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INTRODUCTION Acts of wrongdoing that cause suffering can elicit two reactions in the victim (or in third parties). First, there may be a desire to impose a corresponding suffering on the wrongdoer: an eye for an eye. Second, there may be a desire for the harm to be undone, at least to some extent or as far as possible. As shown by the institution of “Wergeld,” these two ways of restoring an equilibrium can serve as substitutes for each other. In ancient Teutonic and Old English law, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, Wergeld was “the price set upon a man according to his rank, paid by way of compensation or fine in cases of homicide and certain other crimes to free the offender from further obligation or punishment.” Conversely, one might think of punishment as a substitute for compensation if the wrongdoer is unable to pay the Wergeld. Yet in modern legal systems, punishment is not justified by the needs of the victims. Reparation for victims of wrongdoing is uncoupled from punishment of the wrongdoer. The process of compensation may nevertheless be wholly or partly shaped by punitive intentions. In the French Restoration, some émigrés wanted to punish the purchasers of their properties by having them fund the indemnity. Although the preference in post-Communist Czechoslovakia for in-kind restitution over monetary compensation or voucher schemes may have been overdetermined, one motive was to prevent properties from falling into the hands of the former nomenklatura. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

INTRODUCTION Transitional justice in the restoration of monarchy has occurred several times in history. In the next chapter, I briefly summarize some salient features of the English Restoration in 1660. In this chapter, I consider in more detail transitional justice after each of the two Restorations of the French monarchy, in 1814 and in 1815, separated by the Hundred Days in which Napoleon returned to power. During the First Restoration, the Bourbons undertook limited measures of reparation, but otherwise did nothing. During the Second, they carried out vast punitive and reparative measures. To explain the dynamics of these events, I begin in Section II by considering the political constraints on transitional justice, which followed from the fact that these were negotiated transitions. In Section III I consider public and private retribution, before turning in Section IV to the issues of restitution and compensation. Section V offers a brief summary. CONSTRAINTS ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE FRENCH RESTORATIONS Transitional justice in the return of the Bourbons took place twice within a short interval of time. In this section, I explain the constraints on transitional justice that followed from the fact that in both cases, the post-Napoleonic regimes were established under the auspices of the Allied forces with some of Napoleon's leading officials serving as go-betweens. In 1814, Talleyrand, Napoleon's former Foreign Minister and at the time de facto leader of his senate, was the main mediator. In 1815, he was supplemented by Fouché, Napoleon's Chief of Police. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1933 and 1944, Degussa expended approximately 18 million Reichsmarks, a sum equal to about half of the firm's total capitalization at the outset of the Third Reich, on the acquisition of formerly Jewish-owned property – that is, on what the Nazi regime dubbed “Aryanization.” Fully or jointly owned subsidiaries spent at least another 645,000 RM to the same end. Among the objects obtained were no fewer than ten firms, seven of them in Germany and three in the so-called Protectorate, one of which was bought by a corporation Degussa had Aryanized earlier. In addition, the concern augmented its holdings in three other enterprises by buying up four substantial stock packets from emigrating families; took over ten pieces of real estate in Frankfurt, Cologne, Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Prague (two of these also were serial Aryanizations, i.e., takeovers by earlier targets of the same procedure); and capped the process of expansion at Jews' expense with the purchase of a confiscated patent in August 1944. Although it is extremely difficult to specify how much these purchases improved Degussa's balance sheets and profitability both during the Nazi period and later, there can be no doubt that Aryanization contributed appreciably to the corporation's short- and long-term success. All but two of the enterprises taken over returned substantial profits during the 1930s and 1940s; most of them remained in Degussa's possession through the 1950s, and three of them, along with at least one of the stock packets, still did at the end of the twentieth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Degussa, the beginning of the end of the Nazi era occurred on March 22 to 24, 1944, when successive waves of Allied bombers devastated Frankfurt and loosed “catastrophe … upon the main administration building as well as Works I and II.” Within 36 hours, some 18 million Reichsmarks worth of the firm's structures, equipment, and supplies collapsed into ash and rubble. Only the new laboratory building on the Wolf family's former property emerged relatively intact. Also completely or partially destroyed were the homes of Hermann Schlosser, Ernst Bernau, Adalbert Fischer, and Koloman Róka. Though hardly the first aerial attack on either a Degussa installation or the city of Frankfurt, the onslaught of late March 1944 vastly exceeded anything the firm had experienced or anticipated. Knapsack's military importance and proximity to Britain attracted strikes as early as the summer of 1940, prompting Degussa to sink 130,000 RM into blast- and shrapnel-proofing that muted the effects of renewed assaults in October 1942 and March 1943. The Berlin offices and laboratories of the Auergesellschaft at Fr. Krause Ufer 24 were wrecked the following September, and their staffs then transferred to outlying sites, as were some of Degussa's own operations in the nation's capital. And the metropolis on the Main River suffered through no fewer than thirty-six raids in 1940–42, then was hit repeatedly in 1943–44, including by hundreds of aircraft at a time on October 4, November 26, December 20, January 29, February 4 and 8, and March 2 and 18. