by alterity of sexual attitudes. While exposing the shortcomings of these pragmatist sexual theories, the paper conversely shows the resources that classical pragmatism has for a more constructive and fulfilling treatment of sexuality and erotic love. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shortly before writing the papers that many consider the birthplace of pragmatism, Peirce studied Antoine Cournot's application of the calculus to political economy. Though there is no explicit evidence that Peirce's reading of Cournot influenced his theory of inquiry, there is a discernable affinity between Cournot's approach to economics and Peirce's approach to inquiry. The current paper aims at making this affinity explicit and show that looking at Peirce through the lens of Cournot's approach to economics can give us a better understanding of Peirce's views on inquiry and his understanding of truth in terms of a final opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cheryl Misak has presented an argument for democracy based on her analysis of the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce: If we care about the truth of our beliefs—as everyone does, according to Misak—then we ought to support democratic norms and democratic political institutions. We argue in the present paper that Misak's argument does not adequately justify a democratic political system. Her argument does, however, justify a rational commitment to the standard liberal-democratic values of freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the like. We demonstrate as well that Misak's argument for the democratic values withstands well-known objections against her argument for a democratic political system. We also show that weaker premises involving every agent's commitment to pursuing their own subjective ends can get us to Misak's conclusions regarding liberal values. These weaker premises avoid objections raised against Misak's Peircean view and are acceptable even to those who reject Misak's idea, taken from her reading of Peirce, that truth is a constitutive norm of belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper begins with a survey of the state of the art in multimodal research, an international trend in applied semiotics, linguistics, and media studies, and goes on to compare its approach to verbal and nonverbal signs to Charles S. Peirce's approach to signs and their classification. The author introduces the concept of transmodality to characterize the way in which Peirce's classification of signs reflects the modes of multimodality research and argues that Peirce's classification of the signs takes modes and modalities in two different respects into consideration, (1) from the perspective of the sign and (2) from the one of its interpretant. While current research in multimodality has its focus on the (external) sign in a communicative process, Peirce considers additionally the multimodality of the interpretants, i.e., the mental icons and indexical scenarios evoked in the interpreters' minds. The paper illustrates and comments on the Peircean method of studying the multi and transmodality of signs in an analysis of Peirce's close reading of Luke 19:30 in MS 599, Reason's Rules, of c. 1902. As a sign, this text is "monomodal" insofar as it consists of printed words only. The study shows in which respects the interpretants of this text evince trans and multimodality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper gives a survey and presents a critical analysis of Peirce's studies in Egyptology from 1885 to 1904, as documented mainly in MSS 1227, 1228, 1244, and 1294. It examines Peirce's studies and advances in the language and script of Pharaonic Egypt as well as his assessments of the scientific achievements of the Ancient Egyptians. Among the linguistic topics in focus are Peirce's assumptions concerning the iconicity of hieroglyphic writing, his conjectures on the origins of indexical words from nouns, and his hypotheses concerning the proximity of Ancient Egyptian to the ursprache of humans. The paper traces some of Peirce's hypotheses concerning the structure of Egyptian to his fundamental assumptions about iconicity and indexicality in language. Altogether, Peirce was not only very familiar with the state of the art of contemporary Egyptology, but he also achieved a remarkable competence of the Egyptian language and its hieroglyphic writing. While some of Peirce's insights into the language and civilization of the Ancient Egyptians are still tenable, others reflect certain misinterpretations of the scholarship of his time, which call for correction in light of the state of the art of today's Egyptology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is of common use in modern Venn diagrams to mark a compartment with a cross to express its non-emptiness. Modern scholars seem to derive this convention from Charles S. Peirce, with the assumption that it was unknown to John Venn. This paper demonstrates that Venn actually introduced several methods to represent existentials but felt uneasy with them. The resistance to formalize existentials was not limited to diagrammatic systems, as George Boole and his followers also failed to provide a satisfactory symbolic representation for them. This difficulty points out issues that are inherent to the very nature of existentials. This paper assesses the various methods designed for the representation of existential statements with Venn diagrams. First, Venn's own attempts are discussed and compared with other solutions proposed by his contemporaries and