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peer-reviewed, It is frequently asserted that the doctrine of adverse possession performs a valuable social function in Ireland by allowing the ownership of land forming part of an unadministered estate to be updated many years after the death of the owner. More specifically, it is argued that this role is particularly important in rural Ireland where, historically, will-making was uncommon, emigration was widespread and grants of representation were rarely extracted in relation to small farms. 1 The typical scenario involved the death of the registered owner of a farm2 with the result that his children became entitled to the land as co-owners under the rules governing intestacies. However, only one (or some) of his children remained in possession of the farm for 12 years or more, while the others left to work and live elsewhere. In the meantime, the deceased farmer’s estate remained unadministered. On the expiry of the limitation period, a Land Registry application could be made by the child in possession, frequently the eldest son, pursuant to s 49 of the Registration of Title Act 1964 to register him as the new proprietor on the basis of his adverse possession. 3 A s 49 application avoids the inconvenience and expense of extracting multiple grants if there was more than one death on the title or the need to obtain numerous consents to a deed of family arrangement for the purposes of releasing the intestate shares of the applicant’s siblings., PUBLISHED, peer-reviewed

Casenote on the decision in Hardy v Sidoti [2020] NSWSC 1057. The case considered the application of the principles of adverse possession to limited Torrens title land in inner Sydney.

Sumario: I. Planteamiento de la cuestión. II. La usucapibilidad de los elementos comunes desafectables. III. La prueba del animus domini. IV. La usucapión ganada y el Registro de la Propiedad. V. Bibliografía.

Традиционално, државина је посматрана као чињеница (possessio non iuris est, sed facti). Један део правне доктрине сматра да је државина право. Мада има одговарајућа правна дејства и ужива правну заштиту, државина није и не може бити право. Веома често се државина и право на државину поклапaју, и правни субјект може имати право на државину (ius possidendi) засновано на неком субјективном праву, али државина може настати не само као вршење правне власти, већ и без ње, па и супротно таквом овлашћењу. Државина може да постоји независно од права на ствар, односно, независно од тога да ли се у конкретном случају правна и фактичка власт на некој ствари подударају или супротстављају. Предмет истраживања и рада на докторској дисертацији „Правна дејства државине у савременом праву“, представља анализу појма, правне природе, субјеката и објеката државине, врста и квалитета државине, стицања, преноса и престанка државине. Овако детаљно сагледавање института државине доприноси разумевању најзначајних правних дејстава које државина производи. Циљ истраживања представља критичку анализу позитивног права и прилагођавање регулативе изазовима савременог доба. Од врста и квалитета државине зависи која ће правна дејства правни поредак везивати уз одговарајућу државину. Субјективна и објективна својства државине детерминишу њен квалитет. Државина са свим позитивним елементима је квалификована државина. То је државина која је истовремено законита, права и савесна. Правна дејства државине настају онда када је државина стечена и у односу на онога ко ју је стекао. Функције државине које се остварују кроз правна дејства су: функција публицитета, функција континуитета и заштитна функција. Правна дејства државине која произлазе из публицитетне функције су: државина је начин стицања стварних права на покретним стварима, државина ствара претпоставку о постојању права својине на ствари, државина ствара могућност стицања својине од невласника, држалац је одговоран за штету која потиче од ствари к, Tradicionalno, državina je posmatrana kao činjenica (possessio non iuris est, sed facti). Jedan deo pravne doktrine smatra da je državina pravo. Mada ima odgovarajuća pravna dejstva i uživa pravnu zaštitu, državina nije i ne može biti pravo. Veoma često se državina i pravo na državinu poklapaju, i pravni subjekt može imati pravo na državinu (ius possidendi) zasnovano na nekom subjektivnom pravu, ali državina može nastati ne samo kao vršenje pravne vlasti, već i bez nje, pa i suprotno takvom ovlašćenju. Državina može da postoji nezavisno od prava na stvar, odnosno, nezavisno od toga da li se u konkretnom slučaju pravna i faktička vlast na nekoj stvari podudaraju ili suprotstavljaju. Predmet istraživanja i rada na doktorskoj disertaciji „Pravna dejstva državine u savremenom pravu“, predstavlja analizu pojma, pravne prirode, subjekata i objekata državine, vrsta i kvaliteta državine, sticanja, prenosa i prestanka državine. Ovako detaljno sagledavanje instituta državine doprinosi razumevanju najznačajnih pravnih dejstava koje državina proizvodi. Cilj istraživanja predstavlja kritičku analizu pozitivnog prava i prilagođavanje regulative izazovima savremenog doba. Od vrsta i kvaliteta državine zavisi koja će pravna dejstva pravni poredak vezivati uz odgovarajuću državinu. Subjektivna i objektivna svojstva državine determinišu njen kvalitet. Državina sa svim pozitivnim elementima je kvalifikovana državina. To je državina koja je istovremeno zakonita, prava i savesna. Pravna dejstva državine nastaju onda kada je državina stečena i u odnosu na onoga ko ju je stekao. Funkcije državine koje se ostvaruju kroz pravna dejstva su: funkcija publiciteta, funkcija kontinuiteta i zaštitna funkcija. Pravna dejstva državine koja proizlaze iz publicitetne funkcije su: državina je način sticanja stvarnih prava na pokretnim stvarima, državina stvara pretpostavku o postojanju prava svojine na stvari, državina stvara mogućnost sticanja svojine od nevlasnika, držalac je odgovoran za štetu koja, Traditionally, possession has been viewed as a matter of facts (possession not iuris est, sed facti). A part of legal doctrine regards possession as a right. Although possession causes certain legal effects and enjoys protection of the law, possession is not and may not be regarded as a right. Very often factual possession and right to possession overlap and a person may hold a right to possession (ius possidendi) based on some personal right, however possession may be created not only as a result of lawful exercise of one’s rights, but also without, or contrary to, exercise of such rights. Possession may exist independently of property rights, that is, regardless of whether legal and factual control over a thing overlap or are at odds. The subject of this research and work on doctoral thesis titled “The Legal Effects of Possession in Contemporary Law” is analysis of the meaning and legal nature of possession; persons holding possession and things that may be subject to possession; types and varieties of possession; acquiring, transfer, and loss of possession. Such detailed overview of possession contributes to better understanding of the most significant legal effects caused by possession over a thing. The aim of the research is to provide a critical analysis of the law and to examine how the regulations have been modified to meet the challenges of modern time. Depending on the type and form of possession, the legal framework provides for different legal effects to possession over a thing. Personal and objective features determine the quality of possession. Possession, with all the positive elements, constitutes qualified possession. The qualified possession is a possession that is legal and lawful. Legal effects of possession are created at the moment the possession is acquired and they are created towards a person that acquired it. The following elements of possession are created through its legal effects: element of publicity, element of continuity, and protecti

