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On the Compatibility of Rational Deliberation and Determinism: Why Deterministic Manipulation Is Not a Counterexample.
- Source :
-
Philosophical Quarterly . Jul2021, Vol. 71 Issue 3, p524-543. 20p. - Publication Year :
- 2021
-
Abstract
- This paper aims to defend deliberation-compatibilism against several objections, including a recent counterexample by Yishai Cohen that involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It begins by offering a Moorean-style proof of deliberation-compatibilism. It then turns to the leading argument for deliberation-incompatibilism, which is based on the presumed incompatibility of causal determinism and the 'openness' required for rational deliberation. The paper explains why this argument fails and develops a coherent account of how one can rationally deliberate and believe in causal determinism without inconsistency. The second half of the paper then takes up Cohen's proposed counterexample and his Four-Case Deliberation Argument (FCDA) against deliberation-compatibilism, which is meant to mirror Derk Pereboom's famous Four-Case Manipulation Argument. In response, the author defends a hard-line reply to FCDA but also argues that the notion of 'sourcehood' relevant to rational deliberation differs from that involved in free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318094
- Volume :
- 71
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Quarterly
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 151011734
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa061