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In this paper the authors provide an epistemological view on the old controversial random-necessity. It has been considered that either one or the other form part of the structure of reality. Chance and indeterminism are nothing but a disorderly efficiency of contingency in the production of events, phenomena, processes, i.e., in its causality, in the broadest sense of the word. Such production may be observed in natural and artificial processes or in human social processes (in history, economics, society, politics, etc.). Here we touch the object par excellence of all scientific research whether natural or human. In this work, is presented a hypothesis whose practical result satisfies the Hegelian dialectic, with the consequent implication of their mutual reciprocal integration. Producing abstractions, without which, there is no thought or knowledge of any kind, from the concrete, that is, the real problem, which in this case is a given Ontological System or Reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I present an overview of the life and work of Donald MacCrimmon Mackay, a distinguished Christian polymath who made significant contributions across a number of domains in science and philosophy in the middle part of the 20th Century, and the centenary of whose birth was in 2022. After a brief biographical sketch, we will review his contribution to theology & science, the main ones of these being: complementarity, an innovative concept relating information and matter, and mind and brain; and logical indeterminism, a proposed solution to the problem of free will and determinism. I hope that this overview will stimulate interest in, and further exploration of, his ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a new argument for compatibilism about moral responsibility by drawing attention to some overlooked implications of incompatibilism. More specifically, I argue that incompatibilists are committed to some unsavory claims about pairs of agents in deterministic worlds. These include comparative claims about moral responsibility, blameworthiness, desert, punishment, and the fittingness of reactive attitudes. I argue that we have good reasons to reject such comparisons because they fail to account for key differences between deterministic agents. This provides us with reason to embrace compatibilism and reject incompatibilism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to relate two debates about how logic and language influence thought. There is an axis of discussion about whether there exists a plurality of logic or a single logical system as an evaluation criterion for any reasoning context. In linguistics, the debate arising from the strong and weak interpretations of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has centralized the discussion around the degree of influence or determination of language on thought. From different perspectives and theoreticalconceptual frameworks, logic, and linguistics delimit and problematize a field of inquiry and reflection. The article, from a transdisciplinary perspective, intends to account for and postulate communicating vessels between these debates, considering the nuances of each approach. It also seeks to propose its own hypothesis on the problem raised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the account of teleology previously proposed by the authors is consistent with the physical determinism that is implicit across many of the sciences. We suggest that much of the current aversion to teleological thinking found in the sciences is rooted in debates that can be traced back to ancient natural science, which pitted mechanistic and deterministic theories against teleological ones. These debates saw a deterministic world as one where freedom and agency is impossible. And, because teleological entities seem to be free to either reach their ends or not, it was assumed that they could not be deterministic. Mayr's modern account of teleonomy adheres to this basic assumption. Yet, the seeming tension between teleology and determinism is illusory because freedom and agency do not, in fact, conflict with a deterministic world. To show this, we present a taxonomy of different types of freedom that we see as inherent in teleological systems. Then we show that our taxonomy of freedom, which is crucial to understanding teleology, shares many of the features of a philosophical position regarding free will that is known in the contemporary literature as 'compatibilism'. This position maintains that an agent is free when the sources of its actions are internal, when the agent itself is the deterministic cause of those actions. Our view shows that freedom is not only indispensable to teleology, but also that, contrary to common intuitions, there is no conflict between teleology and causal determinism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important and most discussed problems of traditional and contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of science is the problem of causality. The problem has generated a lot of controversies and debates from scholars. One clear point amidst these discussions on the causality problem is that the last has neither been written nor heard. It remains an open-ended issue for philosophical consideration. The causation problem itself is not just a problem but a cluster of problems with puzzling questions such as; how do causes bring about their effects? Our concern in this paper is not to examine all the problems that are embedded