The work deals with the presentation and the consequences that the introduction of the concept of social function in marcários distinctive signs protection system, tangential to the consequênciaspara the third possessor, which uses external signal without the authorization of the owner. To do so, it will initially be made delimitation of the concept of social function, its present-day aspect and, finally, their inclusion in goods accustomed to industrial property. This done, the test will include the specification of mechanisms that, in view of understanding social function in marcário system, are able to change the traditional characterization of the possessor as a violator, such as tolerance, supressio and adverse possession of intangible property., O trabalho tratará da apresentação e das consequências que a introdução da noção de função social no sistema de proteção de signos distintivos marcários, tangenciando as consequênciaspara o terceiro possuidor, que utiliza sinal alheio sem a autorização do titular. Para tanto, inicialmente será feita uma delimitação do conceito de função social, sua faceta hodierna e, por fim, sua inserção nos bens afeitos à propriedade industrial. Isto feito, o ensaio compreenderá a explicitação de mecanismos que, em vista da compreensão da função social no sistema marcário, são capazes de alterar a tradicional caracterização do possuidor como violador, tais como a tolerância, o supressio e a usucapião de bens imateriais.

The Article elaborates on the status of legitimate expectations in Icelandic Property Law, emphasizing the relevance of the concept for the resolution of boundaries between private land and wasteland in the Wasteland Cases. An attempt is made to shed a light on whether possession on account of adverse possession or customary law does in fact cover the alleged role of legitimate expectations in practice. Furthermore, the article examines whether legitimate expectations are conducive for the purpose of independent emergence of property rights, i.e. sequential possession parallel to adverse possesion and customary law, or if the concept solely encompasses a corroborative purpose for other more established ways to establish possession. Arguments pertaining to legitimate expectations in the Wasteland Cases, in support of claims for the ownership of land, have mainly been raised on account of two factual circumstances: Firstly, with regard to alleged legitimate expectations on account of a claimant´s sustained right to utilization or disposal of the disputed land. The Supreme Court has not seconded arguments of legitimate expectation in this context, neither as an independent method to initiate possession, nor in support of other, more established, ways thereto; Secondly, claimants have argued that the acts and omissions of public authorities, e.g. regarding registration of property rights or other treatment of such rights, has created legitimate expectations on the notion that a particular system of property ownership, over the disputed land, is in place. Omissions to this effect are irrelevant in case law whereas specific actions of public authorities can be of significance, see e.g. Cases of the Supreme Court of Iceland No. 345/2005 (Fell), No. 496/2005 (Breiðármörk et al) and No. 617/2012 (Hellisheiði). The Supreme Court held in all three Wasteland Cases that the claims of the State were contrary to its previous actions or its otherwise public position on own