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The revolution of the twentieth century Here are no lessons for the world, no disclosures to shock peoples. It is filled with trivial things, partly that no one mistake for history the bones from which some day a man may make history, and partly for the pleasure it gave me to recall the fellowship of the revolt. We were fond together, because of the sweep of the open places, the taste of wide winds, the sunlight, and the hopes in which we worked. The morning freshness of the world-to-be intoxicated us. We were wrought up with ideas inexpressible and vaporous, but to be fought for. We lived many lives in those whirling campaigns, never sparing ourselves: yet, when we achieved and the new world dawned, the old men came out again and took our victory to re-make it in the likeness of the former world they knew. Youth could win, but had not learned to keep: and was pitiably weak against age. We stammered that we had worked for a new heaven and a new earth, and they thanked us kindly and made their peace. As Lawrence of Arabia's experience of the Great War was far different from what most young British officers lived through in the trenches of Flanders and France, so his assessment of the peace must have seemed strange to many of his readers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From foedera pacis to foedera, paces Peace treaties (foedera pacis) are mentioned by St Isidore of Seville (c. 560–636), the last of the Latin Fathers of the Church, in his famous enumerative definition of the law observed by all peoples (ius gentium). This text, written in the early seventh century, not only is a valuable example of the Roman law tradition within the Church, but later also became a legal norm (canon) of the medieval law code of the Latin Church, the Corpus iuris canonici, owing to the fact that in the twelfth century the learned monk Gratian (c. 1100–60) in Bologna quoted it in his handbook of canon law, the Decretum Gratiani. It is significant that the original Isidorian expression ‘foedera pacis’ in the official edition of the Decretum Gratiani in the sixteenth century, the so-called editio Romana, had been changed to ‘foedera, paces’. Obviously, pax had now acquired an autonomous meaning, which, as a legal term, it had never possessed in Roman times. We will encounter that wide legal concept of pax when we touch on the activities of the public notaries after the twelfth century. The conclusion of treaties International treaties – the solemn agreements between states or their rulers throughout the Middle Ages and into the sixteenth century – were concluded in the same way as in Antiquity, namely through declarations of the treaty-making parties, solemnly confirmed by mutual oaths. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction Central to this chapter are the European peace treaties from the First Treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814 at the end of the Napoleonic wars to the Peace Treaties of 1919/20 signed in various Parisian suburbs at the end of World War I. Some American and Asian treaties will also be discussed. These one hundred years cover an era that sawstormy change and development in the area of politics, economics, culture and international law. Peace treaties as legal instruments played an important, although greatly varying role in these developments and changes, according to the circumstances and the then existing relationships between the partners, which themselves could differ greatly from one another. Treaties were instrumental in the judicial organisation of political constellations, which were in no way comparable with one another, either in content or in structure. They were used for bringing to an end classical European wars; for the ordination of the general political and judicial relationships in Europe as well as in other parts of the world; for the subjection of Asian powers to European dominance; for a comprehensive regulation of the fundamentals of economic cohesion, the position of the citizens, etc.; for the regulation of general problems in international lawregarding war and peace, etc. General developments General political developments in Europe The century was marked by an evolution froma European policy towards a world policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The myth of Westphalia Historians and international lawyers alike have for a long time been quite unanimous in calling the Peace Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 the very birth certificates of the modern European states system and the modern law of nations. In the context of the 350th anniversary of these treaties, scholars from various countries and disciplines have gone a long way to challenging this Westphalian myth. Traditionally, it was alleged that the Westphalian Treaties laid down the basic principles of the modern law of nations, such as sovereignty, equality, religious neutrality and the balance of power. However, this cannot be sustained after a careful analysis of the treaties themselves and a comparison with older peace treaties. These principles are to be found in none of the three main Westphalian Peace Treaties, at least not as principles of international law. In fact, references about the sovereignty and equality of religions can only be found in the treaties when they concern the constitutional arrangement for the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover,these reminiscences are not new or innovative. It was only some decades after 1648 that diplomats and jurists started to see these clauses as reflecting upon international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

it is a mistake to claim, as had often been the case until recently, that Germans in general and German businessmen in particular did not “confront the National Socialist past” after World War II. The real problem is the manner in which they did so. Recent research on West German industry has shown that its leaders were preoccupied and — in cases where they were subjected to lengthy denazification proceedings or threats of socialization — even obsessed with the Nazi past and their role in it. They developed both personal and organized ways of trying to deal with that past that were personally bearable but that also permitted them to present a case to the outside world that at once legitimized the personal rehabilitation of those who were accused of working with the National Socialists and made the case for reconstruction of German industry along traditional lines. As shall be demonstrated here, this was also true of the leaders of the insurance business and of the insurance industry itself. Indeed, this confrontation with the Nazi period was an inescapable necessity for three reasons. First, business leaders were subject to denazification. If, in retrospect, the denazification appears to have been poorly conceived and inconsistently and inadequately implemented, it nevertheless required the filling out of lengthy and detailed questionnaires, liability to internment in some instances (aswell as dismissal and blockage of accounts in many others), and subjection to legal proceedings that could lead to significant penalties if those appearing before the tribunals did not succeed in exonerating themselves. In the last analysis, the entire enterprise proved something of a monument to two American manias, questionnaires and letters of reference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]