successors, notably Lewis Carroll and Peirce. Since disjunctives hold an important role in an effective representation of existentials, their representation is also discussed. Finally, recent methods for the diagrammatic representation of existing individuals, rather than mere existence, are surveyed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frank Ramsey is usually taken to be an emotivist or an expressivist about the good: he is usually taken to bifurcate inquiry into fact-stating and non-fact-stating domains, ethics falling into the latter. In this paper I argue that whatever the very young Ramsey's view might have been, towards the end of his short life, he was coming to a through-going and objective pragmatism about all our beliefs, including those about the good, beauty, and even the meaning of life. Ethical beliefs are not mere expressions of emotion, but rather fall under our cognitive scope. They can be assessed as rational or irrational, true or false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

T.L. Short's Charles Peirce and Modern Science, in which he discusses Peirce's intimate relation to modern science, simultaneously functions as Short's own philosophical testament. Short's overall argument is that Peirce takes inquiry to be the main definition of science, implying that all other definition attempts or central issues of science are but products of inquiry: methods, experiments, observations, conclusions, results, syntheses, theory buildings, system constructions, laws, predictions, metaphysical assumptions, scientific values, etc. On this basis, Short develops central Peircean ideas such as inquiry into inquiry, phenomenology, and his "normative sciences" as elements of a reinvigorated and metaphysically ambitious version of empiricism. In this process, however, certain problems appear, such as Short's tendency to refute any relevance in scientific investigations of systematicity, the a priori, the strive for conclusions and results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages with Isaac Levi's approach to justifying changes in our states of full belief and offers a Peircean criticism of his strategy for resolving conflicts between the results of what inquirers deem to be the most reliable programs for a given situation and the settled beliefs about which we have no doubts. In the first section, I discuss the central features of Levi's theory of justifying changes to our state of full belief. In the second section, I present a Peircean approach to evaluating the reliability of these programs for routine expansion of belief, and I argue that there is a conflict between Levi's approach to situations where an inquirer has expanded her beliefs into inconsistency and Peirce's criticisms of non-scientific methods for settling opinion. The third section presents two potential objections to the Peircean approach, objections that emphasize the importance of our concern to avoid error, and in the fourth section, I propose an original supplement to the Peircean approach that better addresses that concern. Ultimately, my aim is to develop and defend a Peircean approach that is in opposition to Levi's views about when it is appropriate to question the reliability of our programs for routine expansion of belief but that also addresses his legitimate worries about underemphasizing our concern to avoid error. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws upon Peirce's philosophy of inquiry to recommend a theory of religious participation as a form of maximally habitual, inhabited inquiry. It argues for conceiving of inquiry as a ubiquitous phenomenon and works from Peirce's writings on 'vital matters' and science to develop distinctions between different forms of inquiry that are, nevertheless, continuous with one another. As a form of inquiry religious participation, even in its most conservative manifestations, is inquisitive and fallible and the paper argues that scholars of religion would do well to reject conceptions of religion that excise religion and religious people from larger theories of fallible inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the term 'pragmatism' was first coined, there have been debates about who is or is not a 'real' pragmatist, and what that might mean. The division most often drawn in contemporary pragmatist scholarship is between William James and Charles Peirce. Peirce is said to present a version of pragmatism which is scientific, logical and objective about truth, whereas James presents a version which is nominalistic, subjectivistic and leads to relativism. The first person to set out this division was in fact Peirce himself, when he distinguished his own 'pragmaticism' from the broad pragmatism of James and others. Peirce sets out six criteria which defines 'pragmaticism': the pragmatic maxim; a number of 'preliminary propositions'; prope-positivism; metaphysical inquiry; critical common-sensism; and scholastic realism. This paper sets out to argue that in fact James meets each of these criteria, and should be seen as a 'pragmaticist' by Peirce's own lights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a reading of Peirce's manuscript "Ideas, stray or stolen, about scientific writing." The latter text has been considered to be a key for understanding the relationship between speculative rhetoric and methodeutic. While I agree that it includes essential reflections on the third branch of Peirce's logic, I will argue that the classification of rhetoric studies that it contains cannot be used to clarify the way in which methodeutic and