Након недефинасног фуртума у Закону XII таблица, пред истра-живачем се јавља његово широко одређење у класичном периоду. Реч furtum се најчешће преводи као крађа. Данас, у свим прав- ним системима, крађа представља кривично дело. Њен опсег, ипак, значајно одступа од римског приватног деликта furtum. Овај је неу- поредиво шири. Фуртум се прилично разликује и од деликта крађе у античкој Грчкој. Приликом истраживања је било нужно почети од решавања питања односа фуртума и додирних појава, као што су својина, др- жавина и bona fides, мотиви, кривица и њени облици. Тражен је од- говор на питања настанка и развоја два настарија деликта, фуртума и инјурије. Инјурија је на почетку била знак противправности и пракримен. Како се римско друштво развијало из ње су постепено издвајани посебни деликти. Фуртум се не издваја из пракримена. Он настаје врло рано и потпуно независно од инјурије. Смртна каз- на након манифестног фуртума говори у прилог тога да у почетку није могло бити личне својине. Постојала је само апсолутна своји- на. Манифестни фуртум је пре Закона XII таблица био једини об- лик фуртума. Овај Закон успоставља разлику између манифестног и неманифестног фуртума. Она се, макар терминолошки, одржала до краја римске историје. Међутим, постепено су створени услови за укидање тог дуализма. Иако је опстала терминолошка разлика, суштинске више није било. То је зато што је место почињења дели- кта изгубило на значају. Како се друштво развијало тако, код фур- тума, у први план почиње да избија заштићени имовински интерес поводом покретне телесне ствари, науштрб светости дома чији је припадак била та ствар. Фуртум само прати формирање приватне својине. Не узрокује је, нити је то обратно случај. Први фуртум и прва инјурија се складно надопуњују – једна установа штити власт над робовима и лицима alieni iuris (припадницима породице), а друга власт над осталим, у сваком случају мање вредним покретним стварима (припацима дома)., After the undefined furtum in Law of the Twelve Tables, the researcher is faced with its broad definition in the classical period. Word furtum is commonly translated as theft. Today, in all jurisdictions theft represents a crime. Its scope, however, differs significantly from the Roman private tort furtum. This one is much broader. Furtum is quite different from the tort of theft in ancient Greece. During the research it was necessary to begin with resolving the issues of relationships between furtum and common phenomena, such as property, possession, and bona fides, motives, guilt, and its forms. It is sought the answer to the question of the origin and development of the two oldest torts, furtum and iniuria. Iniuria was originally a sign of unlawfulness and pra-crimen. As Roman society was developing, specific torts are gradually being emerged from iniuria. Furtum is not excluded from the pra-crimen. It occurs very early and completely independently of iniuria. The death penalty in the case of the manifest furtum supports the fact that in the beginning there could not be personal property. Only absolute property existed. Manifest furtum, before the Law of the Twelve Tables, was the only furtum. This Act establishes a distinction between manifest and non-manifest furtum. That distinction, at least terminologically, was held until the end of the Roman history. Nevertheless, there have been gradually created conditions for the abolishing of this dualism. Although terminological difference survived, there were no substantial ones. This is because a place of tort commit was diminished. As well as society develops with furtum, in the foreground begins to emerge protection of property interest regarding the movable thing, at the expense of holiness of home whose member was the mentioned thing. Furtum just follows the formation of private property. It neither causes it nor vice versa. The first furtum and the first iniuria are harmoniously complementing each other – iniur

Possession and property are two different sides of the same coin. The two institutions have the same axis: the benefit, mainly economic, of a good. In countries like Colombia and Peru, important reforms have been introduced whose main effect has been the following one: the approach to these two institutions. In this article we will speak of these two institutions, today more than ever, connected., Posse e propriedade são duas caras diferentes de uma mesma moeda. As duas têm um mesmo eixo: o desfrute, principalmente econômico, de um bem. Em países como a Colômbia e o Peru se têm introduzido importantes reformas cujo principal efeito tem sido sua aproximação. Este artigo se ocupa destas sois instituições, hoje, mais que nunca, colimitados., Posesión y propiedad son dos caras diferentes de una misma moneda. Las dos tienen un mismo eje: el disfrute, principalmente económico, de un bien. En países como Colombia y Perú se han introducido importantes reformas cuyo principal efecto ha sido su acercamiento. Este artículo se ocupa de estas dos instituciones, hoy, más que nunca, colindantes.