in the relationship between cause and effect, but to focus on the metaphysical problem of how cause, conceived as a separate event is related or connected to the effect. Several theories have been postulated by Western scholars like Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Hempel, Russell, Kant, Mill, among others to explain the kind of causal connection obtainable between causes and effects. Some of these theories of causation are traditional view or common sense view, Humean, and the host of others. It is a fact that some of these theories have failed in proffering a philosophical solution to the traditional causation problem. In an attempt to further reflect on the traditional causation problem, this paper undertakes an exposition of the nature of causality, determinism, freedom and predestination in traditional African thought with the aim of proffering better explanation towards resolving the traditional causation problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite wholeheartedly endorsing Lycan's commonsensism on display in On Evidence in Philosophy, this paper raises concerns about three views Lycan defends in that book. The first view is compatibilism about free will and determinism. The paper argues that Lycan's Moorean defense of compatibilism fails and that it is plausible for commonsensists to think that, in their dispute with incompatibilists, the burden of proof is on compatibilists. The second view is Lycan's Principle of Humility, offered as an account of the conditions under which recognized disagreement undermines knowledge. The paper considers a permissive and a demanding way of understanding his Principle of Humility and suggests that, contra Lycan, commonsensism fits better with a permissive understanding. The third view discussed is his coherentism about justification. The paper concludes that commonsensism is best understood in foundationalist terms and that Lycan's coherentism is, in fact, an inadequately motivated version of foundationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we clarify, unpack, and ultimately resist what is perhaps the most prominent argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism: the epistemic argument for compatibilism. We focus on one such argument as articulated by David Lewis: (i) we know we are free, (ii) for all we know everything is predetermined, (iii) if we know we are free but for all we know everything is predetermined, then for all we know we are free but everything is predetermined, (iv) if for all we know we are free but predetermined, then it is really possible that we are, so (v) compatibilism. We uncover how the crucial epistemic modality underlying (iv) must be understood, and contend that, understood this way, the libertarian can resist (iv). Importantly, however, resisting the argument does commit the libertarian to what has been called "flip-flopping"—but we argue that this is perfectly coherent. We conclude by articulating two crucially ways the libertarian can resist the argument, by saying that we can know that determinism is false "from the armchair". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important aspect of the nineteenth century debate on the relationship between science and religion concerned the popularity of deterministic views among scientists. An integral part of Comte's positivism, the idea of immutable laws that determined natural and social phenomena became an increasingly prevalent component of scientific perspectives in the Darwinian era. Referring to this tendency as 'scientific fatalism,' critics likened it to Calvinist predestination, which transformed the debate into one involving polemics about different branches of Christianity as well. This paper focuses on a neglected aspect of this debate, namely, the role that references to Islam and Turks played in it. 'Mohammedan fatalism,' already a common theme in justifications of colonialism, promptly became a tool with which to condemn new scientific views. Comparing French, British, and American writings on the topic, the paper illustrates that while there emerged approaches that praised the fatalism of Muslims while making a case for scientific determinism, most scientists and thinkers resorted to condemning the fatalism of Muslims in order to distinguish their views from it. In this respect, the paper demonstrates how political and religious discourses played a significant part in the shaping of scientific discourse in the Victorian era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to investigate the so-called paradox of deterministic probabilities: in a deterministic world, all probabilities should be subjective; however, they also seem to play important explanatory and predictive roles which suggest they are objective. The problem is then to understand what these deterministic probabilities are. Recent proposed solutions of this paradox are the Mentaculus vision, the range account of probability and a version of frequentism based on typicality. All these approaches aim at defining deterministic objective probabilities as to make them compatible with determinism. In this paper, I argue that one can think of the equivalent of subjective and objective deterministic probabilities in terms of typicality. Also, I show that only what I identify with objective probabilities plays the necessary explanatory and predictive roles, while the subjective components essentially guide beliefs. In this way, the paradox is solved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I will try to consider the usual allegations