speculative rhetoric are related to one another. I will first introduce the classification as it is presented by Peirce in "Ideas, stray or stolen, about scientific writing" and list some problems that immediately arise when we identify methodeutic with the rhetoric of science. Then, I will elucidate Peirce's distinction between the universal art of rhetoric, speculative rhetoric, and ordinary rhetoric. I will argue that the classification of rhetoric studies in "Ideas, stray or stolen, about scientific writing" should be seen as a classification of the ways in which we can obtain different ordinary rhetorics specifying the contents of speculative rhetoric for different contexts of sign use. To finish, I will propose a different approach to support the claim that methodeutic is a subdivision of speculative rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After introducing the debate between substance philosophy and process philosophy, and clarifying the relevance of the category of ‘substance’ in Peirce’s thought, the present paper reconstructs the role of ‘substance’ and ‘being’ from Peirce’s early works to his theory of the proposition, provided after his studies on the logic of relatives. If those two categories apparently disappear in Peirce’s writings from the mid-1890s onwards, the account of ‘subject’ and ‘copula’ in Peirce’s analysis of the proposition allows one to grasp the reasons why Peirce omits ‘substance’ and ‘being’ in favor of his three categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness), and to understand why his philosophy cannot be considered as a substance philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about Peirce's understanding and notational realization of the relationship between the logical content of conjunction and the illocutionary force of assertion. The argument moves from an imaginary, subtextual dialogue between several authors in the history of logic and the philosophy of language (Aristotle, Ammonius, Boethius, Frege, Peirce, Geach, and Dummett) and shows that the problem of the relationship between conjunction and assertion is quite old and has received distinct and irreconcilable treatments. Peirce has an original take on the problem, which he addresses, as often happens in his mature writings, in notational terms: the anomaly of conjunction (i.e., the fact that, unlike the other connectives, conjunction is subject to assertion distribution) is not to be hidden behind a uniform notation, like standard sentential calculus, in which the conjunction connective is treated on a par with the other connectives. Rather, a sentential language is possible that embodies rather than conceals the anomaly, and this is Peirce's system of Existential Graphs, which from 1896 onwards understandably becomes his preferred instrument of logical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until well into the 1890s, Peirce did not pay special attention to the act of asserting a proposition, and he used "proposition" and "assertion" interchangeably. This began to change in the period of the "Grand Logic" and the "Short Logic", and in Peirce's vast semiotic development after 1902, no less than three theories of assertion are developed to account for the ability of certain signs to claim truth. One is assertion as a special self-reference of proposition signs, claiming that the sign itself is indexically connected to its object as a truth grant; another is the assumption of social responsibility for the sign's truth on the part of the utterer; the third is the purpose of asserting a proposition, namely to persuade some interlocutor about the truth of the sign. These three theories are oftentimes developed in isolation, but this paper argues they fit together in the way that the third presupposes the second, in turn presupposing the first. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some philosophers claim that truth is the norm of assertion, or that asserting that p commits one to the truth of p. In some seminal works Peirce put it in terms of responsibility: asserting that p makes one responsible for the truth of the proposition that p. I take this thesis to be stimulating but inaccurate, since making an assertion generally commits one to sincerity, not to truth. This explains how it is possible to be truthful liars and why we are disappointed by these. Justification of belief is also important, as shown by the cases of the justified falsity-teller and the unjustified truth-teller. So, for the assessment of assertion, what matters is (a) what we believe, (b) whether we assert what we believe and (c) whether we have a justification for what we believe. This does not throw truth out of the picture, however: insofar as asserting that p is asserting that one believes that p , and believing that p is believing that it is true that p , asserting that p is asserting that one believes that it is true that p. The paper also distinguishes some senses in which truth is normative for belief and assertion, and endorses a teleological understanding of this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early 1909, Charles S. Peirce conducted a series of experiments with three-valued logic, anticipating the pioneering work of Jan Łukasiewicz and Emil Post by ten years. These experiments are entirely contained within six or seven pages of Peirce's Logic Notebook. Due to the work of Atwell Turquette, the formalisms contained in those pages are relatively well understood. What is less understood are Peirce's philosophical reasons for conducting those experiments. His explanation