Property law usually reacts to encroachments with ejectment. Building encroachments differ, as restoring landowner’s property claims implies the reversal of often large costs sustained by the builder. The authority faces thus the following dilemma: either it stands by the landowner and faces the social costs of undoing significant investments, or it defends the investment of the builder at the cost of neglecting landowner’s claims. To address building encroachments, national property laws have deployed interestingly different remedies that range from a property rule in favor of the landowner to a property rule in favor of the builder with a variety of liability rules in between. The paper models the builder-owner conflict after the theory of optional law (Ayres, 2005), it frames different national solutions into a common analytical setting and it evaluates the different laws in their relative allocative and distributive outcomes. Moreover the paper offers support to the idea that property law may implement put-option types of remedies.

non-peer-reviewed, In this paper I will be examining the position of the squatter who, knowing the land belongs to another, purposefully sets out to acquire it through the doctrine of adverse possession. This type of squatter is sometimes described as a bad faith adverse possessor while a person who believes that they own the land in question may be referred to as a good faith adverse possessor. It would be easy to assume that bad faith adverse possessors are universally viewed as moral degenerates or scoundrels who do not deserve to benefit from the doctrine of adverse possession. It is true that a lot of the academic literature condemns this individual and legislatures are increasingly attempting to devise ways of limiting the extent to which such undeserving squatters can benefit from the doctrine. However, there is also a growing body of literature which challenges the consensus view and defends bad faith squatters. In fact, Professor Lee Anne Fennell argues that only the bad faith adverse possessor should be permitted to succeed under the doctrine of adverse possession. In this paper I examine the relevance of Fennell’s arguments in the Irish context.

non-peer-reviewed, The doctrine of adverse possession, as most people know, operates to extinguish the owner’s title to land once a squatter has been in adverse possession of it for 12 years, and allows the adverse possessor or squatter to become the owner of that land. The doctrine still operates in this manner in Ireland and in relation to unregistered land in England. However, the English Land Registration Act 2002 dramatically reformed the doctrine in relation to registered land conferring the registered owner with the power to veto most adverse possession claims.

non-peer-reviewed, The doctrine of adverse possession has generated a lot of controversy over the last 10 years or so. My paper today focuses on only one small aspect of the important questions that have been raised about the doctrine and its role in modern day land law. Some of you might view it as a very technical point but at a more general level it does suggest that certain basic assumptions that have always been made to justify the doctrine should be examined. I have to begin by briefly outlining the reforms were introduced to the English law on adverse possession by the Land Registration Act 2002. These may be very familiar to some of you but not others. The 2002 Act reformed the doctrine as it applies to registered land. It dramatically improves the position of the registered owner. It allows the owner to veto an adverse possession application unless the applicant falls within one of three exceptional situations. These exceptions or qualifications to the veto were designed by the Law Commission to cater for situations where it felt the balance of fairness lay with the adverse possessor; these were ‘deserving’ squatters. Basically, the owner is now warned of the adverse possession application before his title is extinguished. He can object to the application unless the applicant is also entitled to be registered because of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel or because they possess an entitlement on the basis of an informal transaction or transmission. The third exception operates if the applicant owns adjacent land and can prove that throughout the limitation period he believed he owned the boundary plot. The Law Commission felt that the reforms would ensure that the doctrine continues to restore the marketability of abandoned land. Provided the registered owner keeps his contact details up to date on the register, it can probably be assumed that if he fails to object to the application, he has abandoned the land. In all other circumstances, the Law Commission felt that this n

non-peer-reviewed, On the death of a landowner, members of his family may become entitled to the land as co-owners under his will or the rules governing intestacies. Many years may pass without anyone taking the steps necessary to administer the estate while one or only some of his successors enjoy possession of the land with or without the tacit approval of the others. The operation of the doctrine of adverse possession in this context gives rise to a number of doctrinal complications and Irish and English law on this issue has become polarised; while the occupying family member may rely on the doctrine of adverse possession in Ireland, in England and Wales he is precluded from doing so.