of determinism that are directed towards Bourdieu's notion of habitus from a slightly different perspective. One of the most common arguments found in these types of charges is that Bourdieu unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile objective and subjective aspects of social life under one notion. According to critics, habitus is not a viable solution to structure vs. agency debate simply because it cannot be both determined by social structure and open to contingency of autonomous subjective interpretations of the social world. I will show that this critique of Bourdieu actually is inspired by incompatibilist philosophy which maintains that regarding human action either determinism or free will can be true. However, those sociologists who, in criticising Bourdieu's understanding of habitus, follow the incompatibilist line of reasoning usually overlook the compatibilist side of this old debate in moral philosophy. In that regard, I will argue that Frankfurt and Taylor's compatibilist account of second order desires and strong evaluations can help us to better understand how habitus can be determined by environmental social factors and, at the same, time not only foster free will, but also provide a theoretical insight into radical forms of social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate between St. Augustine of Hippo and the British monk Pelagius is a famous event in the history of Christianity. While Pelagius emphasized the idea that we could achieve salvation via our own free effort, Augustine argued for the opposite: That due to original sin, humans are unable to reach liberation alone and must be saved by God's grace. Augustine won the debate, and the doctrine of original sin became a key theological cornerstone of Western Christianity. What is less well known is that two philosophical positions within the Buddhist tradition corresponded to this debate. One from the Buddha Shakyamuni himself, who taught that all could attain nirvana freely, and one from the medieval Japanese monk and philosopher Shinran, who, disagreeing with his master, taught that we live in a fallen era. We are unable to achieve enlightenment ourselves and thus must rely on the saving grace of Amida Buddha to transport us to a place where the goal is achievable. This paper seeks to highlight these similarities between these two debates and, in the process, show that the philosophical issue of free will versus determinism is one that crosses the boundaries of Eastern and Western thought. It is hoped that the revelation of such a shared debate will increase understanding between Christianity and Buddhism, as well as between other diverse traditions of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For a half - century, I have been developing a view of free will that is incompatible with determinism and, in the process, attempting to answer the Intelligibility Question about such a free will: Can one make sense of an incompatibilist or libertarian free will without reducing it to mere chance, or mystery, and can such a free will be reconciled with modern views of the cosmos and human beings? In this paper, I discuss recent refinements to my earlier writings on such a view, refinements developed in recent years in response to the large critical literature on my views in the past several decades. My view has usually been designated an event-causal (EC) view of libertarian free will and distinguished from non-causal (NC) and agent-causal (AC) libertarian views. But I was never happy with this designation of my view as “event-causal” and did not use it myself in earlier writings. In this paper, I explain why I now reject it altogether. I have come to believe that to avoid numerous misunderstandings in current debates about free will, we must distinguish four different kinds of libertarian theories, not merely three: in addition to non-causal (NC), agent-causal (AC), and event-causal (EC) theories, we need to add a fourth kind, which might be called an agent-causal/event-causal (AC/EC) theory. My view has always been of this fourth kind. It represents what I call in the title of this paper the “fourth way forward” for making sense of an incompatibilist free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to defend deliberation-compatibilism against several objections, including a recent counterexample by Yishai Cohen that involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It begins by offering a Moorean-style proof of deliberation-compatibilism. It then turns to the leading argument for deliberation-incompatibilism, which is based on the presumed incompatibility of causal determinism and the 'openness' required for rational deliberation. The paper explains why this argument fails and develops a coherent account of how one can rationally deliberate and believe in causal determinism without inconsistency. The second half of the paper then takes up Cohen's proposed counterexample and his Four-Case Deliberation Argument (FCDA) against deliberation-compatibilism, which is meant to mirror Derk Pereboom's famous Four-Case Manipulation Argument. In response, the author defends a hard-line reply to FCDA but also argues that the notion of 'sourcehood' relevant to rational deliberation differs from that involved in free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a defense of the big ideas behind the free-thinking argument. This argument aims to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with epistemic responsibility in a desert sense (being praised or blamed for any thought, idea, judgment, or