of the need for his "triadic" logic is very brief, taking up little more than a single short page in the Notebook. Here he gives us two clues about his motivations, one connected to modal notions and one to his views on continuity. There are two previous accounts of the philosophical motivations behind triadic logic, due to Max Fisch and Turquette, and to Robert Lane. In this paper, I re-evaluate those views and connect the two clues to Peirce's hypothetical cosmology. I argue that in conducting his three-valued experiments, Peirce was trying to create a logic to capture his notion of the evolving universe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores Peirce's concept of analogy. I begin by arguing that he understands it along two main lines: (1) as a natural cognitive operation that discerns the resemblance of structural relations, pivotally signified by the diagram sign-class, and (2) as a "mixed" form of argument employing abduction, deduction, and induction. After exploring these two aspects, along with their interpenetration, I compare Peirce's account of analogous reasoning with the highly influential view of the late-Medieval scholastic Thomas Cajetan. I argue that Peirce presents a superior approach because his diagrammatic logic renders a view that is methodologically open to further inquiry, explains that openness in terms of inference through sampling, and capaciously accepts a variety of potential determinations for any one analogy due to the objective vagueness of signs. Cajetan's appeal to the irreducible proportionality of analogous thinking, on the other hand, excludes further explanation of analogy's workings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In 1909, Peirce recorded in a few pages of his logic notebook some experiments with matrices for three-valued propositional logic. These notes are today recognized as one of the first attempts to create non-classical formal systems. However, besides the articles published by Turquette in the 1970s and 1980s, very little progress has been made toward a comprehensive understanding of the formal aspects of Peirce's triadic logic (as he called it). This paper aims to propose a new approach to Peirce's matrices for three-valued propositional logic. We suggested that his logical matrices give rise to three different systems, one of them – which we called P3 – is an original and non-explosive logic. Besides that, we will show that the P3 system can easily be transformed into paraconsistent and paracomplete calculi, adding to it, respectively, unary operators of consistency and intuitionistic negation. We conclude with a discussion about philosophical motivations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are unconscious inferences in psychology? This article investigates their journey from the early philosophical psychology of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) to the experimental psychology of the American pragmatist Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914). Peirce's reception of Wundt's early works situates him in an international web of 19th‐century experimental psychologists and its reconstruction opens new perspectives on the relation between philosophy, psychology, and epistemology. Moreover, this reception testifies to a heretofore overlooked strand of influence of Wundt on North American experimental psychology. The notion of unconscious inferences, of which Hermann von Helmholtz is usually considered the chief exponent, becomes the backbone of Peirce's theory of perception mostly because of the affinity between Wundt's early philosophy of mind and Peirce's logic‐mediated approach to psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the topological arrangements in four geometrical figures of modal propositions and their derivative relations by means of Peirce's gamma graphs and their rules of transformation. The idea of arraying the gamma graphs in a geometric and symmetrical order comes from Peirce himself who in a manuscript drew two cubes in which he presented the derivative relations of some (but no all) gamma graphs. Therefore, Peirce's insights of a topological order of gamma graphs are extended here backwards from the cube to the line and the square; and then forwards from the cube to the four-dimensional polyhedron. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Peirce's mature accounts of his classification of the sciences never lack a few sentences about Science of Review, the role that this principal division of science plays for both his architectonic of science in general and the heuretic coenoscopic philosophical sciences in particular remains rather unclear, although it even seems to contain philosophical disciplines such as a philosophia ultima. The aim of this paper is to take stock of Peirce's remarks on Science of Review in published and unpublished writings from the years 1902–1911 in order to (I.) provide a philologically reliable account of the development of Peirce's conception of this branch of science, (II.) highlight the nature of Peirce's work as a taxonomist of the sciences as a contribution to one of the three essential orders of Science of Review, and finally (III.) shed light on its architectonic role as an integral function of scientific semeiosis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empiricists have traditionally assumed that an epistemic subject has immediate access only to some primitive perceptual objects, so that judgments about kinds, modal properties, and dispositions are parasitic upon and less certain than those about what is given