peer-reviewed, In England and Wales the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 dramatically reduced the scope of the doctrine of adverse possession in relation to registered land. The new adverse possession regime was justified in the report prececling the 2002 Act on the basis that it was more compatible with principles of title registration and struck a more appropriate balance between the landowner and squatter. 1 Although the 2002 Act confers the registered owner of land with a power to veto most adverse possession applications, an application by a squatter who satisfies one of the three conditions set out in Schedule 6, paragraph 5, will succeed in spite of an objection by the registered owner. The Law Commission felt that in these situations, the balance of fairness lay with the squatter.2 Two of the conditions were designed to preserve the traditional effect of the doctrine for applicants who went into possession pursuant to an informal transfer.3 The Law Commission noted [hat when a dealing takes place "off the register", the applicant does not represent a "land thief" and it would be unjust to allow the registered owner to veto the applicant'S registration.4

non-peer-reviewed, In this paper I will be examining the position of the squatter who, knowing the land belongs to another, purposefully sets out to acquire it through the doctrine of adverse possession. This type of squatter is sometimes described as a bad faith adverse possessor while a person who believes that they own the land in question may be referred to as a good faith adverse possessor. It would be easy to assume that bad faith adverse possessors are universally viewed as moral degenerates or scoundrels who do not deserve to benefit from the doctrine of adverse possession. It is true that a lot of the academic literature condemns this individual and legislatures are increasingly attempting to devise ways of limiting the extent to which such undeserving squatters can benefit from the doctrine. However, there is also a growing body of literature which challenges the consensus view and defends bad faith squatters. In fact, Professor Lee Anne Fennell argues that only the bad faith adverse possessor should be permitted to succeed under the doctrine of adverse possession. In this paper I examine the relevance of Fennell’s arguments in the Irish context.

non-peer-reviewed, The doctrine of adverse possession, as most people know, operates to extinguish the owner’s title to land once a squatter has been in adverse possession of it for 12 years, and allows the adverse possessor or squatter to become the owner of that land. The doctrine still operates in this manner in Ireland and in relation to unregistered land in England. However, the English Land Registration Act 2002 dramatically reformed the doctrine in relation to registered land conferring the registered owner with the power to veto most adverse possession claims.

non-peer-reviewed, The doctrine of adverse possession has generated a lot of controversy over the last 10 years or so. My paper today focuses on only one small aspect of the important questions that have been raised about the doctrine and its role in modern day land law. Some of you might view it as a very technical point but at a more general level it does suggest that certain basic assumptions that have always been made to justify the doctrine should be examined. I have to begin by briefly outlining the reforms were introduced to the English law on adverse possession by the Land Registration Act 2002. These may be very familiar to some of you but not others. The 2002 Act reformed the doctrine as it applies to registered land. It dramatically improves the position of the registered owner. It allows the owner to veto an adverse possession application unless the applicant falls within one of three exceptional situations. These exceptions or qualifications to the veto were designed by the Law Commission to cater for situations where it felt the balance of fairness lay with the adverse possessor; these were ‘deserving’ squatters. Basically, the owner is now warned of the adverse possession application before his title is extinguished. He can object to the application unless the applicant is also entitled to be registered because of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel or because they possess an entitlement on the basis of an informal transaction or transmission. The third exception operates if the applicant owns adjacent land and can prove that throughout the limitation period he believed he owned the boundary plot. The Law Commission felt that the reforms would ensure that the doctrine continues to restore the marketability of abandoned land. Provided the registered owner keeps his contact details up to date on the register, it can probably be assumed that if he fails to object to the application, he has abandoned the land. In all other circumstances, the Law Commission felt that this n

non-peer-reviewed, On the death of a landowner, members of his family may become entitled to the land as co-owners under his will or the rules governing intestacies. Many years may pass without anyone taking the steps necessary to administer the estate while one or only some of his successors enjoy possession of the land with or without the tacit approval of the others. The operation of the doctrine of adverse possession in this context gives rise to a number of doctrinal complications and Irish and English law on this issue has become polarised; while the occupying family member may rely on the doctrine of adverse possession in Ireland, in England and Wales he is precluded from doing so.

peer-reviewed, In England and Wales the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 dramatically reduced the scope of the doctrine of adverse possession in relation to registered land. The new adverse possession regime was justified in the report prececling the 2002 Act on the basis that it was more compatible with principles of title registration and struck a more appropriate balance between the landowner and squatter. 1 Although the 2002 Act confers the registered owner of land with a power to veto most adverse possession applications, an application by a squatter who satisfies one of the three conditions set out in Schedule 6, paragraph 5, will succeed in spite of an objection by the registered owner. The Law Commission felt that in these situations, the balance of fairness lay with the squatter.2 Two of the conditions were designed to preserve the traditional effect of the doctrine for applicants who went into possession pursuant to an informal transfer.3 The Law Commission noted [hat when a dealing takes place "off the register", the applicant does not represent a "land thief" and it would be unjust to allow the registered owner to veto the applicant'S registration.4