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Explanations of science denial rooted in individual cognition tend to focus on general trait-like factors such as cognitive style, conspiracist ideation or delusional ideation. However, we argue that this focus typically glosses over the concrete, mechanistic elements of belief formation, such as hypothesis generation, data gathering, or hypothesis evaluation. We show, empirically, that such elements predict variance in science denial not accounted for by cognitive style, even after accounting for social factors such as political ideology. We conclude that a cognitive account of science denial would benefit from the study of complex (i.e., open-ended, multi-stage) problem solving that incorporates these mechanistic elements.

Science denial is a pressing social problem, contributing toinactivity in the face of climate change, or to a resurgencein outbreaks of preventable diseases. Cognitive factors are asignificant driver of science denial, in addition to social fac-tors such as political ideology. Biases pertaining to judgmentsof contingency (i.e., inferring causal relationships where noneexist) have been associated with misbeliefs, such as belief inthe paranormal and conspiracy theories. Here, we examinewhether contingency biases likewise predict science denial.We show that (a) various tasks used to study relevant biases doin fact load on a single latent ‘contingency illusion’ factor; (b)this contingency illusion bias is associated with increased sci-ence denial; (c) the contingency illusion bias mediates the re-lationship between intuitive (vs. analytic) cognitive style andscience denial; and (d) this holds even when accounting forpolitical ideology.

From distracted driving, to work focus on a computer,increasing amounts of research is investigating how digitaltechnology influences users’ attention. A couple of widelycited studies have found that the mere presence of cell phonesinterferes with social interactions and cognitive performance,even when not actively in use. These studies have importantimplications but they have not yet been replicated, and alsosuffer from methodological shortcomings and lack ofestablished theoretical frameworks to explain the observedeffects. We improved the methodology used in a previousstudy of phone presence and task performance (Thornton,Faires, Robbins, & Rollins, 2014), while testing an‘opportunity cost’ model of mental effort and attention(Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013). We wereunable to replicate Thornton et al.’s finding that presence ofcell phones reduces performance in a specific cognitive task(additive digit cancellation). Moreover, contrary to ourexpectations, we found that participants who used theirphones more, and who were more attached to them, found thetasks more fun/exciting and effortless, if they completed themwith their phone present.

Do forgiving God primes strengthen support for state-sanctioned punishment?Laurin et al (2012) found that beliefs in powerful, intervening Gods (both in general and when made salient) reduce people’sendorsement of state-sanctioned punishment. In light of this, we investigated whether the manner in which God intervenes (viaforgiveness or punishment) influences people’s endorsement of state-sanctioned punishment.Across four studies we explored a) whether priming participants with a forgiving God and b) whether salient, forgiving Godbeliefs increase endorsements of state-sanctioned punishment. The rationale being that a forgiving God will lead people toview punishment as a responsibility that lies with them rather than one outsourced to God. Our results revealed no evidence foreffects of forgiving God primes or salient forgiving god beliefs on endorsements of state-sanctioned punishment. We discussthe implications of these findings for extant theories of religious prosociality and proportionality-based accounts of morality.

Following the 2016 EU referendum on Britain's membership in the European Union, many people described themselves as "Leavers" or "Remainers." Here, we examine the emotional responses associated with Brexit identities using survey data collected from two nationally representative samples of the British public in 2019 (N = 638) and 2021 (N = 2,058). Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that many in both samples had coherent Leave or Remain identities. Remain and, to a lesser extent, Leave identities (regardless of how people actually voted in the referendum) predicted distress about Brexit‐related events and clinical symptoms of depression and anxiety at both time points. Structural equation models suggested that the effect of identities on symptoms was largely mediated by distress about Brexit‐related events. We demonstrate a lasting impact of Brexit on the mental health of UK citizens and show that the formation of novel political identities has been more important in this process than voting behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the highly infectious nature of COVID-19, social distancing practices are key in stemming the spread of the virus. We aimed to assess the complex interplay among psychological factors, socio-demographic characteristics and social distancing behaviours within the framework of the widely used Capability, Opportunity, Motivation-Behaviour (COM-B) model. The present research employed network psychometrics on data collected during the first UK lockdown in April 2020 as part of the COVID-19 Psychological Research Consortium (C19PRC) Study. Using a network approach, we examined the predictions of psychological and demographic variables onto social distancing practices at two levels of analysis: macro and micro. Our findings revealed several factors that influenced social distancing behaviour during the first UK lockdown. The COM-B model was successful in predicting particular aspects of social-distancing via the influence of psychological capability and motivation at the macro-and micro-levels, respectively. Notably, demographic variables, such as education, income, and age, were directly and uniquely predictive of certain social distancing behaviours. Our findings reveal psychological factors that are key predictors of social distancing behaviour and also illustrate how demographic variables directly influence such behaviour. Our research has implications for the design of empirically-driven interventions to promote adherence to social distancing practices in this and future pandemics. Supplemental data for this article is available online at [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In countries such as Britain and the US, court witnesses must declare they will provide truthful evidence and are often compelled to publicly choose between religious ("oath") and secular ("affirmation") versions of this declaration. Might defendants who opt to swear an oath enjoy more favourable outcomes than those who choose to affirm? Two preliminary, pre‐registered survey studies using minimal vignettes (Study 1, N = 443; Study 2, N = 913) indicated that people associate choice of the oath with credible testimony; and that participants, especially religious participants, discriminate against defendants who affirm. In a third, Registered Report study (Study 3, N = 1821), we used a more elaborate audiovisual mock trial paradigm to better estimate the real‐world influence of declaration choice. Participants were asked to render a verdict for a defendant who either swore or affirmed, and were themselves required to swear or affirm that they would try the defendant in good faith. Overall, the defendant was not considered guiltier when affirming rather than swearing, nor did mock‐juror belief in God moderate this effect. However, jurors who themselves swore an oath did discriminate against the affirming defendant. Exploratory analyses suggest this effect may be driven by authoritarianism, perhaps because high‐authoritarian jurors consider the oath the traditional (and therefore correct) declaration to choose. We discuss the real‐world implications of these findings and conclude the religious oath is an antiquated legal ritual that needs reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]