in perception. Against this view, Peirce argues that perception provides doxastic warrants in virtue of subconscious inferential processes that constitute the content of a temporally extended perceptual episode. According to Peirce, perceptual judgments have an abductive logical form, and they supply the perceiver with novel hypotheses about the world. Though the production of these hypotheses is not subject to conscious control, it is subject to subconscious control, when a present percept is compared to other features of perceptual experience. By examining Peirce's account of the continuity and temporality of perception and his investigations of subconscious processes, this paper considers how experience can confirm or falsify prior beliefs and produce novel knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peirce's sign type of "Dicent Indexical Legisigns" has received relatively little scholarly attention, and it is sometimes confused with the "Dicent Symbol" category. This stems from an inconsistency between Peirce's general explanation and his exemplifications of the category. Taking the lead from the latter, this paper argues that while the role of "Dicent Symbols" is descriptive, the task of "Dicent Indexical Legisigns" is not to describe but rather to establish identity of reference by connecting some proper name to an object or to another identifying sign of that object. Thus, it appears as an overlooked sign type playing an important role both in everyday agreement upon reference and in scientific negotiations over identity, terminology, existence, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses Flórez's idea that an inference having the form of Peirce's abduction is to be found in chapter 13 of the first book of the Posterior Analytics , where Aristotle expounds the distinction between "syllogism of the that" and "syllogism of the why." It is shown that this idea is mistaken because all of Aristotle's examples in APo. I.13 are deductively valid first-figure syllogisms (either of the why or of the that), while abduction is a deductively invalid second-figure syllogism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thesis: Aim of the paper is to present Melanie Klein and Charles S. Peirce concept of symbol in order to combine them into scheme that presents conscious and unconscious aspect of thinking through symbolic signs (signs based on convention). Presented concepts: Paper presents concept of symbol in psychoanalytical and semiotic perspective. Psychoanalytical view is based on interpretation of symbol according to object relation paradigm proposed by Klein. There are two reasons for selecting her theory for the model: it is most closely bound with interdependency between communication and thinking plus her concept of proper symbol fulfills definition of symbolic sign in Peirce theory, due to deployment of matter of absence in substitution process. Peirce theory however is selected to present semiotic perspective not only for its good linkage to Klein's "proper symbol" but also for its accurate understating of object representation in quasi- mind through Representamen and as a result recognition of symbol embedment in code through unlimited semiosis. Chosen concepts are consolidated into psycho-semiotic model of thinking which recognizes symbol to be co-created by unique internal world of unconscious phantasy with simultaneous employment of semiotic devices oriented to external, group order perspective. Results and conclusions: Proposed psycho-semiotic model of thinking enhances psychoanalytic view, based on drive for object, by recognizing communication means required for meaningful relation and with that for thinking itself. As a result conceptualizing thinking processes is enriched with semiotic discoveries such as mechanics and structure of Representamen and Interpretant, along with indispensable code rules, with unlimited semiosis at its core. In turn psychoanalytical view adds to semiotic perspective sensitivity to individual potential and constrains when code is in use and with that raises precision of exploration in the field. Contribution to the field: Proposed model enriches theory of thinking based on object relations with semiotic sign theory, which being focused on communication serves as a frame for establishing object relations and their conceptualization. In turn employing psychoanalytic perspective into semiotic field brings back code theory to actual code usage, and by that expands it to various unconscious forces, which ultimately determine Interpretant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peirce’s triadic logic has been under discussion since its discovery in the 1960s by Fisch and Turquette. The experiments with matrices of three-valued logic are recorded in a few pages of unpublished manuscripts dated 1909, a decade before similar systems have been developed by logicians. The purposes of Peirce’s work on such logic, as well as semantical aspects of his system, are disputable. In the most extensive work about it, Turquette suggested that the matrices are related in dual pairs of axiomatic Hilbert-style systems. In this paper, we present a simple tableau proof for a fragment of Peirce three-valued logic, called P3, based on similar approaches in many-valued literature. We demonstrated that this proof is sound and complete. Besides that, taking the false as the only undesignated value and adding non-classical negations to the calculus, we can explore paraconsistent and paracompleteness theories into P3. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]