Search

The article discusses a laboratory-created strain of H5N1 avian influenza virus that can be transmitted through the air by two separate research teams including one led by Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands and one led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The decision by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity's (NSABB's) to withhold the research from the public and whether the research should be published is discussed. INSET: Biosecurity blowback.

The article discusses how the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity asked the science journals "Science" and "Nature" not to publish a study on the virus A(H5N1), which causes bird flu and is highly transmissible. The article says that although the government cannot regulate the journals, scientists are monitoring their own work to avoid disseminating information that might be useful to terrorists. The original study was conducted in the U.S. and the Netherlands.

The article reports that a U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) committee has called for the creation of global guidelines for research on dangerous influenza (flu) strains, such as the virus that causes avian flu, H5N1.

The article reports that the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) released a statement supporting the publication of two studies on mammal transmission of the H5N1 avian influenza virus, changing its 2011 decision to call for the papers to be redacted for security concerns.

The article presents information about the delay of a scientific publication on H5N1 bird flu research, which showed mutations could lead to a lethal human pandemic, by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity due to the possible threat of bioterrorism.

The article discusses recommendations made by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to the federal government regarding the repeal of current laws that could label certain vaccine researchers criminals. They would also prefer to see industry standards enacted by companies that synthesize DNA to screen suspicious orders.

The article offers information on the role played by censorship of research literatures in order to control bioterrorism in the U.S. It states that the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommended that the journals Nature and Science restrict publication of controversial new research relevant to the transmission of avian flu among humans.

The article reports on a 2011 decision which the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity and American authorities made to ask the journals "Science" and "Nature" to not publish research conducted by two separate research teams which involved the genetic modification of the H5N1 influenza, which is also known as bird flu. A discussion of the aims and objectives of the research and on the factors that led the authorities to request that the research not be published, is presented.

The article discusses the scope of duties of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in the U.S. Some of the functions of the international collaboration working group (WG) involves reaching out to the United Nations, to foreign governments and to nongovernmental scientific organizations in the U.S. Development and maintenance of strong scientific enterprises and mutual biosafety recognition and biosecurity concerns are also discussed.

The article discusses the controversy surrounding two virology studies that found a mutated version of the H5N1 avian influenza virus could be transmitted to mammals through the air which includes one by Ron Fouchier at Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands and one by Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The debate regarding a recommendation against publishing the research by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB) is presented.

The article reports on the recommendation of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) not to publish two studies of the bird flu virus for security purposes.

The article examines the implications of a U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) request that research on how to mutate H5N1, a deadly bird flu, not be published. While scientists share data publicly to quickly collaborate, the government fears the data could be used by terrorists to make biological weapons. The author discusses the government's ability to keep the research of publicly funded scientists secret and the importance of shared data in virology.

The article reports that the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) has recommended publishing two controversial studies of the mutated H5N1 virus. The NSABB was asked by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to evaluate two independent studies: one conducted by Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison School of Veterinary Medicine and another by Dr. Ron Fouchier in the Netherlands.

The article presents information on the March 30, 2012 decision by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity panel on the publication of research papers on the bird-flu virus. The author looks at the H5N1 avian influenza virus, lead researchers Yoshihiro Kawaoka and Ron Fouchier, and infectious-disease expert D.A. Henderson.

The article reports that scientific journals "Science" and "Nature" may publish controversial research about a new version of bird flu virus which could be transmitted between humans, despite the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity's warning that the research could be misused.

The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has explained in detail its rationale in requesting two papers dealing with highly pathogenic H5N1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on a live chat on the benefits and risks of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommendation on the H5N1 report, an avian flu paper which may trigger a pandemic, including the possibility of being utilized by bioterrorists.

The article focuses on the need for the U.S. government to regulate the biotechnology industry. It states that gene-synthesis companies can provide terrorists with deadly bioweapons. According to the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), it is easy to produce synthetic genomes with pathogenic properties equivalent to disease agents that are federally regulated. It discusses how businesses can give terrorists the ability to produce superlethal, vaccine-proof, drug-resistant diseases.

The article reports on the decision of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to drop the variola amendment, a law that bans the synthesis of the smallpox virus in the U.S. The amendment was enacted by the U.S. Congress on December 17, 2004. The definition of smallpox virus according to the amendment is revealed. Complaints of researchers on the definition of the virus in the law are also raised.

Reports on the move made by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to develop safeguards against the wrongful application of life sciences research. Standard for identifying research that might have potential for misuse; Effort of the board to create implementing guidelines; Factors required to implement the guidelines.