belief). This lack of epistemic responsibility is problematic for the naturalist. It seems to be an even worse problem, however, for the exhaustive divine determinist because not only would humanity not stand in a position to be blamed for any of our thoughts and beliefs, but it also surfaces a "problem of epistemic evil", which can be raised against the knowledge of God, the rationality of humans, and the trustworthiness of Scripture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper replies to commentary on my On Evidence in Philosophy, offered by critics Michael Bergmann and Earl Conee. It addresses their concerns regarding (1) whether my explanatory coherentism can explain the justification of introspective beliefs; (2) whether my epistemology is really coherentist rather than foundationalist; (3) my Principle of Humility; (4) my defense of free‐will compatibilism; (5) whether question‐begging is always unacceptable; and (6) whether intuitions qualify as evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Lewis' contemplations regarding divine foreknowledge and free will, along with some of his other more substantial work on modal realism and his counterpart theory can serve as a springboard to a novel solution to the foreknowledge and metaphysical freedom puzzle, namely a proposal that genuine metaphysical freedom is compatible with determinism, which is quite different from the usual compatibilist focus on the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. This paper argues that while Lewis opens the doors to such a possibility, in order to fully elucidate a genuinely metaphysical compatibilist account, Lewis' own counterpart theory must be abandoned in favour of an account of trans-world identity that is theoretically framed by a modified version of Robert Nozick's closest continuer theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, neurophysiological research has pushed the concept of free will towards a reductionist interpretation, largely avoiding the concept of a freely willing agent. This paper explores the ongoing debate surrounding free will, highlighting the contrasting perspectives of determinism, indeterminism (libertarianism), and compatibilism. It questions how individuals, particularly those adhering to deterministic viewpoints, can ethically navigate a world defined by causal relationships. The paper argues that reductionist approaches struggle to account for ethical responsibility and the human experience of making choices. While compatibilism offers a middle ground, asserting that actions in line with one’s desires are free and thus ethically accountable, this stance is scrutinized for its potential limitations in answering questions about personal responsibility. Specifically, it is argued that compatibilism may not be the ideal framework for a neurophysiologist confronted with ethical dilemmas, thus leaving room for the re-examination of indeterminism. Through this discussion, the paper aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of free will that incorporates both the scientific and philosophical dimensions of human decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avicenna’s discussion of future contingent propositions is sometimes considered to entail metaphysical indeterminism. In this paper, I argue that his logical analysis of future contingent statements is best understood in terms of the epistemic modality of those statements, which has no consequences for modal metaphysics. This interpretation is corroborated by hitherto neglected material concerning the question of God’s knowledge of particulars. In the Taʿlīqāt, Avicenna argues that God knows particulars by knowing their complete causes, and when contrasted with the human knowledge of particulars, this epistemically superior access shows that the contingency of statements about future particulars is not due to the modal properties of real particulars but to the nature of human access to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To answer foundational questions in physics, physicists turn more and more to abstract advanced mathematics, even though its physical significance may not be immediately clear. What if we started to borrow ideas and approaches, with appropriate modifications, from the foundations of mathematics? In this paper we explore this route. In reverse mathematics one starts from theorems and finds the minimum set of axioms required for their derivation. In reverse physics we want to start from laws or more specific results, and find the physical concepts and starting points that recover them. We want to understand what physical results are implied by which physical assumptions. As an example of the technique, we will see six different characterizations of classical mechanics, show that the uncertainty principle depends only on the entropy bound on pure states and recast the third law of thermodynamics in terms of the entropy of an empty system. We believe the approach can provide greater insights into both current and new physical theories, put the physical concepts at the forefront of the discussion and provide a more unified view of physics by highlighting common patterns and ideas across different physical theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List's version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List's account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Watson-Crick (WK) finite automata are working on a Watson-Crick tape, that is, on a DNA molecule. Therefore, they have two reading heads, one for each