Search

The article presents a timeline of the Turkey-U.S. relationship from 1945 to the present. The timeline covers the strategic cooperation between the countries in the early Cold War; the challenges and difficulties during the Cyprus conflict and the Kurdish insurgency; and the renewed military cooperation during the Gulf War.

Even though the United States has reduced the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the 2010 New START Treaty, it is also developing new delivery systems for deployment over the next 10-30 years. The 117th Congress will continue to review these programs, and the funding requested for them, during the annual authorization and appropriations process. During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. With the implementation of New START completed in February 2018, the United States is limited to 1,550 accountable warheads on these delivery vehicles, a restriction that will remain in place at least through 2021, while New START Treaty remains in force. At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 400 landbased Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with one warhead, spread among a total of 450 operational launchers. This force is consistent with the New START Treaty. The Air Force has modernized the Minuteman missiles, replacing and upgrading their rocket motors, guidance systems, and other components, so that they can remain in the force through 2030. It has initiated a program to replace these with a new Ground-based Strategic Deterrent beginning around 2029. The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines. Each can carry 20 Trident II (D-5) missiles-a reduction from 24 missiles per submarine-with the total meeting the launcher limits in the New START Treaty. The Navy converted 4 of the original 18 Trident submarines to carry nonnuclear cruise missiles. Nine of the submarines are deployed in the Pacific Ocean and five are in the Atlantic. The Navy also has undertaken efforts to extend the life of the missiles and warheads so that they and the submarines can remain in the fleet past 2020. It has designed and is beginning production of the new Columbia class submarine that will replace the existing fleet beginning in 2031. The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers includes 20 B-2 bombers and 40 nuclear-capable B-52 bombers. The B-1 bomber is no longer equipped for nuclear missions. This fleet of 60 nuclear-capable aircraft is consistent with the U.S. obligations under New START. The Air Force has begun to retire the nuclear-armed cruise missiles carried by B-52 bombers, leaving only about half the B-52 fleet equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force plans to procure both a new long-range bomber, known as the B-21, and a new long-range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile during the 2020s. DOE is also modifying and extending the life of the B61 bomb carried on B-2 bombers and fighter aircraft and the W80 warhead for cruise missiles. The Obama Administration completed a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force, and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, in June 2013. This review advised the force structure that the United States has deployed under the New START Treaty. The Trump Administration completed its review of U.S. nuclear forces in February 2018, and reaffirmed the basic contours of the current U.S. force structure and the ongoing modernization programs. The Trump Administration has also developed and deployed a new low-yield warhead on Trident II (D-5) missiles. Congress will review plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and as it assesses the costs of these plans in the current fiscal environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report of the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), that talks about the strategic nuclear forces in the U.S. It mentions that former U.S. President Donald Trump Administration's, in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the nuclear triad and to the modernization programs; and mentions that the U.S. has developed several types of nuclear delivery vehicles early in the Cold War.

It was not until the 1990s--after German reunification in 1990 and the fall of the Soviet Union the next year--that Western specialists got their first chance to closely examine and [...]

The article offers information on the command and control of nuclear forces in the U.S. Topics discussed include authority of U.S. President to authorize the use of the U.S. nuclear weapons; the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM); nuclear employment plans of the U.S. reviewed and revised several times since the end of the Cold War; and views of Bruce Blair, an expert on U.S. command and control, on order of president on firing of missiles.

The article reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin be allowed to seize Ukraine, a sovereign country, with his imperialist efforts after sought to redraw post Cold War national boundaries in Europe. Topics include Soviet republics allowed to leave the Soviet Union with allies in North Atlantic Treaty Organization . It mentions that the international community, given Russia's interventions into Trans­Dniestr, under Moldovan jurisdiction, as well as South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.- Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia's greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. Both the Trump Administration and Congress may address these questions during a new review of the U.S. nuclear posture. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range "strategic" nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has approximately 760 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed and removed some of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas; questions about the implications of the disparity in numbers between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others argue that NATO should consider expanding its deployments in response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Some believe the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. The 114th Congress may review some of these proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons by the U.S. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were a major part of the U.S. strategy of deterring Soviet attacks against the U.S. and its allies. In the 1980s, U.S. planned to deploy cruise missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe.

The article discusses the force structure and the size of the nuclear arsenal of the U.S. Armed Forces after the Cold War. It states that the U.S. reduced the numbers and types of weapons in the strategic nuclear as part of modernization process and response to the limits in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). It mentions that in 2009, the U.S. reduced forces to 2,200 warheads on 850 delivery vehicles.

The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power to "to raise and support Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" and "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.... " In the exercise of this constitutional authority, Congress has historically shown great interest in various issues that bear on the vitality of the reserve components, such as funding, equipment, and personnel policy. This report is designed to provide an overview of key reserve component personnel issues. The term "Reserve Component" refers collectively to the seven individual reserve components of the Armed Forces: the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The purpose of these seven reserve components, as codified in law at 10 U.S.C. §10102, is to "provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components." During the Cold War era, the reserve components were a manpower pool that was rarely tapped. From 1945 to 1989, reservists were involuntarily activated by the federal government four times, an average of less than once per decade. Since the end of the Cold War, the nation has relied more heavily on the reserve components. Reservists have been involuntarily activated for contingency operations by the federal government six times since 1990, an average of once every four years, including large-scale mobilizations for the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) and in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks (2001-present). Additionally, starting in FY2014, reservists began to be involuntarily activated under a new authority for "pre-planned" missions in support of Combatant Commanders. This report provides insight to reserve component personnel issues through a series of questions and answers which address: • How reserve component personnel are organized (questions 2 and 4); • How many people are in each of the different categories of the reserve component (question 3); • How reserve component personnel have been and may be used (questions 1, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 11); • How reserve component personnel are compensated (questions 8 and 10); • The types of legal protections that exist for reserve component personnel (question 12); and • Recent changes in reserve component pay and benefits made by Congress (question 13). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This section offers news briefs relating to digital publishing as of June 20, 2016. These include a free update from Instant Flipbook for people who bought earlier versions of flipbooks, the launch of an enterprise mobility development platform called Zuznow Red Fox by Zuznow and the launch of an online public access catalog with highlights from its collections by the Wende Museum of the Cold War.

This article looks at the rise of emerging markets (EMs) from 2001 to 2010. It identifies some of the trends that affect EMs during the decade, including globalization, demographic change, urbanization and information technology (IT) and communications revolution. It highlights the path to free-market reforms in China in 1979 and the end of the Cold War in Europe in 1989. In addition, the article discusses the EM competition between China and India.

The article discusses the efforts of former Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to strengthen the relations of Russia with Western Countries and regain its former power. Putin is stated to have transformed Russia's foreign relations, particularly with the U.S., by using the country's vast oil and gas resources. The article also examines the Russian-Georgian war which erupted in August 2008, reportedly deteriorating Russian economy and being responsible for the re-emergence of the Cold War.