strand. In traditional WK automata both heads read the whole input in the same physical direction, but in 5 ′ → 3 ′ WK automata the heads start from the two extremes and read the input in opposite direction. In sensing 5 ′ → 3 ′ WK automata the process on the input is finished when the heads meet, and the model characterise the linear context-free languages. Deterministic variants are weaker, the class 2detLIN is accepted by them. In this paper a new concept, the state-determinism is investigated, that is in each configuration of a computation (if it is not finished yet) the next state is determined by the actual state of the configuration. There are various usual restrictions on WK automata, e.g., all-final, stateless or 1-limited variants. We place the new class, the state-deterministic 5 ′ → 3 ′ WK automata, into the hierarchy based on the accepted language classes. Further, various hierarchy results including combined restrictions, e.g., 1-limited all-final state-deterministic 5 ′ → 3 ′ WK automata are shown. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the development of neuroscience, neuroscience agendas are also being dealt with in the field of criminal law. Therefore, this paper attempted to explore the relationship between neuroscience and criminal law through a specific question, "Does neural determinism threaten criminal responsibility?" Neurodeterminism is an unclear position. Neuro is not a sufficient condition for human behavior, nor is human behavior reduced to neurological causes. Neural activity may be a necessary condition for human behavior, and human behavior may lie in its causal relationship, but it is difficult to regard it as a 'determinism.' Compared to the time when the modern criminal law system was established, this era is undergoing many changes. Therefore, it is necessary to imagine the content and basis of new responsibilities suitable for the present era. Neural determinism in itself does not threaten the concept of free will and responsibility under criminal law, but it is meaningful in that it provides an opportunity to consider the concept of free will and responsibility under criminal law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I analyse the problem of free will and determinism as it pertains to the Austrian School of Economics. I demonstrate that despite the fact they subscribe to the concept of causality, contemporary Austrians generally reject determinism at the level of human action, thus remaining proponents of what is known as metaphysical libertarianism. However, as I then show, Ludwig von Mises, the founding father of the modern Austrian School, was probably a determinist. My purpose is to test which metaphysical foundations best fit Austrian theory. I come to the conclusion that the economic theory of the Austrian School is consistent both with determinism (compatibilism) and metaphysical libertarianism (incompatibilism). In light of this, the determinist world-view widely embraced by scientists does not threaten the economic theory propounded by the Austrian School. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industry 4.0 is changing data collection, storage, and analysis in industrial processes fundamentally, enabling novel applications such as flexible manufacturing of highly customized products. However, real‐time control of these processes has not yet realized its full potential in using the collected data to drive further development. Indeed, typical industrial control systems are tailored to the plant they need to control, reusing, and adapting to challenge. In the past, the need to solve plant‐specific problems overshadowed the benefits of physically isolating a control system from its plant. We believe that modern virtualization techniques, specifically application containers, present a unique opportunity to decouple control from plants. This separation permits us to fully realize the potential for highly distributed and transferable industrial processes even with real‐time constraints arising from time‐critical subprocesses. This paper explores the challenges and opportunities of shifting industrial control software from dedicated hardware to bare‐metal servers or (edge) cloud computing platforms using off‐the‐shelf technology, that is, technologies commercially available. We present a migration architecture and show, using a specifically developed orchestration tool, that containerized applications can run on shared resources without compromising scheduled execution within given time constraints. Through latency and computational performance experiments, we explore three system setups' limits and summarize lessons learned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is human free will compatible with the natural laws of the universe? To "compatibilists" who see free actions as emanating from the wants and reasons of human agents, free will looks perfectly plausible. However, "incompatibilists" claim to see the more ultimate sources of human action. The wants and reasons of agents are said to be caused by physical processes which are themselves mere natural results of the previous state of the world and the natural laws which govern it. This paper argues that the incompatibilists make a mistake in appealing to such non-agent sources of human action. They fail to realize that free will may exist at one scale, but not at the scales where they look. When free will is considered from the correctly scaled perspective, it does seem compatible with determinism and natural laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]